FA-TSANG'S TREATISE ON THE FIVE DOCTRINES

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

by

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To Professors: Kiyota
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This thesis having been approved in respect to form and mechanical execution is referred to you for judgment upon its substantial merit.

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Approved as satisfying in substance the doctoral thesis requirement of the University of Wisconsin.

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Introduction

1. The Hua-yen Universe

Far away, in the heavens of the great god Indra, among all the delights of his heaven, there is a wonderful net which stretches to infinity. In each "eye" of the net hangs a brilliant, glittering gem, and because the net is infinite in size, the gems are infinite in number. There hangs the net, its jewels shining like stars of the first magnitude. This would in itself be an imposing sight, but some ingenious artificer has hung the net in such a way that each jewel in the net reflects all the other jewels in its mirror-like surface. Thus, each jewel is not only reflecting all the other jewels, but is also reflecting jewels reflecting itself and all other jewels, so that the reflections are repeated infinitely.

The Hua-yen school of Buddhism has chosen this image as best portraying its own special view of the universe.[1] It is, I believe, a very Chinese kind of universe, one in which Śākyamuni, Nāgārjuna, and Vasubandhu probably would not have felt at home as Buddhists. There would be several reasons why an Indian Buddhist would have been uncomfortable. First of all, it is a universe in which phenomena have been not only restored to a measure of respectability, but, indeed, have become important, valuable, and lovely. Second, to accept such a world view would entail a radical overhauling of the understanding of traditional Buddhist concepts such as emptiness and dependent origination. Finally, it would have meant that many of the important dogmas of Indian Buddhism would have to be abandoned, such as the belief in gradual self-purification, the difference between the noumenal and phenomenal orders, and the distinctions of the stages of progress. All of these are implied in the Hua-yen world-view, and for a Buddhist to subscribe to it would, I feel, necessitate an abandoning of the orthodox Indian views and a turning to Chinese views.

I wish to do four things in this introduction to the translation of the treatise. First, I wish to give a rather general description of the Hua-yen universe. Second, I wish to discuss in some detail some of the complexities of the tenth chapter of the treatise, particularly Fa-tsang's unique handling of the theory of the three natures (_trisvabhāva_). The third part will deal with Fa-tsang's system of doctrinal classification (_p'an_-_chiao_). Finally, I will discuss the text and commentaries used in the preparation of the translation. These comments will, by and large, be restricted to matters which were not treated in the notes to the translation, or which were at least not developed to any great extent. My primary concern in the translation has been to present this very important text for the first time in a Western language as clearly and gracefully as I could. I am confident that I have not always succeeded. However, because of its importance in the history of Chinese Buddhism, and because of its own merits, I have felt that it deserves to be translated and annotated.

In Hua-yen Buddhism, the first thing we notice is that things count. This is striking in view of the traditional Buddhist suspicion of the phenomenal world. The Hīnayāna program of self-perfection is solidly based on a series of exercises calculated to impress the practitioner with the impermanence, impurity, and painfulness of the world. Whatever the Hīnayāna nirvāṇa may be, we can say that it is qualitatively quite different from this world. The best of men is the monk, who turns his back on the goods most prized by other men and seeks a greater good beyond World. In Mahāyāna, there is a greater accomodation with the world, but in theory, it is seen to be inadequate. The Yogācāra-vijñānavādins tend to reduce the phenomenal world to a bunch of symbols projected from mind itself, which have only an imagined existence. The world we commonly know is nothing but mental constructs or conceptions (vijñapti). The Śūnyavāda rigorously and consistently denies that anything has a svabhāva, a self-existence, and in so doing deprives things of anything but a purely contingent existence. Things exist, but they are deprived of the reality they would have if they had an absolute existence.

I do not wish to demonstrate the Indian Buddhist view of phenomenal existence here, but only wish to remind the reader that generally speaking, Indian Buddhists had little faith in the ability of the world to bring peace and happiness. In contrasting this with what I believe to be the Hua-yen view, I do not wish to imply that Indian Buddhist theorists had no interest at all in dharmas or things; this would be to fly in the face of both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna abhidharma. Nor, on the other hand, do I wish to imply that the theorists of the Hua-yen system did not conceive of the religious goal, Buddhahood, to be more desirable than the life of the foolish common person. But something very interesting, and, I believe, unique in Buddhism occurs in Hua-yen, and that is that despite the fact that a man like Fa-tsang is, as a Buddhist, still committed to Buddhist practices, which necessarily imply a concern with some kind of noumenous goal, the burden of Hua-yen treatises such as the Wu-

chiao-*chang* is to demonstrate a relationship between any phenomenal object and all other phenomenal objects in the universe. That is, the main object of Hua-yen philosophy is to establish a universe of *shih*-*shih*-*wu*-*ai* 事事無礙.

The reason why things are so important is that each object in the universe, however insignificant or humble we may usually think it is, is completely indispensible to the totality of things which makes up the universe at any given instant. The "Great Barn" in which we find ourselves requires every rafter, every shingle, every nail, in order to be the structure it is. In answer to the questioner who asks what the problem would be if just one rafter were to be taken from the building, Fa-tsang answers that it would no longer be a perfect building, it would be a spoiled building.[2] In reality, it is not a question of missing pieces. When a piece is removed, the structure becomes a new one, a new configuration. The importance of each piece of the whole lies in the fact that in *that* whole, the individual part and the whole are mutually supporting and conditioning. Is not the universe just the sum total of these little pieces? There is no totality apart from the myriad of things which combine to make it. Let it be noticed, however, that there is no one-sided dependence in this picture of the part and the whole. The truth of the matter is that while the whole is dependent on its parts, it is the totality which gives existence and meaning to each constituent. Thus, to borrow an analogy from Fa-tsang, while it is certain that a single rafter makes the house, or indeed *becomes* the house, it can also be said that the house is the cause of the rafter, which is not a rafter outside the context of the house. In this way, the part and the whole are very intimately related; each is simultaneously cause and result, and in the totality there is mutual need, mutual support. Since the whole is no more than the sum of its parts, it is clear that this system is really talking about the relationship of each part to all the other parts. To change the metaphor, the universe is a gigantic cosmic dance, in which each individual is necessary to the dance, and within which the individual dancer in his contributory and participatory role finds his meaning. To the eyes of an American, it is a square dance.

The aim of Hua-yen thinkers---and this is indubitably true of Fa-tsang---is to describe and rationalize this kind of universe. They are concerned with the relationship between phenomenal objects. The technical Hua-yen term for this kind of relationship is *chung-chung-wu-chin-chu-pan-chü-tsu* 重重無盡主伴具足. *Chu* means "lord," "chief," "master," "primary," etc.. *Pan* means "retainer," "retinue," "attendent," "secondary," etc.. *Chü*-*tsu* 具足 is often translated as "complete,"[3] but I have translated it everywhere as "endowed with," or "possesses," etc., because it is clear from its use in context that Fa-tsang is talking about a situation in which in the *dharma*-*dhātu* of an infinity of things, if we arbitrarily choose one object as our center of attention, in order to discern its relationship with the rest of the *dharma*-*dhātu*, that object can be seen to stand in a relationship with the other objects of "lord," or "chief," while the others are, in that context, the "attendents," or "retinue." Just as we can speak of a lord possessing a retinue, so we can speak of object "a" possessing, or being endowed with, a retinue. I have, therefore, translated *chu*-*pan*-*chü*-*tsu* as the "endowment of primary with secondary," in order to emphasize the ontological relationship of the two elements. However, there is no one, single object in the Hua-yen universe which is alone the primary or chief, just as in the square dance there is no one dancer to fill that position. Accordingly as we move from dancer to dancer, it can be seen that each is simultaneously serving as the primary or chief. In the *dharma*-*dhātu* of the Hua-yen, each object is simultaneously the chief and part of the retinue. Thus, we do not have a static situation in which one object is always just the chief, while all the others are always just retinue; each thing is simultaneously chief and retinue, because at all times the object in question is simultaneously cause and result. Thus, *chu-pan-chü-tsu* is always qualified, explicitly or not, with *chung-chung-wu-chin*, which means that this relationship of primary to secondary, or chief to retinue, or part to whole, is repeated infinitely.

Chu-pan-chü-tsu is obviously an attempt to portray a situation in which one object has been isolated from the whole and is thereby surrounded with the remainder. At this point, it is possible then to begin to describe what the relationship is between the one and the others. *Chung-chung-wu-chin* makes this relationship completely fluid in pointing out that in the totality, each object is simultaneously serving as chief and part of the retinue. The major part of Fa-tsang's treatise is devoted to describing just what the nature of the relationship is and the reasons for this relationship. While the overall structure of the treatise shows an ostensible concern with criticizing the doctrines (*p'an-chiao*), the main interest which the work has for the present-day student of Buddhism is this elaborate description of the Hua-yen world-view, found in the tenth chapter. Before moving on to a more detailed discussion of this system, I would like first to present a little more in general terms about the Hua-yen cosmos, in the belief that such a general understanding is prerequisite to an understanding of the complexities of the tenth chapter of the treatise.[4]

To the eyes of the unawakened, the world is a place of strict hierarchy, wherein each item has a fixed value, around which are erected walls which eternally separate it from all other things. It is a world of absolute values, in which the virgin is prized and the whore is rejected, where the gods and ourselves are of entirely different ranks. It is a world of fixed time and place, where spiritual development proceeds painfully over a long time, with a beginning, middle, and end, where my own enlightenment is irrelevant to the Eskimo in Point Barrow. It is, in short, a world of distinctions, in which the distinct things are all separated from each other by their fundamental differences. It is also, therefore, the arena of competition.

This kind of world has always been rejected by the wise. The Hua-yen abrogation of this view had its beginnings well before the creation of a Hua-yen school of Buddhism.[5] Groundwork was laid in such texts as the _Uttaratantra_, _Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra_, and the _Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun_ (_Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna_), where, by means of the _tathāgata-garbha_ theory, a picture of the universe was presented in which phenomena and noumenon were seen as existing in a state of union.[6] A passage in the _Uttaratantra_ says,

> The Body of the Supreme Buddha is all-pervading,
> The Absolute is (one) undifferentiated (Whole)
> And the Germ (of Buddhahood) exists (in every
> living being).
> Therefore, for ever and anon, all that lives
> Is endowed with the Essence of the Buddha.[7]

According to this view, represented in the present treatise be the "developed Mahāyāna," the whole phenomenal universe is a manifestation of the Absolute, which, while appearing as phenomena, does not lose its absoluteness in the process. This has been described clearly in the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, the classic location of this doctrine. Fa-tsang's indebtedness to this line of thought is everywhere evident in the treatise, as can be seen in the number of times he refers to that text for corroboration. In that text, the universe is presented as having two aspects, which are the two aspects of the absolute one Mind; they are Mind as it appears as phenomenal objects, and Mind as it remains eternally unmoved, undefiled, and immutable behind, or within, the individual object.[8] What we call the person, then, is an intersection of the phenomenal and noumenal orders. In such texts as the *Awakening of Faith* and *Uttaratantra*, then, phenomena have already become invested with a new and important significance; they are the outer coverings of the absolute itself. Thus, if we show the relationship between phenomena and the absolute in the form of a picture we would have the following situation. ("X" here symbolizes the ultimate reality, Buddha-nature-tathatā-emptiness. "A", "b", "c", etc. are individual manifestations of the absolute.)



At this point, much of the Hua-yen system already exists. In basing his own system on the intuitions of the tathāgata-garbha tradition, Fa-tsang had at his disposal a picture of the universe which showed the complete identity of the absolute One and the phenomenal many. The first section of the tenth chapter of the treatise is a sustained attempt to furnish a rational basis for this situation. His assertion of a cosmos which is a perfect fusion of emptiness and existence is the bed-rock basis of his whole system.[9]

A study of the treatise will readily convince the reader of the importance of this ontology of the *Awakening of Faith* to Fa-tsang's philosophy. However, he went one step further and thereby created a unique new Buddhist philosophy. The difference between the developed Mahāyāna view of the *Awakening of Faith* and *Uttaratantra* on the one hand and his own system on the other can be seen at once in a comparison of the terms used by his school to describe each. Two of the most significant of these terms are *li-shih-wu-ai* 理事無礙, which is the tenet of the developed Mahāyāna, and *shih-shih-wu-ai* 事事無礙, the tenet of the perfect doctrine, Hua-yen.[10] These rubrics show the developed Mahāyāna as adhering to a view of a universe where there is an identity of noumenon and phenomena, while the Hua-yen holds a view of a universe in which there is an identity of phenomena with phenomena. This concern with the nature of phenomena and the relationships that exist between phenomena is the special contribution of the Hua-yen school.

Fa-tsang did not utterly abandon the view of the *Awakening of Faith* when he constructed his own system. The eclectic nature of his own system derives partly from his great indebtedness to the idea of *li-shih-wu-ai*, taken over part and parcel from the *Awakening of Faith* and similar texts. But the special teaching of Hua-yen is the universe of *shih-shih-wu-ai*. If Fa-tsang had rejected the intuitions of the developed Mahāyāna and erected a system which postulated the identity of things *qua* things, his would no longer have been a religious system, and certainly in no sense a system of Buddhism. By retaining the idea of *li-shih-wu-ai*, religious practice and its fruits remain an important part of his system, because *li-shih-wu-ai* means that behind phenomena lies the absolute. Our true nature is enlightenment, and transcendence becomes possible; within us we can find Buddhahood, enlightenment, and *nirvāṇa*. In fact, it is this identity of the two orders that underlies the perception of *shih-shih-wu-ai*, as will be shown further on in this introduction.

If we return to the cosmic dance mentioned above, and once more raise the question of the exact relationship existing between the primary and secondary, the answer can be given in terms of these two rubrics. That is, each part of the whole is identical with the absolute, is ultimately noumenous, and, at the same time, each thing is identical with each and every other thing in the totality. Therefore, *chung-chung-wu-chin-chu-pan-chü-tsu* means that any part arbitrarily chosen from the whole for purposes of analysis can be seen to be identical with all the other individuals in the whole, and that this relationship exists between each individual and all others.

Though identity is the primary relationship between the individual and all the other individuals, in fact, Fa-tsang speaks of the relationship as being both of identity 相卽 and mutual inclusion, or interpenetration 相入. I will return to the matter of interpenetration further on, but here it may be said that the two relationships are two sides of the same coin, one static, the other dynamic, and the dynamic relationship of interpenetration is another expression of identity. My sole aim at this point is to point out that the Hua-yen objective is to show the identity of things 事 and not primarily to show an identity of things with their source and support, the absolute 理, though of course this is also very important to Fa-tsang's theoretical framework.

Yet, to characterize Hua-yen with the belief in just the identity of things is somewhat misleading. In fact, Fa-tsang is talking about identity in difference. This is evident in the third section of the tenth chapter, where Fa-tsang emphasizes the differences in his eighth example, "The distinct existence of separate dharmas of the ten times." Things are identical while retaining their distinct characteristics. Fire is thus hot and ice is cold, and it is within the context of these distinctions that their identity is asserted. This seemingly paradoxical situation can be easily understood if it is always remembered that anything has a double nature. In terms of Fa-tsang's discussion of the identity and difference of the three natures, in chapter ten, any thing is at once empty and existent. In its emptiness, which means its ultimate nature, tathatā, it is identical with all other things, because every object in the great dharma-dhātu without exception is nothing but an expression of the absolute in time and space. This is Fa-tsang's interpretation of the passage from the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra which says rūpam śūnyatā---form is emptiness---and he takes it to mean that essentially all things are alike. However, the second half of the assertion of the sutra is śūnyataiva rūpam---emptiness itself is form ---and this means that in spite of essential emptiness, distinctly different forms do indeed exist. Inasmuch as things are empty and exist as forms, identity in difference is possible. Fa-tsang takes up this matter at length in his analogy of the ten coins, in part three of the tenth chapter. This identity of each object with all other objects can be shown in the following graphic form. (Again, as in the picture on page eleven, "x" symbolizes the absolute underlying unity of things, and "a", "b", "c", etc. symbolize phenomenal objects.) For the sake of simplicity, I have only shown the relationship of an object with its immediate neighbor, but each object should be understood as relating to all the others; thus, "a" is related to "b", "c", "d", "e", etc..



Identity is asserted on the basis of the underlying emptiness of all things. But, as was mentioned above, the things of the dharma-dhātu are more than essence; they also have a functional relationship to each other. That is, the relationship is dynamic as well as static. To Fa-tsang this means that each object has certain powers or potentialities to influence other things. An example of this is a tripod of sticks, tied together at one end and stood up.[11] The tripod will remain standing as long as all three poles remain in place, each contributing to the totality. If one of the poles is removed from the whole, the tripod will fall over. Let us center our attention on one of the poles at random; it will then become the primary, or "chief," and the other two will become, for the moment only, the secondary, or "retinue," of the chief. Seen from this particular point of view, it can be said that the "chief," pole "a," has complete power to form the whole structure which is the tripod, while the "retinue," poles "b" and "c", are, from this point of view, without this causal or supporting power. But, our choice of poles was completely arbitrary. If we pick out another different pole, it will then be seen to have total causal and supporting power, while the other two---and one of them was the pole we examined first---are then seen to be without this power. It will be evident that in reality, each of the poles, seen from the standpoint of that pole, is simultaneously acting as the cause and as result; i.e., it is at once cause of the totality and result as part of the totality. Thus, on the one hand, each object in the universe possesses complete power to form the whole; it forms, and indeed becomes, the whole, and that particular totality could not be that particular totality without it. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the remainder of the totality as result is also the cause of the one small part, because it has no meaning apart from the totality of which it is one small part.

It must be remembered that when Fa-tsang speaks of dharmas, or things, as empty and existent, possessing power and lacking power, he is not speaking of many different things each possessing one or several of these qualities. He means that any given single object simultaneously possesses all the qualities. This can be seen in the following representation of a single object considered as a cause.[12]



This shows that any one object is simultaneously empty and existent, has power and lacks power to produce an effect, and both requires conditions and does not require conditions to produce the result. It is particularly interesting to see that causal efficiency is associated with a *dharma* which is not only conditioned (*saṃskṛta-dharma*) but unconditioned as well (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*). The implications of this situation become a little clearer when we compare this with the system of Hsüan-tsang and K'uie-chi, in whose *Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun* it is said that only conditioned *dharmas*---meaning *bīja* stored

tr.

in the *ālaya-vijñāna*---can be causes. In that system, the unconditioned *dharmas*, which are separate from the conditioned *dharmas*, do not participate in the causal process. This is carefully pointed out by Fa-tsang on several occasions in the ninth chapter of the treatise.[13] The reason for this restriction of causality to conditioned *dharmas* in the Fa-hsiang school is that the *ālaya* and its seeds are conditioned only, and the unconditioned plays no part in the processes of *ālaya*. For K'uie-chi tr. and his school, the conditioned and unconditioned occupy two different levels of being which never overlap. For Fa-tsang, however, any *dharma* is a mixture of conditioned and unconditioned, or, as he calls them, emptiness and existence. This means that the unconditioned---the absolute---also exerts this causal efficiency. This is unusual because in other schools of Buddhism, the absolute is not at all creative or even active. This is especially evident, for instance, in Śūnyavāda, to which Fa-tsang is so heavily indebted. There, *śūnyatā* is not active in any way. However, in the Hua-yen, all activity, creativity, and sustaining power is ultimately the function of the absolute, which Fa-tsang calls emptiness.

The chart on page 445 shows clearly that Fa-tsang is speaking of a kind of causal scheme when he speaks of the identity and interpenetration of *dharmas*. There, a *dharma* is said to (1) possess power and not require conditions, (2) not to possess power and to require the help of other conditions, and (3) to have power and to require conditions, but the remaining possibility, the dharma which lacks power and requires no conditions is not considered, because, according to Fa-tsang, "It does not have the meaning of cause."[14] In another place, when asked what the conditions are which are required by the direct cause, he replies that they are the usual ones of adhipati-pratyaya, samanantara-pratyaya, and ālambana-pratyaya, while the cause itself is hetu-pratyaya.[15] In his own mind, he was concerned about a kind of causation. In fact, the above system which I have been describing is often called the theory of dharma-dhātu-pratītyasamutpāda.

When we speak of Fa-tsang's theory of causation, then, by "cause" we should understand a certain kind of pratītyasamutpāda. Moreover, this dependent origination is seen within the context of a horizontally existing universe; we are not here involved with a theory of production in time, but with the mutual conditioning of an infinity of things all existing at one frozen instant, outside any consideration of before and after. Fa-tsang is not, therefore, talking about how things come into being, but about the mutual conditioning of things already coexisting. His universe is an intricately interrelated organism in which the part forms the whole and the whole forms the part, in which the one is identical with the many and the many are identical with the one.

While Fa-tsang and his school did not deny the validity of more traditional Buddhist theories of dependent origination---the sprout from the seed is the favorite example---it is certain that his contribution to Buddhist thought consisted in a new interpretation of pratītyasamutpāda. We may justifiably credit the Hua-yen brand of Buddhism with the last significant creative effort in Buddhism in coping with the matter of causation. Causation here no longer has any reference to actual production in time of a result from a cause, but rather refers to the relationships existing between all the members of a timeless totality. In fact, the traditional Buddhist insistence on the difference between the cause and the effect has been dropped. The effect of the Hua-yen view of things is to see cause and effect as being substantially identical. This has important implications in terms of practice, and it may be useful at this point to show how the above abstract theory serves as a basis for religious and practical considerations.

One of the characteristic statements of the Hua-yen schools is that the stage of faith is identical with Buddhahood. This is a remarkable statement in view of the fact that in the Hua-yen scheme of stages of practice, there are 52 stages covering the whole career of the practitioner from the time the faint stirrings of faith arise in him until the time he becomes a completely enlightened Buddha. The stage of faith consists of the first ten of these stages, and there are 30 more stages intervening between the stage of faith and the well-known ten stages of the Bodhisattva (*daśabhūmi*). In other words, following the Hua-yen explanation of the correspondence between their system of stages and those of the small vehicle, the Hua-yen stage of faith would correspond to the small vehicle *sambhāra-mārga*, the earliest stage in the system, preceeding even the rudimentary attempts at concentration (*dhyāna*).[16] For a Hua-yen Buddhist to claim that he is a Buddha in the final phase of the stage of faith is equivalent to a *śrāvaka* claiming he is an Arhat even before he becomes a monk.

The reason Fa-tsang can make such a claim is because of his theory of mutual identity and interpenetration, here, meaning the identity of cause and result. As I mentioned above, we normally think of cause and effect as having a sequence; first there is the cause, then there is an effect. However, to Fa-tsang, the cause as stage of faith and the result as complete Buddhahood are simply two elements which condition each other on a horizontal plane, because cause and effect are related terms existing as a pair. That is, Buddhahood conceived as result exists as result due to the cause which is the stage of faith; this much is familiar to us. However, it is also clear that without the result stage of Buddhahood, the causal stage of faith is not a cause at all, because a cause is a cause only with regard to a definite result. Therefore, we have the odd situation whereby the causal stage is what it is due to the conditioning effect of the result. The result of this is that Buddhahood is a cause for the stage of faith. Both elements are simultaneously cause and result in the same way that, in the example of the tripod, while one pole can be seen to be the cause and the other two poles the result, at the same time the other poles are acting as the cause for the one pole. The _identity_ of the two elements is due to the fact that both elements are empty, which is the same as saying that they are both participants in a nexus of mutual causation. In this respect, Fa-tsang has been quite faithful to the Śūnyavāda insistence on the identity of emptiness with _pratītyasamutpāda_.[17] In being mutually dependent, they are seen as being both empty, and their common emptiness is the reason for their identity. Therefore, says the Hua-yen, if you acquire one, you acquire all, because the whole 52 stages are each dependent on the others. If the stage of faith is perfected, this is tantamount to the acquisition of the rest of the stages, including Buddhahood.[18] Therefore, whether we look at these two stages from the standpoint of _essence_, which means their emptiness, or from the standpoint of _func-_

tion, which means the possession and non-possession of causal efficiency of each, both their identity and mutual interpenetration are a result of their both being participants in a process of dependent origination. That is to say, their emptiness and existence are both to be interpreted as meaning pratītyasamutpāda.[19]

Fa-tsang stresses this particular identity---that of the stage of faith and Buddhahood---for its obvious value in exhibiting the implications of identity. However, as Fa-tsang's famous example of the ten coins (in section three of the tenth chapter) shows, it can be said that each of the 52 stages is identical with all the others, because all are part of one great dependent origination.

Such an equation would seem to imply that once the practitioner had perfected the stage of faith, there would be nothing more for him to do, since he is now a Buddha. However, as was mentioned above, the Hua-yen universe is one of identity in difference, and while it is certainly true that the stage of faith is identical with the stage of Buddhahood, the two stages still retain their distinct characteristics. Therefore, the Bodhisattva, while indeed being a Buddha at the stage of faith, will nevertheless continue his practices throughout the whole 52 stages. This apparent paradox can be resolved if it is kept in mind that identity is ultimately a matter of dependent origination; to say that the two stages are identical is simply to admit that both are empty of self-essence and therefore arise in mutual interdependence. In Fa-tsang's analogy of the ten coins, while it is true that one coin is cause for the remaining nine coins (i.e., the part is the cause of the whole), it is equally true that the other coins are simultaneously cause for the one coin. Now, in terms of the Bodhisattva stages, while it is true that the stage of faith is cause for all the remaining stages, including the stage of Buddhahood, it is equally true that the remaining stages are the cause of the stage of faith, and this means that without the remaining stages, the stage of faith is not the cause of Buddhahood. Therefore, no person has completed the stage of faith who has not become a Buddha; conversely, no person becomes a Buddha who has not perfected the stage of faith.

Therefore, I believe, when the Hua-yen school says that the Bodhisattva is already a Buddha when he perfects the stage of faith, we must understand this possession of Buddhahood to exist in a certain sense, and that is one of inevitability and potentiality. The Bodhisattva is a Buddha at that point in his development in the same sense that I am an octogenarian at birth.

This sort of reasoning underlies the whole Hua-yen point of view towards time and space. One's enlightenment in one place implies the enlightenment of all persons in all places; Śākyamuni's enlightenment in the sixth century B.C. occurs every instant of the past, future, and present. When the Bodhisattva extinguishes one fault, all are extinguished, and when one practice is perfected, all are perfected. *Dharma-dhātu pratītyasamutpāda* is the reason.

At this point, it may be appropriate to turn to the question of some of the sources and motives for this view of the world. For Fa-tsang and his followers, the explanation is simple; the world of *shih-shih-wu-ai* is the world revealed in the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra* (*Hua-yen ching*), the fundamental scripture of the school. The ultimacy of this teaching is due to the special circumstances of its utterance. While all the other sutras of the canon are, according to Hua-yen, merely partial expressions of the truth delivered to accomodate the varying abilities of audiences, the whole truth of the *Avataṁsaka* was uttered without any regard for extenuating circumstances. The main reason for its superiority is that it is the direct and immediate expression of the knowledge acquired by Śākyamuni while he was in the "concentration which is like the images of the ocean."[20] During the first seven days beneath the tree of enlightenment, he contemplated the workings of *pratītyasamutpāda*. During the second seven days, he sat immersed in the *samudra-mudrā-samādhi*, and during this time, as he was visited by advanced Bodhisattvas and divine beings from all the points of the compass, he delivered the discourse we now know as the teaching of the mutual identity and interpenetration of the things of the world, *dharma*-*dhātu* *pratītyasamutpāda*. This teaching was so difficult for his audience that they were completely baffled, and so from the third seven weeks, starting at Banaras, he began his long teaching career of trying to present the truth of his enlightenment in a form palatable to the limited capacities of his listeners. Therefore, the rest of the canon, the *Āgamas*, *Abhidharma*, *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, etc., are all partial expressions of the truth, concessions to his audience. This literature and its teaching are also *pṛṣṭha*-*labdha*-*jñāna*, as distinct from the teachings of the *Avataṁsaka*, which is a direct revelation of the whole truth. The primacy of the doctrines of the *Avataṁsaka* therefore derives from the special circumstances of its delivery. First, it was delivered during the second seven days of the time of enlightenment, before the time the Buddha began to present the doctrine in a more concessional form. It was, moreover, spoken while the Buddha was still in the *samādhi*, and it is therefore not an attempt to recapture the truth of the enlightenment experience afterwards. Second, the place of delivery is superior; it was beneath the tree of enlightenment, not at Banaras or some other place. It was addressed to a rather elevated audience, whereas on later occasions the Buddha addressed *śrāvakas* and other lesser beings. Third, the Buddha who delivered the teaching beneath the tree of enlightenment was, on that occasion, merely the human, manifested form of Vairocana, the cosmic Buddha of the ten bodies (i.e., universally immanent), while at later times Śākyamuni was speaking solely as the human teacher. For these reasons, the doctrines of the *Avataṁsaka* have, in the eyes of Hua-yen thinkers, an ultimacy lacking in any other sutra. Therefore, for a member of the Hua-yen school, there is no real problem concerning the source of the world-view in which he believes; it is revelation.

The problem is more complex for the student of Buddhism who is not blessed with faith. He knows that the text now known as the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra* is the result of an elaborate fitting together of many smaller sutras which had once existed independently and which were gradually assembled over a long period of time in several countries, apparently to fit a preconceived plan.[21] My own study of the sutra leads me to believe that the sutra was meant to portray in great detail the whole career of a Bodhisattva. The interpretations of the Hua-yen school are strictly sectarian and not necessarily the only reading of the text. The sutra is not at all philosophical as a whole, and it is somewhat a credit to the ingenuity of Hua-yen thinkers that they were able to find the meanings in it which they sought.[22] This is only to say the obvious; the elaborate, extremely complicated system we now know as Hua-yen is not at all the teaching of the Buddha, nor is the *Avataṁsaka* itself, whatever its history, the place where we must seek for the origins of *shih-shih-wu-ai*. Those origins are, I believe, to be found in the social, historical, and religio-philosophical conditions of the Sui-T'ang period. It would be beyond the scope of this introduction to try to demonstrate this. The interested reader will find some of this problem discussed in the works of Kamata Shigeo, who is the leading scholar in the development of Hua-yen thought.[23] The complexities of the tenth chapter of the translation make it more appropriate to take up some of its problems next.

2. Fa-tsang's System

A. The Identity and Difference of the Three Natures

The philosophical basis of the Hua-yen world view is established in the first two of the four sections comprising the tenth chapter of the treatise. The third section, "The Dharma Teaching on the Freedom of the Tenfold Profound Dependent Origination," while being really the central and most important section of the chapter, is not theoretical in nature. It is rather an application of the theory of the first two sections through the use of concrete examples. The first part of that section uses the example of ten coins in order to show the relationships between the ten coins. The later part applies the theory to such matters as time and space. The fourth section of the treatise, "The Concept of the Perfect Interfusion of the Six Characteristics," is also devoted to a concrete illustration of the nature of the things constituting the dharma-dhātu. Here, Fa-tsang uses the example of a building to show the relationships existing between the part and the whole. The first two sections of the chapter, however, consist wholly of a discussion of the nature and properties of a dharma or object (Fa-tsang uses the word dharma to mean "thing."), and it is on the basis of the postulations of those two sections that Fa-tsang and his school are able to speak of a universe in which things are related through identity and interpenetration. This section of the introduction will be concerned mainly with the theories of the first two sections of the tenth chapter of the treatise. In particular, I will discuss some of the peculiarities and implications of Fa-tsang's treatment of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*) and the relationship of the six meanings of cause to the matter of interpenetration or mutual support.

Fa-tsang's interpretation of the three natures is too unusual to escape notice by anyone studying his treatise.[1] The most obvious peculiarity is that despite the ostensible concern with the three natures, in reality they are used merely as a framework for the establishment of a theory of two natures, and Fa-tsang does not discuss the differences between the three natures *per se*. This is simply to say that we must not look for the Vijñānavāda theory of the three natures in the Hua-yen system. The *trisvabhāva* 三性 theory which we find in such works as Hsüan-tsang's *Ch'eng-wei-shih lun* 成唯識論 or the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* is used as an integral part of a larger theory about the unreality of the known phenomenal world. In these texts, the distinctions between the three natures are strictly observed, and while a relationship exists between them, each nature has its own unique characteristic. The three natures are three aspects of any given *dharma*. *Parikalpita-svabhāva* is the absolutely unreal, imagined nature of the object. Both the apprehend-ing subject and the perceived object are imaginary and unreal in the form in which they appear. Paratantra-svabhāva is the thought or mind which serves as a basis for the imagined nature, and as a product of causes and conditions, it has a real, though impermanent, existence. In its true state, which means in its existence apart from the imagined aspect in which it normally appears to us, it is not perverted or erroneous, but this aspect is not normally an object of knowledge. Thus, the main difference between these two natures of a thing is that the first is utterly unreal, like a mirage or a fata morgana, while the second is real inasmuch as it is a product of conditions. The third nature, pariniṣpanna-svabhāva, is the absolutely real nature of things. In texts such as that of Hsüan-tsang, it refers to the mind which has ceased to operate on the basis of a subject-object duality. This nature of mind is nothing more than the removal of the imagined nature from the dependent nature.[2] The main difference between this nature and the dependent nature is that while both are real, the perfect nature is eternal and immutable, while the dependent nature is impermanent and constantly changing. Thus, the three natures are different in their characteristics. Furthermore, inasmuch as all three natures are the natures of mind, and because they are not exterior to or separate from vijñāna,[3] it is clear that their purpose is to point to a method of purifying the mind of its chronic dualizing activity, to restore it to a pure state. This is also suggested by the order in which the three natures are usually discussed in these texts, from parikalpita up to pariniṣpanna. The three natures must be seen in such works as these as being intimately connected with a system which in one way or another asserts the unreality of the world in the manner in which it appears in the mind.

If we compare the treatment of the three natures as it is found in either Hsüan-tsang's work, or in the Mahāyānasaṁgraha,[4] with Fa-tsang's treatment, his own unique handling of this traditional material becomes evident. First of all, each of the three natures is seen as possessing two aspects. Parikalpita-svabhāva is both non-existent in reality and existent sensually. We perceive the object without doubt, and it appears to be "out there," but in fact, it does not exist really in that form. This is not different from the common Vijñāna-vāda interpretation; while insisting on the absolute unreality of the perceived, the grāhya, that school never denied that in fact we do perceive the object. Paratantra-svabhāva also has two aspects. First, in its dependent nature, the object is said to be without a nature of its own; this is no more than the classical Mahāyāna equation of pratītyasamutpāda with emptiness. That which is dependent on another for its existence can not be said to have an essence or nature of its own. At the same time, this emptiness, or self-naturelessness, does not mean non-existence; the dependently originated object has a reality which makes it resemble ultimate reality in many ways. Thus, while being without a nature of its own, the object is nevertheless a phenomenal fact. Emptiness and phenomenal existence are thus not at all mutually exclusive states for Fa-tsang; the mutual dependence of *dharmas* is precisely their emptiness. Finally, *pariniṣpanna*-*svabhāva* is likewise double. For Fa-tsang, the perfected nature is synonymous with *tathatā*, Buddha-nature, *dharma*-*kāya*, and all the other names under which the Buddhist absolute is known. As such, its first meaning is non-alteration, or immutability. By definition, the absolute cannot change in any way; at no time, under no circumstances, does it ever become limited or transformed. This aspect of the absolute is the one we encounter in many sutras and treatises, and no Buddhist would probably argue with this view of the absolute. However, this immutable and eternal absolute is also said to be subject to conditions, and in so being, it becomes self-limited and forms phenomenal objects, the universe. Few Buddhist texts say this about the absolute, always insisting on its immutability, but Fa-tsang rests his whole philosophical system on the paradox of an absolute which is immutable but becomes phenomenal objects through its obedience to conditions. The following chart shows the various aspects of the three natures.

Parinispanna = non-alteration + obedience to conditions
Paratantra = naturelessness + quasi-existence
Parikalpita = non-existence in reality
+ common-sense existence

The sources for this manner of discussing the three natures are somewhat of a problem. As was mentioned above, the dual nature of parikalpita-svabhāva is also recognized by most Vijñānavāda texts discussing the three natures. There is no contradiction in saying that a thing does not exist absolutely in spite of the indubitable fact that we perceive it. Probably the two aspects of the discriminated nature were taken from common Vijñānavāda sources. Even the dual nature of paratantra-svabhāva is not utterly foreign to "orthodox" Vijñānavāda, though in the texts of that school, the implications of Fa-tsang's assertion of a complete identity of naturelessness and quasi-existence can not be found. In the Mahāyānasaṁgraha, for instance, a passage from the Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra which is quoted with approval by Fa-tsang says that paratantra-svabhāva is composed of an impure part and a pure part, which means it is a kind of neutral ontological no-man's land which can either be seen under the aspect of ignorance or under the aspect of enlightenment.[5] This is an intimate part of a system concerned with rectifying the errors which the mind perpetrates on itself; the three natures and the central, pivotal character of *paratantra-svabhāva* exist within the frame of reference of a system which sees on the one hand that we are deluded about the externality and ultimacy of the world we know, and on the other that the delusion can be removed, permitting us to see that the perceiving subject and perceived object alike are not real. There are therefore three natures because the system of which they are a part has a theory about the nature of delusion and the process of removing it, and this exists within a system which sees all things as representation only (*vijñapti-mātra*). *Parikalpita-svabhāva* and *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva* are two ways of approaching the pivotal and central *paratantra-svabhāva*. This is what such texts as the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* mean when they speak of the two parts of *paratantra-svabhāva*. There is thus a precedent for speaking of the two sides of *paratantra-svabhāva*, but Fa-tsang does not mean the same thing when he speaks of its two aspects, nor do the meanings of his two parts of *paratantra* coincide exactly with those of the two parts discussed in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*. In Fa-tsang's formulation, naturelessness means immanent noumenousness, and quasi-existence means phenomenality, but the real meaning is that real existing things ~~which~~ are the products of conditions are also identical with the absolute; this is a reformulation of the Śūnyavāda statement: *rūpam śūnyatā*, but with an entirely different definition of what *śūnyatā* is. For Fa-tsang and his school, it is the cosmic Buddha, Vairocana, who is the source and ground of all existence. This is plainly evident if we turn to the perfect nature.

Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva is, like the other two natures, of dual aspect. To consider the absolute as having two parts, and particularly these two parts, is not at all normally a part of the three-nature theory, whatever we may say about the other two natures.[6] The source for this peculiar view of *pariniṣpanna* probably should be sought for not in the three-nature theory itself, nor in Vijñānavāda thought, but rather in the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* and *Uttaratantra* and their theory of the *tathāgata-garbha*.[7] Because we are indeed faced with such a theory when Fa-tsang says that the perfect nature is both immutable and obeys conditions. The first aspect, as I noted above, is accepted by all Mahāyāna schools, but the second, that *tathatā* or *pariniṣpanna* obeys conditions, is not a generally held view. In defending his own position, Fa-tsang says that when all the other texts speak only of the immutability of the perfect nature, they do not use the word "immutability" in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather mean "inconceivable immutability," which Fa-tsang interprets as the immutability which obeys conditions and is identical with the imper-

dangling subordinate clause

manent.[8] Fa-tsang's argument is sustained by his analogy of the bright mirror which, despite its brightness, can reflect pure and impure objects. He apparently means that *tathatā* is able to appear as impure and pure objects and yet not lose its essential immutability. In fact, just because it is immutable, it can appear as forms. The scriptural authorities he quotes as corroboration are the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and *Awakening of Faith*, both of which teach the doctrine of the *tathāgata-garbha*. The model which Fa-tsang has in mind is probably that of the *Awakening of Faith*, in which essential Mind becomes bifurcated and comes to exist in a double aspect, as 心眞如 and 心生滅,[9] which mean, respectively, mind as immutable and unmoved, and mind become subject to the suffering of *saṁsāra*.

The two aspects of each of the three natures is, in form, not unique with Fa-tsang. The above sources, while not at all exhaustive, show that various texts describe one or more of the three natures as having this double aspect, but the meaning which Fa-tsang gives to the double aspect of each is probably his own contribution. He may in fact have had such a text in mind as the *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*, which at least *in form* could have served as a model. That treatise says this about the three natures:

> *Parikalpita* is seized as existing and absolutely does not exist; thus it is held that it has for characteristics both being and non-being.

> *Paratantra* exists in an illusory existence and does not exist in the manner in which it appears; thus it is held that it has for characteristics both being and non-being.
> *Pariniṣpanna* exists in non-duality and is the absence of duality; thus it is held that....[10]

The way in which this text finds the two characteristics of being and non-being in each of the three natures is, in fact, similar to Fa-tsang's method, and the end result of both his treatment and that of the above text tends to reduce the three natures to two. The chart given in the earlier part of this section shows this clearly.

The key to this process of reduction lies in the description of *pariniṣpanna* in terms of the two aspects mentioned above. *Pariniṣpanna* in its aspect of non-alteration is described in terms of "true" (in opposition to false and derivative), "true source," and "essence." Furthermore, on the basis of such passages as that of the *Sutra on Neither Increase Nor Decrease*, which says that "The *dharma-kāya* transmigrating in the five paths is called sentient beings," and, among others, the passage from the *Awakening of Faith*, which says that "Mind which is pure in its own essence moves and becomes impure mind because of the winds of ignorance," both of which are used to corroborate his view of *pariniṣpanna*, we can see that Fa-tsang is apparently speaking of a mythical event in which the absolute came to manifest itself as the phenomenal universe. This phenomenal universe, which is the manifestation of the absolute and which is still identical with that absolute, is the other aspect of parinisp̣anna, which Fa-tsang calls "obedience to conditions." In the second section of the tenth chapter, and after, Fa-tsang refers to these two aspects of each nature under the rubrics "emptiness" and "existence." By these terms, he means, on one level at least, much the same that the Indian Śūnyavādins meant when they said that form is emptiness and emptiness is form. By this, the Śūnyavādins meant, not that things are non-existent ("We are not nāstikas," say the Śūnyavādins) but that things are not absolute as they appear, because they exist in an interdependent way. This is to say that they are empty. Thus, when Fa-tsang speaks of the conditionedness of pariniṣpanna, he is speaking of it in its manifestation as form, and when he speaks of its lack of self-essence, he means, on the one hand, that forms have no absoluteness as forms; they are empty. But unlike the Indian teachers of emptiness who were simply referring to the non-absoluteness of the forms which exist to us as concepts, and who refused to hypostatize this emptiness, for Fa-tsang, the emptiness of things consists of their being nothing but the dharma-kāya, Vairocana, in their essence.[11] Thus, the two aspects of emptiness and existence mean something in Fa-tsang's system which they do not in Śūnyavāda texts. Emptiness is a dynamic and creative force which forms the phenomenal world and at the same time remains the sustaining base of that creation.

Thus, in his treatment of parinispanna, Fa-tsang describes it in terms of emptiness and existence. The meaning is that the absolute in its immutability and permanence becomes mutable and impermanent things, without losing its essential immutability, and these two states are described as emptiness and existence. His treatment of paratantra-svabhāva is patterned after that of parinispanna, because paratantra is the derivative of parinispanna. As I have mentioned above, he probably based this treatment, at least formally, on the traditional Vijñānavāda view of paratantra as being composed of a pure part and an impure part, or, put in a different way, that it can be perceived either under the aspect of parikalpita or under the aspect of parinispanna. Actually, however, his treatment of paratantra-svabhāva very closely follows the Śūnyavāda critique of the phenomenal world. That is to say, he is faithful to the Śūnyavāda critique of conditioned things to the extent that he equates conditionedness with emptiness, because his two aspects of paratantra, naturelessness and quasi-existence, are equivalent to emptiness and conditioned existence. The difference between his meaning and that of the Śūnyavādins, however, is, as I said above in connection with parinispanna, that the Śūnyavādins did not hypostatize emptiness. They hasten to add to the assertion that all things are empty the further assertion that emptiness is also empty. In Fa-tsang's case, though, the emptiness of things, their lack of self-nature, is precisely the immanence of Vairocana in phenomenal objects. This directly follows from Fa-tsang's view of the absolute, of course, because paratantra is nothing more than the phenomenally existent aspect of parinispanna.

Parikalpita-svabhāva is not important in Fa-tsang's system. In the T'an-hsüan-chi, he discusses ten kinds of "mind-only" within Buddhism, assigning each of the five doctrines to one or more types of mind-only theory, and, in the process, Hua-yen is also assigned to a variety of this theory. However, whereas other doctrines interpret "mind" as the empirical, phenomenal mind of each individual, the "mind" discussed in Hua-yen is the absolute immanent in phenomena.[12] Fa-tsang is not concerned with the epistemological problems of the mind-only schools, and for that reason is really utterly unconcerned with parikalpita-svabhāva. However, for reasons which I will mention further on, he had to impose his own interpretation on parikalpita-svabhāva also because it was part of the total three-nature theory which he was using. Thus, just as with the other two natures, he interprets this nature in terms of emptiness and existence. That is to say, his description of the two sides of this nature, nonexistent in reality and sensually existent, means emptiness and existence respectively.

The result of this interpretation of the three natures, then, is that each of the natures partakes of the two aspects of emptiness and existence. Referring to the chart earlier in this section, it can be seen that in spite of the different nomenclature, all the aspects in the second and third rows taken vertically mean emptiness and existence respectively. And for this reason, says Fa-tsang, all three natures are identical in being both empty and existent. This completely obliterates any distinction between parinispanna-svabhāva on the one hand and paratantra-svabhāva and parikalpita-svabhāva on the other; at the same time it also obscures the meaning of the three natures which the Vijñānavādins also maintained. However, this is seen strictly from the point of view of essence, which here means emptiness. If, on the other hand, ascriptions of the three natures are read horizontally on the chart, a distinction of essence and characteristics can be perceived, because although the three natures are identical in essence, this essence expresses itself in an infinity of diverse forms, and, what is more, there is a difference between the unconditioned and conditioned. Therefore, Fa-tsang says that the three natures are both identical and different.

If we translate the three natures into concrete terms (because the three natures are the three natures of any single thing), Fa-tsang's meaning in ontological terms becomes clear. By initially ascribing the aspects of non-alteration and conditionedness to the perfect nature, he has on the one hand maintained the absolute and immutable nature of the absolute, and on the other hand has shown it to descend into phenomenal forms. This is why his description of the perfect nature is so important to his system, because he must first demonstrate a situation in which phenomenal objects have their source and ultimate being in the absolute. Also, this is the reason why he discusses the three natures in the order opposite from the order of Vijñānavāda texts. The nature of phenomenal objects follows from the nature of the absolute; the emphasis is on creativity, and the movement is from up to down. Therefore, when he turns his attention elsewhere in the tenth chapter to phenomenal forms, which is his main concern as a philosopher, he can both maintain that there are differences between phenomena and insist on their essential unity. Though a star, a Bodhisattva, and a cheese mite are all different in form and function, they are essentially identical in being expressions of Vairocana. Furthermore, because of this essential emptiness, inasmuch as none of the three has an absolute self-existence, all three are mutually interdependent.

It will occur to the reader that the situation I have described above does not materially differ from the situation we find in the *Awakening of Faith*. The mind as *tathatā* and the mind as birth-and-death coexisting in the same locus, which is the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith* is, by and large, what Fa-tsang ends up with in saying that the three natures are both identical and different.[13] His indebtedness to that treatise is evident all through his own treatise. Why, then, did he not adopt the *Awakening of Faith* wholesale and continue to build on it? Why did he go through the elaborate business of discussing the three natures in his unique way when in fact all he really wanted was two natures, a root and a derivative of reality?

We must conclude that the three natures are for Fa-tsang nothing more than a means of rationalizing his postulation of the two aspects of reality. In using the three-nature theory as he does, it has lost all the significance it usually has as part of the Vijñānavāda system. Texts such as the *Awakening of Faith* do not sufficiently demonstrate their assertions of a reality which is simultaneously phenomenal and noumenous, and therefore Fa-tsang has found it necessary to interpret the three natures in such a way as to give a theoretical basis to his view of reality.[14] His own methodical, analytical, thorough nature, evident on every page of the treatise, would never have allowed him to assert this double nature of reality without this elaborately demonstrated theoretical groundwork. Closely related to his need for this basis is the strongly eclectic nature of his system, which draws freely on all schools and intellectual trends within Buddhism. The school most often associated with the trisvabhāva theory, the Vijñānavāda, was a flourishing concern in ~~the~~ Ch'ang-an during Fa-tsang's lifetime,[15] and in his desire to synthesize the whole of Buddhism within one system, he probably felt it necessary to account for Hsüan-tsang's influential doctrine.[16] By at least ostensibly utilizing the three-nature doctrine, he made it part of the perfect doctrine. Also, along with what I believe was his sincere desire to include all other doctrines within a single system, there may well have been some kind of outside urging to do this. I am referring to his close connection with the Empress Wu. It has been suggested by one leading expert on Hua-yen that the inclusion of the Vijñānavāda theory of the three natures into the Hua-yen system, which carries with it the implication that the Hua-yen is more inclusive and more perfect, may have been fostered by the Empress, who wished to identify her own reign with a form of Buddhism which was self-avowedly superior to the Buddhism identified with the preceeding reign, which she had ended violently.[17] Thus, by including and superseding the system of Hsüan-tsang, which had been patronized by the Empress' predecessors, and which was identified with them, the Hua-yen school presented a superior culture with which the Empress could identify. It would be a way of legitimatizing her own rule. This motive need not be seen as an alternative to the more obvious one of making a sincere effort to synthesize Buddhist doctrine; in fact, the Empress' patronization of Fa-tsang may very well have resulted from the fact that features of his system such as this recommended it to her.

Whatever his reasons may have really been, Fa-tsang's desire was certainly to be broadly eclectic and synthetic. Perhaps the very extensive and consistent eclecticism of his whole system is the best argument against any supposition of a narrow political motivation with regard to the utilization of Vijñānavāda material. In describing Fa-tsang's system in the notes to the translation of the first part of chapter ten, I have used the cumbersome phrase, "a Buddhist superimposition on a Taoist model, clothed in the Vijñānavāda theory of the three natures, which is in turn discussed by means of the Mādhyamika tetralemma." Actually, all these elements can be found in some measure by Fa-tsang's system. The Mādhyamika tetralemma used in the latter part of this first section is the most obvious example of deliberate borrowing. I do not believe it really adds much to that section. Much space and effort is devoted to showing that the existence and emptiness of the three natures are not to be construed in the conventional sense of the terms. But the tetralemma is used more as a rhetorical flourish than as an organic part of Fa-tsang's discussion.[18] It is, I believe, simply a case of wanting to include as much as possible within his own system. I have also mentioned above that his treatment of the three natures is characterized by a basically Śūnyavāda point of view. Although his conception of the nature of emptiness is finally different from that of the Śūnyavādins, he is, I believe, true to the spirit of Śūnyavāda in interpreting dependent origination as emptiness. But this Śūnyavāda element in Fa-tsang's thought is not extraneous as is the Mādhyamika material. It was a fundamental part of his intellectual furniture, just as it was for most Chinese Buddhists like him. In a more or less faithful manner, most Chinese Buddhists made the doctrine of emptiness an integral part of their own thought.

That a considerable part of Fa-tsang's thinking was influenced by Taoist patterns of thought and concepts seems evident. First of all, the considerable use of Taoist terminology is suggestive of the way in which he thought about Buddhist concepts. The use of "true source" 真源 in the treatise at hand is a case in point. It is used in the treatise as a synonym for *tathatā* and *śūnyatā*, but, as can be seen in his discussion, by using such terms as synonyms for *tathatā* and emptiness, the latter take on metaphysical connotations which are not common to Indian Buddhism, but which are common to Taoism.[19] In another work, the遊心法界記 , he uses the term 理性 as a synonym for *tathatā*.[20] The use of this kind of terminology suggests that for Fa-tsang, such Buddhist concepts as *tathatā* were viewed in the light of a Taoist world-view, which is to say that though the idea is Buddhistic, the manner in which it is understood is Taoistic.[21] But it is more than a matter of terminology, however indicative that may be of the extent of Fa-tsang's Taoistic approach to Buddhist ideas. Some of his writings show that his whole approach to religious practice and his understanding of the religious goal were conceived on Taoist lines. An example of this is his修華嚴奥旨盡還源觀.[22] The thought is similar to that of the *Awakening of Faith* and the concept of "mind intrinsically pure" 自性清淨心 . However, the title is instructive in showing the *kind* of thinking upon which Fa-tsang erected his own system. We do not, to the best of my knowledge, find Indian texts speaking of Buddhahood or enlightenment in terms of "source," but Fa-tsang is speaking of terminating or transcending the false phenomenal evolutes of an original true source and "returning" to it. This is the talk of a Taoist, not a Buddhist, for it is in Taoist thought, not Buddhist thought, that we hear of the phenomenal world originating from a creative, dynamic, primitive One.[23] It is also in Taoist writings that we hear the injunction to "return to the source." Fa-tsang is, as a Buddhist, talking about the acquisition of Buddhahood, but in speaking of it in terms of returning to the source, he means, in the same way Chuang-tzu means it, that we must look beyond the apparent diversity of the world and see that its source, basis, and reality is a oneness or One. For Fa-tsang, this means the recognition that our source and true being is Vairocana, the cosmic Buddha.

The Taoist element in Fa-tsang's thought, therefore, is to be found in his understanding of the nature of the noumenon. In saying that phenomena are empty and thus equating dependent origination with absence of self-essence, he is faithful to Śūnyavāda doctrine. However, in Śūnyavāda there is never any question of emptiness existing prior in time to the existents of which it is the true nature. Nor is there any attempt to hypostatize the emptiness of things; it is simply the absence of a self-essence, the existence of which would otherwise make the object absolute. However, Fa-tsang's emptiness was the source from which the "myriad things" came, and the model seems to be that of the Taoist wu and yu, or li and shih. More than this, this emptiness is none other than Vairocana, the Buddha who is omnipresent in phenomena, like the Tao which is found in an ant, a weed, a piece of tile, and a turd.[24] And like the Tao, Fa-tsang's emptiness is active and creative, in contradistinction to the emptiness of the Śūnyavādins, which is always inactive and in no sense creative.

The description of parinişpanna-svabhāva in terms of immutability and obedience to conditions points to a view of the absolute as becoming phenomena without losing its absoluteness; the description of phenomena as both without self-nature and as existent points to a view of phenomena as being really existent things whose final reality is contingent on the absolute which is immanent in them and which are the clothing or body of that absolute. This is strikingly and graphically shown in the figure of the great Buddha of Tōdaiji, a huge central figure surrounded by ten smaller Buddhas. The number ten, of course, signifies infinity in Hua-yen literature, and the meaning is that the great cosmic figure of Vairocana, the "Buddha with ten bodies," is present in all things. "Therefore, Vairocana Buddha exists everywhere and everytime in the universe, and the universe itself is his body. At the same time, the songs of birds, the colours of flowers, the currents of streams, the figures of clouds---all these are the sermon of Buddha...."[25] The implications of this view of the world for a form of Buddhism which believes that all beings possess the Buddha nature are evident; it supplies a satisfying theoretical foundation for the belief that we are indeed none other than Buddhas in reality, despite the undeniable fact that our corrupted humanity seems only too real.

What this view of things meant to Chinese of Fa-tsang's time can be seen to some extent in the ways in which this preoccupation with identity meanifested itself in the time preceeding and during the T'ang. Kamata Shigeo has shown, in his two major works on Chinese Buddhism,[26] that the preoccupation with the identity of the phenomenal and noumenal orders was characteristic of Buddhist thought during the period of the North and South Dynasties, particularly in the northern dynasties, during the Sui, and during the T'ang. While not ignoring their earlier manifestations of this kind of thought, Kamata sees the real preoccupation with it during the northern dynasties as being related to the need of Buddhists to come to terms with the secular rule in those times. The attempt to show that the phenomenal and the noumenal are the same can therefore be seen as an attempt to legitimatize Buddhism as a part of the greater social order.[27] In this way of thinking, there would be no antagonism between the sangha and the secular state, because the two spheres would completely overlap. The rock carvings of Yün-kang and Lung-men are a perfect example of this, where Buddhas are shown with the features of emperors, thereby concretely expressing the doctrine that the emperor is the Tathāgata

皇帝卽如來 .[28] This not only legitimatized the northern emperors but generally affirmed the secular, worldly order. Closely related to this is the fact that the sangha was very dependent in those circumstances on the good will and sponsorship of the aristocrats and courtiers in general, and Buddhism found it necessary to teach a doctrine acceptable to these laymen.[29] Kamata devotes considerable space in his studies to such monks as Hui-yüan (*Ch'ing-ying ta-shih*, born 523), who made a great effort in his 大乘義章 to establish the identity of *li* and *shih* 理事 and in this regard was one of the most important Buddhists of the time with regard to laying the foundations of Sui-T'ang thought.[30] The result of Hui-yüan's thought was the establishment of a doctrine of the identity of all *dharmas*; more specifically, that they are alike in being empty and different in characteristics. The same kind of thought can be seen in such thinkers of the Sui period as Seng-ts'an 僧粲,[31] who carried on the tradition. The identity of *li* and *shih* is, of course, one of the main concerns of the Hua-yen patriarchs of the Sui and early T'ang, Tu-shun and Chih-yen. Whether this considerable activity was motivated by political circumstances remains a question; at least this line of thought is coincident with a growing and critical relationship between the sangha and the state during those times. Whatever its background is, it clearly indicates a growing desire among

Chinese Buddhists to form a kind of Buddhism which did not deny the reality and value of the phenomenal world. One can not spurn a world which is the Buddha's own body.

With the establishment of the doctrine of the emptiness and existence of dharmas, half of Fa-tsang's theoretical structure is in place. It enable him to maintain the real phenomenality and diversity of things and at the same time to assert a common underlying essence. While agreeing to the common-sense claim that things exist and are different in characteristics and function, he was able to show that in essence all things are identical. The phenomenal world did not have to be rejected as inferior or unreal, and phenomena were shown to have an ultimate value not readily perceivable, a great "plus," which gave them a truly religious significance. It still remained for him to demonstrate the interpenetration of these same phenomena. The second section of the tenth chapter fills that office.

B. The Six Meanings of Cause

The emptiness and existence of each phenomenal object constitute its static nature. But things are also dynamically related to each other; even on a common-sense level, it can be seen that various things depend on other things for their existence and support. The example of the tripod used in the previous section of the introduction is a case in point. It is not too difficult to see that each of the three poles exerts a crucial influence on the other two, and that at the same time the whole is exerting an influence on each part. It is more difficult to understand that in the totality of the immense cosmos the same sort of interdependence exists between each part and the whole. Yet, while the ten thousand things are all identical on the basis of essence, they are also interdependent on the basis of their existence as phenomenal objects with distinct characteristics and functions. For this reason, a maggot and a king are identical in their common emptiness; and what is more, each is equally important in forming the universe of which it is a part. Looking at the universe fixed as a perfect totality and as existing outside considerations of temporality, we see that every single item in it, down to a grain of sand, has the power to form and sustain the whole. Each thing therefore has a great importance in the whole, like a keystone of efficiency. All Buddhist terms and meanings aside, one is reminded of the attitude toward the Chinese family and its relationship to the nation; is not the functional relationship of the family to the nation very much like the relationship of Fa-tsang's dharma to the rest of the universe?

Hua-yen texts refer to this relationship as interpenetration 相入, which I have sometimes called mutual inclusion. From what has already been said above, it can be seen that by "interpenetration," Fa-tsang and his school mean a situation in which a *dharma* has certain qualifications which enable it to form the totality of which it is, in reality, but a small part. It can also be seen that in the last analysis, the Hua-yen school is talking about a species of causation, though not at all something like material derivation. The most common name for this particular form of causation is *dharmadhātu pratītyasamutpāda*, the dependent origination of the realm of things.[32]

The sources of Fa-tsang's theoretical basis for his doctrine of interpenetration reveal some of the same methods and intentions which were noticed in his use of the three-nature theory. His unusual interpretation of traditional material again suggests that it is in reality simply something to manipulate in such a way that he can substantiate his own views. That is to say, the end product of his system completely differs in spirit and intention from the material used to explain it. At the same time, by using the material in question, he continues the eclecticism of the section on the three natures and, indeed, of his whole system. The following chart, almost identical with the one at the beginning of the second section of the tenth chapter of the translation, may be used for reference during the following discussion.


緣不生自生故
因不生緣生故
不共生無知者故
不無因隨緣有故
Treatise on the Daśabhūmika
自種有故不從他
待眾緣故非自作
無作用故不共生
有功能故非無因
Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā
因有力不待緣
因無力待緣
因無力不待緣
因有力待緣
Wu-chiao-chang
3 main meanings
空有力不待緣
有有力不待緣
空無力待緣
有無力待緣
空有力待緣
有有力待緣
6 meanings of cause
剎那滅
性決定
待眾緣
恒隨轉
果俱有
引自果
6 meanings of cause in Mahāyānasaṃgraha

It is clear from the correspondences in this chart that Fa-tsang's six meanings of cause are closely related to the efforts of various predecessors, primarily Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*[33] and Sthiramati's *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā*.[34] The chart shows that both these works arrive at identical positions with regard to causation (and it should be kept in mind that both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati were Vijñānavādins and therefore when they speak of cause, they are speaking of the *bīja* stored in the *ālaya*-*vijñāna*). The four conclusions of each are restated in the *Wu*-*chiao*-*chang* in terms of the possession or lack of efficiency in the cause and the requirement or non-requirement of assisting conditions by the cause. Since Fa-tsang is only interested in the causal potentiality of a thing, he does not include the third conclusion within his system, because, as he says, it does not have the meaning of cause.[35] Therefore, he incorporates only three conclusions from his sources and thus has the three main meanings of cause: 1) the cause has complete power to produce the effect and does not require conditions; 2) the causal efficiency is completely absorbed by conditions; 3) the cause unites with conditions to produce the result. When each of these three basic meanings of cause is combined with the two meanings of emptiness and existence (discussed above), Fa-tsang has the six meanings of cause.

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The way in which Fa-tsang has transformed this material is some guage of his general methods. First of all, the causation theories which he has borrowed from the Vijñānavāda are closely connected with its whole system of the eight *vijñānas* and the *bīja*, and the four meanings of cause which he has taken from such works as Vasubandhu's are meanings of cause as *bīja*. In Vasubandhu's treatise, causation is discussed in terms of the *bīja*, the stored "seeds" or impressions of acts, acting as main cause (*hetu*-*pratyaya*), collaborating with the other three kinds of conditions (*ālambana*-*pratyaya*, etc.), and bringing about the result, which consists of the other seven *vijñānas*. This kind of causation theory (*ālaya*-*vijñāna pratītyasamutpāda*) is the theoretical basis for the view that the world is only mental constructs, and that the process of falsely externalizing our pictures of the world is due to the influence of the *bīja*. While Fa-tsang indeed discusses his own causation theory in terms of the *bīja*,[36] in the same way that his sources do, the fact is that his own system is not at all epistemologically oriented in the way that the Vijñānavāda is, nor is it at all concerned with a theory about the unreality of phenomena. On the contrary, for the Hua-yen school, phenomena are very real. But, just as Fa-tsang went to the considerable effort to base his own convictions about the double nature of reality on the classic three-nature theory, here, also, he takes pains to found his causation theories on a system which is in many ways antithetical to his own and which, in the end, he criticizes as a lesser teaching. (In the scale of value implicit in his doctrinal classification and criticism, the Vijñānavāda is second from the bottom, only a little higher than the small vehicle.)

The second point in his treatment of this material is especially significant. For the Vijñānavādins, causation is restricted to the *bīja* which are stored in the *ālaya* consciousness, and it is not permitted that the *results* of these *bīja*, the other seven functioning *vijñānas*, be considered as causal.[37] The usual reason given for this is that though the other seven consciousnesses can also be seen to create new *bīja* through their operation, the *bīja* are indubitably the stronger of the two insofar as cause is concerned, and so they alone are considered to be cause. Probably a consideration in this position is that if the *vijñānas* outside the *ālaya* are granted an indubitable causal power, it will undermine the basic Vijñānavāda assertion that these *vijñānas* and the objects which are associated with them are nothing but ideas projected by the power of *bīja*. To grant causality to something considered to be unreal would have the effect of making that thing more real.[38] This is a dangerous move if one is a Vijñānavādin, but Fa-tsang is not. His strategy is to say that the *vijñānas* other than the *ālaya* also have the same six meanings of cause that the *bīja* have. His defense for this arises from the situation he has created in his discussion of the three natures; all things are the phenomenalization of the absolute, and therefore, the seven forms of consciousness other than the ālaya share the same qualities as the ālaya, because these other consciousnesses are within ālaya, and all eight consciousnesses are the results of a phenomenalized absolute.[39] While in the Vijñānavāda tradition such an admission as this would be in effect to agree that the images created by the seeds in the store consciousness can, in turn, act causally and create more seeds, in the non-vijñānavāda system represented by Fa-tsang, it means that everything has causal efficiency. This means, in short, that all dharmas, or things, have the six meanings of cause, whether these dharmas are internal or external.

The third point to be noticed is that Fa-tsang has changed the Vijñānavāda teaching that only compounded, or conditioned, dharmas are causes. This is because the bīja are conditioned, and it is only the bīja which are causes. However, Fa-tsang has shown that all dharmas can be causes, and we know from his discussion of the three natures that conditioned things are simply the outer garments of the perfect nature. As a result of the dual aspect of conditioned things, the causal power that belongs to the phenomenal object belongs also to the emptiness which is its true nature. This can be seen immediately from a look at the above chart. After having derived the three basic meanings of cause from the formulations of the commentaries on the Daśabhūmika and Abhidharmasamuccaya, he combines each of the three meanings with both emptiness and existence to get his six meanings of cause. The meaning of this seems to be clear; causal power belongs not only to the object as a conditioned phenomenal object, but also to the absolute within. In fact, it may be asked whether in the final analysis the causal power exerted by each dharma on all others is not ultimately the function of the absolute immanent in it. At any rate, part of the purpose of this section on the six meanings of cause is to show that cause can be found in both the empty and existent aspects.

The end of the chart at the beginning of this section shows that Fa-tsang has correlated his six meanings of cause with the six meanings of cause-bīja in the Mahāyānasaṁgraha.[40] It is evident from the Mahāyānasaṁgraha that these meanings of cause make little sense outside the context of bīja and ālaya, but despite the fact that Fa-tsang's system is radically unlike that of Vijñānavāda, his only explanation of his own six meanings of cause relies on those of the Mahāyānasaṁgraha. It can be seen here, just as in the section on the three natures, that his use of basically incompatible material has been ingeniously manipulated in order to substantiate his views on the ontological and ontical nature of phenomena. The three natures were utilized to give a theoretical foundation to the idea of a universe in which each thing par-

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takes of two natures which, as was shown, are finally not at all incompatible. In that section of the treatise, however, the emphasis was on the ontological nature of things as results; that is to say, it discussed the static nature of phenomena without any consideration of their having a causal function. In the second section of the tenth chapter, discussed here, while the ultimate objective is to show the interpenetration of these same phenomena on the basis of their causal natures, it can be seen that an important function of the six meanings of cause is to demonstrate the identity of emptiness and existence within the context of cause. Thus, the two aspects of reality are not only identical in their static nature, but are also identical in their dynamic, functional nature.

This is shown in the second section of the tenth chapter, where Fa-tsang defines the six meanings in terms of emptiness and existence:

> "(1) It exists; i.e., this means that its nature is fixed. (2) It does not exist; this means instantaneous cessation. (3) It both exists and does not exist; this is the unity of the combination of [the meanings of] attracting its own result and existing simultaneously [with the result]. (4) It neither exists nor does not exist; this is the unity of the combination of [the meanings of] constantly evolving in dependence and requiring conditions.41

If it is remembered that the six meanings belong to each single dharma, the point to this sort of equation is obvious; the causal *dharma* exerts its influence both in its capacity of being phenomenal and in its capacity of being absolute. (These aspects are called "existence" and "non-existence" here, but the terms are exactly interchangeable with "existence" and "emptiness.") This is especially clear in the third and fourth statements, where it is said in each that the existence of two of the six meanings united in the same *dharma* equal either *both* existence and non-existence or *neither* existence nor non-existence. The effect of both is to show that existence and emptiness are still identical when the *dharma* is seen in a causal capacity. This is not quite so evident in the first two alternatives, where only one alternative in each is postulated, either existence *or* non-existence. But, again, since the equivalent two meanings of cause---fixed nature and instantaneous cessation---are present in each *dharma*, we should also see these two as showing the identity of existence and emptiness in the cause. Therefore, one of the purposes of defining the six meanings of cause in terms of the six meanings of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* is to show that the six meanings, as coexisting in a single *dharma* which has a causal nature, show the two aspects of existence and emptiness functioning as cause. The two aspects are thus identical from the standpoint of essence or from the standpoint of function.

It should be also mentioned before proceeding that the utilization of the six meanings of cause from the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* also accomplishes the objective begun with the incorporation of the *trisvabhāva* into the Hua-yen system, which is the synthesization of many elements from various other schools with the Hua-yen, with the ultimate purpose of superseding them.

The use of the six meanings of cause to show the identity of existence and emptiness in the causal aspect is, of course, of great importance to Fa-tsang's system, but their main purpose is to validate his assertion that the infinity of phenomenal objects which comprise the *dharma*-*dhātu* are all mutually supporting or interpenetrating. This is shown mainly in the passage on page 456:

> 1.[The result is] not born of itself, because of the unity of the combination [of the meanings] of constantly evolving in dependence and requiring conditions. 2. It is not born of something other than itself, because of the unity of the combination of instantaneous cessation and fixed [nature]. 3. It is not born of both [itself and another] because of the unity of the combination of existing together [with the result] and attracting its own result. 4. It is not born without a cause because of [emptiness and existence] possessing the three alternatives and uniting to make the six meanings and becoming a cause. Consequently, as a result of the six meanings, cause and conditions are wholly absorbed [into each other], and show the marvellous qualities of dependent origination.42

In this passage, the only really explicit statement Fa-tsang makes concerning the reason for the interpenetration of things, it is apparent that the six meanings of *bīja*-cause given in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* are his basis for postulating the four alternatives with regard to the causal potentiality and dependency of dharmas. It must at all times be remembered that all these qualities belong to any one given dharma; it can be said of, let us say, a daisy, that it possesses the six meanings of cause, or, on the other hand, that it is not born of a cause alone, or conditions alone, etc., which are exactly equivalent to the six meanings.[43] Thus, the six meanings allow him to say, for instance, that because a causal dharma requires all conditions as aids and eternally evolves in a continuous succession in dependence on other conditions until the time the result is produced, (1) the dharma is both empty and existent, and (2) the cause is without power to form the result without the collaboration of conditions.[44] On the basis of the six meanings, then, he arrives at three major statements: the cause has power to produce a result and does not require helping conditions, cause is without power and requires conditions, and cause has power and requires conditions. It can be seen from the chart on page 460 of the translation that these three alternatives are correlated with the three means of: (1) result is not born from conditions, (2) result is not born of a cause, and (3) result is not born of both possibilities. In this latter alternative, Fa-tsang apparently denies (1) when it implies the opposite and (2) when it means the opposite. He then draws a fourth conclusion; the result is not born without a cause. This statement makes explicit what was only implicit in the other three statements, and that is that the result derives from the combined power of the cause and the collaborating conditions. We are thus in a position now to determine what Fa-tsang means by his six meanings of cause; they show that the result is not produced from cause alone, or conditions alone, but that it results from the combined efficiency of the cause and the conditions.

At this point the reader may ask why this is especially new or significant, since indeed all Buddhism is agreed that a result derives from the confluence of cause and conditions. But we need to ask what the Hua-yen means by cause, conditions, and result. In the first section to this introduction, it was pointed out that the Hua-yen view of dependent origination is not one of a temporal production of _dharmas_, where it could be said with regard to any specific situation in which production takes place that some _dharmas_ are the antecedent cause and conditions while another _dharma_ or thing is the result. This view of causation is one in which, for instance, the milk is the cause of the cheese, and the one proceeds from the other. The only result which the Hua-yen is interested in, however, is the whole universe as it exists "now"; i.e., it is a _donnée_, in the consideration of which the question of the new creation of something from antecedent conditions is irrelevant. And, whereas in the model of the milk and cheese, the former is the cause and the latter is the result, without any ambiguity in their functions, the Hua-yen is describing a situation in which by virtue of the qualities possessed by any one dharma, it is simultaneously cause and result. For these reasons, the Hua-yen type of causation is innovative.

We must now consider the question of just how it is that all the things that constitute the dharma-dhātu are able to support each other. The only explicit statement which Fa-tsang gives us is the one at the end of the last quoted passage from his treatise: "...as a result of the six meanings, cause and conditions are wholly absorbed [into each other], and show the marvellous qualities of dependent origination." It is because the six meanings exist in each thing that dharma-dhātu pratītyasamutpāda is a fact. In reality, however, it is because of the three primary meanings of cause (cause has power, does not require conditions, etc.) that interpenetration occurs, because the six meanings are derived from a combination of those three meanings with the static aspects of emptiness and existence, and these latter aspects are responsible for identity among things, not interpenetration.[45] Since emptiness and existence are alternate ways of saying dependent origination, it is obvious that the two terms apply always to every existent object, so they do not effect the presence or absence of the other three meanings in the same object. Interpenetration therefore must be seen in terms of the three primary meanings of cause.

These three meanings are summarized in the middle of the second section of the tenth chapter in the following words:

> With regard to function, it is divided into three: one, [cause] has power and does not require conditions; two, it has power and requires conditions; three, it is without power and requires conditions. In one, there is total power; in three, there is no power at all; and in the middle one, there both is power and no power. A fourth alternative, no power and requiring conditions, is not discussed, because it is not a cause.46

What is worth noticing here is that the three meanings have been defined in terms of total possession of power, total lack of power, and both total possession and total lack of power. If we turn at this point to Fa-tsang's analogy of the ten coins in the third section of the chapter, we can see what he means by these terms. He says there:

> First of all, in progressive order of counting, there are ten categories [i.e., ten coins]. First, one is the basic number. Why is this? Because it is formed by conditions. Finally, [after going through coins two through ten,] the ten are the ten within the one. Why? Because if one did not exist, ten would not be formed. Because one has complete power, it includes the ten. Still, [the ten] are ten, and not one [and hence are not identical]. The remaining nine [basic numbers] are also like this; each one [of the remaining basic nine coins] possesses ten. You can understand this in the same

> way [as the original coin and its inclusion of ten]. In the descending order of counting, there are also ten categories [or coins]. One, ten includes [coin number] one. Why is this? Because of conditions; i.e., if there were no ten, one would not be formed. That is to say, *one being completely without power, it is included in the ten*. Still, it is one, not ten. The rest is the same as the discussion above with reference to ascending order.47 [Italics are mine]

Here, total possession of power means that the one coin is responsible for the existence of the ten coins, or the whole. Because coin number one must exist in order that the whole exists, it is said that from the point of view of that one coin, it has total power to form the whole. The ten coins being a symbol for the infinity of things which constitute the universe, this is therefore the same as saying that any arbitrarily chosen object can be seen to have total power to form the whole. This seems to be absurd at first glance, since it seems to be saying that a mouse is the cause of the universe. However, as the analogy of the coins shows, it is not really a matter of just one of the many things in the universe forming the rest of the universe, for *each* thing is performing the same function simultaneously. The reason for this is that each *dharma*-thing possesses the six meanings, at all times, in all places. The descending order of counting the coins shows that while it is true that, let us say, coin one creates the whole, nevertheless, at the same time, the totality of the ten coins creates coin one. This situation is spoken of in terms of the one coin being without power and being included in the ten. In other words, if there were not ten coins, the one coin as an object with its own characteristic and nature would not exist, because it exists only within the context of ten. In this case, coin number one is said to be without power, and the totality of which it is a part exists only through the collaboration of all the parts acting together.

It is evident from the above that at any one time, _each_ part of the whole can be seen to have complete power to form the whole, and also to be without power. In the first case, the whole universe as result derives from the one object as cause; in the second case, the same object is seen as part of the result, because other objects like it are also acting as causes for it. This state of things is shown by the third of the three main meanings of cause: the cause has power and requires conditions, or, it both possesses total power and is totally lacking in power. This third meaning, then, is really a general meaning which synthesizes the other two meanings; this is shown in the following chart (on the next page). Thus, the first meaning shows the ability of an object to be a cause which forms the totality of objects, the second meaning shows the same object as forming part of the result, which is the totality, and the third synthesizing


2.
無力待緣
cause is completely without power
1.
有力不待緣
cause possesses total power
3. 有力待緣
cause both has total power and totally lacks power

meaning shows that the object is simultaneously acting as cause and result. When Fa-tsang speaks of the cause and conditions being mutually absorbed into each other, he is in reality speaking of the ability of a thing to absorb the total power of all other things with the ability to be causes within itself and to simultaneously have its causal power absorbed by others exerting the same function. The conditions which act in collaboration with the cause to produce the result are none other than the result itself, for there are no conditions external or antecedent to the universe as it exists "now." Fa-tsang shows this state of things in the fourth section of the tenth chapter, in his analogy of the building. The building is usually considered to be the result of a number of parts acting as conditions, such as rafters, roof-tiles, pillars, etc.. If we examine the relationship of the rafters to the building, it can be said that the rafters have total power to form the building, because without them, the whole building would not exist. Yet, it can also be said that rafters are not rafters outside the totality of the building. Seen from their status as part of the total result, or, better, as the result---because the rafters _are_ the building---it is evident that their existence is contingent on the whole building, which is, after all, nothing but many other parts acting as causes. Seen from this angle, the rafters are without power; they exist only within the context of the whole. As was pointed out above, however, these two situations exist simultaneously. The rafters are acting as the total cause of the building and are at the same time rafters only by virtue of existing within the whole. This fluid status is shown by the third synthesizing meaning in the above chart: the cause has power and requires conditions. The meaning is that the result---the whole building---is produced by each part in collaboration with assisting conditions, but the assisting conditions are none other than the result itself.

The picture we have is of an organism which is self-forming and self-sustaining. The part forms the whole and the whole gives meaning and being to the part.

Since the whole is made up of many parts, it is quite obvious that finally we are considering a situation in which the one and the many are mutually supporting. *Dharma*-*dhātu* *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is the name of this state of things, therefore means the origination of the universe by the universe itself. Since each object can, from the point of view of that object, be seen to have the ability to be the cause that all other objects can when the point of view changes, interpenetration refers to the ability of any object to possess the causal power inherent in all other objects.

Of course, the reason why all this is possible is that the things which constitute the *dharma*-*dhātu* are without any essence of their own; they are empty. Because they are empty, they exist only through interdependence. For this reason, the dynamic relationship expressed by the six meanings of cause is simply another expression of the static emptiness of things. Identity on the basis of essence and interpenetration on the basis of function are thus the same thing. Nāgārjuna, in his *Middle* *Treatise*, showed the emptiness of everything by means of his negation of four possibilities: the result is produced from its own cause, from external conditions, from both, and from neither.[48] Fa-tsang has done something unusual and interesting with the problem of emptiness. He has demonstrated his own view of emptiness by making positive assertions of the same possibilities denied by Nāgārjuna.[49] Nāgārjuna's method was to dispose of all "views" as being false by definition, and his tetralemma was simply a device designed to wean people away from their views. The negation of the fourth and last lemma disposed of all views.[50] Fa-tsang, to the contrary, affirms the fourth lemma and thereby affirms the previous three. By affirming the six meanings of cause, he shows that the universe exists by virtue of its interdependent character, and that is nothing but its emptiness. If we understand Nāgārjuna correctly, the dependent nature of things was to be understood as being no more than their non-finality, and reality is not to be apprehended by means of categorization. For Fa-tsang, however, the complete interdependence of things, in the final analysis, was to be understood as the absolute Buddha Vairocana reflecting himself in the infinity of creation. We return once more to the Great Buddha of Nara, Vairocana, "the Illuminator." Like the sun itself which shines on all things and makes them flourish, Vairocana, the origin and basis of all things, shines out of every particle everywhere, reflecting himself over and over, infinitely. Everything is empty, for where can we not find the Buddha?

3. Doctrinal Classification

Despite the detailed explanation of the Hua-yen system in chapter ten, Fa-tsang's main purpose in writing the treatise was to classify and judge the various doctrines in Buddhism. This is not only evident from the structure of the work, but it is also clear in the light of the nature of the whole first nine chapters, where we find a sustained attempt to discuss such matters as the differences between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, the main differences within the larger area of Mahāyāna, and, particularly, the differences between Mahāyāna and the "perfect doctrine," meaning Fa-tsang's own brand of Buddhism. In fact, it can be said that the overall purpose of the whole treatise is first of all to show that there is a "perfect doctrine," or "one vehicle," which is distinct from orthodox Mahāyāna, and second to demonstrate the tenets of the perfect doctrine which make it distinct.

P'an-chiao 判教 means to judge the doctrines, and with the attempt to judge and criticize there is also the obvious need to explain. As the treatise shows (in the third chapter), there had been several attempts prior to Fa-tsang's own time at this type of classification, one of the best known being that of Chih-i. Two different but connected motives seem to have been at the root of these exercises. First, the Chinese were in the unenviable position of having received Indian Buddhist canonical literature in a rather helter-skelter fashion.[1] Unlike their Indian counterparts, they had no knowledge of the history of their religion, the nature of the differences between schools and sects, the relationship of various texts with these schools, etc.. One text would assert the real existence of *dharmas*, another would assert with equal force that *dharmas* were empty. One text would restrict Buddhahood to a very small number of persons, while another text would claim universal Buddhahood. The examples could be multiplied. The Chinese were baffled; if all these were the authenic teachings of the founder of their religion, he would seem to have been either confused or a liar, both of which were unthinkable. Therefore, one reason for the attempts at doctrinal classification was to find a rationale for this apparent self-contradiction in the canon. Whatever motives there may have been besides this, it seems to have always been an important consideration.

There seems to have been, however, another motive, one which was not as completely objective as the first. This can be detected in Fa-tsang's usual method, in describing doctrinal differences, of proceeding always (to his own way of thinking) from the shallowest doctrine through progressively deeper doctrines, and ending with the deepest. The deepest, which means the most complete and the best, is the doctrine he himself represents, which he calls the perfect doctrine, and which is the Hua-yen. He finds a rich spectrum of doctrine running from the "doctrine of the ignorant"愚法 ---meaning the Sarvāstivāda, mainly---up to his own doctrine, and while he frequently credits the teachings of such texts as the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, *Laṅkāvatāra*, *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, and *Uttaratantra* with possessing great sublety and richness of meaning, he nevertheless always reserves the crown of perfection for the doctrine to which he is an adherent. A study of Fa-tsang's doctrinal classification will show that within the context of the criterion with which he judges, he is completely fair and, I believe, correct, but his criterion automatically predisposes him to find the perfect doctrine in his own type of Buddhism. Therefore, we can see two purposes in his doctrinal classification; one is to divide, classify, and explain the major doctrinal trends within Buddhism, within the frame of reference of the criterion which he sets up, and the second is to demonstrate the existence and superiority of his own kind of Buddhism, which is variously called "one vehicle," "perfect doctrine," and Hua-yen. The following pages will be devoted to Fa-tsang's method of classification, and I will base the discussion on the three types of material I have found in the first nine chapters. One kind shows that there is a "one vehicle," and that it is distinct from the rest of Buddhism;

the second demonstrates the differences between the various doctrines within Buddhism, thus setting up Fa-tsang's well-known scheme of the "five doctrines and ten tenets"; the third gives some of the reasons for the differences, and along with this is also Fa-tsang's own description of the attempts of his predecessors to classify the doctrines.[2]

Of the first nine chapters, chapter nine is wholly devoted to an analysis of the beliefs which characterize the various major intellectual trends within Buddhism. This material is far too complex for adequate treatment in this introduction. It will suffice here to mention that the material of that chapter covers almost all the important psychological, philosophical, and religious tenets to be found in Buddhism. These include such items as the varying definitions of Buddha-nature 佛性, the theories concerning mind 心識, stages of practice, the bodies of the Buddha, and the eradication of defilements (*kleśa*). Five phases are discussed in connection with each item, ranging from the simplest and most insufficient (the *Sarvāstivāda*) up to the most perfect. The whole chapter is a very interesting compendium of Buddhist beliefs, and the fairness and breadth of knowledge shown in the discussion are impressive. Fa-tsang knew his canon. The most illuminating characteristic of the chapter outside the data itself is the manner in which it shows where Fa-tsang's interest lay in describing and judging the doctrines. In terms of quantity alone, it is abundantly clear that he was not at all interested in a detailed analysis of Hīnayāna tenets, because in most cases the tenets of the small vehicle are disposed of in a short paragraph or even a sentence or two.[3] In fact, in that chapter, even Fa-tsang's own school is summarily dealt with by means of a short paragraph, probably because the whole tenth chapter is wholly devoted to Hua-yen beliefs.[4] His chief concern in the ninth chapter, if we can judge on the basis of quantity, seems to have been to discuss standard Mahāyāna teachings. The reasons for this, probably, are that he wanted to demonstrate both the similarities and differences between the Mahāyāna *per se* and his own doctrine, and in this connection he felt that the Hīnayāna teachings were both too well known and too irrelevant for him to dwell on at length. In short, Hīnayāna beliefs were irrelevant to his purposes.

The first eight chapters contain the following material:

Chapter I. "Establishing the one vehicle": This chapter is devoted to demonstrating the existence of the one vehicle as an entity distinct from the rest of Mahāyāna.

Chapter II. "Attraction and benefits of doctrine and meaning": In this chapter Fa-tsang shows the scope of the doctrine and meaning of each of the one vehicle and three vehicles and shows the attraction and benefits of each. The emphasis here, as in the first chapter, is on distinguishing between the one vehicle and the three vehicles (*śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and Bodhisattvas).

Chapter III. "Doctrines propounded in the past and present": A brief description of the doctrinal classifications of ten predecessors, including Bodhiruci, Chih-i, and Hsüan-tsang.

Chapter IV. "Analyzing the doctrines and explaining the tenets": This chapter establishes Fa-tsang's structural and theoretical basis for analyzing the doctrines of Buddhism. On the basis of a preëstablished criterion, he finds five "doctrines" and ten tenets, which are in turn correlated with the five doctrines.

Chapter V. "Relationship of doctrine and vehicle": Here, Fa-tsang shows the relationship between the one vehicle and three vehicles discussed in the first two chapters, and the doctrines discussed in chapters three and four. Doctrines are shown as being five, four, three, two, or just one, and the vehicles are related to these.

Chapter VI. "The sequence of appearance of the doctrines": This is mainly a defense of the Hua-yen position that the teaching of the *Avataṁsaka* is more fundamental and more true than the other teachings. Fa-tsang

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discusses the references in canonical literature concerning the times and places the Buddha taught various doctrines.

Chapter VII. "Settling the intention of the sequence": This chapter is a continuation of the questions in the sixth chapter, and is an attempt to settle the reason for a sequence in teaching. The sixth chapter claims that the Buddha first taught the Avataṁsaka under the tree of enlightenment and then taught other doctrines at other times and places. This chapter gives the reason why this was done.

Chapter VIII. "Establishing the differences": This is closely related to chapters six and seven. It lists and explains the reasons for the differences between the one vehicle and three vehicles. There are ten reasons: difference of time, place, teacher, audience, support (kind of samādhi), teaching, stages of practice, practices, Dharma topics, and concept of phenomena.

Since the framework for Fa-tsang's discussion of the major differences within Buddhism is his division of "five doctrines and ten tenets," it would be best to first of all determine what he meant by "doctrine," "tenet," and "vehicle." The fourth chapter sets up this system. In previous chapters he has already demonstrated the separate existence of the one vehicle. I will return to that matter further on, but here it may be noted that he does not elaborate on it in this chapter. Neither does he say much about the Hīnayāna, which he probably felt was a matter of common knowledge. The bulk of the chapter is really devoted to the division of Mahāyāna into three parts, which, along with the small-vehicle doctrine and perfect doctrine will make the five doctrines. First he considers Mahāyāna to be just one uniform doctrine, just as we commonly think of Mahāyāna as opposed to Hīnayāna. Then he divides Mahāyāna into two, because he finds that there is a "gradualist" side in which the practitioner practices the stages in sequence, manifests his Bodhisattva nature gradually, and is involved with the distinctions of saṁsāra and nirvāṇa. This is, in fact, the orthodox, main-stream Mahāyāna of almost all Indian texts. Then, there are those who, as in the Zen sect, eliminate all such distinctions, avoid verbalization, and try to "produce one instant of non-dual thought." They adhere to the tenet of instantaneous enlightenment. Then, he divides the gradual side of Mahāyāna into two, which he calls the early, or primitive, and the later, or developed. The basis for this division is the question of the nature of emptiness. These two, added to the suddenist doctrine give him his tripartite Mahāyāna. The five doctrines, then, are the Hīnayāna, primitive Mahāyāna, developed Mahāyāna, suddenists, and perfect doctrine.

The same chapter also analyzes Buddhism by the use of ten tenets. The whole of the small vehicle is characterized by the belief in the real existence of *dharmas* and the non-existence of the personal self (*ātman*). Of the ten tenets discussed, the first six all belong to the small vehicle and comprise variations on this tenet as held by Sarvāstivādins, Vātsīputrīyas, Mahāsaṁghikas, Prajñaptivādins, Lokottaravādins, and Ekavyāvahārikas. Despite differences of opinion, all are considered to be small vehicle because of the belief, in some degree, in the real, ultimate existence of *dharmas*. The primitive Mahāyāna, exemplified by the *Prajñāpāramitā*-*sūtra*, *Mādhyamika*-*kārikās*, and allied texts,[5] is that part of Buddhism which teaches emptiness. It is an advance over the small vehicle because it teaches the two-fold emptiness. Also included under the rubric of primitive Mahāyāna, though not in this chapter, are the Vijñānavādins,[6] because they teach the doctrine of the *ālaya*-*vijñāna* as a strictly phenomenal entity, in contradistinction to the developed Mahāyāna. Fa-tsang considers the undeveloped Mahāyāna under two different criteria; one is the undeveloped Mahāyāna from the standpoint of characteristics 相始教, the other the undeveloped Mahāyāna from the standpoint of emptiness 空始教, the first being exemplified by such texts as the *Saṁdhinirmocana*-*sūtra*, *Vijñaptimātratā*-*siddhi*, and *Yogācārabhūmi*-*śāstra*, and the second exemplified by the texts mentioned above.[7]

The developed Mahāyāna has reinterpreted emptiness. Exemplified by such texts as the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna, this is the doctrine that the emptiness of things is their ultimately noumenous nature, but in speaking of the ultimately noumenous nature of phenomenal objects, this really means that the absolute has become phenomenal objects, the appearance of tathatā-Buddha-nature in time and space. Sources cited in corroboration of this tenet include the Laṅkāvatāra, Awakening of Faith, Uttaratantra, and Śrīmālādevī-sūtra. This belief is referred to in the treatise on other occasions as the belief in non-emptiness of tathatā, meaning that phenomenal objects have all the qualities of tathatā. In many places, the tenet is referred to in terms of the tathāgata-garbha, and this is really the characteristic tenet of the developed Mahāyāna.

The ninth tenet is that of the suddenists. Whether Fa-tsang had in mind the growing Ch'an sect of his day or was only referring to a tendency in certain Mahāyāna texts such as the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa is not entirely clear, though at no time in the treatise does he refer to Ch'an by name. His own life was almost exactly contemporaneous with that of Hui-neng,[8] and therefore he may well have known about the growing Ch'an sect. At any rate, the tenet of this group has a close affinity, if not identity, with that of Ch'an; they avoid conceptualizing and verbalizing "like Vimalakīrti revealing true non-duality."[9] Fa-tsang's description of this tenet here is typical of all his descriptions of the tenet of the suddenists elsewhere in the treatise: "[It is] the tenet of eliminating both characteristics and conceptions. It is like, in the sudden teaching, revealing the principle of eliminating words, etc.. It is like the silence of Vimalakīrti revealing [true non-duality], etc.." The emphasis, as in Zen, is on suddenness of acquisition of enlightenment, which means an abrogation of the traditional concern with stages of development, gradual self-purification, and reliance on written authority. The tenet could well be called the tenet of no tenet.

Finally, the tenth tenet is that of Fa-tsang's own growing Hua-yen. The one tenet which distinguishes the perfect doctrine from all others is that of *chu*-*pan*-*chü*-*tsu*-*wu*-*chin*-*tzu*-*tsai* 主伴具足無盡自在 , which is fully discussed by him in the last chapter of the treatise.

On the basis of this chapter, the following observations can be made with Fa-tsang's definition of "doctrine" and "tenet." First, "doctrine" is a large, comprehensive term which includes "tenet." For instance, the doctrine of the small vehicle includes six tenets, because within the small vehicle there are six slightly varying views on the ultimacy of *dharmas*. This one feature would seem to be the one determining factor which aligns several groups under the name "doctrine of the ignorant." Undeveloped Mahāyāna, in like manner, is the rubric under which are aligned all those who accept the principle of universal emptiness. Now, it is clear that in characterizing certain groups within Buddhism with a certain tenet, Fa-tsang is ignoring many other tenets also held by each group. The small vehicle, for instance, has a theory of mind, a view of the nature of the Buddha, and a view of the nature of *nirvāṇa*, all of which are certainly to be considered to be tenets. Likewise, the undeveloped Mahāyāna also has various tenets beside that of *sarvam śūnyam*, and the same sort of thing could be said of all the five groups discussed. Indeed, in the ninth chapter, we are shown some of the other tenets of each doctrine. It is therefore obvious that a "doctrine" comprises many "tenets," though in the fourth chapter, each doctrine has been characterized with one tenet. It would thus appear that a doctrine is a rather large, unified system of thought and practice comprising many smaller beliefs. Doctrine, in short, is a total system made up of many interrelated tenets, which are in turn all closely related to one crucial, informing tenet. Thus, for instance, the small-vehicle doctrine is the sum total of many tenets, such as the four holy truths, the eight-fold path, the five-*skandha* theory, etc., and all these conform to the central tenet of the real existence of dharmas. That is, the central tenet of the existence of dharmas can be seen as controlling the scope and nature of other tenets.

In fact, doctrine seems to be synonymous with vehicle. When, in the first chapter, Fa-tsang discusses the various vehicles, he shows that the holy teaching can be divided into two vehicles, three vehicles, four, or five, depending on the point of view, or there can be seen to be only one vehicle. But his division into five---the small vehicle, three vehicles, and one vehicle---corresponds exactly to his system of five doctrines. The use of the metaphorical "vehicle," then, appears to be interchangeable with "doctrine."

It will occur to anyone reading the treatise that finally there is no real, absolute reason for dividing Buddhism into five doctrines. For instance, the usual way of thinking about Buddhism for Buddhists as well as non-buddhist students is to divide it into Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. Moreover, as Fa-tsang's third chapter shows, his predecessors had made many different kinds of divisions. One may therefore legitimately ask why Fa-tsang found five doctrines and not some other number.

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The ultimate criterion by means of which Fa-tsang is led to analyze Buddhism into five doctrines must be seen as being determined by the primary objective of demonstrating the validity of his own system and of showing its comprehensiveness and superiority. His system, which I have described in part one of this introduction, is a theory of dependent origination, *dharma*-*dhātu*-*pratītyasamutpāda*. This means that he is ultimately concerned with saying something about the nature of *dharmas* and their interrelationships, and the Hua-yen system therefore describes the nature of phenomenal existence in terms of the qualities possessed by the separate pieces of existence. When Fa-tsang attempts to demonstrate the existence of the perfect doctrine and to show its superiority over the rest of Buddhism, he therefore must do this by describing and criticizing the varying views within Buddhism concerning the nature of *dharmas* and the scope and nature of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Using this criterion, he finds five major views on these matters within the whole of Buddhism. It goes without saying that had the criterion been different, he would probably have found a different number of doctrines, just as Chih-i, concerned with different problems and using a different yardstick, found four, not five.[10]

It must be noted that Fa-tsang's criticism of the doctrines has no sectarian implications. He never points the finger of scorn at a sect *per se*. Even when on occasion he speaks slightingly of the Hīnayāna, no real animus is involved, for he is merely following an ancient

Mahāyāna tradition of polemicism. He had no acquaintance with the small vehicle, and that almost mythical (to a Chinese) group of Buddhists posed no threat or possibility of competition to him at all. The Hīnayāna shortcomings were something he had read about in the polemical literature of his predecessors, and as a Buddhist he had to account for them in his system. He was not even very interested in the small vehicle, as any chapter of the treatise will show. On very rare occasions, he mentions a prominent member of one of the Chinese schools by name,[11] but he never makes a comparison of sects by name. His scriptural authorities also are not always associated exclusively with any one sect or even doctrine, and therefore criticism of a tenet in a certain text is not an indirect criticism of a sect. For example, while in the _T'an-hsüan-chi_ he associates the _Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra_ with the undeveloped Mahāyāna, in the present treatise he associates it, along with the _Awakening of Faith_, with the developed Mahāyāna. The _Laṅkāvatāra_ is used to exemplify both the developed Mahāyāna and the doctrine of the suddenists, and the _Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa_ is cited as exemplifying both the doctrine of the suddenists and the perfect doctrine.[12] Doctrine, in other words, is not synonymous with sect or school. The five doctrines are five phases or aspects of the Buddha's teaching on _pratītyasamutpāda_, and the selection of an illustrative passage from a text usually associated with a certain school or sect does not imply any criticism of that school.[13]

The first and eighth chapters are mainly devoted to the demonstration of the existence of the perfect doctrine apart from the three vehicles, and along with this, Fa-tsang gives the reasons for its superiority. The existence of the perfect doctrine is proved exclusively on the basis of scriptural authority, mainly the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka. Most of the argument of the first chapter centers around the episode of the burning house, in the chapter of the Lotus called "A Parable,"[14] though evidence is drawn from a wide range of texts, including the Treatise on the Daśabhūmika, and the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra on Benevolent Kings. Most of the evidence, however, is drawn from the Lotus, which lends itself naturally to the postulation of a one vehicle outside the three vehicles.[15] The parable of the burning house shows how a rich man lured his three heedless sons from a burning house with the promise of a cart for each, drawn by a deer, a goat, and an ox respectively. When they finally escape from the house, they find that there are not three carts outside the house; instead, the father gives them a beautifully decorated cart drawn by a magnificent great white ox. This parable has been interpreted by the founder of T'ien-t'ai, Chih-i, and by Fa-tsang, among others, as indicating that there is actually only one method, or path, to emancipation, and none of the other vehicles really exist; the Buddha's teaching of the three vehicles is a pious untruth, a skillful device, meant only to encourage beings in danger of being harmed in the flames of the triple world to escape. However, the escape is not final; each person must then continue on in the one vehicle in order to reach the true goal, because escape from _saṁsāra_ is not the same as acquisition of complete Buddhahood. Like Chih-i before him, Fa-tsang used the testimony of the _Lotus_ to prove the existence of something called "one vehicle." Scripture can not be denied; it only remains to be shown that your own particular truth is indeed identical with the one vehicle. Fa-tsang gives eight ways in which the one vehicle and three vehicles are distinct, all drawn from the scriptures. The differences are described in terms of fundamental and derivative, real and provisional, and so on. Most of the argument of the first chapter, however, is spent in proving that the one vehicle is something distinct from the three vehicles; considerable effort is made, for instance, to refute the contention that the one vehicle is identical with Mahāyāna.

The eighth chapter discusses ten reasons for the superiority of the one vehicle over the three vehicles. (The three vehicles in this context always refers to __śrāvakas__, __pratyekabuddhas__, and Bodhisattvas or, in short, all Buddhism except the one vehicle. When the three vehicles are referred to in the context of the five doctrines, they are early Mahāyāna, developed Mahāyāna, and suddenists.) These consist of difference in time of teaching the one-vehicle doctrine, differences of place of teaching and the teacher, difference of audience for the teaching, difference of the basis for the kind of wisdom involved, meaning the supporting __samādhi__, and difference of teaching itself. With regard to the differences in practice between one vehicle and three vehicles, these include differences in concepts of stages, practices, numerical categories, and differences in attitude toward things. In all these examples, the superiority of the one vehicle rests mainly on its view of all these things as being participants in the world of __shih__-__shih__-__wu__-__ai__, the world of the infinite interrelationship of each thing with all other things. Thus, for instance, with regard to stages of practice, in the Hua-yen view, each stage includes and is identical with all other stages, so that one is a Buddha in the early stage of faith. However, in the three vehicles, the stages are all different, and there is a progressive order from inferior to superior, with no mixture or identity.

These differences show the superiority of the one vehicle over the three. More of the nature of the one vehicle and its difference from the three is shown in the seventh chapter, where Fa-tsang gives the reasons for the sequence in revealing the doctrines. The main reason is one often found in this sort of literature; people are not all of the same abilities. Thus, the reason the Buddha explained the nature of *dharmas* and dependent origination in five phases is because there are five groups of beings, each able to absorb one level of explanation. According to this chapter, beings are born with a predetermined capacity which will determine which rank among the five doctrines they will reach. Some have a very feeble capacity, and they will be taught the doctrine of the small vehicle. Others can progress to the rank of the undeveloped Mahāyāna, and so on. The Buddha is like a skilled Physician who is able to make expert diagnoses, and when he sees that a person or group has a certain capacity, he suits the teaching to it. This does not mean that the doctrine suited to one set of individuals is incorrect. Each doctrine is tailored to help the person understand as much of the truth as is possible at his stage of development, and at a later time, in another life, the individual may be ready for a headier dose of the truth. The teachings of the three vehicles, therefore, must be seen to be *upāya*-*kauśalya*, skillful means, and are not to be seen as final and complete by any means.

These various reasons all amount to substantially the same thing; the doctrine of the three vehicles is a pale, fragmentary version of the truth seen and revealed by the Buddha in the concentration which is like the images of the ocean. This total, final, and, indeed, only truth is not shared by the adherents of the other _soi-disant_ vehicles, nor indeed even recognized by them. They are marking time until the time they are ready for the one-vehicle truth. In having no understanding of this truth at all, the other vehicles remain apart from the one vehicle. However, despite the existence of a distinct doctrine of the one vehicle, there is also a common doctrine of the one vehicle. This common doctrine consists of the doctrinal common ground shared by the one vehicle and three vehicles. In fact, there is only one vehicle, and there is not a thing which is not included in it. This is only the recognition of the indubitable fact that there is no sharp, total division between the one-vehicle doctrine and the rest of Buddhism. They are not two totally different religions, but share much in common. That doctrine which is characteristic of the three vehicles is, after all, part of the total one-vehicle doctrine. The one vehicle thus has two aspects; because all the doctrines of the three vehicles are based on the truth found in the Buddha's _samādhi_, and are thus derivatives of it, they are all included in the one-vehicle doctrine. Nothing taught by the three vehicles is really false; everything taught by them is also taught by the one vehicle, albeit in a perfect form. The one vehicle of the common doctrine is thus nothing more than the sum total of the doctrines taught by the three vehicles. However, there is something more over and above the common ground of the one vehicle and three vehicles, and this is, of course, the teaching of the infinitely repeated interrelationship of all phenomena, and it is the exclusive possession of this truth which makes the one vehicle also distinct from the three.

"One vehicle" means that there is one and only one method, or truth, outside of which there are in reality no others. It is not an alternative one vehicle opposed to two or three; "one" does not have any numerical significance at all. The meaning is that there is only one goal, the goal of complete Buddhahood, to which all sentient beings will eventually attain, and the truth of the perfect doctrine is the sole means by which all beings will achieve their goal. That some people believe that the doctrine of the Hīnayāna, or of developed Mahāyāna, say, is the correct means to emancipation is only an indication of the unripeness of their faculties. All other vehicles are merely stepping stones upward to the one vehicle, and because of the inevitability of that upward movement and final goal, it can be said that all beings, whatever their convictions, whatever their present circumstances, are already mounted on the one vehicle which takes them to *nirvāna*.[16] The goal of the one vehicle is the *terminus ad quem* of all beings. In asserting this, Fa-tsang was doing something more than legitimizing and elevating his own school over the others, though this was certainly part of his aim. But such an effort should not be seen as an attempt to degrade and exclude other teachings. The obvious trend of his *p'an-chiao*, as well as his philosophical system in general, is to synthesize and embrace. There is, in his philosophical system, a conscious attempt to weld many different doctrinal strands into a single, coherent, unified structure, and the one vehicle is simply the system which embraces all the others. The four kinds of *dharma-dhātu* which are implicit in his treatise, and which were developed by his successor, Ch'eng-kuan, show how this synthesizing and unifying process occurs. The four kinds of *dharma-dhātu* consist of the four kinds of views within Buddhism on the nature of the universe. There is the view of the universe as phenomenal only, or conditioned, made up of really existing *dharmas* which exist because of causes and conditions. (This is the classic Sarvāstivāda view.) There is also a view of the universe as noumenal, wherein phenomena are not recognized. This is the universe seen as unconditioned, *asaṁskrta*. There is a third view of the universe as being composed of the interfusion of the phenomenal and noumenous. Finally, there is a view of a universe where every object is interfused with all other objects.[17] The fourth kind is the Hua-yen universe, but it does not exclude the other three. The Hua-yen universe is a conditioned universe, an unconditioned universe, the intimate interfusion of the two, plus the infinite interrelationship of things-*dharmas*. Rather than exclude the other three views, the perfect doctrine includes them, and in doing so, of course, it also includes the vehicles or doctrines which observe them. It is for this reason that Fa-tsang's system must be seen as being comprehensive and unifying, rather than exclusive and d~~e~~visive. i/

The analysis of the whole body of Buddhism into five parts is Fa-tsang's own unique contribution to the Chinese attempt at classifying the doctrines, and as I have shown, this five-fold division is a result of a certain criterion used by him. In fact, the five-fold scheme was not really his own invention. He had inherited it from his own master, Chih-yen,[18] and it was really part of the common stock of ideas of the Hua-yen thinkers, and ultimately derives from the concerns of a large number of Buddhist philosophers in China stretching back through the traditions of the Ti-lun and Che-lun schools. S/ His own effort was the end of a venerable tradition. The third chapter of the treatise is a catalogue of earlier attempts at *p'an-chiao*.

The ten examples given of earlier attempts are all alike in that they all start, as presumably Fa-tsang did, with the assumption that the whole system of sutra literature had been taught by the Buddha himself, and it was this belief which led to the untiring efforts of so many Chinese masters to find a rationale for the internal inconsistencies in the canon. Fa-tsang's catalogue is just that, a brief, simple description of these earlier attempts. Every master of note is included, but here only one of these need concern us, because it is the only one Fa-tsang takes the pains to refute,[19] and in so doing, he reveals what his one vehicle meant to him. That is the interpretation of Bodhiruci, who taught that in actuality the Buddha only taught one thing during his whole career, but because the various audiences were composed of individuals with different abilities to grasp the teaching, each person heard only what he was capable of hearing. For this reason, there are different interpretations. This is, in a way, an ingenious solution to the problems involved, because it takes all the responsibility for inconsistency from the Buddha and places it where it belongs, on the frail shoulders of the unenlightened listeners. It glosses over the differences and postulates an originally single doctrine. This means that there is a common principle underlying all of the different forms of doctrine, and that therefore, the underlying principle can be found in any form of the doctrine. The danger of this interpretation to Fa-tsang is obvious; if the true principle can be found equally in any form of the doctrine, then the unique status of the perfect doctrine will become lost. Fa-tsang's position is that each of the five doctrines was taught from the beginning in the form we find it in the canon. He reasons that if beings of slight abilities heard the small-vehicle doctrine when the Buddha taught the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, then by the same process, beings of powerful abilities should have heard the perfect doctrine when the Buddha taught the *Āgamas*, but scriptural authority does not bear this out, says Fa-tsang, and so Bodhiruci's theory does not stand. In refuting Bodhiruci, Fa-tsang maintains his own position that each of the doctrines was taught as an accomodation to the audience in question and consists in being a part-truth, while the whole truth is precisely that which constitutes the perfect doctrine and one vehicle.

The other nine examples are simply described without comment by Fa-tsang. His own system of five doctrines and ten tenets, however, is a tacit rejection of all the previous attempts at this sort of thing. He could not use them because each was based on presuppositions which he could not share, and, as I have indicated, his own version of doctrinal classification grew directly out of his great concern with showing that among all the varying interpretations of *dharmas* and *pratītyasamutpāda*, that of the Hua-yen both embraced the others and at the same time was an advance over them. However, his final evaluation of his predecessors is generous; they were "the Dharma-generals of their times....Their rank is difficult to guage." Each had plumbed the depths of the canon, and, seeing differences, had no choice but to try to explain them. In doing so, they had shown the worthiness of the Dharma, despite apparent contradictions within it.

In summary, the following points are made in the nine chapters dealing directly with doctrinal classification and criticism:

1. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* and other texts testify to the distinct existence of the one vehicle outside the three vehicles of *śrāvaka*, *pratyekabuddha*, and Mahāyāna Bodhisattva. In teaching a more comprehensive and perfect view of *dharmas* and dependent origination, it is distinct from the others; in utilizing the other four views in its own system, it also has a common ground with the others.

2. The system we call Hua-yen is to be seen as this one vehicle because the teaching which it offers derives from special circumstances. In particular, the time, place, and teacher connected with it show that it comprises the wisdom found by the Buddha in the concentration which is like the images of the ocean, and is therefore the pure, unadulterated truth, to which all other

doctrines stand in the relationship of derivative and accommodative.

3. Using the criterion of the interpretation of the nature of _dharmas_ and their relationships with each other, five major interpretations can be found in the canon. These are the teachings of the small vehicle (meaning Sarvāstivāda), which says that the universe is made of conditioned _dharmas_; the undeveloped Mahāyāna, which teaches the universal emptiness of all _dharmas_ and does not recognize their absoluteness; the developed Mahāyāna, which teaches the complete interfusion of the phenomenal and noumenal orders through the theory of the _tathāgatagarbha_; the doctrine of suddenness (i.e., the intuitive school), which shares the same view of the universe as the undeveloped Mahāyāna (i.e., empty), but is special in refusing to make assertions about it; the perfect doctrine; each discrete, unique individual is on the one hand identical with all other individuals, and on the other hand has total power to form and maintain the totality of which it is a part.

4. Texts

This translation and study of the treatise is based on the text of the *Taishō Daizōkyō*, No. 1866. It is the so-called "Sung text," named for the fact that it was brought to Japan during that period. According to Professor Yusugi[1] it was brought to Japan from China "about 730 years ago," which would place its arrival at about 1202. I have used it for the sake of convenience, rather than the "Japanese text," in part because it is the basis for a recent Japanese translation and annotation by Professor Yusugi, upon which I have relied heavily for my own translation and interpretation.[2] The "Japanese text" was brought to Japan much earlier, in about 736, by the Chinese monk Tao-hsüan (Dōsen 道璿).[3] This Japanese text became the basis for practically all subsequent Japanese commentaries, among which are the *Shiji-ki* 指事記 and the *Tsūro-ki* 通路記, while the Sung text was the basis for the Chinese *Fu-ku-chi* 復古記, all three of which have been extensively used in my translation. The popularity of the Japanese text is probably due to an apparently greater antiquity, though its earlier arrival in Japan does not in itself indicate greater antiquity or the implied greater authenticity.

There are differences in the two versions. The most obvious of these is the order of the two last chapters in the two texts. In the Sung text, the ninth chapter contains the ten doctrinal items on ālaya-vijñāna, Buddha-nature, the stages, etc., and the tenth chapter contains the elucidation of the Hua-yen system of the three natures, six meanings of cause, etc.. The Japanese text has the two chapters in the opposite order. I have followed the order of the Sung text, but a case could be made for the other order. The Sung text, in ending with the detailed discussion of the Hua-yen system, leads up to a climax, and this seems to me to be consistent with the internal structure of the whole treatise. In this order, the ninth chapter also, in discussing various doctrinal items as they pertain to the five doctrines, seems to be placed logically with the first eight chapters, and at the same time there is a climactic progression throughout these whole nine chapters. However, if the whole treatise is seen as an exercise in p'an-chiao, the Japanese text would seem to be more logical in concluding with a comprehensive criticism of doctrinal items. I must confess that for the reasons I have given, as well as the esthetic appropriateness, I have followed the Sung order. Little harm is done at any rate.

Internally, also, there are differences between the two versions, but I do not feel that any of the variants are important. The most common variants are in the text itself. Other than the places in the translation where I have indicated reasonably important variant readings in square brackets, the differences have been so insignificant that I have not bothered to note all of them. These variants fall into the following types:

1. Inversions: for example, the Sung text will have 說一部 and the Japanese text will have 一說部 (Ekavyāvahārikas)
2. Variants: for example, the Sung text will have 已去 and the Japanese text will have 以去 .
3. Additions or shorter forms: for example,

   Sung: 大乘　　Japanese: 大
   " 何以故。三乘　　" 何以故。以三乘

   Either text may have a final 也 where the other lacks it.

The vast bulk of variants falls into these categories, and where the variant was insignificant, I have simply followed the Taishō version. I have shown all important variations in square brackets, and where, in a very few cases, the reading of the Japanese text seemed preferable, I have used it, with the proper notation.

The Chinese text of the treatise occupies 32 pages in ~~the~~ Taishō (No.1866, pp.477-508). The text is very good; there is a close similarity among all versions. Japanese scholars are generally agreed that the variants of the text are not significant, an opinion with which I agree.[4] The treatise is economical in language, without any of the literary devices which would soften its terse, matter-of-fact presentation. While it avoids prolixity and redundancy, it must be admitted that it is frequently too terse. The complexities of Fa-tsang's system are such as to really require a much more leisurely and expansive presentation than we have. Without the benefits of the many commentaries on the treatise, much of the point of Fa-tsang's argument in various places would be utterly opaque to the twentieth-century western student, so separated in time and milieu from the early T'ang. It is also both a blessing and a curse for the modern reader that Fa-tsang had a mind perhaps too alive to interconnections and implications. The treatise is a real thicket of divisions and subdivisions, and the complexity is nowhere more evident than in a comparison of his treatment of some problem with that of his predecessor and master, Chih-yen. But, on the other hand, Chih-yen could not see the whole as Fa-tsang could, and no other person probably could have welded the thousand and one fragments borrowed from many sources into an imposing system as Fa-tsang did. Structurally, Fa-tsang follows a practice of always presenting his material in such a way that he moves from simple to complex, and shallow to profound. Because of the significance of the number ten in Hua-yen thought, almost every chapter is divided into ten parts, often with major parts subdivided into ten. In several places there is some doubt as to whether the material really warrants this. Thus, there is a little excess fat in the text. By and large, however, the text is a model of organization, brevity, and clarity.

The treatise has always been highly regarded by both Chinese and Japanese interested in Buddhism. It has shared, with the T'ien-t'ai 摩訶止觀 the reputation of being one of the "two jewels of Chinese Buddhism."[5] It may or may not be jewel-like, but it is certainly a *tour de force* of the first order. It is especially remarkable in the light of the fact that Fa-tsang composed it in his thirties. Because his commentary on the *Avatamsaka-sūtra*, the *T'an-hsüan-chi*, shows a greater development in thought, as well as a greater mastery over the material, it is certain that he composed the treatise at hand before he was 42, which was the age at which he composed the *T'an-hsüan-chi*.[6] Still, though the treatise lacks the maturity of the sutra commentary, it is considered even today in Japan to be indispensible to not only the study of Hua-yen, but to general Chinese Buddhism as well. In Japanese Buddhological circles, it is considered to be one of the most important introdictory texts 入門.

Important as it is to the study of Hua-yen Buddhism, it must be said that great parts of the text are unintelligible by themselves, and this despite the linguistic clarity mentioned earlier. This is not unique to the treatise, of course, and we need only recall the difficulty of understanding the meaning of the verses of the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, or the *Triṃśikā*, to mention only two, without a commentary. It is well known that texts of this nature require a commentary, and Fa-tsang's treatise has found a large number of monks willing to devote considerable energy and ingenuity toward clarifying Fa-tsang's meaning. Among these many commentaries by both Chinese and Japanese,[7] three of the best have been used extensively in the preparation of the notes to the translation and the commentary. I have relied on them in every case of difficulty of interpretation or reading of the Chinese. These have all been gathered together and published with the text of the treatise by Professor Yusugi, in *Bukkyō Taikei*: *Go-kyō-shō*; it remains an extremely useful text for anyone who undertakes a study of the treatise. The three commentaries are the following:

1. *Kegon Go-kyō-shō Shiji-ki* 華嚴五教章指事記 in three volumes, composed by Juryō during the Nara period. It is said to be the oldest extant commentary on the treatise in either Chinese or Japanese. Texts in *Taishō* vol.72, *Dai Nippon Bukkyō Zensho* 10, and *Bukkyō Taikei* vols.13-14. It relies heavily on the tradition of Hui-yüan, the pupil of Fa-tsang. Much of the commen-

tary is in the form of questions and answers, and it usually comments on crucial words, phrases, and whole clauses. It is immensely useful in the reading of the Chinese, particularly difficult chapter and section titles.

2. Gyōnen's *Tsūro-ki* 通路記. There are only 39 volumes extant of the original 72. Texts in *Taishō* vol.72, *Dai Nippon Bukkyō Zensho* 9-10, and *Bukkyō Taikei* 13-14. It uses the traditions of both the Chinese Sung commentators and those Japanese commentators who preceeded Gyōnen. It frequently quotes the *Shiji*, for instance. Gyōnen's critical and independent spirit is evident everywhere. It is at the same time the fullest and generally most useful of the three commentaries.

3. The Chinese *Wu-chiao-chang fu-ku-chi* 五教章復古記 by Shih-hui, of very early Sung. It exists in versions of three or six volumes. Texts in *Manji Zokuzōkyō* 2.8.3, and *Taikei* 14. Shih-hui based his commentary on the writings of Chih-yen and Fa-tsang, the second and third patriarchs, rather than on the interpretations of the fourth and fifth patriarchs, Ch'eng-kuan and Tsung-mi, hence the title, "Restoration of Antiquity." He did not finish it, so it was completed by his pupil, Shan-hsi. It tends to be brief in its explanations, but it is especially helpful in showing structure and sequence in the argument. Shih-hui frequently exhibits great talent for

showing the point to a complex passage in the treatise in a few words.

Another primary work which I have consulted often for purposes of interpretation is the *Kegon-gyō Bungi Yōketsu Mondō* 華嚴經文義要決問答, an anonymous collection of questions and answers concerning various problems in Hua-yen philosophy. The various answers are drawn from the writings of Fa-tsang, Hui-yüan (Fa-tsang's pupil), and several others. (Source: *Manji Zokuzōkyō* 1.12.4) It is very useful for not only study of the treatise, but Hua-yen in general. It is an excellent tool for a comparative study of various treatments by Hua-yen masters of a given problem.

I have, in giving a title to this work, adopted the title best known for Fa-tsang's treatise and the one most used in all Japanese references to it, *Wu-chiao-chang* 五教章. The *Taishō* title is *Hua-yen i-ch'eng chiao-i fen-ch'i-chang* 華嚴一乘教義分齊章, translated as "A Treatise on the Divisions of the Doctrine and Meaning of the One Vehicle of the Hua-yen." Several titles can be found in Hua-yen works referring to the treatise. All indicate the nature of the treatise, which is primarily classificatory. These titles, listed by Yusugi in his *Kōgi*, p.13, are as follows:

1. 華嚴一乘教義分齊章
2. 華嚴一乘教分記

3. 華嚴經中一乘五教分齊義
4. 華嚴一乘分教記
5. 教分記
6. 華嚴教分記

The title found in the *Taishō* has been most favored by Chinese commentators of the Sung period, while the title I have used has usually been preferred by Japanese from earliest times. For practical and esthetic reasons, I have decided to call this work "The Treatise on the Five Doctrines."

In my translation, I have made liberal use of expressions within square brackets, as will be evident to the reader. I have used these rather than refer the reader to a footnote, which seems to me to be a nuisance. Since I had no predecessors in a western language to help me with translation of technical Hua-yen terms, I feel that in many cases, the English equivalent I have used has to be accepted as provisional. I have always given the original Chinese in brackets, and where there was no doubt as to a Sanskrit original, I have given both the Chinese and Sanskrit; for example, [法界緣起 *dharma*-*dhātu* *pratītyasamutpāda*]. Other expressions are either alternative renderings or clarificatory expansions of the text. In all cases, these attempts to clarify the text are based on the commentaries. Immediately following this section, I have included a key to the various devices I have used to help the reader. With regards to scriptural citations by Fa-tsang, I have given these in their Sanskrit originals whenever I was reasonably certain, and in cases of very well-known works, I have sometimes used the usual English translation. My source for the Sanskrit titles has been the *Hōbōgirin*, "Fasicule Annexe." Fa-tsang uses a wide range of scriptural authorities, and I have also included, at the end of this section, a list of the works he cites, along with the number of times it is cited in the treatise. The list will be of some interest for showing the works Fa-tsang had at his disposal and for indicating which texts he relied on most heavily.

Works cited by Fa-tsang. Numbers following titles indicate frequency of citation. I have listed the works as cited, though many sutras belong to the same class, as in the case of the *Prajñāpāramita* sutras. I have ignored chapter titles, and thus the list does not show, for instance, the citations of the *Daśabhūmika*, which are included in the *Avataṃsaka*.

Abhidharmakośa 3

Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā 11

Abhidharma-sūtra (or Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra)[8] 1

Āgamas 3

Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodana-sūtra 1

Avataṃsaka-sūtra 65

Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (Cf. Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun)

Bodhisattva-bhūmi-śāstra 3

Brahmajāla-sūtra 1

Buddha-bhūmi-sūtra 3

Buddha-bhūmi-śāstra[9] 6

Buddha-nature (Treatise) 6 *Taishō* 1610

Concentration of Contemplating the Buddha (sutra) 觀佛三昧經 1

Daśabhūmika-sūtra śāstra[10] 11

Dharmagupta-vinaya (?) 1 *Taishō* 1428

Fifty Essential questions and Answers 五十要問答 2

Hsing-ch'i hsing ching 興起行經 1 *Taishō* 197

Kao-seng chüan 2
Karudaka-sūtra 十二遊經 3 *Taishō* 195
K'ung-mu chang 孔目章 4
Lalitavistara 1
Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra 8
Lu-ken tsu ching[11] 六根聚經 1
Mādhyamika-kārikās 3
Mahābherīhāraka-parivarta 1
Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra 5
Mahāyāna-abhisamaya-sūtra 1
Mahāyāna-avatāra-śāstra 1
Mahāyāna-upāyakauśalya-sūtra 1
Mahāyānasaṁgraha 31
Mahīśaska-vinaya (?) 1
Maitreya-paripṛcchā 4
Mañjuśrī-paripṛcchā 1
Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra 7
Neither Increase Nor Decrease (sutra) 不增不減經 2 *Taishō* 668
Original Action (sutra)[12] 12
Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra 12
Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra on Benevolent Kings 10
Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra 2
Ratnakūṭa-sūtra 1
Ratnamegha-sūtra 1
Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra 21

Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra commentary[13] 1
Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra 7
Sarvadharma-pravṛtti-nirdeśa 1
Sarvāstivāda-vinaya (?) 1
Sou-hsüan-chi (by Chih-yen) 1
Śrīmālādevī-sūtra 5
Supreme Support (sutra) 無上依經 1 Taishō 669
Sūtra-alaṁkāra 1
Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra 5
Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun 16
Ta chih-tu lun 11
Triṁśikā 1
Three-fold Naturelessness (treatise) 三無性論 1
Upāsakaśīla-sūtra 1
Uttaratantra 7
Vajracchedikā-sūtra 1
Vajrapāṇi-sūtra (?) 密迹力士經 2 (Ratnakūṭa class)
Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi 2
Vibhāṣa 2
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa 10
Viśeṣacintābrahma-paripṛcchā 1
Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra 24

Sample abbreviations, symbols, etc..

1. [486a]: Page and column in *Taishō* text.
2. [T.9.455]: *Taishō* volume and page numbers for texts mentioned by Fa-tsang.
3. [T.54.153 Int.] The quotation from Fa-tsang's text is not found as is in the *Taishō*, but rather is an interpretation and paraphrase.
4. *Taikei* I.223; *Kōgi* 96: References to the two sources from which the material in the notes is drawn. These references follow the note. The *Bukkyō Taikei* is in two volumes, hence the Roman numerals I and II in the *Taikei* reference. The two works are listed in the bibliography at the end of the translation.
5. [a = 縁]: I have used the Japanese text in this case, and the Sung text on which the translation is based otherwise, which I will call "a", has the reading shown.
6. *Msg*.: *Mahāyānasamgraha*.
7. [b + 思可見] : The Japanese text has the added passage, which is lacking in the *Taishō* version.
8. *Vmk*.: *Vimalakīrti*-*nirdeśa*.
9. Pp.: Large version of the *Prajñāpāramitā*-*sūtra*.
10. In two cases I have used standard Japanese abbreviations for characters: 摂 = 攝
    麁 = 麤

THE TREATISE ON THE FIVE DOCTRINES

by Fa-tsang

Text. [477a] Now I shall explain the meaning of the doctrine of the one vehicle, of the concentration which is like the images of the ocean [*samudra*-*mudrā*-*samādhi* 海印三昧] of the Tathāgata Śākyamuni, and I shall epitomize it in ten topics:

1. Establishing the One Vehicle
2. Attraction and Benefits of Doctrine and Meaning
3. Doctrines Propounded in the Past and Present
4. Analyzing the Doctrine and Explaining the Tenets
5. The Relationship of Doctrine and Vehicle
6. The Sequence of the Appearance of the Doctrine
7. Settling the Intention of the Sequence
8. Establishing Differences
9. Distinctions of Content [of the Five Doctrines]
10. Divisions of Principles [of the One Vehicle]

Notes. These ten headings make up the framework of Fa-tsang's treatise. By "one vehicle" is meant the vehicle which embraces all living beings and leads them to Buddhahood. It is also called the uniform great vehicle and the non-dual Dharma of the Mahāyāna. The "Concentration Which Is Like the Images of the Ocean" is the basis of the claim of Hua-yen that it possesses the whole essential truth of Buddhism. It is the basis because the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra* was, according to this view, taught by the Buddha while he was actually immersed in this *samādhi*, and during which time he saw the universe as it truly is. Part of the content of this vision is that of the one vehicle without another. The name of the *samādhi* is derived from a metaphor. The *samādhi* is vast and deep like the ocean, and just as all things are reflected in the ocean when it is not disturbed by the winds, so are all things reflected in the mind when it is not disturbed by the winds of external influences. Thus, while the Buddha was sunk in this concentration during the second seven days after enlightenment, he was able to see the universe in its totality and reality. At this time he preached the *Avataṁsaka*, which is to say, the one vehicle. For more details on the *samudra-mudrā-samādhi*, see the Introduction, pp. 26-29. Also, see 佛教大系五教章 2 vols., by Yusugi Ryōei, Tokyo, 1921, pp.14-18 (hereafter called *Taikei* in the notes). See, also, Yūsugi's synopsis of the *Taikei* commentaries in his *Go-kyō-shō-kōgi* pp.27-30 (in *Daizōkyō-kōza*, vol.14, Tokyo, 1931). (Hereafter called *Kōgi*)

Chapter 1

Establishing the One Vehicle

Text. First, I shall show the establishment of the one vehicle; however, I shall explain the divisions of the doctrine of the one vehicle in two categories; one, the distinct doctrine; two, the common doctrine. There are [also] two parts to the first category; one is the ocean of nature which is result, and this is inexpressible. Why? Because it is unrelated to teaching. It is identical with the ten Buddhas' own realm. Thus, it says in the *Treatise on the Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, "The causal part is expressible, but the result part is inexpressible." [T.26. 134a Int.] The second is dependent origination which is the causal part; i.e., the realm of Samantabhadra. These two are a non-dual whole everywhere united. It is like the wave and the water. If you think about it, it is apparent.

Within the category of [the realm of] Samantabhadra, there are also two categories; one is the category of separation 分相 ; two is the category of complete union 該攝. In the case of the category of separation, the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine is different from the three vehicles. For instance, the three carts in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*-*sūtra* which are pointed to outside the gate from within the house, which lure out the boys and cause them to escape, is the doctrine of the three vehicles. The great white ox cart which is given to them in the open place outside [the gate] is the one vehicle. However, the distinction of one vehicle and three vehicle has, in brief, ten expressions among the holy teachings.

Notes. The "ocean of nature" is the actual content of the Buddha's enlightenment. In its pristine form, before being made accessible to the limited capacities of people, it is inexpressible. Only a Buddha can understand, or, as the text says, it is the very realm of the ten Buddhas. The text will therefore not attempt to explain result, but rather will concentrate on the causal part, identified with the practices of Samantabhadra. The practices of Samantabhadra are the cause of enlightenment-result, and consist, in part, of responding to the needs of beings. However, as the teaching of Hua-yen tries to show, cause and result are mutually inclusive and identical with each other. When the Bodhisattva arrives at the last instant of the stage of faith, before even beginning the ten *bhūmis* he is already the same as a Buddha.

Taikei I.19-67; *Kōgi* 32-45

Text. 1. The first is the distinction of provisional and true [teaching]. Because the ox cart among the three carts, like the goat and deer carts, also draws out the boys as an expedient and gets them to go outside quickly, therefore all the three carts near the gate disclose the category of upāya. The different great white ox cart conferred on them at the four crossroads reveals the characteristics of the true at that time. As for that ox cart among the three carts being a real one, when the rich man in the house lures out his sons, he points to an ox cart just outside the gate. When they go out, then, they should be able to see the [ox] cart. Why do they go all the way out to where the originally offered cart is supposed to be [477b] and, because they can not obtain it, search for it afterwards? Again, we can not say that the carts sought outside are only the two vehicles, because the sutra [referred to] does not say that the person seeking the ox cart goes outside the gate and obtains the ox cart, and because it does not say that it is just the two vehicles searching for the carts first promised. Therefore, each of the sons in the sutra, having been able to leave the house and go all the way out to the open place, says to his father, "We pray that our father will now give us the playthings--the goat cart, deer cart, and ox cart--which he promised us before." In this way we are able to know that the three carts were sought equally. The three carts here are mentioned in connection with the results which the three vehicles seek; by this, the [Buddha's] primary intention is expressed. Question: Both of the two vehicles obtain a small result. Why do they still search in the realm outside [the triple world]? Answer: According to the small vehicle, there is the doctrine, and there is the result of practice. Now, according to the Mahāyāna, in ancient times there was only a verbal teaching, because the real result of practice did not exist. Therefore, it is said that the three carts are empty and non-existent. From the point of view of the schools themselves, all obtain the result. If they did not obtain it, how could they leave the world? Now, if it is said that all do not obtain [the real result] it is because it is said from the viewpoint of the one vehicle. Since the provisional is obscured 映 by the true, then skillful means is used up, and therefore all do not obtain it.

Notes. The last question and answer seem to be obscure, and in fact in the Japanese text the question and answer are missing, all the way to the passage which begins "From the point of view of the schools themselves ...." It may be a late addition to the text. However, taking it as it is, it means something like this. In answer to the question "Why do the men of the two vehicles continue to search once they have escaped the burning triple world?" it is noted that in the small vehicle, there is the teaching of escaping the world and the result which is the escape from the world and the acquisition of arhatship. Both of these are symbolized in the Saddharmapundarīka episode of the boys' escape from the blazing house. Yet, when they get out, they do not find the carts which were promised; instead, the father offers a cart drawn by a great white ox. According to the Mahāyāna, the goal of the small vehicle is illusory, because the true goal, Buddhahood, is not the goal sought. But the Mahāyana goal is also illusory, because it, along with the small vehicle, is only upāya meant to lead all three on to the one vehicle, wherein the true goal can be won. From the point of view of each of the three vehicles, the goal is won, for all escape the world, but from the point of view of the one vehicle, none of them can win the true goal. Since all three are only skillful means meant to attract them in the end to the one vehicle, then when they enter the one vehicle they see that the escape from _saṁsāra_ was not the real goal. This whole passage, in discussing the small vehicle, really detracts from the emphasis in this section on the difference between the one vehicle and the three vehicles, meaning for the most part the Mahāyāna.

Taikei I.94-102; _Kōgi_ 51

Text. On account of the wish to convert those men of the three vehicles, in order to get them to enter the one vehicle, the great vehicle also is said to be converted. As for this not being so, since the man seeking the ox cart has already gone out into the realm outside [the triple world], he is not a worldling, and since he does not seek the goat and deer [carts], he does not belong to the two vehicles, and since he has not yet obtained the great white ox cart in the open place he does not belong to the one vehicle, then if he is not a man of the great vehicle among the three vehicles, what kind of man is he? As a result of reaching the final stage of their own grades, they all later advance and enter the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine.

Question: Are the three carts near the gate real or unreal? Answer: They are [both] real and unreal. Why? Because they are _upāya_. Because they are a skillful device to lure out the three sons so they can escape, they are not unreal; because they are a skillful device which lures them out, they are not real. These two are not two, but have a single characteristic [i.e., upāya].

2. Two, the distinction of doctrine and meaning. Since the ox cart near the gate, like the goat and deer carts, is only a name, because from the point of view of the one vehicle they are all doctrine, therefore the [Saddharmapundarīka] sutra says, "By means of the door which is the Buddha's teaching, one escapes the suffering of the triple world." [T.9.13] But we can not say that the words "by means of the Buddha's teaching" only concern the two vehicles, because the sutra does not specify them, and because the man seeking the ox cart, who pursues the doctrine to its meaning, like the two vehicles does not obtain it. [Therefore, none of the three vehicles acquires the true meaning of the doctrine, which exists only in the one vehicle.]

3. Three, the distinction of what is expected [期=望 a = 明]. Because that one vehicle is not the three vehicles which were previously promised in the house, when the father gives it to his sons at the four crossroads in the realm outside, they all say that it is not the one they originally expected. Thus, the [Saddharmapundarīka] sutra says, "At that time each of the sons mounts the great cart [477c] and obtains the wonderful thing which he did not originally expect." [9.13a] But we can not say that the expression "not what they originally expected" only refers to the two vehicles, because they are not specified

in the sutra, and because the holy words are not in error. Indeed, none now obtains what was promised in the house. Since the ox cart in the open place is not the one originally expected, when they now obtain the cart, they say that it is not the one originally expected.

4. Four, the distinction of the amount of qualities; i.e., when the father in the house points outside, he only mentions an ox cart, but he does not mention other qualities. Yet, it is a large cart with seven jewels which he gives them in the open place; that is, it is decorated with countless jewels such as a jewel net, jewel bells, etc.. These are all the qualities of the *essence* 體. Also, there [in the house] he only mentions an ox and does not mention other characteristics. Here it is said that it is a white ox, fat, powerful, swift as the wind, etc.. Its *activity* is extraordinary. It also says that many servants attend it, etc.. These, moreover, constitute the *retinue* of its activity. All these different characteristics concern the one vehicle of the common doctrine, simply in order to show the difference [between it and the three vehicles]. Also, the ox cart among the three vehicles [i.e., the Mahāyāna]is only one, because in that school it illustrates the skillful means of one characteristic, without the infinite interrelationship of primary and secondary 主伴. Here [in the one vehicle], it is not the same. Primary and secondary are infinitely interrelated and include

limitless qualities. Thus, the [*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*] sutra says, "I possess an infinite number of such seven-jewelled great carts. This measureless number of jewelled carts is not only one." [T.9.12] This shows the inexhaustible doctrine and meaning of the one vehicle. The full discussion of this meaning is as in the Hua-yen [sutra]. This concerns the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine, merely in order to illustrate the difference [between it and the three vehicles].

Notes. Number four compares the three vehicles with, first, the one vehicle of the common doctrine, then with the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine. The first shows that with regard to essence, function, and retinue, the one vehicle possesses qualities which the three vehicles lack. The second shows that whereas the three vehicles are characterized by a single characteristic (i.e., the doctrine that all is empty, etc.), the one vehicle is characterized by inexhaustibility of qualities; i.e., anything presents itself as the doctrine. Thus, as far as the common doctrine is concerned, it is endowed with qualities; the three vehicles is not. As for the distinct doctrine, its characteristics or qualities are countless, while the three vehicles are limited. Thus, the one vehicle is separate from and superior to the three.

Taikei I. 115-18; *Kōgi* 57-58

Text. 5. Five, the distinction concerning the attribution of stages 位 . The *Sūtra on the Original Act of the Bodhisattva* [T.24. 104-05], the *Sūtra on How Benevolent Kings Should Protect Their Countries* [T.8.826], *the Treatise on the Daśabhūmika sūtra* [T.26 passim], and the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* [T.31.263] all attribute the first, second, and third stages [of the *Bodhisattva-mārga*] to this world, and from the fourth to the seventh stages to the supramundane world, and the eighth stage and beyond to the supra-supramundane world. In the supramundane world, the fourth and fifth stages are assigned to the *śrāvakas*, and the sixth stage is assigned to the *pratyekabuddhas*. The seventh stage is assigned to the Bodhisattva, and the eighth stage is attributed to the one vehicle. Now, if the great vehicle is the same as the one vehicle, the seventh stage would be supra-supramundane and the one vehicle would not be on the eighth stage. Therefore, you should know that the men of the three vehicles in the *Saddharmapundarīka* who leave the house and go outside in order to find the three carts are [the men of] the three vehicles who have reached the ultimate of their own supramundane rank. [478a] That is to say, it is from the fourth to the seventh stages among these [stages]. The great white ox cart which is given separately at the crossroads, because it is above the supramundane world, is the supra-supramundane one vehicle; i.e., the one vehicle Dharma of the eighth stage and above.

Question: If that is so, why does the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* say "The bliss of the two vehicles is called supramundane; from the eighth stage up to the Buddha stage is called supra-supramundane."? [T.31.263] But since it does not say that the *three* vehicles are supramundane, why do you say this?

Answer: Actually, the fourth and fifth stages are the *śrāvakas*. The sixth stage is the *pratyekabuddha*. From the eighth stage on is supra-supramundane. What kind of man is that on the seventh stage [then]? Therefore, you should know that it [i.e., the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*] says that the bliss of the two vehicles is called supramundane; i.e., the great and small two vehicles. Because the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* are both called small, two vehicles are spoken of in common. It is as fully discussed below.

6. Six, the distinction of affiliation 付囑. The *Saddharmapundarīka* says, "If in the future there are good sons and daughters who have faith in the *Tathāgata's* wisdom, you should expound this *Saddharmapundarīka* to them, and enable them to hear and know it, that they might acquire the wisdom of the Buddha. If there are beings who do not believe or accept it, you should always reveal and teach [the Dharma] and benefit and delight [these beings] in the remainder of the *Tathāgata*'s profound Dharma. If you can do all this, then you will requite the Buddha's favor." [T.9.52]

To explain, "the remainder of the profound Dharma" is the Mahāyāna. Because it is not the one vehicle, it is called "remainder"; however, it is not the small vehicle, so it is called "profound". Yet, it can not be claimed that the small vehicle is considered to be the remaining profound Dharma. Since the small vehicle is refuted in the *Saddharmapundarīka*, how could it be praised as being profound? Therefore, you should know that the correct meaning of the Saddharmapundarīka lies in the one vehicle. Therefore, it makes this affiliation.

7. Seven, the distinction of receiving [the Dharma] according to capacities 根. The chapter on "The Arising of the Tathāgata from Essential Nature" in the Avataṁsaka says, "Oh sons of the Buddha, the Bodhisattva, the Great Being, who has practiced the six perfections [pāramitā] for countless kotis of nayutas of eons, cultivated the roots of goodness of the [37] constituents of enlightenment, and has never heard this sutra, even if he hears this sutra, but does not believe, support, and comply with it, he is a Bodhisattva in name only." [T.9.630] To explain, this shows that because the faculties of the Bodhisattva of the three vehicles are still not perfect, even though he cultivates the practices of the Bodhisattva over so many eons, he does not hear and believe this sutra of the one vehicle. Know that this man is the one in the Saddharmapundarīka, mentioned above, for whom one reveals, teaches, delights, and benefits within the remainder of the profound Dharma. From the point of view of the final Dharma of the one vehicle, it is said that he is considered to be a Bodhisattva in name only. With regard to his own school, however, he is a real Bodhisattva. The meaning of this passage shows that because the Hua-yen is the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine, it is not the same as the other

[Bodhisattva vehicle].

8. Eight, the distinction of difficult to believe and easy to believe. [478b] It says in the chapter called "Chief of the Wise" 賢首, in this [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra, "There are few among all the kinds of beings in the world who seek the path of the *śrāvakas*; those who seek [the path of] the *pratyekabuddhas* are even fewer; those who seek the great vehicle are exceedingly rare. To seek the great vehicle is still [comparatively] easy; to be able to believe this [one vehicle] Dharma is exceedingly difficult." [T.9.441] To explain, because this chapter rightly shows that the last moment 終心 of the stage of faith includes all stages, as well as such matters as Buddhahood, consequently, it surpasses the three vehicles. Probably because it is hard to believe, it brings forward the three vehicles and judges them by comparison.

9. Nine, the distinction of revealing principles in connection with capacity 機. The first verse of the ninth stage of this [*Daśabhūmika*] sutra says, "If there are inferior beings with thoughts of distaste [for *saṁsāra*] and cessation [in *nirvāna*], I show the path of the *śrāvakas* and cause them to escape all suffering. Again, if there are beings whose faculties are a little bright and sharp, who delight in the law of causes and conditions, I teach the path of the *pratyekabuddhas* to them. If there are men of bright and keen faculties, who have thoughts of

great compassion, and who benefit beings, I teach the path of the Bodhisattva to them. If there are men with supreme minds [of *bodhi*], who delight in great activities, for them I reveal the [ten-fold] body of the Buddha, and teach the inexhaustible Dharma of the Buddha." [T.9.567] To explain, because this shows the infinitely repeated interrelationship of primary and secondary 主伴, it says "inexhaustible Dharma of the Buddha." It is not the same as the Dharma of one characteristic 一相 and one cessation 一寂, etc., of the three vehicles. Because in this [ninth] *bhūmi* the Bodhisattva becomes a great teacher of the Dharma, and the mode of teaching the Dharma is shown, therefore [the sutra] reveals the distinction of the expressions "one vehicle" and "three vehicles".

Notes. When a Bodhisattva reaches the ninth *bhūmi*, he acquires, among other things, 40 kinds of eloquence in debate and teaching, and therefore he qualifies as a Dharma teacher. At this stage he is shown how to teach the Dharma to people with widely varying capacities for absorbing the doctrine, and therefore the distinction between the three vehicles and one vehicle has to be shown. The passage from the *Daśabhūmika* shows the differences. Again, the difference between the three vehicles and one vehicle is shown and the superiority of the man with a capacity for one vehicle truth is emphasized.

Taikei I.144-47; *Kōgi* 66-67

Text. 10. Ten, the distinction of dividing and uniting the fundamental and derivative 本末開合. The *Mahāyānābhisamaya*-*sūtra* [? = 大乘同性經] says "All the Dharmas of the *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas flow into the great ocean of the store of wisdom of Vairocana." [T.16.650] This passage separates the differences between fundamental and derivative, and again unites the derivative and restores it to the fundamental. It just illustrates the principle of the distinction of one vehicle and three.

These above ten pieces of evidence serve as examples. The characteristics of the stages of practice, cause and effect, etc., which the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine has shown, and those teachings of the three vehicles, are completely different, not alike, in their arrangement. They are discussed extensively in the sutras, and are discussed below [in chapter 8] in brief. Even if there were no scriptural basis [for the division], we would still have to divide the schools according to differences of meaning. How much more does the holy teaching dazzle the eyes with its splendor when the clouds are dispelled!

Complete Union

The second topic [under the category of the realm of Samantabhadra] is that of complete union 該攝. All the Dharmas of the three vehicles, etc., are originally the Dharma of the one vehicle. Why is that? Because from the point of view of the one vehicle, the three vehicles can be seen in two ways: the not different 不異 and not identical 不一 .

The first also has two divisions. First, since the three vehicles are the same as the one, they are therefore not different. Second, since the one vehicle is the same as the three, they are therefore not different. Question: In the case of the first category of the three being the same as the one, we do not know whether the three exist or not. If they exist, how can there be only the one vehicle? If they are abolished, then relying on what Dharma would the beings with capacities for the three vehicles be able to progress [to the one vehicle]? [478c] Answer: There are four alternatives: one, since they [i.e., three vehicles] are the same as the one, there is no need for abolition; two, since they are identical [with the one] there is no obstruction to their existence; three, since they are identical, they are not abolished; four, since they are identical, [the three] can not exist. On the basis of the first two principles, the beings of three-vehicle capacity are able to have a support. As a result of the last two meanings, the beings of the three-vehicle capacity can enter the one vehicle. Because there is identity in the four alternatives, there is thus only one vehicle and no other.

Second, non-difference is shown by the identity of the one vehicle with the three. There are four alternatives of concealment and revelation, and you should consider them in contrast with the above [question and answer]. Therefore, there are only three vehicles, not just one. This is the same as the explanation in the section on "Common Doctrine", which follows.

The second category is the non-identical. The three vehicles which are the one, and the above one vehicle which is identical with the three are not the same category. [Therefore, they remain one vehicle and three vehicles.] Here, we have shown their non-difference without injuring their non-identity. Also, herein, the non-identity is the above-mentioned category of separation, and the non-difference is this present category of total inclusion.

Notes. Whereas the previous section developed the idea that the three vehicles and the one vehicle are separate, the present section for the most part develops the contrary idea that the three and one are identical. Indeed, there is nothing which is not included within the one vehicle; both in essence and characteristics, the three vehicles are derivations of that totality which compromised the content of the *samudra*-*mudrā*-*samādhi*. In form, this section presents an odd bit of categorizing and sub-categorizing. The two divisions of this section, the non-different and the non-identical, correspond to the two larger sections of 分相 and 該攝, so that the section on separation in included under total inclusion. The commentaries say simply that this is an attempt at complete exposition of the relationship of the one and three. Also, since this section concludes the whole first section on the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine, such a general summary is perhaps not really out of place. It should also be noted that in the first section here, on the identity of three and one, there are also two divisions. When the three are identified with the one, the one is the distinct one vehicle. When the one is identified with the three, the one is the common variety of one vehicle. Then, as I have already mentioned, the final section on non-identity reasserts the separateness of the one and the three, and is none other than the earlier section on separation.

The reason given---that from the point of view of the one vehicle there are two categories---answers an unspoken question "Since you have already asserted earlier that the one vehicle and three vehicles are different, why do you now contradict yourself by saying that they are the same?" The answer forms this section, taking the form outlined above: that is, in the relationship of the three and the one, we can see that they are 1. not different, and 2. not one.

The four alternatives are meant to answer the question: "If the three vehicles exist, how can there be only one vehicle, etc.?" Fa-tsang's answer is that they can both exist and yet be identical with the one vehicle. The reasoning behind the four alternatives is based on identity of essence and characteristics, and takes the following form:

1. The three vehicles in their essence are originally the one vehicle, so they are the one vehicle and cannot be destroyed. (Abolition is denied on the basis of essence.)

2. The characteristics of the three vehicles are fundamentally those of the one vehicle, so while being the three vehicles, they are one vehicle. (Existence is affirmed on the basis of characteristics.)

3. The characteristics of the three vehicles are fundamentally those of the one vehicle, so they must be abolished as three vehicles so they may enter the one vehicle. (Abolition is affirmed on the basis of characteristics.)

4. The three vehicles in their essence are originally the one vehicle, so they cannot exist as they are, but rather are the one vehicle just as they are. (Existence is denied on the basis of essence.)

These four correspond to the four alternatives given above by Fa-tsang. In one and two, existence is affirmed, and in three and four it is denied. Although there appears tò be a contradiction, it is to be noted that in one, the existence of the three is affirmed with regard to essence, while in three their existence is denied on the basis of characteristics. In two, they exist with regard to characteristics and in four they do not exist on the basis of essence. As the text says, the first two show that the three vehicles have a support, and this is because their existence is rooted in the one. The second two show that the three can progress and enter the one vehicle because tough they exist as the three vehicles, they have only a provisional status, and the reality is to be found only within the one vehicle. Thus, Fa-tsang comes to his favorite position of the existence of plurality, or diversity, in unity. The three vehicles exist and yet are nothing but the one vehicle.

The contrary position, that the one is the same as the three, or is the three, is said from the point of view of the _common doctrine_. The reasoning here is to be found in Fa-tsang's rather terse statement about the four alternatives of obscurity and revelation, to be seen in contrast with the preceding statements in the text. Since it can never be a question of the non-existence of the one vehicle in its essence, the expressions "obscurity" and "revelation" are used instead. The question now is, if the one is the three, does the one become obscured in the identification, or is it revealed? If it is revealed, how can there be only three, etc.. The four alternatives then take the following form:

1. Because the one is the three, it does not require obscurity; the _characteristics_ of the one vehicle are those of the three vehicles without needing to be obscured.
2. Because the one is the three, its revelation is not hindered; the _essence_ of the one is revealed in its identity with the three.
3. Because the one is identical with the three, it is not obscured; its _characteristics_ are obscured from the beginning when the three are revealed.
4. Because the one is identical with the three, it can not be revealed; when the three are revealed, they are not outside the one vehicle, from the standpoint of _essence_, so they are revealed as the essence of the one, and the one as such is not revealed.

Because of the first two reasons, the one vehicle has a support; because of the last two reasons, the one vehicle can enter the three; i.e., it can become enlightened in three-vehicle Dharma and thus fulfill its nature of being universal. There are three vehicles and no other.

Thus, whether the three are the one, or, conversely, the one is the three, they are not different. Last of all, they are not the same, because the three vehicles which are the one, and the one which is the three are not the same; i.e., they are separate, as was shown in the previous section. While maintaining the difference of the preceding section, they have been shown here to be identical.

Taikei I.157-60; _Kōgi_ 70-76

The Common Doctrine

Text. The common doctrine has two parts; the first divides the vehicle [in various numerical categories];

the other unites the fundamental and derivative 本末 . There are six types of the first. Number one [of the six types] explains one vehicle, and herein there are seven kinds.

1. Seven Kinds of One Vehicle

First, the one vehicle is explained in connection with intermixing of Dharma items; i.e., for instance, in the three vehicles there are such things as the teaching of the net of Indra, and very small things including the very large, but there is no teaching of the infinite interrelationship of primary and secondary. Or, they may teach the world contained in the lotus 華藏世界, but they do not teach its inexhaustibleness, etc.. Or, in the one vehicle there are Dharma items of the three vehicles; i.e., like the five kinds of vision among the ten, or the six supernatural powers among the ten. Nevertheless, the sense of these things is different [in the one vehicle and three vehicles]. Here, the one vehicle is pulled down to the level of the three, and the three are involved in the one. In this case, both schools are connected together [*via* the mutuality of Dharma items] and the three vehicles are attracted, their capacities, desires, and natures are perfected, and they are caused to enter the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine.

Notes. This first section shows that the one vehicle of the common doctrine embraces the three vehicles through the overlapping of such Dharma items as the supernatural powers, the teaching of the universe which is like the net of Indra, etc.. Among the ten kinds of supernatural vision of the one vehicle, five are the traditional ones of the Mahāyāna. The three vehicles teach some of the same things as the one vehicle does, and vice-versa, but the meaning is different. For instance, the three vehicles teach the world contained in the lotus, as does the one vehicle, but there is a profound difference. The world contained in the lotus is this whole world system seen as existing within a great lotus, which in turn grows out of the water circle beneath the earth. It is the world purified and glorified by the practices of Samantabhadra, though ordinary worldlings can not see it in this way. Now the three-vehicle view of this lotus-store world is, according to Fa-tsang, limited, while the same world as conceived by the one vehicle is the world of the ten Buddhas, where the interrelationship of phenomenal fact and fact is inexhaustible. It is, indeed, the world of 主伴具足 , while the same world in the three vehicle version is the *dharmadhātu* of a single characteristic; i.e., probably *śūnyatā*. For more on the lotus-store world, cf. Mochizuki, *Daijiten*, p.5040ff., and Oda, *Daijiten*, p.389. See also *Taikei* I.162-63, and *Kōgi* 78.

The "large things included in small things" alluded to is, for instance, Vimalakirti including Mt. Sumeru in a mustard seed. The same sort of thing occurs in the *Laṅkāvatāra*.

Text. Two,[the one vehicle] in connection with the inclusion of skillful means 攝方便 ; i.e., because all the Dharmas of the three vehicles, etc., are wholly the expedient of the one vehicle, they are all called "one vehicle", because of which the [*Saddharmapundarīka*] sutra says, "All that has been done [i.e., *upāya*] is for one great object," etc.. [T.9.7]

The third is explained in connection with the derived 所流; i.e., because the three vehicles, etc., are all derived from the one vehicle. Therefore, the [*Saddharmapundarīka*] sutra says, "That which you practice is the way of the Bodhisattva." [T.9.20] Also,[the *Śrīmalādevī-sūtra*]says, "The *vinaya* is the same as the great vehicle [i.e., the one vehicle]." [T.12.219]

[479a] The fourth concerns the category of the superior. That is to say, the great vehicle among the three vehicles is considered to be the one vehicle, because from the point of view of the distinct doctrine [i.e., one vehicle], even though there is a difference of expedient and true, they are both equally the vehicle of the Bodhisattva. Thus, the *Saddharmapundarīka* sutra says, "Only this vehicle 事 is real; the other two are not real." [T.9.8] It also says, "For the sake of cessation, I teach two *nirvānas*," etc.. [T.9.27] There are two interpretations to these passages. First, from the point of view of the distinct doctrine, the remaining two are the great and small two vehicles, because the *śrāvakas*, etc., even though differing in sharpness and dullness [of faculties], all anticipate a small result, and because the one vehicle is differentiated from the two. From the point of view of the common doctrine, the disciples [and *pratyekabuddhas*] are the two, and the great vehicle is equated with the one vehicle.

Five concerns the profundity and subtlety of the doctrine and its items. The [*Saddharmapundarīka*] sutra says, "I eternally abide on the Vulture Peak," etc.. [T.9.43]

Notes. Here "profundity and subtlety" are opposed to shallowness and coarseness. The full passage from the sutra reads, "I eternally abide on the Vulture Peak and other places. When beings see the eon utterly burned by the great conflagration [at the end of the *kalpa*], this land of mine is [in reality] tranquil, and is always full of *devas* and men." The common doctrine sees the world as the Pure Land, and hence not subject to periodic dissolution, as the three vehicles believe. Now, this view of the common doctrine is very similar to the view held by the Hua-yen that this world is the world contained in the lotus; i.e., a world glorified by the practices of Samantabhadra. The common doctrine is profound; therefore, such a doctrinal item as this is subtle, in opposition to the coarser view held by the three vehicles. However, the one vehicle of the common doctrine holds the view of the three vehicles to be provisionally true, an *upāya*, and yet at the same time offers the eternally abiding Buddha in his Pure Land as a higher, final truth, and in maintaining both views, qualifies as the one vehicle.

Taikei I.182-83; *Kōgi* 83

Text. The sixth concerns the intention of eight interpretations, like the discussion in the "Questions and Answers"[in Chih-yen's *Fifty Essential Questions and Answers*], based on the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*.

Notes. *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (T.31.265) lists four intentions of the Buddha in teaching according to the capacities of his audience. The third intention, (different meaning 別義) is subdivided to make eight interpretations, each of which gives a reason for teaching one vehicle. The eight are:

1. In order to attract one kind of *śrāvaka*, those who are not completely fixed in that category, the one vehicle is taught in order to get them to enter the *great vehicle*.
2. In order to provide a support for the remainder, one vehicle is taught in order to get them to avoid remaining in the two vehicles and to enter the vehicle of the Bodhisattva quickly.
3. Because of the sameness of the Dharma, even though the three vehicles are different, *tathatā* is one, so one vehicle is taught.
4. One vehicle is taught because in the three vehicles there is unanimity of opinion on the selflessness of beings (though not of *dharmas*).
5. The sameness of liberation. All vehicles strive for liberation from the obstructions of *kleśa* (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*) (though not from *jñeya-āvaraṇa*).
6. Unlikeness of natures. The practices of the *śrāvaka* in his present life, and his Bodhisattva nature,

which exists fundamentally, are unlike, but if the disciple turns to the Mahāyāna, his reward is the same as that of the Bodhisattva; therefore, one vehicle is taught.

7. Because of the acquisition of the two convictions. The first conviction is that of the Buddhas, who acquire the conviction that they are identical with all beings, and thus all other beings will become Buddhas. The second conviction is that of the *śrāvakas* and other beings, who are convinced that they will become Buddhas. There is thus the double conviction of the converter and the converted.

8. Because the Buddhas transfer themselves into small-vehicle Buddhas in order to get the *śrāvaka* to cultivate the practices of the small vehicle. But the body which transforms itself is the one vehicle.

For somewhat the same list, see also Lamotte's translation of the *Msg.*, *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asanga* (Louvain, 1938), II, 326-28, including his notes. There, the list is slightly different; the above list divides the first reason of Lamotte's list into two separate reasons and omits the eighth reason in *La Somme du Grand Véhicule*. At any rate, by means of these eight reasons, the three vehicles are called "one vehicle," and that is the meaning of Fa-tsang's brief statement.

Taikei I.184-88; *Kogi* 84-85

Text. Seven concerns the skillful means of the ten interpretations. This is as explained in the *K'ung-mu-chang* [孔目章 of Chih-yen].

Notes. In the *K'ung-mu-chang*, Chih-yen divides the one vehicle into two parts, the correct, or true one vehicle, and the one vehicle of skillful means. The latter is analyzed from the standpoint of ten contrasting statements, in each one of which the three and one are contrasted. I shall list only the first three as an example of the reasoning involved.

1. With regard to the *Triratna*: The Buddha is the one vehicle; the Dharma and Sangha are the three vehicles. That is to say, the Buddha is inexhaustible; the three vehicles are indeterminate.

2. With regard to the *Catuhsatya*: *nérodha* (cessation) is the one vehicle; *duhkha* (suffering), *samudaya* (origination), and *mārga* (path) are the three vehicles. Same reason as above.

3. With regard to the two truths: *paramārtha-satya* (the highest truth) is the one vehicle; *lokasamvrti-satya* (conventional truth) is the three vehicles. Same reason as above.

The other seven contrasts are similar; in each case the one vehicle is shown to be superior to the three vehicles.

Taikei I.189-92; Kōgi 85-87

Text. On the basis of the above interpretations, the three vehicles, etc., are all called one vehicle, because they are established in accordance with the fundamental school. Because they do not have the doctrine of the infinite interrelationship of primary and secondary, they are the common [school of one vehicle], not the distinct.

Notes. The seven interpretations of one vehicle are all made from the point of view of the common doctrine, They variously explain the three vehicles as being included in the one, or the one in the three; the main point is that the three vehicles are called one vehicle. However, in this one vehicle, there is no teaching of the infinite interrelationship of primary and secondary, so this is a case of the common, not the distinct form of one vehicle.

Taikei I.189-92; Kōgi 87-88

2. The Three Kinds of Two Vehicles

Text. Two shows there are three kinds of two vehicles. One, the one vehicle and three vehicles are the two vehicles; i.e., like that [great white ox cart] offered at the four crossroads and the three carts near the gate in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Here, the Dharma of the ignorant[愚法 i.e., the small vehicle] are combined with those who have turned to the great vehicle迴心 . Since they are both small vehicle, there are only two. Two, the great vehicle and small vehicle are the two vehicles.

Here, the one is united [to the two groups who have turned to the Mahāyāna] to make three. The Dharma of the ignorant is separated from those who have turned to the Mahāyāna. Three, the disciples and *pratyekabuddhas* are the two vehicles. They correspond [in each case] to the Dharma of the ignorant and those who have turned to the Mahāyāna. Also, the first concerns the one vehicle, the second the three vehicles, and the third the small vehicle. You should understand [the three kinds] correspondingly.

Notes. The question "What are the two vehicles?" is here answered by the one vehicle, three vehicles, and small vehicle respectively. The one vehicle says that the two are the one vehicle and the three vehicles. In this case, the three vehicles are *śrāvaka*, *pratyekabuddha*, and Bodhisattva. Among the first two, there are *śrāvakas* who follow the so-called Dharma of the ignorant, and those who have been partially converted to the Mahāyāna *via* an acceptance of *dharma*-*śūnyatā*. Also, among the *pratyekabuddhas*, both types can be found. Fa-tsang assigns the members of both *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* who belong to the Dharma of the ignorant to one class, and members of each group who partially adhere to the Mahāyāna to that class; i.e., the 迴心 . Thus, categories are really in terms of type rather than vehicle. The three groups that result from this reshuffle are 1. the Dharma of the ignorant, made up of both *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*; 2. those who have turned to the Mahāyana, made up of both; and 3. Bodhisattvas. It should be noted here that the Dharma of the ignorant is based on the *Āgamas*, *Abhidharmakośa*, and *Vibhāṣā*. Those who have turned to the Mahayana are represented by the *Saṁdhinirmocana-sutra*, *Yogacara-bhūmi-śāstra*, *Prajñāpāramitā-sutra*, and various texts of the *Mādhyamika* and *Vijñānavāda*.

The second kind of two vehicles is made from the point of view of the Mahāyāna. Here, the two vehicles are the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Here, the Mahāyāna consists of the true Mahāyāna Bodhisattva *per se*, and those who have turned toward the Mahāyāna *via* acceptance of the two-fold emptiness. The small vehicle is derived from the separation of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* who do not accept *dharma*-*śūnyatā* from those who do, and putting them in the lowest class. Thus, there are two vehicles, the large and the small.

The third group is made from the standpoint of the small vehicle itself; the Mahāyāna does not even appear here, because for the small vehicle, it doesn't exist. The two vehicles are those of the *śrāvaka* and *pratyeka-buddha*. Among each there are those who follow the Āgamas, etc., (i.e., the Dharma of the ignorant), and those who have turned partially to the Mahāyāna.

Taikei I.193; *Kōgi* 88-89

3. The Three Kinds of Three Vehicles

Text. Three shows that the three vehicles are also of three kinds. First, the one vehicle, three vehicles, and small vehicle are the three vehicles. Because this is in order to show original and derivative, the one vehicle is separated out below. Thus, there are only three [groups]. Because in the *Saddharmapundarīka* the two vehicles making up the Dharma of the ignorant consist of the sons who are drawn from the house, we know that there is a separate small vehicle outside the three vehicles. Because the three carts draw the sons out, we know that outside the small vehicle there are three other vehicles. When the three boys go all the way out to the open place, they are then offered the different great white ox cart. Therefore, we know that outside the three vehicles there is a separate one vehicle.

Question: How do you know that the two vehicles making up the Dharma of the ignorant are among those to be drawn from the house? Answer: Because, from the point of view of the later teaching of Mahāyāna and later, it can not be said that the two vehicles of the Dharma of the ignorant have completely left the triple world [i.e., they are still in the burning house, the triple world, while the three vehicles are outside]. Why is this? Because the defilement consisting of attachment to a self is not yet extinguished for good. They can only suppress it, and that is all. Thus it says in the treatise on the *Sutra of the Questions to Maitreya*, "None of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* can really cultivate the four Immeasurables. They can not completely extinguish all the defilements, [479b] because they are only able to suppress the defilements." [T.26.265 Int.] Also, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* says, "That *nirvāṇa* which you have obtained is not the real *nirvāṇa*." [T.9.7] It also says, "If you do not have faith in this Dharma, it is impossible to possess the result of Arhatship." [T.9.7] Also, the Large *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* says, "He who wishes to acquire such things as Arhatship ought to learn the perfection of wisdom [*prajñāpāramitā*]." [T.8.220 Int.] Therefore, you should know that the true meaning of Arhatship is in the great vehicle. Therefore, the great vehicle surely possesses three vehicles.

Thus, the *Ajātaśatru-kaukṛtya-vinodana-sūtra* says, "There are three vehicles within such a great vehicle as this; i.e., there are three groups 藏; i.e., the group of the disciples, group of the *pratyekabuddhas*, and group of the Bodhisattvas. Only within this great vehicle can there be three groups. Within the other two, these are lacking." [T.15.418] It says the same in the *Mahāyāna-avatāra-śāstra*. [T.32.36] Therefore, you should know that the three vehicles outside the gate do not correspond to the Dharma of the ignorant, because the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* opposes the small vehicle. What is meant here is the difference between, on the one hand, the section on *śrāvakas* 聲聞決擇 in the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* and the explanations in treatises such as the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā* [T.31], which explain the delimitations of doctrine, practices, stages, and result of *śrāvakas*, as well as the extinction of *kleśa*, and, on the other hand, such works as the *Vibhāṣa* and the *Abhidharmakośa*. Therefore, you should know that the boundaries of the one vehicle, three vehicles, and small vehicle are different.

Notes. Here, in this first type of three vehicles, the emphasis is on the clear distinction not only between the three vehicles and one vehicle, but also on the distinction between the three vehicles and the small vehicle. The question and answer are devoted to sharply delineating the line between three vehicles and small vehicle. The people in the burning house are the members of the small vehicle. One of the reasons for their not being outside the house---that is, still not freed from the bonds of *saṁsara*---is that from the point of view of later Mahāyāna teachings the small vehicle does not recognize the *ālaya-vijñāna* and its *bīja*, and thus, without attending to *bīja* and the perfumings of the *ālaya*, attachment to self can never be severed, only suppressed. The following testimonies from sutras and treatises show this and support the position that those inside the house and those outside the house are different. The sutra testimonies emphasize the fact that those in the house are equivalent to beings who have not yet left the triple world; the later quotations, mainly from sāstra literature, point up the fact that the three carts near the gate are equivalent to the three vehicles of Bodhisattvas, and *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* who have turned to the Mahāyana, and therefore different from those beings still in the house. The last passages in particular distinguish between the two kinds of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*. In the first group of texts, represented by the *Yogacārabhūmi*, the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* do not belong to the "Dharma of the ignorant," while in the other group, represented by the *Kośa*, they do, according to their own doctrines. Those of the first group are the people in the house; those of the second group belong to the three vehicles.

Taikei I.194-98; *Kōgi* 90-95

Text. On the basis of this interpretation, the *Ta chih-tu lun* 大智度論 says that there are two kinds of perfection of wisdom; one is the common, and the other is the uncommon. The so-called common is said to be the Mahāyāna [*Prajñāpāramitā*] sutras and other *vaipulya* sutras, because they were taught in common to all groups of disciples. The uncommon is the *Acintya-sūtra* [i.e., the *Avataṁsaka*], because it was not taught in common to the disciples. [T.25.310,357,754 Int.] The explanation is, the *Acintya-sūtra* is that by which that treatise itself indicates the *Avataṁsaka-sutra*. Because this only teaches the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine, it is called uncommon. This is understood in accordance with the meaning, just as the four *Āgamas* are also called uncommon, because they only teach the doctrine of the two vehicles of the Dharma of the ignorant. It is like the *Prajñāpāramitā* [sutra], etc.. It teaches the doctrines of the three vehicles in common by gathering together the beings of the three vehicles and causing them to obtain the benefit of the three vehicles. Therefore, it is called common. Here, the small vehicle which is common to the great vehicle is not the Dharma of the ignorant, and the great vehicle which is common to the small is not the one vehicle.

Notes. The *Ta chih-tu lun* is quoted to corroborate Fa-tsang's thesis that the three vehicles are composed of the Mahayāna Bodhisattva and the two vehicles who have turned to the Mahāyāna *via* acceptance of *dharma-śūnyatā*, etc.. "This is understood in accordance..." means that even though the *Ta chih-tu lun* does not explicitly equate the "uncommon" *prajñāpāramitā* with the one vehicle, we should nevertheless understand it in this way, just as the *Āgamas* are uncommon for the same reason given.

Taikei I.199-201; *Kōgi* 96-97

Text. Based on these three interpretations, the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "There are three types in the perfect establishment [*suvyavasthā* 善成立 i.e., of the True Dharma]. The first is the small vehicle, the second is the three vehicles, and the third is the one vehicle. Because the third stands highest, we say 'perfect establishment'." [T.31.212] This is the matter at hand. If you say that when [the Buddha] taught the Large *Prajñāpāramitā* [sutra], etc., the audience acquired small results, and therefore there are three vehicles, because there were different interpretations of a single sound, then when he taught the *Avataṁsaka*, there being different interpretations, why didn't they acquire small results? Also, when he taught the *Ekottara-āgama*, etc., there being different interpretations, why didn't they acquire major results? Therefore, you should know, each of the three schools is different. This is certain from the point of view of reason.

Notes. Here there is a refutation of the theory of Bodhiruci, unnamed here, that each person acquired what he was capable of when he heard the single teaching of the Buddha, and this explains the division of the Dharma into parts; i.e., the three vehicles. Fa-tsang insists that the three were three from the very beginning, taught as three, and are different from each other, and from both the one vehicle and small vehicle.

Taikei I.201-02; *Kōgi* 97-98

Text. Second, the great vehicle, medium vehicle, and small vehicle are the three vehicles. [479c] This has three interpretations. First, the one vehicle is combined with and equated with the great vehicle, and the Dharma of the ignorant is combined with the small vehicle. Therefore, there are only three [vehicles]. The principle is evident. This is said in connection with the one vehicle. The second is as mentioned above; there are three vehicles within the great vehicle itself. Third, there are also three vehicles within the small vehicle itself. According to the treatises of the small vehicle itself, there are the Dharmas of the *śrāvakas*, the *pratyekabuddhas*, and the Buddha Dharma. Here, the Dharma of the Buddha is nothing but compassion, altruistic actions, etc., because it is different from the two vehicles.

Notes. In the first category, the three are *śrāvaka*, *pratyekabuddha*, and Mahāyāna Bodhisattva. The one vehicle is included in the large vehicle, and the 愚法 is lumped with the small vehicle. That is to say, the *pratyeka*-

buddha who belongs to the Dharma of the ignorant is included in the group of _pratyekabuddhas_ who belong to the group which has turned to the Mahāyāna 迴心 , and the _śrāvakas_ of the Dharma of the ignorant are grouped with _śrāvakas_ who have turned to the Mahāyāna. Thus, the three are in terms of type; Bodhisattvas belong to the great vehicle, _pratyekabuddhas_ to the medium vehicle, and _śrāvakas_ to the small vehicle. Also, in the second classification, the Mahāyāna itself has small, medium, and large. The third group also has three; _i.e._, the small vehicle itself recognizes a hierarchy of _śrāvaka_, _pratyekabuddha_, and Buddha, the last being a one-member class. Fa-tsang ends the three kinds of three vehicles at this point and does not discuss the third type. The commentaries consider the third group of the above second type of three vehicles to be the third type.

Taikei I.201-02; _Kōgi_ 98-99

4. The Three Kinds of Four Vehicles

Text. Four, three kinds of four vehicles. First, the one vehicle and the three vehicles are the four vehicles. In this case, the one vehicle is differentiated from the three, and the two [kinds of disciple, the 愚法 and 迴心 are combined. Second, the one vehicle, three vehicles, small vehicle, and the vehicle of men and deities are the four. This is the idea of total analysis. Third, the three vehicles and the vehicle of men and deities are the four. You can understand this with reference to the above.

Notes. By the last sentence, Fa-tsang means that the three are the small, medium, and large.

Taikei I.201-02; _Kōgi_ 99-100

5. The Three Kinds of Five Vehicles

Text. Fifth, there may be three kinds of five vehicles. First, the one vehicle, three vehicles, and small vehicle are the five. Second, the three vehicles, the vehicle of men, and the vehicle of the deities are the five. Third, the Buddha [vehicle], the two vehicles, [vehicle of] the deities [of the realm of desire] and Brahmadevas are the five. You can understand all this in the same way as the above.

Notes. The last sentence means that each of the three interpretations should be seen as made from the viewpoint of the one vehicle, three vehicles, and small vehicle respectively. In the second group, the gods of the kāma-loka and the Brahmadevas are combined to make a single class, while in the third interpretation, the two are put in separate classes. Since this last interpretation is made from the point of view of the small vehicle itself, the Mahāyāna naturally does not appear.

Taikei I.202; Kōgi 100

6. Innumerable Vehicles

Text. Sixth, there may be countless vehicles; i.e., all the teachings of the Dharma. Thus, this [Avataṁsaka] sutra says, "In a single world you hear the sound which speaks of one vehicle, or two, three, four, five, or even countless vehicles." [T.9.787] This is what is meant here. In the above I have concluded the division of the vehicles.

Two, the harmony of fundamental and derivative: all the vehicles of this common doctrine are in harmony and non-dual, the same one dharma-dhātu. This has two parts.

Notes. This is the second of the two parts which comprise the larger section on "Common Doctrine." "All the vehicles of this common doctrine" refers to the various vehicles discussed in the immediately preceding section. In that section, a little was said about the unity of the one and three vehicles. This concluding section of the first chapter, however, is completely devoted to the thesis that there is complete harmony of the one and three. In the foregoing section, where the one vehicle was the "root", and the three were the "limbs", the difference between one and three was posited on the basis of characteristics. Now, on the basis of the essence of one vehicle, the one and three are harmonized. Thus, in essence they are one, in characteristics they are many. In this apparent contradiction lies the essence of Hua-yen philosophy; that is, the identity of the one and many, of diversity in unity and unity in diversity.

Taikei I.203-05; Kōgi 101-02

Text. One is the topic of obliterating [attachment to] the provisional and returning to the real 泯權歸實. It is the teaching of the one vehicle. Two is the topic of retaining the real and forming the provisional 攬實成權. It is the teaching of the three vehicles, etc.. The first does not destroy 壞 the provisional, yet, because it obliterates [attachment to] it 泯, the three vehicles are identical with the one vehicle, but the three are not hindered. Last, [the provisional] is not different from the real, yet is provisional; therefore, the one and the three are fused, non-dual in essence.

Notes. The first of the two topics is equated with 會三歸一. The passage clearly denies the destruction of the provisional, but the commentaries gloss 泯 with 泯亡, so that is apparently the meaning. The character also has the meaning of "to muddy", perhaps with the extended meaning of "to obscure". Perhaps what is meant is that even though the vehicles themselves are not destroyed, attachment to them is, and consequently the practitioners of the three vehicles enter the one. At any rate, the meaning here is that the Dharma which is essentially one but taught in a fragmented form is reassembled and restored to its one-vehicle status. It is also equated with 從末歸本. The second category is equated with 從本垂末. It refers to the condescension on the part of the Buddha in dividing the unitary Dharma into parts for the benefit of listeners who could not absorb the whole truth. He retains the real but creates the provisional. While in essence the three are only one vehicle, each vehicle retains its own peculiar characteristics. The problem of how separate identity is maintained within this unity leads to the next question.

Taikei I.205-06; Kōgi 102-03

Text. Question: If that is so, the two categories [of provisional and real] are alike. Then how can you say that there are provisional and real? Answer: Because of difference of purpose, 義門 , provisional and real always exist. Because principle 理 is universally pervasive they are completely the same. The reason for this is that when the provisional comes into being, it necessarily relies on the real. Therefore, in retaining the real, the real is not lost. [However], the revelation of the real does not at all rely on the provisional. Therefore, in obliterating [attachment to] the provisional [into one vehicle], the provisional is not established. Thus, the three vehicles being identical with the one, even though they may exist or be destroyed, they necessarily are exhausted finally. The one vehicle being identical with the three, even though it may be illuminated or obscured, it is never exhausted at all.

Notes. The answer to the question is in terms of essence and characteristics. The expedient three vehicles can not exist apart from the essence of the one vehicle, which is not lost in the division of the one into three. Yet, on the contrary, when the three are fused together through the essence of the one, there are no longer three. The common simile of water and waves is used as an example. There are no waves without water, and when water is formed into waves, it does not lose its "waterness." Yet, the water does not need waves for its own self-revelation.

Taikei I.207-08; *Kōgi* 104-05

Text. Hence, there are four alternatives in this harmony. One, there may be only one vehicle; i.e., the distinct doctrine. Two, there may be only three vehicles, like the teaching of the three vehicles, because they are not acquainted with the one. Three, there may be both one and three, like the common doctrine. Four, there may be neither one nor three, like the above "Ocean of Result." [480a] Each alternative among the four completely includes the essence of the Dharma. Therefore, the various vehicles may either exist or perish, but they do not impede each other. This can be understood upon consideration. The explanation of other vehicles, showing the essence, etc., is as explained elsewhere [in such works by Fa-tsang as the 起信論別記]. The foregoing explanation of the establishment of one vehicle is completed.

Notes. The first alternative refers to the above category of "obliterating attachment to the provisional and returning to the real" where the real is the distinct doctrine, the origin of the other vehicles. The second is the category of "retaining the real and forming the provisional," where the one is maintained as essence but revealed in the form of three vehicles, so the three are existent and the one is obscured. The third combines one and two; there are both one and three, the view of the common doctrine of one vehicle. The three exist as *upāya* which leads one to the one vehicle. The fourth refers to the inexpressible content of the Buddha's enlightenment, where there are no such distinctions.

In the above four alternatives, all of the five doctrines---one vehicle, three vehicles, and small vehicle---are included. Fa-tsang has shown that each of the five retains its individuality within the overall framework which was erected by the Buddha in order to cope with beings of different capabilities. Yet, they are all bound together by a common essence. Thus, when we look at the others from the point of view of the distinct doctrine of one vehicle, since it includes all others, the others do not exist as separate essences. From the point of view of the three vehicles, they comprise all aspects of the Dharma; consequently, there is no separate one vehicle; it is obscured at that time, while they exist. Thus, from different points of view there is alternate existence and non-existence, revelation and obscurity. But from an absolute viewpoint, there is truly only the one vehicle, the destiny of all beings, who will be made by it to achieve Buddhahood. Yet, each of the doctrines serves its purpose in the larger scheme, flourishes, and exists alongside the others. However, in the final analysis, only the one vehicle is real and eternal, while the three vehicles may or may not exist; in the end, they are restored to the real.

Taikei I.209-12; Kōgi 105-06

Chapter 2

Attraction and Benefits of Doctrine and Meaning

Text. Attraction and benefits of doctrine and meaning; this topic has two parts. First, the discussion of the scope of doctrine and meaning, then the scope of attraction and benefit 攝益. There are two parts within the first; one shows characteristics, the other divides and combines them. There are three interpretations to the first [i.e., showing characteristics]. One, the great white ox cart in the open place possesses both doctrine and meaning in itself; i.e., [it possesses] the infinitely-repeated interrelationship of primary and secondary 十十無盡主伴具足 , as taught in the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra*. This refers to the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine. Two, the three vehicles near the gate possess doctrine and meaning in themselves; i.e., the indication of the carts from within the world is doctrine, and escaping [from the triple world] is meaning. Still, doctrine and meaning are not separate [according to the Hua-yen]. This refers to the teaching of the three vehicles. It is like the doctrines of the *Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*, etc.. Three, the three vehicles near the gate are the doctrine, establishing skillful means, and the differently conferred great white ox cart in the realm exterior [to the world, the burning house] is the meaning, revealing the true essence. This refers to the one vehicle of the common doctrine, like the teaching of the *Saddharma-pundarīka*.

Notes. By "doctrine" is meant such things as the sutras, oral teaching, etc., the program of the school in question. "Meaning" is essence or substance. The first is 所詮 ; the second is 能詮 ; i.e., the "explainer" and the "explained". "Meaning is further glossed by 實體 . "Attraction" means simply that---attracting beings to the various vehicles via certain doctrinal items. "Benefit" refers to what an individual derives from a certain vehicle; for instance, Arhatship in the small vehicle, Buddhahood in the one vehicle, etc.. Though the discussion here ranges around these topics, with reference to all five doctrines, the emphasis is on the one vehicle. The question in this chapter centers around the problem of who possesses doctrine, considered by the one vehicle to be merely upāya, and who possesses the essence of the teaching of the Buddha. In Fa-tsang's view, the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine possesses both. In the second interpretation, the three vehicles have both; this is seen from their own point of view, naturally. The doctrine is the program which leads men out of this world, the burning house. Essence is found in the benefits of supramundane character. However, from the point of view of the one vehicle, the benefit is not the true one, because, as the Saddharmapundarīka shows, it is in reality only upāya to attract the boys and lure them from the house, and lead them eventually to the true essence, or meaning, the one vehicle which is symbolized by the great white ox cart. Therefore, Fa'tsang says that doctrine and meaning are not different. The third interpretation is made from the standpoint of the common doctrine. As in the Saddharmapundarīka, the three carts near the gate are only upāya, and the great white ox cart in the open place is the true meaning. The difference between this and the first interpretation is that for the common doctrine, the great white ox cart is the one vehicle as Mahāyāna, while the three vehicles are merely upāya leading men on to the true vehicle. To the distinct doctrine, however, the Mahāyāna is included in the three vehicles, and the great white ox cart is something entirely different.

For a discussion of 十十無盡主伴具足 , see the Introduction pp. 6-9, Mochizuki's Bukkyō Daijiten, vol. III, pp.2270-71, and a good discussion in Yusugi's Kegon-gaku-gairon, pp.127-32. The pages preceding this section of the Gairon might also be read for background.

Taikei I.213-23; Kōgi 107-10

Text. Second, dividing and combining; there are two parts. First is the analytic 別=開 , then the synthetic 總=合. In the analytic, the one vehicle and three vehicles each have three alternatives. With regard to the three alternatives of the three vehicles, first, they may possess doctrine and meaning. This is said from the point of view of the three vehicles themselves. Second, there may be only doctrine and no meaning. This is said from the point of view of the common doctrine. Three, they may lack both doctrine and meaning. This is said from the point of view of the distinct doctrine, because they are all subsumed under 所目 the one.

As for the three possibilities with reference to the one vehicle, first, it may possess both doctrine and meaning. This is said from the point of view of the distinct doctrine. Second, it may have only meaning and no doctrine. This is said from the viewpoint of the common doctrine. Third, it may lack both doctrine and meaning. This is said from the standpoint of the three vehicles, because they obscure its inexhaustible doctrine and meaning [in not being aware of it].

Notes. The three vehicles lack both doctrine and meaning as far as the distinct doctrine is concerned, because from its own point of view these things do not exist outside the one vehicle. The last sentence in the section on the three vehicles means that they are the property of the one in the sense that they are merely derivatives of the one vehicle, and their doctrine and essence is covered by one vehicle items. In the section on the one vehicle, as far as the common doctrine is concerned, meaning resides in the one vehicle (i.e., itself), and doctrine-_upāya_ is the province of the three vehicles. The last sentence means that the three vehicles never hear of the one.

Taikei I.221-23; _Kōgi_ 110-11

Text. Next, if you combine [the one and three vehicles], it may be that [one], both doctrine and meaning are doctrine, because the three vehicles are seen from the point of view of the one vehicle [distinct doctrine]. [Two,] or else doctrine and meaning are both meaning, because the one vehicle is seen from the point of view of the three vehicles. [Three,] or else there are both of these alternatives, which is said from the point of view of the common doctrine. [Four,] or else all vehicles possess both doctrine and meaning. This is said with regard to distinctions of each of the schools themselves.

Notes. 1. The distinct doctrine considers the doctrine and meaning of the three vehicles to be only doctrine, because what the three vehicles consider to be essence-meaning is just the *upāya* of the one vehicle. 2. The three vehicles consider the doctrine and meaning of the one vehicle to be all meaning. 3. From the viewpoint of the common doctrine, the three vehicles are doctrine, the one vehicle is meaning. 4. Each of the vehicles considers itself to have both doctrine and meaning.

Taikei I.224-25; *Kōgi* 112

Text. Two, there are three parts to the explanation of the scope of attraction and benefit. First, attracting only beings 機 within the world and causing them to acquire a supramundane benefit is considered to be final. This is said concerning the schools in question of the three vehicles, as discussed in such texts as the *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra*. Second, attracting the beings 機 outside the world and causing them to acquire a supra-supramundane benefit is considered to be final now. There are two varieties of this. If first they are made to leave the world *via* the three vehicles, and later acquire the one vehicle by means of expedients, in this case, the one vehicle and three vehicles are taught in combination, so this type belongs to the attraction of the common doctrine. It is called the doctrine of turning away from the three and entering the one 迴三入一. [480b] This is as taught in the Saddharmapundarīka. Second, if they have first perfected comprehension and practice 解行 in the one vehicle and afterwards are enlightened in other Dharmas with a supramundane body, then in this case, this category belongs to the attraction of the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine. This is as taught in the chapter "Minor Characteristics," [in the Avataṁsaka]. Third, attracting both kinds of beings 機 and causing them to acquire both benefits in common. This has two parts. If, at first, beings are attracted by the three vehicles and later are caused to acquire the one vehicle, this also attracts the two kinds of beings by the combination of the one and three vehicles and causes them to acquire the two benefits, so it belongs to the common doctrine. This is as taught in the Saddharmapundarīka. [Or, second,] if one sees and hears [the doctrine of the one vehicle] within the world, obtains the Dharma in the supramundane world, and obtains the final result 證成 in the supra-supramundane world, or, on the other hand, if in the world one sees and hears and comprehends and practices together, and only comprehends and practices in the supramundane world, and in the supra-supramundane world obtains the final result, then this belongs to the distinct doctrine. It is as taught in the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra*.

Notes. The three varieties are as follows: 1. Only unenlightened beings still in the world of *saṁsara* are attracted and benefited with a supramundane reward. This is the three vehicle attraction and benefit. 2. Beings who have already escaped *saṁsāra* and then continue on to acquire a higher benefit are attracted. They may be of the common doctrine type or distinct doctrine type, depending on their origin before turning to the one vehicle. 3. Both those still in and those already outside *saṁsāra* are attracted and receive both kinds of benefit. These beings may also be of either common doctrine type or distinct doctrine type. Numbers two and three require further clarification. As already stated, in number two there are two possibilities, depending on how the Bodhisattva starts off. If at first, while in *saṁsāra*, he belongs to the three vehicles and by means of their practices is able to escape the world, and then turns to the one vehicle, this being is of the common doctrine type, because of the combination of three vehicles and one vehicle. The second possibility is that a person while in the world begins to cultivate the practices of the one vehicle and is enlightened in the Dharma of the one vehicle. After he is free of *saṁsāra*, he can complete his practices in a supramundane body. He is of the distinct doctrine type, because all his activity has been within the context of the distinct doctrine of one vehicle.

The third type consists of both types of beings---those still in *saṁsāra* and those who have escaped. Here, also, these beings may belong either to the common type of one vehicle, or the distinct type. It should be mentioned here that when the text speaks of two types of beings---those within the world and without the world---in reality only one being is spoken of, and he is considered both from the aspect of still being in *saṁsāra* and later being out of it. Now if he is of the kind of being who is first attracted by the doctrine of the three vehicles, escapes the world and has that as a supramundane benefit, then is attracted by the one vehicle and acquires the supra-supramundane benefit of Buddhahood, he belongs to the common doctrine. If he is, on the other hand, first attracted by one vehicle doctrine while still in the world, and at this time sees and hears the *ekayana* teaching, and then in a supramundane body perfects enlightenment and Bodhisattva practices, and finally achieves Buddhahood, he belongs to the one vehicle as the distinct doctrine.

This being who belongs to the one vehicle does the above program in three lives, and exemplifies what Hua-yen calls "Achieving Buddhahood in Three Lives" 三生成佛 . That is, the three lives correspond to the above mentioned three phases of religious activity of 1. seeing and hearing 見聞 ; 2. comprehension and practice 解行 ; and 3. experiencing and entering 證入 , the latter being Buddhahood. Generally speaking, these three lives are, respectively, past, present, and future, but specifically there are two interpretations. The first is precisely as mentioned above. The second interpretation is connected with the Hua-yen doctrine of the identity of time. Whereas the first interpretation takes cognizance of the necessity for words, and must distinguish between cause and effect, the second interpretation sees cause and effect as identical and interfused; therefore, in the present life of comprehension and practice, one is already a Buddha. Implicit in these two interpretations, I believe, is the distinction of _gradual_ access to Buddhahood, and _sudden_ access. For more about the doctrine of achieving Buddhahood in three lives, cf. Oda, _Bukkyō-daijiten_ pp.622,624; Mochizuki, _Bukkyō-daijiten_, pp. 1587-89 (Vol. II).

Chapter 3

Doctrines Propounded in the Past and Present

Text. Three, describing the doctrines propounded in the past and present: all the doctrines propounded in the past and present are different, not alike. For awhile I shall describe ten schools 家 in brief, and make them the standard.

One, Bodhiruci establishes the teaching of one sound on the basis of such sutras as the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*. That is, all the holy teachings flow uniformly from one sound, one taste, one rain. Just because the faculties and actions of beings are not the same, they understand differently, in accordance with their faculties. Therefore, there are many kinds [of doctrine]. If one is able to understand the essential [本 = 本教 i.e., essential doctrine], it is just the doctrine which is the one perfect sound of the Tathāgata. Therefore, the sutra [= *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*] says, "The Buddha propounds the Dharma by means of a single sound, and each kind of living being is able to understand it according to his kind," etc.. [T.14.538] This is what is meant.

Notes. This is the Bodhiruci who came to Loyang in 508, during the Northern Wei Dynasty. He was a North Indian. The Hua-yen and T'ien-t'ai both credit him with instituting the theory that the Buddha only taught one thing, but beings of varying capacities derived different meanings from it. This is denied by Fa-tsang, who insists that the different teachings were all different from the beginning.

Taikei I.237-45; *Kōgi* 119-20

Text. Two, the two doctrines of gradual and sudden are established by the Dharma master Tan [誕 a = 護], and others, on the basis of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, etc.; i.e., because one first cultivates the small vehicle and then turns to the large, and the large arises from dependence on the small, [this doctrine] is called gradual. Also, because great and small are exhibited together, this is like the teaching of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. In the case of the Bodhisattva of direct access 直往, etc., the great does not depend on the small; therefore [this doctrine] is called sudden. Also, because there is no small vehicle [considered in the doctrine], it is the Hua-yen [which is the sudden doctrine]. Many worthies of later times, such as Hui-yüan, have agreed with this teaching.

Notes. Those who have agreed with this are the two Hui-yüans of the Liang and Sui periods, but not the two Hui-yüans of Lu-shan, in the fourth and early fifth centuries, and of the T'ang; i.e., Fa-tsang's pupil. The brief allusion to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* means that in that work both the Hinayana *vinaya* and the eternal Buddha of the later Mahayana are taught side by side. The Bodhisattva of direct access is, of course, the individual who begins his practices within the fold of the Mahāyāna, without going through the small vehicle stages first. The name Tan, or 護 as the Sung text has, is a problem. No person by the name of Hu, of the Sui period, is listed. The commentaries give T'an-yen 曇延 as the person meant. He lived from 516-588 and was a scholar of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. The "etc." refers to, among others, Paramartha. For more information on T'an-yen, cf. Mochizuki, *Bukkyō-daijiten*, vol.IV, pp.3957-58.

Taikei I.245-58; *Kōgi* 120-21

Text. Three, three kinds of doctrine are established by the *vinaya* master Kuang 光 the Supervisor; i.e., gradual, sudden, and perfect. What Kuang means is, due to the immaturity of [beings'] faculties, first, impermanence was taught, and later permanence was taught. First emptiness [*śūnyatā*] was taught, and later the meaning of the deep abstruseness of non-emptiness was taught. Therefore, because there was a gradual sequence in the teaching [of the whole truth], this is called the gradual doctrine. For those of mature faculties, the whole Dharma of the Buddha was taught completely in a single discourse on the Dharma 一法門 . Permanence and impermanence, emptiness and non-emptiness were all taught together at the same time, without sequence, and therefore this is called the sudden doctrine.

For the proficient, and those already partly advanced to the realm of Buddhahood, he taught the unimpeded liberation of the *Tathāgata*, the ocean of final result, the perfect, mysterious, sovereign Dharma teaching. Therefore, it is called perfect. It is the same as this [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra. Later followers of Kuang, such as Tsun 遵 [i.e., Hung-tsun, the Supervisor] also followed and agreed very much with this teaching of the gradual, sudden, and perfect.

Notes. The biography of Kuang 光 is in HKSC 27. He lived during the later Wei, and was primarily a master of the *vinaya* and also a patriarch of the Ti-lun school. He was also fifth patriarch of the Vinaya school. Tsun the Supervisor was Hung-tsun, but due to the taboo on Hung 洪 , he was known as just Tsun. His biography is in the HKSC 27.

He was Kuang's best student, said to have even surpassed his master. The "proficient" means those prior to the *bhūmis*, and the "partly advanced" are those on the *bhūmis*. The reference, in the section on perfect doctrine, to "unimpeded liberation", etc., refers to result; since this is so difficult, it is reserved for those who are highly developed.

Taikei I.251-58; Kogi 121-23

Text. [480c] Four, the doctrine of four tenets is established by such worthies as T'an-yin and his contemporaries, in order to include the holy teaching of the one lifetime [of the Buddha]. One is the school of causes and conditions; i.e., the Sarvāstivāda of the small vehicle. Two is the school of conventional names; i.e., Sautrāntikas of the *Satyasiddhi*, etc.. Three is the school of unreality; i.e., the *Prajñāpāramitā*-*sūtra* of all divisions. It teaches the principle of emptiness and reveals the unreality of all *dharmas*, etc.. Four is the school of reality; i.e., in the *Mahāpārinirvāṇa*-*sūtra* and in the *Avataṁsaka*-*sūtra*, the true principle of Buddha-nature and *dharma*-*dhātu* are revealed.

Notes. I have given the name T'an-yin instead of the name given in the text, 大衍 , which is the name of his monastery. T'an-yin 曇隱 is of the Sui period. His biography is in HKSC 27.

Taikei I. 259-62; *Kogi* 123-24

Text. Five, the doctrine of five kinds is established by the Dharma master Hu-shun 護身. Three kinds are like those of the above-mentioned T'an-yin. The fourth is called the teaching of the school of reality; i.e., the *Mahāpārinirvāṇa*-*sūtra* and others show the truth of the nature of the Buddha. The fifth is called the school of dharma-dhātu; i.e., the Avataṁsaka [-sūtra] reveals the Dharma teaching of the freedom and inobstructibility of the dharma-dhātu.

Notes. Hu-shun is the name of the monastery. His name was Tsu-kuei 自軌. Ch'i dynasty. He belonged to the lineage of Kuang the Supervisor, the third in this list of masters who founded a theory about the origin of schools. The fourth and fifth schools of Hu-shun are derived from a combination of the principles of the two sutras mentioned, by means of which the school of reality is established, and after which it is divided in two to make a kind of ancillary school, the "dharma-dhātu school".

Taikei I.262-63; Kōgi 124

Text. Six, the doctrine of six schools is established by Ch'i-tu [i.e., Vulture, from Skt. Gṛdhra]. The first two are the same as those of T'an-yin. The third, the school of unreality, shows that the doctrines of the great vehicle all teach that all dharmas are like illusions, etc.. The fourth is called the school of reality. It reveals the truth of the real emptiness of all dharmas[諸法真空 ; text has 諸法真宗], etc.. The fifth is called the school of the eternal; it shows the meaning of the persistence of the qualities of tathatā which are as innumerable as the sands of the Ganges, etc.. The sixth is called the perfect school. It shows that the dharma-dhātu being free, and inobstructible in its dependent origination, it is perfectly endowed with qualities. What this is is the Dharma-teaching of the Hua-yen.

Notes. Number three is equated with the Fa-hsiang school, number four with the *Prajñāpāramitā*, five with the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* and *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyana*. The sixth is, of course, the one vehicle as represented by the Hua-yen. It shows the complete freedom of interrelationship of all *dharmas* in the realm of *dharmas*. Ch'i-tu is the name of the monastery; his real name was An-lin (安凜).

Taikei I.263-64; *Kōgi* 125

Text. Seven, the teaching of four kinds is established by the *dhyāna* master Hui-ssu of Nan-yueh, and Chih-i of [Mt.] T'ien-t'ai, etc.. [These four] include the holy teaching of the whole life-time [of the Buddha] which was transmitted east. One is called the *tripiṭaka* teaching; i.e., because it is the small vehicle. He himself [i.e., Chih-i] quotes the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, which says, "You should not keep company with Hīnayānists who train in the *tripiṭaka*." [T.9.37] Also, the *Ta chih-tu lun* says that the small vehicle is the teaching of the *tripiṭaka*, and the great vehicle is the [teaching of the] *tripiṭaka* of the great vehicle.

Two is called the common 通 teaching. That is to say, in the sutras of the great vehicle, preaching the Dharma and commonly benefiting the men of the three vehicles, and, as in the Large *Prajñāpāramitā*, that which is common to the great and small vehicles with regard to the ten stages, such as that of dry wisdom, etc.. [b,c + It is also called the gradual teaching.]

Notes. All obtain benefit in common through the teaching of sunyata in the Mahāyāna sutras. Also, all participate in the same stages, in that the *śrāvaka* reaches the seventh stage, the *pratyekabuddha* reaches the eighth stage, and the Bodhisattva the ninth stage. Even though not all attain to the same stages, the stages are common as a means to all in the three vehicles. "Dry wisdom" is the name of the first stage of these ten and it is the stage of the common worldling. These ten stages include the stages delineated in, for instance, the *Abhidharmakośa*. The whole discussion may be seen in the *Ta chih-tu lun*. I have translated 通 as "common" since the commentaries give as glosses 通同 and 通入. This "common" is further divided in three, the early, middle, and late. For more information on the ten stages, cf. Oda, *Daijiten*, p. 923.

Taikei I.265-92; *Kōgi* 127-28

Text. Three is called the distinct teaching; i.e., the principles of the Way shown in the sutras of the great vehicle which are not common to the small vehicle, etc.. [b,c + It is also called the sudden teaching.]

[481a] Four is called the perfect teaching; i.e., the *dharma*-*dhātu* is completely free; it is endowed with all the inexhaustible Dharma teachings. It is the Hua-yen. [b,c + It is also called the secret teaching, because the *śrāvakas*, etc., did not see or hear it.]

Eight, two teachings are established by the Dharma master Ming [i.e., Fa-ming 法敏], of Chiang-nan. The first consists of the "Śākya sutras"; i.e., the concessional sutras 屈曲經 , because they comply with the capacities of beings, and in making concessions to their capacities, block their attachments. The *Mahāparinirvāṇa*-*sūtra*, etc., are examples. The second consists of the sutras of Vairocana; the teaching of the even path 平等道, because they teach the nature of the Dharma freely. This is the Avataṁsaka-sūtra.

Notes. Fa-ming's biography is in HKSC 17. The distinction made here is between two teachers, Śākyamuni on the one hand, and Vairocana, the Buddha as Dharma-kāya, on the other. Also, the places of teaching are different, being India and the Pure Land respectively. Audiences differ also; one is the audience of śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas, the other Bodhisattvas alone. The "even path" is an allusion to the landscape of the Pure Land of the Tathāgata.

Taikei I.292-96; Kōgi 130-31

Text. Nine, the teaching of four vehicles is established by the Dharma master, Yun-fa [i.e., Fa-yun 法雲], of the Liang dynasty, who dwelt in the Kuang-che monastery 光宅寺. That is to say, he considers the three carts near the gate [in the episode of the burning house in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka] to be the three vehicles, and the great white ox cart offered at the crossroads to be the fourth vehicle, because that ox cart near the gate also, along with the sheep and deer vehicles, is not obtained. The other meanings are as explained above.

Notes. Fa-yun's biography is in HKSC 6. He lived from 467 to 529. He was apparently the first to conceive of a difference between the three vehicles and the one vehicle, though of course at that date there was no intention of distinguishing the Hua-yen from the tradition of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. He seems to have simply seen that there are four vehicles, and thus anticipated the idea of the one vehicle apart from the three.

Taikei I.296-302; Kōgi 131-32

Text. At a later time, two teachings were established by the dhyana master Hsin-hsing 信行 on the basis of this tenet; i.e., the one vehicle and three vehicles. As for the three vehicles, it is [a matter of] comprehension and practice which is different [in each of the three], as well as the distinction of three vehicles. They all first cultivate the small vehicle, then they turn to the great vehicle. As for the one vehicle, universal comprehension and universal practice only are the one vehicle. It is also the Dharma teaching of the Hua-yen, and direct access, etc..

Notes. The biography of Hsin-hsing (540-594) is in *HKSC* 20. His main distinction is between gradual and sudden, and here gradual means gradual progress through the various vehicles, starting with the small vehicle. The sudden is, of course, the province of the one vehicle. Here, the practicioner understands all *dharmas* by means of one *dharma*, and cultivates all practices by means of one practice (and for this reason called "universal"). Thus, when a practicioner of the "universal" practice cultivates one practice, he cultivates at the same time all the practices of all vehicles. In the three vehicles, on the other hand, the *śrāvaka* meditates on the four holy truths, the *pratyekabuddha* reflects on the twelve-linked chain of causation, and the Bodhisattva practices the six *pāramitās*. Hsin-hsing is the famous founder of the San-chieh sect or theory 三階, and author of numerous works on the doctrine of the San-chieh, such as the *San*-*chieh*-*hsueh*-*mi*-*chi* 三階教密記.

Taikei I. 302-03; *Kōgi* 132-33

Text. Ten, three kinds are established by the great T'ang master of the *tripiṭaka*, Hsüan-tsang, on the basis of the *Saṁdhinirmocana*-*sūtra*, *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*, and *Yogācāra*-*bhūmi*-*śāstra*. This is the same as the three wheels of the Dharma. The first is called turning the wheel of the Dharma; i.e., turning the Dharma-wheel of the four holy truths in the Deer Park during the first period [of teaching]; that is, it is the small vehicle. The second is called illuminating the wheel of the Dharma; i.e., in the intermediate period he taught with a hidden intention within the great vehicle, saying that all *dharmas* are empty, etc.. The third is called maintaining the wheel of the Dharma; i.e., in the last period he taught such things as the three natures 三性 and the non-emptiness of *Tathatā* to the great vehicle, with a thoroughly revealed intention. Among these three wheels of the Dharma, only the small vehicle and the early and developed two vehicles of the three vehicles are taught. They do not include the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine. Why is that? Because the *Avataṁsaka*-*sūtra* was taught in the first period, [and in this system of Hsüan-tsang the small vehicle doctrine was taught first,] therefore, it is not the small vehicle. Because the maintaining of the wheel of the Dharma was taught in the last period, it is not the Hua-yen [which was in reality taught during the first period]; therefore, these do not include the Dharma teaching of the Hua-yen.

Notes. "Illuminating the wheel of the Dharma" means illuminating all things with the knowledge of emptiness. "Maintaining the wheel of the Dharma" means maintaining both emptiness and existence side by side; i.e., the middle path.

Taikei I.303-16; *Kōgi* 134-36

Text. These worthies of the above ten families who established teachings are the Dharma-generals of their times. Their talents were superior, and they were the illustrious models of past generations. Their rank is difficult to guage. Such masters as Hui-ssu and Chih-i have responded to the spiritual and have turned their footsteps towards the stage of ascension [i.e., to the stage of the ten abodes 十住]. Having heard the Dharma and reflected on it [previously] on the Vulture Peak, now they are here in this time. The response of others [among the above ten] to the spiritual is as treated extensively in the "Biographies of Eminent Monks". Also, such evidence of holiness as Fa-yun's experiencing a heavenly rain of flowers while discoursing on the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* and dividing the schools is as mentioned in the "Biographies of Eminent Monks". The comprehension and practices of other worthies surpassed all others, as also treated in the "Biographies of Eminent Monks". [481b] How could *these* worthy men like the differences [between the schools]? Only with great care, through the exhaustion of the *tripiṭaka*, have they perceived these differences, and not being able to do otherwise, have divided the schools. Finally, each divided the schools on the basis of doctrine, and endeavored to maintain harmony. They resolved great doubts and removed great hinderances. Even though there are differences in the holy teaching, each person attested to its worthiness.

Chapter 4

Analyzing the Doctrine and Explaining the Tenets

Text. Analyzing the doctrine and explaining the tenets: there are two parts. First, the doctrine is analyzed with regard to the Dharma. There are five varieties of doctrine. Last, the tenets are explained by means of essential meaning. There are ten tenets.

Notes. The previous section dealt with various theories of Fa-tsang's predecessors; this section is Fa-tsang's, and here he describes the five doctrines and ten "families" of his own system for the first time. Of the two parts to this section, the first deals with vehicle, or instrument, and the later part deals with the philosophical essentials which are the particular province of each of the vehicles.

Taikei I.325-29; Kōgi 138

The Five Doctrines

Text. First topic: even though there are many distinctions in the holy doctrine, essentially, there are only five: 1. the doctrine of the small vehicle; 2. the preliminary doctrine of the large vehicle; 3. the later doctrine [of the large vehicle]; 4. the sudden doctrine; 5. the perfect doctrine. The first is the doctrine of the two vehicles of the Dharma of the ignorant [i.e., the Hīnayāna]. The last one is the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine. It is so called [i.e., perfect] because in the last part of the [Avataṁsaka]sutra, that which is taught for the benefit of Prince Sudhana is called the "perfect sutra". [T.9.749 Int.]

There are three interpretations of the middle three. One, they may be generally considered one; i.e., the one doctrine of the three vehicles, because it is what all three sons obtained. It is like the above quotation.

Notes. It is considered one inasmuch as the whole is the one doctrine of three vehicles. The quotation alluded to is from the section on the three kinds of three vehicles in "Dividing the Vehicles", p. 146, i.e., "For instance, in the Large Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra the three vehicles are taught in common and caused to obtain the benefits of the three vehicles."

Taikei I.329-37; Kōgi 141-42

Text. Two, they can be divided into two; i.e., gradual and sudden. Because the comprehension and practice of the two doctrines of early and late [Mahāyāna] exist in the teaching through words, and the stages [of the Bodhisattva] are performed in sequence, cause and effect [in the stages] are in succession, and one proceeds from the subtle to the manifest, they are called "gradual" in common. Thus, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, "'Gradual' means as the amala-fruit ripens gradually, not suddenly." [T.16.525] This is what is meant [in the above passage.].

Notes. Both the early and later Mahāyāna are called gradual because the path to perfection is gradually covered.

Taikei I.338-41; Kōgi 142

Text. "Sudden doctrine" means that the teaching through words is suddenly stopped, the nature of ultimate principle is suddenly revealed, comprehension and practice are suddenly perfected, the non-production of one instant [of erroneous conceptions] is Buddhahood, etc.. Thus, the _Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra_ says, "'Sudden' means as the reflections in a mirror are revealed suddenly, not gradually." [T.16.525] This is the meaning [of the above passage]. It is because all _dharmas_ are independent from the beginning, do not depend on the teaching with words, and do not rely on wisdom derived from contemplation [for their revelation]. It is like Vimalakīrti revealing non-duality by his silence. Also, the name is based on the fact that the _Ratnagotra-vibhāga_ speaks of "sutras of the sudden teaching". [T.26.208]

Three, they may be divided in three; i.e., the beginning and later [Mahāyāna] within the gradual doctrine are differentiated. For example, they are the last two in the above-mentioned three doctrines [as exemplified by] the _Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra_, etc..

Notes. Here, the initial teaching of the Mahāyāna is differentiated from the later, developed doctrine, to make two, and the addition of the sudden makes the three. In the previous section on "Doctrines Propounded in the Past and Present", these two vehicles were the two last as exemplified by such texts as the _Ratnagotra-vibhāga_, _Suvarṇaprabhāsa_, etc..

Taikei I.347-49; _Kōgi_ 143-44

Text. On the basis of this interpretation, the _Mahābherīhāraka-parivarta_ considers the teaching of emptiness to be the early, and the teaching of non-emptiness to be the later. [T.9.296] Thus, that sutra says, "Kāsyapa said to the Buddha, 'Many Mahāyāna sutras teach the meaning of emptiness.' The Buddha answered Kāśyapa, 'All the sutras on emptiness are teachings which leave something unsaid. Only this sutra is the unexcelled teaching which leaves nothing unsaid.'" And then, "Oh Kāśyapa, it is just as King Prasenajit always sets up a great alms-giving ceremony in the eleventh month, and first he feeds the hungry spirits, orphans, and the poor, then he gives to *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* [481c] whatever ambrosial delicacies they might desire. All the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, have done the same. They have expounded the Dharmas of various sutras in accordance with the expectations of various kinds of beings. If there are beings who are lax, and break the moral code [*śīla*], and do not strive to follow it, they turn their backs on the wonderful texts on the permanence of the *Tathāgata-garbha*, and enjoy cultivating and studying various sutras dealing with emptiness," etc., and so on through the whole explanation. [T.9.296] To explain, in this case, leaving something unsaid about the principle of emptiness concerns the early teaching, and the later teaching is in connection with the wonderful texts on the permanence of the *Tathāgata-garbha*. Also, the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* explains the *Tathatā* which is apart from words in connection with the topic of the sudden teaching. The *Tathatā* which relies on words is explained in connection with the topic of the gradual teaching. Within the category of dependence on words, the two *Tathatās* of emptiness and non-emptiness are taught in connection with the early and later teachings. This is said in connection with the Dharma, in order to divide the doctrine. As far as the essence of the Dharma is concerned, it is as discussed separately, below.

The Ten Families

Text. Two, the tenets are divided according to principles 理 and there are ten parts.

One, the tenet that both self and *dharmas* exist. There are two parts to this; a. the vehicle of men and deities; b. the small vehicle. Within the small vehicle this consists of those like the Vātsīputrīyas. They establish *dharmas* in three groups. One is the *dharma* of the compounded [*saṁskṛta*] group; two is the *dharma* of the uncompounded [*asaṁskṛta*] group; three is a *dharma* which belongs to neither of the two groups. The first two are *dharmas*, the last one is the self. They also propose a collection 藏 of five *dharmas*: one, the past; two, the future; three, the present; four, the uncompounded; five, the inexpressible. This [last] is the self. It is called inexpressible because it can not be said to be either compounded or uncompounded.

Two, the tenet that *dharmas* exist, the self does not; i.e., the Sarvāstivādins, etc.. They say that all *dharmas* are grouped in two kinds; one is name, the other is form. Or else, they are grouped in four; i.e., the three times and the uncompounded. Or five; i.e., mind, mental functions, form, the unconnected [with mind or form], and the uncompounded. Therefore, all *dharmas* really exist, [because they exist in the three times].

Notes. For more definite information on the Vātsīputrīyas, cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, pp.114,ff.. Among those who share the second tenet with the Sarvāstivādins are named the Haimavata, Bahuśrutīya, and Mahīśasaka.

Taikei I.374-80; *Kōgi* 147-48

Text. Three, the tenet that *dharmas* do not exist in the past or future; i.e., the Mahāsāṁghikas, etc.. They say that present *dharmas* and uncompounded *dharmas* both exist, and the past and future are without essence and function.

Notes. According to the Mahāsāṁghikas, one part of all *dharmas* is non-existent and empty; i.e., the past and future. Also adhering to this view, says the commentary, are the Kukkutikas (Bareau, p.79); the Caitikas (制多山部, Bareau, p.87); Aparaśailas (西山住部, Bareau, 104); Uttaraśailas (北山住部, Bareau, p.99); Dharmaguptaka (法藏, Bareau, p.190); and Mahākāśyapīyas (飲光部, Bareau, p.201).

Taikei I.380-84; *Kōgi* 149

Text. Four, the tenet that the present [*dharmas*] are both false and real; i.e., the Prajñaptivādins. They say that the past and future do not exist, and in the present time, all *dharmas* as aggregates [*skandha*] are considered to be real. Those as *āyatanas* and *dhātus* are conventional only 假. According to the circumstances, the falsity or reality of dharmas is not fixed. Different teachers of the Sautrāntikas, of the tradition of the Satyasiddhi-śāstra, are of this type.

Notes. The conventional character of dharmas when subsumed under the list of dhātus and āyatanas is based on the fact that they take their characteristics from the classification of skandhas. Thus, for instance, a dharma when subsumed under the category skandha really exists, but when considered as part of the classification of dhātus and āyatanas is merely conventional, a name only. Thus, the past and future do not exist, and the present may be real or false, depending on contingencies. Cf. Bareau, pp.84-86. Bareau sees them as adhering to the tendencies of the Mahāsāmghikas.

Taikei I.384-89; Kōgi 149-50

Text. Five, the tenet that the worldly [conventional] is false, and the real is true; i.e., the Lokottaravādins, etc.. [482c] The worldly [dharmas] are all conventional, because they are unreal. The supramundane dharmas are all real, because they are not false.

Notes. Among the four holy truths, the first two, duhkha and samudaya, are conventional and unreal. The last two, nirodha and marga, are real. The first are worldly cause and effect; the second are supramundane cause and effect. Fa-tsang's description of this belief is somewhat inadequate, and in all probability he didn't know very well what a Lokottaravādin was. Bareau believes (p.75) that they were identical with the Ekavyāvahārikas who had kept the name "Mahāsāmghika" after the schism which separated them from the Gokulikas. "At least the Lokottaravādins appear to have been the principal school of the Ekavyāvahārikas." At any rate, they seem to have been among the first Buddhists to deny the reality of worldly things and assert the reality of the supramundane, such as the mārga and the fruit of mārga.

Taikei I.390-91; Kōgi 150

Text. Six, the tenet that all dharmas are nothing but names; i.e., the Ekavyāvahārikas. Self and *dharmas* are all only conventional names, because they are without an essence [of their own]. This is common to the beginning of the early teaching [of Mahāyāna]. You should understand it correspondingly.

Notes. The Ekavyāvahārikas are assigned to the small vehicle, and thus, their conception of the emptiness of *dharmas* is only a kind of half-way *śūnyatā*. Yet, this same teaching is common to the earliest stages of the early teaching of Mahāyāna, though not completely identical. The last sentence means that this emptiness should be seen in the context of small vehicle doctrine, though common to the doctrine of the 初教.

Taikei I.392-95; *Kōgi* 151

Text. Seven, the tenet that all *dharmas* are empty; i.e., the early teaching of the Mahāyāna. They say that all *dharmas* are truly empty, because when they arise outside of [false] sensations 情, they are without distinctions. This [doctrine] is like that of the *Prajñāpāramitā* [sutra], etc..

Notes. This tenet is found in such works as the *Treatise on Twelve Topics* 十二門論, the *Hundred Treatise* 百論, and the *Middle Treatise* 中論. The reason for the tenet is that all distinctions between *dharmas* are a result of false sensations, and outside these sensations, the distinctions do not exist. *Taikei* I.305 says, "Because all *dharmas* are pure, if you get rid of the graspings of the sensations, then *dharmas* are without distinctions."

Taikei I.395-96; *Kōgi* 151

Text. Eight, the tenet that real qualities are not empty; i.e., the later [developed] teaching [of Mahāyāna]. Various sutras say that all *dharmas* are nothing but

Tathatā, because they are the real qualities of the *Tathagata-garbha*, because they possess an essence of their own, and because they are endowed with the qualities of essential nature 性德.

Notes. Cited as holding this opinion are such texts as the *Yogācārabhūmi*-*śāstra* and *Vimalakīrti*-*nirdeśa*. *Dharmas* are not empty because they are the qualities, or function, of the true reality. *Dharmas* are the true reality which has appeared in phenomenal form as a result of the conditions effecting it. This true nature is not really altered, however, and therefore underlies the *dharmas*.

Taikei I.397; *Kōgi* 152

Text. Nine, the tenet of eliminating both characteristics and conceptions. It is like, in the sudden teaching, revealing the principle of eliminating words, etc.. It is like the silence of Vimalakīrti revealing [true non-duality], etc.. You should understand it correspondingly.

Notes. Characteristics 相 means the phenomenal world, the realm of the conditioned. Conceptions 想 are thought, or conditioning mind. The first is 所緣; the second, 能緣心.

Taikei I.397-98; *Kōgi* 152.

Text. Ten, the tenet that [each *dharma* of the *dharma*-*dhātu*] is perfectly endowed with all qualities 圓明具德; i.e., the Dharma-teaching which the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine reveals, [which is] the inexhaustible, free endowment of primary with secondary.

Notes. This is, of course, the tenet of the Hua-yen. Of the ten tenets shown above, one through six are those of the small vehicle, while the last four belong to the large vehicle, here including the one vehicle.

Taikei I.398-401; *Kogi* 153

Chapter 5

Relationship of Vehicle and Doctrine

Text. Five, the relationship of vehicle and doctrine 乘教開合: there are three parts. One, relationships of the doctrines; two, subsuming the vehicles under the doctrines; three, the mutual inclusion of the various doctrines.

First, with reference to doctrine, even though the five doctrines are mutually inclusive and interfused, there are five interpretations [to this state]. One, they may, generally speaking, be considered to be one; i.e., fundamental and derivative are fused into one single great Dharma of skillful means. Two, they may be divided into two. One is the fundamental teaching; i.e., the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine, because it is the root of all the doctrines. Two is the derivative doctrine; i.e., the small vehicle and three vehicles, because they are the derivative of the other [one vehicle]. Also, [the two] are called "final" and "skillful means", because from the point of view of the one vehicle, the three vehicles and small vehicle are skillful means [which lead men finally to the one]. Three, they may be divided into three; i.e., the doctrines of one vehicle, three vehicles, and small vehicle. This is because the two vehicles of the Dharma of the ignorant are separated out from skillful means. Four, they can be divided into four; i.e., small vehicle, gradual, sudden, and perfect, because the early and later two doctrines [of Mahāyāna] consist in [the teaching by means of] words, etc.. Five, they can be broken up into five; i.e., as discussed above.

Notes. In the division of three, the Dharma of the ignorant is separated from those who have turned to the Mahāyāna, thus making three groups. If we correlate these relationships, in this chapter, with the foregoing ten families, this division of three most resembles Fa-yun's four vehicles. Next, in the division of four, there is a further division on the basis of distinction between gradual and sudden. The early and developed Mahāyāna are placed alone in the category of gradual because they depend on the scriptures, the spoken word, etc., whereas the suddenists do not. This division resembles those of Chih-i and Kuang the Supervisor. The last group of five includes small, early, developed, sudden, and perfect vehicles.

Taikei I.403-06; Kōgi 154-56

Text. There are two parts in subsuming the vehicles under the doctrines. First, there are five kinds of one vehicle in connection with the doctrines. 1. The one vehicle of the distinct doctrine, etc.. 2. The one vehicle of the common doctrine, etc.. 3. The one vehicle consisting of eliminating conception, such as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra [conception]. This is the sudden doctrine. 4. One vehicle is considered with regard to the uniformity of Buddhahood [i.e., it exists in all beings]. This is the later doctrine [of Mahāyāna]. 5. The one vehicle of the hidden intentions, like the eight intentions [mentioned above, p.139]. This concerns the early doctrine [of Mahāyāna].

Second, in explaining the three vehicles, there are also five kinds. 1. The three vehicles in the small vehicle; i.e., in the beginning they are different, but in the end all are alike, because they all become Arhats. 2. The three vehicles in the early doctrine [of Mahāyāna]. They are different in the beginning and in the end because there is entrance into Nirvāṇa [on the part of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, and Buddhahood for the Bodhisattva]. 3. The three in the developed doctrine [of Mahāyāna]. Beginning and end are alike, because all become Buddhas. 4. The three in the sudden doctrine. In the beginning [causal stage] and in the end [result] they are divorced [from conceptualization]. [482b] 5. The three within the perfect doctrine [of the common type]. Beginning and end are alike, because "That which you practice is the path of the Bodhisattva," etc..

Notes. 1. In the small vehicle, even though causal practice is different, the results are the same. The *śrāvaka* concentrates on the four holy truths, the *pratyekabuddha* concentrates on the law of dependent origination, and the Bodhisattva on the six *pāramitās*. 2. Beginning and end are different; the causal part, as in number one, above, is different, and in the result stage, the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* enter *nirvāṇa*, and the Bodhisattva achieves Buddhahood. 3. All beings, including the members of the three vehicles, have Buddha nature in the causal stage, and in the end, all become Buddhas, so they are alike in beginning and end. 5. Everything done by the three vehicles is *upāya* -causal state which in the end leads to the uniform result, entrance into the one vehicle.

Taikei I.408-10; *Kōgi* 158-59

Text. Three, the mutual inclusion of all the doctrines: there are two categories. One, including the derivative in the fundamental 以本收末 ; two, restoring the derivative to the fundamental 以末歸本 . Within the first [category], there may be only one perfect doctrine in the perfect, because all other characteristics are exhausted, or else there may be five doctrines, because it embraces skillful means. In the sudden doctrine, there may be only one sudden doctrine, also because other characteristics are exhausted, or else there may be four, because it embraces skillful means. In the later [developed] Mahāyāna there may be only one, or three. In the early doctrine, there may be one, or two. In the small vehicle, there is only one doctrine. You should understand all these [last three] in relation with the above [explanation of the perfect and sudden doctrines].

Two, restoring the derivative to the fundamental. Within the small vehicle, there may be one doctrine, on the basis of the school in itself. Or, there may be five, because the later four doctrines each consider it as skillful means. In the early doctrine, there may be only one, on the basis of the school in itself. Or, there may be four, because each of the later three doctrines considers it to be skillful means. In the later Mahāyāna, there may be one, or three. In the sudden doctrine, there may be one, or two. In the perfect doctrine there is only one doctrine. You can understand all these [last three] in correspondence with the above [small vehicle and early doctrine].

You should consider all the divisions of the interrelationships of principles which are shown in the following in connection with these [above two] doctrines. Here, the net of the Dharma is perfected by means of the alternatives [enumerated above in regard to the relationship] of fundamental and derivative. The skillful devices of the Great Saint nourish beings to the last degree. Thus, the *Avataṁsaka* [sutra]says, "I spread the net of the great Dharma in the sea of *saṁsāra* and deliver the fishes of men and deities to the shore of *nirvāṇa*." [T.9.773,670] This is the meaning [of the above passages].

Notes. The above two categories show the mutual inclusion of the five vehicles. In reality, though, only the perfect doctrine is fundamental, and only the small vehicle is just *upāya*. Depending on the point of view, the three vehicles may be either. In the first section, "including the derivative in the fundamental", from the point of view of each of the five doctrines, it, itself, is the one vehicle. On the other hand, it may consider itself to include others as *upāya* leading to it, so it may be five, four, etc.. In the second section, "restoring the derivatives to the fundamental", again, each of the five considers itself to be the one vehicle, but each vehicle is also seen from later, and presumably more advanced, doctrines as part of its *upāya*, and this vehicle is restored to it. Thus, for instance, while the small vehicle considers itself to be the one sole vehicle, it is also the *upāya* of the early Mahāyāna, later Mahāyāna, sudden, and perfect, which, added to itself, make five. Thus, in a manner of speaking, it is also five. However, the perfect doctrine can not be restored to a higher original, so it is only one. The point of this whole section seems to be that among the five doctrines, some are *upāya* and some the true doctrine, some are provisional, some are real, some are the included, some are the includers. The point of view is the final criterion. The last summarizing statement points out that in this section, the five doctrines in their positions as derivative and fundamental have been woven into one great whole which serves all beings regardless of capacity or disposition, and carries them to salvation.

Taikei I.412-14; *Kōgi* 160-62

Chapter 6

The Sequence of the Appearance of the Doctrine

Text. The sequence of the appearance of the doctrine: there are two parts. First, the fundamental doctrine which conforms to [the nature of] Dharma is shown; last, the derivative doctrine which is based on capacities [of beings] is shown.

Notes. The previous five chapters were devoted to the explanation of the "great net of the Dharma", and concerned such things as the relationship between the vehicles and their teachings. It was made obvious there that there are five doctrines, and that some are more fundamental than others. Now, Fa-tsang takes up the question of the appearance of these doctrines in time. Fa-tsang especially emphasizes the belief that the one vehicle, as represented by the Hua-yen, is based on the teaching of the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra*, taught by Śākyamuni beneath the *bodhi* tree while he was immersed in *samādhi*. This *samādhi* revealed the totality of the universe in its true nature, and the Buddha preached what he saw as he saw it. This gives the sutra and the one vehicle a special status. The three vehicles and small vehicle, taught at other places at other and various times, are concessions to the varying capacities of beings. Their truth is only partial, an imperfect efflux of the original pristine whole.

Taikei I.415-16; *Kōgi* 163-64

The Fundamental Doctrine Which Conforms to Dharma-nature

Text. The first is the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine. That is, in the second seven days beneath the tree of enlightenment, at the time the Buddha first achieved the Way, in the same way that the sun rises and first illuminates the tall mountains, he taught at that same time, while [still] in the concentration which is like the images of the ocean [*samudra*-*mudrā*-*samadhi* 海印三昧], the inexhaustible Dharma-teaching 十十法門. It was endowed with the infinite interrelationship of primary and secondary, the perfect freedom [of the *dharmadhātu*], included the nine times and ten times, and exhausted the realm of the wonderful [net] of Indra. At this time, all Dharma teachings about cause and effect, noumenon and phenomena 理事, which were taught in sequence, and even such things as, at the end of his life, the dispersal of [his] relics [*śarīra*], seeing and hearing [the Buddha and the Dharma], etc., were all revealed simultaneously.

Why is this? Because of the complete freedom of [the identity and mutual inclusion of] contraction and expansion 卷舒, [an instant] includes the nine times, and [the nine times] exist in a single instant 一時. Contraction is identical with expansion, and expansion is also identical with contraction. Why is this? Because of a single, identical dependent origination, and because *dharmas* do not have two characteristics [i.e., they have only the one characteristic which is that they have no self-essence]. The [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra says "All the acts of the Buddhas of the three times are established within a grain of dust," etc.. [T.9.601] It also says, "Within a single instant are contained the achievement of the Way in its eight acts, and even *nirvāṇa* and the distribution of the relics," etc.. [T.9.666] [482c] The details are as discussed in the sutra.

Notes. "Just as the sun rises and first illuminates the tall mountains" is taken from the chapter of the Avataṁsaka called "The Appearance of the Tathāgata from Essential Nature," T.9.616b. It is a simile which means just as the sun rises in the morning and illuminates the tallest mountains first, then lesser mountains, then the low, flat places, so the full truth discovered in the samudra-mudrā-samādhi was first taught to Bodhisattvas of the greatest capacities, then other beings of increasingly lesser capacities were taught aspects of this truth.

This whole section is of greater importance than it looks at first glance, because it presents the rationale for the Hua-yen belief that it possesses the supreme teaching. Here, in one way or another, the superiority of time, place, teacher, doctrine, and audience are presented in a short space. The Hua-yen truth was taught in the second seven days after enlightenment, beneath the bodhi tree, by Śākyamuni, who is in reality the cosmic Vairocana, the dharma-kāya, to Bodhisattvas of the one vehicle capacity. The truth of the infinitely repeated interrelationship of dharmas being too difficult for most people, the Buddha began his fifty-year career of teaching the truth in a form palatable to beings of different capacities. Because the truth was taught in this way, at different times, different places, different occasions, it is inferior to the other. The difference is thus between the fundamental, or original, and the derivative.

When the Buddha taught the Dharma for the first time, beneath the bodhi tree, he taught everything, all Dharma topics, of even countless eons before and after his time. The reason for this is that the time beneath the bodhi tree includes all time. Two reasons are given for this: one, since all dharmas are identical in their essence, which is the lack of self essence, there is no essential difference between one instant and a thousand eons; second, any period of time exists only in dependence on all other time. If there were no instant, there could be no eon, and if there were no eon, there would be no instant. On the basis of interdependence, and therefore since they are not mutually obstructing, the Hua-yen sees them as mutually inclusive. In the first instance, we have the doctrine of the free interrelationship of noumenon and phenomena; in the second instance we have the doctrine of the free interrelationship of phenomenon and phenomenon.

Taikei I.416-24; Kōgi 164-67

Text. Therefore, on the basis of this universal

Dharma, in the second seven days, the whole Dharma of the Buddha was taught in sequence at one time, and the sequence was taught at one time. It is just as when books are printed, the text is read, and there is a sequence in the sense of the sentences, but when [the text] is printed, they are revealed simultaneously, and there is no contradiction between simultaneity and sequence. You should understand that here, the reasoning is the same. You can understand it in correspondence [with the simile].

Notes. "Taught in sequence at one time, and the sequence was taught at one time" means, I believe, that at the one time beneath the *bodhi* tree, all the teachings of the full fifty-year career were taught at one time, and each of the occasions later when the Dharma was taught also includes all other times. It may, on the other hand, mean that in the one time all the other occasions in the sequence of teaching are included---that is, the one time is all times---and, conversely, the whole career of teaching was contracted into the one time.

Taikei I.425-26; *Kōgi* 168

The Derivative Doctrine Based on Capacities

Text. Two, the derivative doctrine which is based on the capacities [of beings]; that is, the three vehicles, etc.. There are two interpretations. One, it was taught with the one vehicle on the same day, at a different place. Two, it was taught at a different time at a different place. The first interpretation is due to the fact that it is the common doctrine [of one vehicle], because the derivative is not apart from the fundamental, and because [the three vehicles, the derivative] are formed in dependence on the fundamental. The last interpretation is due to the fact that fundamental and derivative are separated from each other, and because [the derivative] is not identical with the fundamental. Each of these two [interpretations] has two interpretations: one, the three vehicles; two, the small vehicle.

The first [interpretation]: the Vajrapāṇi-sūtra 密迹力士經 says, "After the Buddha had achieved the Way for the first time, and having reflected for seven days, he adorned the Dharma seat in the Deer Park with jewels, etc., and gathered together a large number of beings of the three vehicles. Brahmā requested the Dharma, and the Buddha turned the wheel of the Dharma for him, and benefited the group of the three vehicles and caused them to gain the benefits of the small and great [vehicles]," etc.. [T.11.64] The full discussion is as in the sutra.

Also, the Large Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says, "The Buddha turned the wheel of the Dharma consisting of the four holy truths for the first time in the Deer Park. Countless beings aroused the thought of [the paths of] śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha. Countless beings aroused the thought of the highest perfect enlightenment and practiced the six perfections [pāramitā]. Countless Bodhisattvas acquired patience with regard to [the truth of] the non-arising of dharmas, and dwelt in the first, second, third, and even tenth *bhūmis*. Countless Bodhisattvas who were bound to only one more life achieved Buddhahood at one time." [T.25.517 Int.] To explain, you should know through the evidence of these teachings that at the very beginning, during the second seven days, [the Buddha] taught the Dharma of the three vehicles, and it was taught at the same time as the one vehicle.

Two, the small vehicle: the *Mahīsāśaka-vinaya* [?彌沙塞部 和醯五分律] says, "When the Buddha had finally perfected the Way for the first time, he entered a concentration, and after seven days, he also turned the wheel of the Dharma in the Deer Park." [T.22.103] Therefore, you should know that the small vehicle also was taught at the same time as the one vehicle. Also, the *Lalitavistara* says, "In the second seven days, five hundred merchants, consisting of Trapusa [and Bhallika] and others, offered parched grain and honey 麨蜜 to the Buddha," etc.. [T.3.526] Even though what this sutra says refers to the doctrine of the three vehicles, [483a] it also includes the Dharma of men and gods, etc.. It was also taught at the same time as the one vehicle.

Question: since the time of teaching is the same, why is the place different? Answer: because in order to deliver and reveal the Dharma, sameness and difference was needed with regard to time and place [respectively]. Thus, the *Treatise on the Daśabhūmika* says, "It is because by comparing such things as time and place, superiority [of the Dharma] is shown." [T.26.124 Int.] Sameness of time shows that it is the common doctrine [of the one vehicle]; difference of place shows that it is not the distinct doctrine. With regard to the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine having been taught beneath the *bodhi* tree, this tries to show that this is the place where *bodhi* was obtained; i.e., it shows that the Dharma which the Tathāgata himself acquired was taught in conformity with the essence [of the Dharma]; therefore, it was taught without moving from beneath the *bodhi* tree. As for the other Dharma of the three vehicles, etc., because this tries to show that the place was changed and the Dharma was taught in the Deer Park to beings [of varying capacities], this shows that it was not the essential [teaching].

Second [interpretation], the difference of both time and place means that, due to the non-identity [of the other vehicles] with the one vehicle, both time and place are different. For instance, there is the teaching after the third seven days, as it says in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* [9.9]. Or, there is the teaching after the sixth seven days, as it says in the *Dharmagupta*-*vinaya* [? 四分律 T.22.781], and in the *Sarvāstivāda*-*vinaya*-*bhāṣā* [?薩婆多論 T.23.510]. Or, the teaching after the seventh seven days, as it says in the *Hsing*-*ch'i*-*hsing* sūtra[興起行經 T.4.164]. Or, after the eighth seven days, as it says in the Sarvāstivāda-vinaya [?十誦律 T.23]. Or, the teaching after the 50th seven days, as it says in the Ta chih-tu lun [T.25.109]. Or, for one year he did not teach the Dharma. In the second year, for the first time, he ferried across five men [to the shores of salvation], as it says in the Karudaka-sūtra [十二遊經 T.4.147]. Some people explain [this last] by saying that fifty seven days of the Ta chih-tu lun consist of fifty [times] seven days [i.e., 350 days], and is the same as the one year of the Karudaka-sūtra.

On the basis of these pieces of evidence from the teachings, you should know that the teachings of the three vehicles and small vehicle were not taught in the second seven days, because they are different from the teaching of the one vehicle, and because they are based on the capacities of beings. The rest can be understood in the same way.

Notes. The teachings attributed to the Hsing-ch'i-hsing sutra (T.4.164) and Sarvastivada-vinaya (T.23) are not found there, according to Yusugi (Kogi p.175). The passage from the Karudaka-sūtra is apparently corrupt. It gives an inexplicable 12 years as the time in which Śākyamuni did not teach, but 十二 should probably be read as 第二, as Yusugi suggests. Thus, instead of reading the text "After he had passed through 12 years,..." we should read "When he had reached the second year...." In fact, Fa-tsang sees the Karudaka-sūtra as saying that Śākyamuni did not teach for one year after enlightenment.

The whole section seems to be devoted to the proposition that the sequence of the teaching demonstrates the validity of the Hua-yen claim to superiority, inasmuch as the Hua-yen doctrine was taught first, beneath the bedhi tree, etc., while others were taught either at different times or different places, or both. In actuality, the Buddha taught all the doctrines without moving from beneath the bodhi tree, and what seemed like different times and different places to beings of varying capacities is only a device to show the superiority of the Hua-yen one vehicle doctrine, and the relative values of the doctrines of the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine, the one vehicle of the common doctrine, and the three vehicles and small vehicle. Their true position in the whole schema is, of course, shown by the fact that all others are the derivatives of the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine. Thus, when we turn to the doctrines, or the sutras, we find that there is one which is basic, or fundamental, and others which are derivative.

Taikei I.439-46; Kōgi 174-76

Chapter 7

Settling the Intention of Sequence

Text. Seven, settling the intention of sequence: however, the distinctions in the sequence of the various doctrines are difficult to enumerate, so I shall briefly distinguish the intention [of the sequence] in ten topics.

One, there may be beings in this [present time] who are fixed in the beginning [of their training, in the present life] or later [in another life] in the disposition of the small vehicle; that is, they see that the Tathāgata taught only the small vehicle from the first, when he achieved the Way, until he entered [final] *nirvāṇa*. They do not see him turn the wheel of the Dharma of the great vehicle. In this way, the beings of the small vehicle are attached to their own tenets and do not have faith in the great vehicle.

Two, there may be beings in this time who, because they are not fixed in the disposition of the small vehicle, are fit to proceed, and enter the beginning doctrine of the Mahāyāna. In this case, those who are fixed [after turning to the Mahāyāna] see the Tathāgata at first turning the wheel of the Dharma of the small vehicle and reversing the heretical teachings, and they see him later turn the wheel of the Dharma of the doctrine of the early Mahāyāna; i.e., turn the wheel of the Dharma of emptiness [*śūnyatā*], and turn away from the small vehicle. It is like the initial teaching [as mentioned in] the Mādhyamika-kārikās [T.30.1].

Three, there may be beings in this time who, because their dispositions are not fixed in the small vehicle or early doctrine of the Mahāyāna, [483b] are fit to enter the later [developed] Mahāyāna. In this case, those who are fixed [in the later Mahāyāna] see [the Buddha] turn the wheel of the Dharma of the small vehicle at first, they see him turn the wheel of the Dharma of emptiness in a middle period, and they see him turn the wheel of the Dharma of non-emptiness last. It is as taught in the Saṁdhinirmocana, etc..

Four, there may be beings of the gradual teaching who, because their dispositions are not fixed, are fit to enter the sudden doctrine. In this case, those who are fixed [at this time] see that the first revelation of a doctrine which consists of teaching by words might not be final, and they see the later revelation of the doctrine consisting of the elimination of words as being final. It is just like in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, where the non-duality which the 32 Bodhisattvas and Mañjuśrī spoke of consisted of words, while the elimination of words revealed by Vimalakīrti was final.

Five, there may be beings in this time whose capacities for sudden enlightenment are developed. In this case, those who are fixed [in the sudden doctrine] see that from the time he first obtained the Way until he entered [final] *nirvāṇa*, the Buddha never spoke a word. It is as it says in the *Lañkāvatāra-sūtra*. Also, the *Mahāpārinirvāṇa-sūtra* says, "If one knows that the Tathāgata never taught the Dharma, I call him one who completely possesses [the power of] much hearing 多聞 of the Bodhisattva," etc..

Six, there may be beings in this time who are fixed in the nature of the three vehicles. They see that the Buddha taught the Dharma of the three vehicle teaching from the first, and until he entered [final] *nirvāṇa*, he taught no other. It is like the teaching in the above *Vajrapāṇi-sūtra* and in the Large *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*.

Seven, there may be beings in this time who, because they are not fixed in the disposition of the three vehicles, are fit to proceed, and enter the one vehicle of the common doctrine. They see that their own three vehicle Dharma which they have obtained appears in reliance on the inexhuastible teaching of the one vehicle, and the *Āgama* of skillful means which was established by the other [one vehicle]. Therefore, they turn back all which they have cultivated to the one vehicle. It is like uniting the three and restoring them to the one, etc.. Also, it is like the above quotation: "The three vehicles were taught with the one vehicle at the same time," etc..

Eight, there may be beings in this time who, because they are not fixed in the nature of the three vehicles, are fit to proceed, and enter the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine. They understand that the Dharmas of the other three vehicles, etc., are originally not different from the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine. Why? Because that other [three vehicle doctrine] belongs to the one vehicle, and because it is not a different thing. It is like the teaching of the common doctrine in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra.

Nine, there may be beings in this time who fully possess the capacities of Samantabhadra. They see that the Tathāgata, from the first when he achieved the Way until the time he entered [final] nirvāṇa, taught everywhere in a sovereign manner, in the second seven days, while in the concentration which is like the images of the ocean, the inexhaustible interrelationship of primary and secondary, the realm of the inexhaustible subtlety of Indra's net. They do not see him teaching the Dharmas of the three vehicles, small vehicle, etc.. It is as it says in the distinct doctrine of the Avataṁsaka-sūtra. This is said in connection with the positions of seeing and hearing, and comprehending and practicing, in the part having to do with teaching, under the realm of Samantabhadra [i.e., the causal stage].

[483c] Ten, there may be beings in the distinct doctrine of the one vehicle who, having perfected compre-

hension and practice, are enlightened in the ocean of result. They understand that all the above Dharmas [of the various vehicles, etc.] are the inexhaustible ocean of ultimate nature, are formed in accordance with conditions, and are not different things. Therefore, all the doctrines are qualities [or functions] of this perfect, inexhaustible ocean of result. They are inconceivable and inexpressible. This is said in connection with the part which is one-vehicle enlightenment [and result]. The rest can be understood accordingly.

Notes. This chapter is concerned with the reasons for the sequence of teaching as given in the previous chapter. The reason is, in general, that the capacities of beings vary from very dull to very sharp, from the shallow to the deep. These capacities have innumerable degrees, but Fa-tsang condenses them into ten general categories. The following notes will clarify some of the obscure points in the text. The numbers correspond to the ten categories.

1. "In this time" means the present time in which the subject in question is living, and is opposed to past and future lives. The same is true of the following nine categories. Here, the person in question is fixed, or determined, as to the doctrine or vehicle he will follow, in this case, the small vehicle. As in the teaching of the five *gotras* of the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, this person is of fixed nature, and as a result of his *karma*, will in the future also belong to the small vehicle.

2. This type of person is not fixed in the small vehicle, but strives to understand teachings of Mahāyāna. In a later life he becomes a person whose nature is fixed in the early teachings of Mahayāna, which is simple *śūnyatā*. By "seeing", Fa-tsang means much as we do by one use of the term; that is to understand or comprehend. The allusion to the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* refers to the answer given there at the beginning to the question, "Why was this work composed?"

4. Categories 2 and 3 are, respectively, the early-undeveloped and later-developed forms of Mahayāna. These are both, from another point of view, "gradual" doctrines, in the sense that one gradually acceeds to the Mahayana *via* the small vehicle, and there is a dependence on stages,

sutra teachings, etc.. However, this present category concerns the person who is worthy of belonging to the sudden school, and he can progress from the gradual to the sudden.

5. This class of beings belongs to the sudden doctrine from the beginning of his career, and does not progress from gradual to slow.

6. All the preceding groups belong to the small vehicle and Mahāyana three vehicles. This section groups them all together as those who have listened to the early and later stages of Mahāyana teaching. The *Vajrapāni-sūtra* 密迹力士經 says that the Buddha taught the Dharma of the three vehicles and caused the men of the three vehicles to acquire various benefits thereof.

7. This category is composed of beings within the common doctrine of the one vehicle who have dull faculties. They are originally of the three vehicles, but come to recognize that the three vehicles are merely the *upāya* of the one vehicle. They turn to the 同教 , but do not receive the benefits of the distinct doctrine, which belongs to those of the following eighth category. They are not, however, of a single capacity, since they may turn from any stage among the small and three vehicles.

8. This group is composed of beings within the one vehicle of the common doctrine who have sharp faculties. Because they recognize the special qualifications of the distinct doctrine of the one vehicle, they are fit to take their place in it, but they are in reality part of the common doctrine. They do not look for one vehicle outside of the three vehicles.

9. This concerns the teachable aspect of the one vehicle. The person of this category sees that the Buddha taught the whole truth while in *samādhi*, beneath the *bodhi* tree, and never taught such things as the doctrines of three vehicles or small vehicle. He enters the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine directly, because he is of the capacity to understand and practices the one vehicle teaching. The two stages, or lives, of 1. seeing and hearing, and 2. comprehension and practice, are the causal stage preceding the final stage, and the person in question is of this stage of development.

10. This is, of course, the furthest developed of the ten groups; indeed, this is for those who have perfected the stage of comprehension and practice and become Buddhas. They perceive that the five doctrines are the infinitely interrelated functions of *tathatā*, arising in mutual interdependence and mutual benefit, and not different from each other.

Of these ten categories, 1, 2, and 3 compare the great and small vehicles, 4 and 5 compare gradual and sudden, 6, 7, and 8 compare the three vehicles and one vehicle, and 9 and 10 compare the stages of cause and result within one vehicle. With regard to natures being fixed or not fixed, 1,5,6,9, and 10 are fixed, the others are not.

Taikei I.446-65; *Kōgi* 177-84

Chapter 8

Establishing Differences

Text. Eight, establishing differences 施設異相 : although these differences are numerous, I shall reveal their inexhaustibility be means of ten categories. What are the ten differences?

1. Difference of time; i.e., this one vehicle was certainly taught in the second seven days of the first period. It is like the sun rising and first illuminating the tall mountains, etc.. Thus, the Treatise [on the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*] says, "Because this reveals the superiority of the Dharma, it was taught at the first time in the superior place." [T.26.124] If this is so, why did he not teach it during the first seven days? [a person might ask.] "He contemplated the activity of cause and conditions," etc., as [this same] treatise shows. Also, because this is identical with time as the net of Indra, it includes all time. Whether past or future eons beyond recount, both past and present are included in this one time. The three vehicles, etc., are not so. Because the time is not fixed, as a result of complying with the suitability of beings' capacities, there is either previous or later. Also, [in this case] all eons, etc., are not included in the one time [when one of the other doctrines was taught].

Notes. The differences are the differences between the one vehicle and the other vehicles. Ten are given, though the differences are innumerable. Here, the difference is in the time during which a particular doctrine was taught. This part, the difference of time, shows the superiority of the one vehicle on the basis of the fact that it was taught at the very first, beneath the bodhi tree. Time, like all other dharmas, being mutually inclusive and identical, tends to lose its distinctions of previous and later. The time beneath the bodhi includes all times, and thus, even the later doctrines taught to the three vehicles and others are included in this one special time.

Taikei I.466-71; Kōgi 185-88

Two, difference of place; i.e., this one vehicle certainly [was taught] beneath the bodhi tree adorned with jewels, in the ocean of the world situated in the lotus, which is to say that it embraces the seven places and eight assemblies, etc.. Other oceans of worlds beyond mention are also included in it, because one place includes all places. Therefore, without moving from the bodhi tree [the Buddha] everywhere mounted the six heavens, etc.. This is what is meant here. Also, because the world situated in the lotus is coterminous with the net of Indra, it completely pervades 側 all grains of dust. In this place [i.e., the place beneath the bodhi tree] which is equal to the dharma-dhātu, he taught the Dharma of the one vehicle which is equal to the dharma-dhātu. The three vehicles and the others are not like this. [Their doctrines were taught] in such places as beneath trees in the Sahā world, etc.. Also, one place is not identical with all places [in their case].

Notes. The emphasis in this section is universality of place. The Buddha as dharma-kāya is omnipresent, and while expounding the one vehicle beneath the bodhi tree, he also taught in the six heavens of the kāma-dhātu; i.e., the seven places and eight assemblies of the *Hua-yen-sūtra*. Moreover, the *bodhi* tree of tradition is not the same tree as seen by other beings, nor is this the ordinary world. It is, to the contrary, the world which is situated in the great cosmic lotus, which in turn grows from the belt of waters underlying the world. It is the glorified land which has been purified, transformed, and glorified by the practices of Samantabhadra. It resembles the *Sukhāvatī*. The doctrines of the three vehicles and small vehicle were, on the other hand, taught in the Sahā world in such places as the Deer Park, and this place is not all places.

Taikei I.471-73; *Kōgi* 188-89

Text. Question: If that is so, why was the *Buddhabhūmi-sūtra*, etc., taught in the Pure Land? [484a] Answer: That sutra only says that abiding in the bright shining palaces, etc., he possesses 18 kinds of perfections 圓滿 . Also, it does not particularly indicate the country of Māghada, etc.. Because he teaches the qualities of the stage of Buddhahood for the sake of Bodhisattvas who are on the stages [*daśabhūmi*] he abides in the land of the *saṁbhogakāya* 受用土 outside the triple world. This is said according to the later teaching of the three vehicles and the common doctrine of the one vehicle. This Hua-yen says that all were [taught] in the country of Māghada, etc., in the world of the lotus. We do not say within the Sahā world or outside the triple world. Therefore, you should know that it is different. The other meanings can be understood in the same way.

Notes. Along with the *Buddhabhūmi-sūtra* is listed the *Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra* as being taught in the Pure Land of the *saṁbhogakāya*, not in ordinary places in the Sahā world. These are the teachings of the three vehicles. However, the point is that they do not mention the Sahā world, the impure world, so only the pure land outside the triple world is specified. For this reason, they can not be indicating a situation such as that in the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra*, where the Buddha teaches all over the universe without moving from beneath the *bodhi* tree, because they do not recognize the special relationship between the impure Sahā world and the glorified world of the lotus.

Taikei I.474-75; *Kōgi* 189-90

Text. Three, the difference of teacher; i.e., this one vehicle [teacher] is certainly Vairocana, the Buddha endowed with the ten bodies. Also, it is the teaching of the inexhaustible three worlds. The chapter on "The Practices of Samantabhadra," [in the *Avataṁsaka*] says, "The Buddha teaches, the Bodhisattvas teach, the Buddha land teaches, beings teach, the whole three worlds teach," etc. It is not the same as the teaching of the three vehicles that it is the teaching of the transformation body [*nirmāṇa*-*kāya*], the enjoyment body [*saṁbhoga*-*kāya*], etc.. The other matters can be understood in the same way.

Notes. The quotation from the *Samantabhadracārya* shows the whole universe as teaching the Dharma; all things teach, and all sounds are the teaching. The three worlds referred to are not those of traditional Buddhist cosmology, the *kama*-*dhatu*, *rupa*-*dhatu*, etc., but the three worlds of beings, the physical world in which they live, and the world of enlightenment (or of the Buddha). These three are further expanded into ten, which in turn are equivalent to the ten bodies of the Buddha Vairocana. Thus, since Vairocana contains within him all things, when he teaches, all things teach. While in the other sutras of the three vehicles, one of the three traditional bodies of the Buddha is seen as teacher, here it is the Buddha Vairocana as the *dharma*-*kāya* of the ten bodies. Thus, for this reason, the Hua-yen doctrine is superior.

Taikei I.475-77; *Kōgi* 191

Text. Four, the difference of assembly; i.e., the beginning of this sutra of the one vehicle lists [as the assembly listening to the Buddha] only such Bodhisattvas as Samantabhadra, and the assemblies of the divine kings of the realm of the Buddha. It is not like assemblies of just śrāvakas or the two assemblies of the great and small vehicles, in the three vehicles, etc.. Question: if that is so, why are there assemblies of śrāvakas in the eighth assembly? Answer: there are two reasons why assemblies of śrāvakas are listed first there. One, because if presents the Dharma by showing the opposite, it shows the śrāvakas as deaf and dumb, in order to reveal the profound superiority of the Dharma. Two, the six thousand monks collected together by Mañjuśrī after he left the [main] assembly are not the assembly mentioned earlier [in the sutra]. These have belonged to the three vehicles before. Because they are made to turn to the one vehicle, this statement is made.

Notes. In the eighth assembly of the Avataṁsaka, the assembly of śrāvakas is mentioned as hearing the discourse, and this seems to contradict the statement made by Fa-tsang that part of the difference between the three vehicles and one vehicle is that the assembly which heard the Hua-yen doctrine was composed solely of the great Bodhisattvas and assorted ethereal beings. Fa-tsang's explanation is, 1. they are present but cannot hear the discourse, because it is too profound and elevated for them. This shows the superiority of the Hua-yen doctrine. 2. The śrāvakas who listen to Mañjuśrī retain their old names as śrāvakas, but since they have turned to the one vehicle, they are not really śrāvakas any more, so they are not the śrāvakas such as Śāriputra, mentioned earlier.

Taikei I.477-81; Kōgi 192-93

Text. Five, the difference of support; i.e., the arising of this doctrine of the one vehicle certainly appeared based on the Buddha's concentration which is like the images of the ocean. It is not like the three vehicles, etc., which came from the knowledge which the Buddha acquired after enlightenment [*pṛṣṭhalabdha*-*jñāna*].

Notes. According to Chih-yen, in the *K'ung*-*mu*-*chang*, the knowledge derived from the *samudra*-*mudrā*-*samadhi* is the knowledge seen by the "universal eye," while the knowledge of *pṛṣṭhalabdha*-*jñāna* is of a lower order. The first is closely connected with *prajñā*, while the second is connected with *karuṇā*. At any rate, Fa-tsang certainly sees a qualitative difference between the two kinds of knowledge, and consequently between the two kinds of teaching. Of course, *pṛṣṭhalabdha*-*jñāna* is also ultimately derived from the *samudra*-*mudrā*-*samādhi*, and the convert to the one vehicle comes eventually to see it as an *upāya* existing within the concentration. This sounds as if it meant the common doctrine of the one vehicle.

Taikei I.481; *Kōgi* 193

Text. Six, the difference of teaching; when this one vehicle taught one thing, one meaning, one chapter, in one assembly, etc., in this one direction [beneath the *bodhi* tree], without doubt [these things] were merged with all worlds in the ten directions, and in the same way as this teaching, all were primary and secondary together and formed a whole [which is this *Avataṃsaka*-*sūtra*]. Thus, in the same way that one phrase or sentence of this sutra fills the ten directions, all [other phrases and sentences] fill the ten directions [and thus form the infinitely repeated interrelationship of primary and secondary]. The three vehicles are not like this. [Their teaching] is taught only in one place and in accordance with a single characteristic, and lacks this interfusion of primary and secondary, etc..

Notes. By "difference of teaching" is meant, apparently, method. What is meant is that when one part of the teaching was made in one place, other parts were taught in other places simultaneously, the whole forming the single great "net of the Dharma" through the primary-secondary relationship of the parts. Also, of course, when one thing was taught, all things were taught.

Taikei I.482; Kōgi 194

Text. Seven, the difference of stages; i.e., the characteristics of the stages of the one vehicle [practice] are mixed. Therefore, each stage includes all stages. Therefore, even such a stage as Buddhahood exists in the stages of faith and the other [following ones]. The other stages are the same. In the three vehicles, however, this is not so. There is inferior and superior with regard to a given stage, and they are not mixed. The rest is as discussed below [in chapter 9].

Notes. "Stages" are the six stages of faith, abode, etc., including the stage of Buddhahood. Any stage is included in each of the other stages, so that one is a Buddha in the stage of faith or any other stage. This means that the causal stages leading to Buddhahood-result are identical with that result. In the three vehicles, however, there is an orderly progression from inferior to superior, because, for instance, avidyā and prajñā are antagonistic. In the one vehicle, if the first stage of faith is perfected, all stages are perfected, at least in potential, for the Bodhisattva of this rank is irreversible.

Taikei I.482-83; Kōgi 195

Text. Eight, the difference of practice [484b]; i.e., any one Bodhisattva is endowed with the six stages consisting of faith, etc.. He cultivates at one time, altogether, the different characteristics of practice of concentration and distraction, etc., which exist in each stage. It is like being continually in concentration, etc., in all the worlds in the eastern direction and continually venerating the Buddha, etc., in all the worlds of the four directions. Thus, [the Bodhisattva] exhausts the practices of the dharma-dhātu in the worlds of the ten directions, yet does not divide his body. He fills [the ten directions] everywhere simultaneously, and in a single instant cultivates all [practices] everywhere. Each instant, also, is the same. In each stage, from the perfection of faith on, he cultivates all in the same way. Also, there is no question of his lacking fitness or unfitness [with regard to any stage], one practice is identical with all practices, etc., in common with the [meaning of the] net of Indra, etc.. The three vehicles, however, are not like this. For the Bodhisattva who is on the stages, there are distinctions; how much more for those anterior to the stages. The rest is as discussed below.

Notes. Concentration and distraction 定散 mean concentration-intuition and emerging from concentration and performing such acts as veneration of the Buddha. The Bodhisattva of the one vehicle does both simultaneously, in all worlds, yet he is only a single Bodhisattva. "Lacking fitness and unfitness" is another way of referring to a Bodhisattva in relation to the stages; the Bodhisattva anterior to the bhūmis is called unfit, and the one on the bhūmis is called fit. Because each phenomenal item of the dharma-dhātu has a relationship to all other items like the relationship of the gems in Indra's net, one practice includes all other practices.

Taikei I.483-85; Kōgi 196

Text. Nine, the difference of Dharma topics; i.e., I will present ten kinds in order to show this in brief. 1. They [the three vehicles] have three Buddhas; we have ten. 2. They have six supernatural powers; we have ten. 3. They have three kinds of knowledge[*vidyā*]; we have ten. 4. They have eight liberations; we have ten. 5. They have four fearless states; we have ten. 6. They have five kinds of vision [lit. eyes 眼]; we have ten. 7. They speak of three times; we have ten. 8. They have four truths; we have ten. 9. They have four means of conversion; we have ten. 10. They have 18 characteristics peculiar to Buddhas; we have ten. There are other topics without limit. The details are as in the sutra.

Notes. For details concerning these topics cf. the following. 1. T.9.565,634,663; 2. T.9.639; 3. T.9.578-80, 662; 4. T.9.640; 5. T.649; 6. T.9.657; 7. T.9.634; 8. T.9.555; 9. T.9.636; 10. T.9.650. The number ten is symbolic of inexhaustibility.

Taikei I.486-88; *Kōgi* 197

Text. Ten, the difference of things; i.e., all such things as dwellings, forests, rivers, land, mountains, etc., are Dharma topics 法門. They may be practices, or stages, or teaching and essence, etc., yet, the things are not harmed. Consequently, each atom of dust may possess all the different things of the *dharma*-*dhātu*. They form the subtle interrelationships of the realm of Indra. All things arise as one thing does. The three vehicles, etc., are not the same. Because they can only say "It is empty," or "It is _tathatā_," etc., they are not the same. Even if they were to use the inconceivable power of the supernatural powers, they could only manifest this a little. This is not like the self nature of the Dharma of the other [one vehicle]. The rest can be understood in the same way. This is the end of the eighth chapter. Next come the two sections on content and the principles which form the middle and final two _chüan_. They complete the ten chapters.

Notes. All things can be contained within a single thing without destroying its integrity as that particular thing; thus, even the factual, phenomenal things of the _dharma_-_dhātu_ are pregnant with the reality which is the object of the Bodhisattva's quest. Because any one thing contains the functions of all other things as a result of the infinitely repeated interrelationship of primary and secondary, all things arise when one thing arises. This is the inexhaustibility of the arising from conditions of the _dharma_-_dhātu_. For this reason, the one vehicle does not stop at a single characteristic, such as emptiness, or _tathatā_. This relationship of primary and secondary is the property of the Hua-yen; in the three vehicles, such a relationship is only temporarily possible, as when Vimalakīrti includes Mt. Sumeru in a grain of mustard. In the one vehicle, however, this is the very nature of the universe.

Taikei I.488-90; _Kōgi_ 198

Chapter 9

Distinctions of Content

Text. [484c] Nine [b = ten], explaining the distinctions of the content 所詮 of the [five] doctrines: through the brief presentations of distinctions of meanings in ten topics, I will show that the teachings 能詮 are different. The rest is as explained elsewhere [in Chih-yen's K'ung-mu chang and in his Fifty Essential Questions and Answers].

1. Mind, the support
2. Distinctions of seed-nature
3. Divisions of practice and stages
4. The time of cultivations
5. The body which supports cultivation
6. Divisions of extinguishing defilements
7. The transformation of the two vehicles
8. Essence and bodily marks of the Buddha
9. Divisions of the Buddha's material surroundings
10. Analysis and synthesis of Buddha-body

Notes. The previous eight chapters discussed such matters as the difference between the one vehicle and three vehicles, various ways of dividing doctrines and vehicles, and other such matters, all of which was calculated to show not only the distinctions between the one vehicle and three vehicles, but also the superiority of the one. Chapter nine is devoted to the discussion of various important doctrinal items as taught by the five vehicles, or doctrines, and as Fa-tsang explains, this again will prove that there is a difference in the vehicles or doctrines themselves. The basis for his discussion is the threefold topic of ultimate principle 理 , practice 行 , and result 果 , a favorite method of analysis which he has often used elsewhere (for instance, in the *T'an-hsüan-chi*). The above ten topics make up the framework of this chapter. Of these ten, number two is principle; three through seven concerns practice; and eight through ten have to do with result; i.e., Buddhahood itself. From another point of view, two through seven concern the causal stage, and the three remaining topics concern result. Mind is called support because it is the support for the other nine; indeed, it is the support of all things.

Taikei II.170-72; *Kōgi* 199-200

1. Mind, the Support

Text. One, the distinctions of mind心識: the small vehicle has only six *vijñānas* [and not eight]. They are divided into *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*, on the basis of interpretation, as the treatises of the small vehicle teach. They recognize the *ālaya*-*vijñāna* only as a name, as in the *Ekottara*-*āgama*.

Notes. The small vehicle, represented by such works as the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmakośa*, claims a separate consciousness (*vijñāna*) for each of the six organs---eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind itself, but there is not, in that system, a seventh *vijñāna*, or *manas*, nor an *ālaya*-*vijñāna*, the eighth. In general, the six *vijñānas* are really only the one mind in its various capacities. Also, since this mind not only relates to various functions of the whole psycho-physical organism, but also relates to such activities as discrimination, etc., it is variously called *vijñāna*, *citta*, or *manas*. In the same way, mind is seen as a storehouse of moral consequences, and in that respect might be called an *ālaya*, but this is not a technical term applied to a very special aspect of mind as is found, for instance, in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, *Saṁdhinirmocana*-*sūtra*, and others. The *Ekottara*-*āgama* apparently does not teach the matter described above, though it is quoted as doing so by the Liang translation of *Msg*. and in the *Vijñaptimātratā*-*siddhi* of Hsüan-tsang. For the teaching of the *Abhidharmakośa*, see, in the translation by La Vallée Poussin, vol.1, pp.30,33, and vol.2, pp.176, 177, 315.

The first of the ten topics is mind, the support of all *dharmas*, and the following nine topics are the compounded and uncompounded *dharmas* supported by this mind.

The interpretations of mind among the various vehicles and schools vary considerably, and all the patriarchs of the Hua-yen have described the various types of mind-theory. In the Mahāyāna, the *ālaya-vijñāna* and concomitant doctrine of mind-only, or one mind, have held a dominant position in the overall teaching of the schools. This is equally true of Hua-yen, where the interpretations of the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* and Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Daśabhūmika*, via the earlier *Ti-lun* school, led to the peculiar one mind doctrine of Hua-yen. For some of the development of this doctrine, cf. Takamine's *Kegon Shisō Shi*, pp.67 ff., and S. Kamatani's *Kegon Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, chap. 1 and 2. Both works have good material on the *ālaya* theory apropos Hua-yen.

Taikei II.172-73; *Kōgi* 202

Text. The initial doctrine [of Mahāyāna] understands only the one aspect of *ālaya-vijñāna* which is that it arises and subsides. With regard to *tathatā*, they are still unable to harmonize [the phenomenal and noumenal], so they just say that [*tathatā*] is immutable and does not become *dharmas*. Therefore, they establish the *ālaya* among phenomena 事 which arise and cease in dependence on conditions. It is born from the seeds 種 of action, etc., in distinguishing the essence [of the seeds]. As the *vijñāna* which is maturation-retribution [i.e., *vipāka*], it is the support of all *dharmas*.

Notes. The early Mahāyāna, exemplified by the *Saṁdhinirmocana-sutra*, views the *ālaya* as another phenomenal object which arises and ceases in dependence on conditions, but not as being essentially non-arising and non-ceasing. In effect, it is not identified with immutable *tathatā*. In the system of early Mahāyāna, this strictly empirical and individual *ālaya* comes into being as a result of the "seeds" or impressions (*bīja*) left from mental, vocal, and and physical acts. The accumulation of these seeds is nothing but *ālaya* itself. The accumulation of *bīja* is indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), being a mixture of both good and bad impressions, and can not bring about a result on its own strength. The *ālaya* or *bīja* must be "perfumed" by new impressions, and these, acting as the sovereign condition (*adhipati*-*pratyaya*) and in interdependence with "old" *bīja*, cause the result, which will be either pleasant or unpleasant. *Ālaya* is thus produced from the new *karma*-*bīja* and the morally indeterminate *bīja* already stored in the *ālaya*. "Distinguishing the essence" means that good or pleasant results will come from good seeds, and bad or unpleasant results will come from bad seeds, and this law is never transgressed or bypassed. Because of the mutually causative relationship of the *ālaya*-*bīja* and the results of these causal seeds, the *ālaya* also becomes result of these in turn, when it is again "perfumed" by new action, and in this sense it can be said to be born of the distinction of its essence. The *Vijñapti*-*mātratā*-*siddhi* of the Chinese Fa-hsiang school perhaps best represents this system. Cf. for instance, pp.94 ff., vol.1, in the translation by La Vallée Poussin, where *ālaya* and *bīja* are discussed.

Taikei II.173-76; *Kōgi* 202-04

Text. Through the use of *upāya*, [the small vehicle] is gradually drawn to the truth. Therefore, it is taught the seeds, etc., are all empty. The *Saṁdhinirmocana*-*sūtra* says, "If a Bodhisattva sees, with regard to both internal and external, neither store place nor seeds, neither *ālaya* nor *ālaya*-*vijñāna*, neither *ādāna* [grasping] nor *ādāna*-*vijñāna*, if he perceives in this way, then he is called 'Bodhisattva, Bodhisattva'. [b = skillful Bodhisattva] The Tathāgata, in accordance with this, established the *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*, the skillful means of the hidden [intention]." [*Mahāyānasaṁgraha* I, quoting the *Saṁdhinirmocana*] The *Yogācārabhūmi*-*śāstra* says the same. The explanation is that because the *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* are established in accordance with this non-seeing, etc., because it is a skillful device, therefore, such characteristics of __ālaya__ as arising and cessation all have a secret meaning. Because it can not be grasped through such things as words, [this teaching] is restored to the true [principle of real emptiness apart from such characteristics].

__Notes__. "Inside" and "outside" refer to the six senses and their respective correlative objects. The "non-seeing" means to see them as empty. The teaching of the emptiness of __ālaya__ and __bīja__ is a skillful device meant to lure the small vehicle to the truth, which is a later, higher emptiness, or, rather, the truth consisting of the non-duality of emptiness and existence. The small vehicle is thus first attracted by the doctrine of __ālaya__ as an impermanent, conditioned phenomenal object. Then it is said that __ālaya__ and such things are empty. Later, as will be seen in the discussion of the later Mahāyāna, the higher truth of __ālaya__ as a mixture of the permanent and impermanent will be taught.

__Taikei__ II.176-79; __Kōgi__ 204-05

__Text__. [485a] The later [Mahāyāna] doctrine sees both parts, the interpenetration of the noumenal and phenomenal 理事 in the __ālaya__-__vijñāna__. Therefore, the __Treatise__ [i.e., the __Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna__] says, "Non-arising and non-cessation, and arising and cessation, are united, and [mind] being neither identical with nor different [from arising and cessation] is called __ālaya-vijñāna__." [T.32.576] [It says this] because by acknowledging that __tathatā__ becomes the fundamental [__ālaya__] in accordance with [conditions consisting of] perfuming and uniting with [the impermanent], it is not the same as the previous doctrine, which says it is born of the seeds of __karma__, etc..

Notes. According to Fa-tsang, the later Mahāyāna, as exemplified by the above-mentioned text, considers *ālaya* to be a union of the conventional and real, the union of non-arising-non-cessation and arising-cessation, or, again, change and immutability. Thus, this doctrine transcends the previous, in which *ālaya*-*vijñāna* did not partake of the immutable *tathatā*. This interpretation is obviously similar to that of the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, and it is this view which, *via* the earlier *Ti*-*lun* school, had such a great impact on the formulation of some key teachings in Hua-yen, such as the nature of the Buddha, the universality of Buddha nature, and one mind. An example of this may be seen in Fa-tsang's commentary to the *Avataṁsaka*, in the section dealing with the chapter on "The Arising of the Tathāgata from Essential Nature," in the *T'an*-*hsüan*-*chi* (T.35.405-06), where the Tathāgata is discussed in terms of non-change 不改 and the apparently contradictory appearance, or arising 起. This is, according to Fa-tsang, the arising of non-arising, or the appearance in the world, through conditions, of the immutable and unconditioned; i.e., the arising from essential nature. The following texts develop this idea.

Taikei II.179-81; *Kōgi* 206

Text. The *Laṅkāvatāra*-*sūtra* says, "The *tathāgata*-*garbha* which has been perfumed from the beginningless past by unwholesome actions 惡習 is called *ālaya*-*vijñāna*." 藏識 b = 識藏 T.16.510 Int.] It also says, "The *tathāgata*-*garbha* experiences pain and pleasure, and arises and ceases together with its cause [which is ignorance]." [T.16.512] It also says, "The *tathāgata*-*garbha* is called *ālaya*-*vijñāna*. and is united with ignorance and the previous seven *vijñānas*." [T.16.556] Also, the *Awakening of Faith* says, "Mind pure in its own essence is agitated because of the winds of ignorance, and forms impure mind," etc.. [T.32.576] [Thus, as is shown above,] the scriptural proofs are numerous.

Notes. The above passages are quotations used to support the argument that the ālaya-vijñāna is a mixture of pure and impure, true and false, immutable and conditioned. The quotation from the Awakening of Faith draws on the simile of water and waves. The tathāgatagarbha is like water, which, if ruffled by the strong winds of avidyā, is transformed into waves, the impure, constantly evolving and changing mind. Implicit in this is the corollary that if ignorance is removed, the mind is revealed once more in its original purity and immutability, and one is at that instant a Buddha. It should be pointed out that in the quotation from the Awakening of Faith, the last part, "and forms impure mind," is an addition by Fa-tsang, and not in that text.

Taikei II.182; Kōgi 207-08

Text. Question: Since you say that tathatā is an external dharma, how can you say that it arises and ceases because of the impressions [vāsanā]? Since you say that it does arise and cease, how can you again say that it is eternal? Answer: Even though I say that tathatā is permanent, it is not the permanence of commonsense things [such as trees, rocks, etc.]. The reason is, when the Buddha spoke of tathatā as immutable, he meant that when it obeys conditions and becomes all dharmas, it does not lose its own essence, and for that reason he called it eternal. In this case, the eternal which is not different from the non-eternal is called "inconceivable permanence." It does not mean that it does not become all dharmas, which is immutability meant by ordinary thinking. Thus, when the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra says, "Not impure yet impure," it means it becomes all dharmas; "Impure yet not impure" means that it does not lose its own essence when it obeys conditions. [Both phrases are from T.12.222.] Because of the first meaning, conventional truth is achieved. Because of the second, the real truth is established. These real and conventional truths are merely two interpretations, not two essences. They are mutually inclusive without barrier, and divorced from the attachments of ordinary thinking. Thus, the *Treatise* [i.e., the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*] says, "The blind carry to extremes the obstruction to wisdom, discriminate and grasp, and speak of real and conventional." [T.31.153] This is what is meant [by the above explanation].

Notes. The question is raised by the followers of the Fa-hsiang school, here, the early doctrine, for whom the eternal and the impermanent, *tathatā* and *ālaya*-*vijñāna*, are two separate entities which are not united. Here, the terms "eternal" and "conditioned" are used for the two aspects of *tathatā*. The quotation from the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* puts the matter in terms of pure and impure, where "impure yet not impure" is the conditioned yet eternal, and the "pure, yet not pure" is the eternal, or *tathatā*, obeying conditions, and falling into the state of *ālaya-vijñāna*. In terms of this *ālaya*, this means that the *ālaya*, although it is conditioned by *bīja* and gives rise to all the *dharmas* of the five *skandhas*, twelve *āyatanas*, etc., remains forever pure and untouched by *bīja*, *vāsanā*, etc.. This essentially unmoved *ālaya* is none other than the Buddha nature within.

Taikei II.183-84; *Kōgi* 208-09

Text. With regard to these two meanings of *tathatā*, because the previous doctrine is concerned with the distinctions of the marks 相 of *dharmas*, it discusses only the one part [of *tathatā*] which is immutability. This developed doctrine is concerned with the mutual interfusion of essence and characteristics, so it teaches that the two aspects are non-dual. The full discussion of these interpretations is as found in the commentary on the *Awakening of Faith* [by Fa-tsang; i.e.,起信論義記].

Also, with regard to the teaching in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* that "The triple world is false and made of only one mind," [T.9.558] the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* and other texts explain [this mind] as *ālaya*-*vijñāna*, in connection with the early doctrine. The treatise on the *Daśabhūmika* explains it as true mind from the standpoint of the highest truth, in connection with the developed doctrine [of Mahāyāna]. Also, a verse of the *Abhidharma*-*sūtra* is explained in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, which says, "'This realm', etc.: 'realm' [*dhātu*] means 'cause'因 ; that is, the *vijñāna* which contains the seeds." And so on. The *Uttaratantra* explains it in connection with the later doctrine [of Mahāyāna]: [There,] "This nature" is the nature of the *tathāgata*-*garbha*. [T.31.839] "Based on this there are all the destinies," etc., is like the *Śrīmālādevī*-*sūtra*, [where it says,] "On the basis of the *tathāgata*-*garbha* there is *saṁsāra*," "Based on the *tathāgata*-*garbha* [485b] there is *nirvāṇa*," etc., and so on through the full discussion. Therefore, you should know that the two doctrines [of early and later Mahāyāna] are different.

Notes. The verse from the *Abhidharma-sūtra* which is explained by the *Msg*. is as follows:

Anādikāliko *dhātuh* *sarvadharmasamāśrayah* /
Tasmin *sati* *gatih* *sarvā* *nirvāṇādhigamo* '*pi* *ca* //

Cf. Lamotte's translation of _Msg._, _La Somme du Grand Véhicule_, Tome 1, p.12, and Taikei II.184-86; Kōgi 210-11.

Text. According to the sudden doctrine, all _dharmas_ are mind only which is absolute reality 唯一眞心 a = 一眞如心. It is the inexpressible, the termination of distinct characteristics, the cutting off of discourse, and the suppression of conceptualization. The Dharma of non-duality such as was discussed by the 32 Bodhisattvas in the _Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa_ is the non-duality of the interpenetration of impure and pure in the above [later Mahāyāna] doctrine. The non-duality which is apart from words, shown by Vimalakīrti, is the [non-duality meant by the] present doctrine. Because when all characteristics such as impure and pure are exhausted, there are not two _dharmas_ to be reconciled, [therefore,] the inexpressible is the non-dual.

According to the perfect doctrine [i.e., the Hua-yen], it concerns the perfect brightness of the ocean of essential nature 性海圓明. It is the unimpeded freedom of the dependent origination of the _dharma-dhātu_, all is one and one is all, and the perfect interfusion of primary and secondary 主伴圓融 . Therefore, ten minds are taught in order to show inexhaustibility, as taught in the chapter, "Free of the World" [離世界 T.9.657] and in the ninth stage [in the chapter on the "Ten Stages"]. Also, the absolute one mind which is the arising from essential nature of the *dharma*-*dhātu* possesses ten qualities, as it says in the chapter on "The Arising of the Tathāgata from Essential Nature" [in the *Avataṁsaka*]. These are all taught according to the distinct doctrine.

Notes. In the perfect doctrine, mind is, from the standpoint of essence, the absolute essential nature. From the standpoint of characteristics, it is the universe comprising *dharmas* infinitely interrelated with each other, and in their mutual dependence constituting the dependent origination of this *dharma*-*dhātu*. "Ocean of ultimate nature" means this essence which is Buddha nature, the result state, and is symbolized by Vairocana. "Perfect brightness" means the function or characteristics of this essence. The allusion to the chapter on "The Arising of the Tathāgata from Essential Nature" shows that this one mind has an inexhaustible number of qualities, here symbolized by the number ten, and means, I believe, that this one mind which is personified in Vairocana is endowed with countless qualities which are its function or retinue.

Among the five doctrines, the concept of mind varies considerably, as has already been shown. In general, it can be said that there are four kinds of mind. According to Hui-chao, in his commentary to the *Suvarnaprabhāsa*, these are 1. the rational, thinking mind, 2. accumulation, 3. *ālaya*, the eighth *vijñāna*, and 4. *tathatā*. (Kametani, *Kegon Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, p.94) Now, when we get to Hua-yen, by "mind" is meant *tathatā*. "In Hua-yen, when they say 'one mind', 'one' is not the number one which is opposed to two, three, etc., but means 'only one absolute', and the'non-dual only one'. 'Mind' is fundamental nature, and true essence; it does not mean arising from accumulation, or cognition. That is, 'one mind' is the fundamental true essence of the myriads of things of the universe, the absolute, uniform true source in which there is no distinction of true and false, beings and the Buddha." (Kametani, *Kegon Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, p.97)

"One mind" has several meanings in Buddhism. The Hua-yen patriarchs have catalogued these, and in Fa-tsang's *T'an*-*hsüan*-*chi* we find ten kinds enumerated. These in turn can be correlated with the five doctrines. Of these ten kinds of *wei*-*shih*, the last three are the province of Hua-yen. These are called, 1. The mind only consisting of the mutual inclusion of things which are interfused; 2. The mind only consisting of the total identity of all things; 3. The mind only consisting of the free interrelationship of the things in the realm of Indra. These three, the last three of Fa-tsang's list of ten, are the Hua-yen meanings of mind only, or one mind. For the meanings of these three, as well as the previous seven, cf. Kametani, *Kegon Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, pp.60-83.

Taikei II.188-89; *Kōgi* 212-13

Text. The common doctrine [of the one vehicle] includes the teachings on mind of all the previous [four] doctrines. Why is this? Because they are its skillful means, and because they are a derivation of it. The rest can be understood in the same way.

Notes. The doctrines of the small vehicle, early and developed Mahāyāna, and sudden doctrine are the *upāya* of the common doctrine, and do not exist outside it. The distinct doctrine is not included.

Taikei II.189-90; *Kōgi* 213

Text. Question: How can there be such different interpretations as these of one mind in the various doctrines [since mind in its essence is one]? Answer: There are two reasons: one, with regard to the Dharma, [the various interpretations are] wholly included [in the essence]; two, with regard to the capacities of beings 機 there is division [into various interpretations]. With regard to the first reason, because within this one mind of extremely profound dependent origination there are five meanings, therefore, the Buddha accordingly taught beings with one teaching [for each type of being]. One, substituting the name for the concept 攝義從名門, as taught in the small vehicle. Two, substituting phenomena for the noumenon 攝理從事門, as taught in the doctrine of the early Mahāyāna. Three, the category of the complete interfusion of noumenon and phenomena, as taught in the later Mahāyāna. Four, the category of exhaustion of phenomena and the revelation of noumenon, as taught in the sudden doctrine. Five, the category of the ocean of essential nature which is endowed with [countless] qualities, as taught in the perfect doctrine. Consequently, the fundamental is not destroyed, yet is eternally fundamental. Thus, the five doctrines are mutually interpenetrating and are the transformations of the absolute one mind.

Two, with regard to showing the divisions of acquiring the Dharma, with reference to beings, [one] they acquire the name, but not the concept, like the small vehicle. [Two,] they may acquire the name and one part of the meaning, like the early doctrine. [Three,] they may acquire the name and the whole meaning, like the developed doctrine. [Four,] they may acquire the meaning and not permit the name to exist, like the sudden doctrine. [Five,] or else the name and meaning both exist without end, like the perfect doctrine. The other meanings are like the discussion in the chapter on mind only [in the K'ung-mu-chang].

Notes. The question is, if the one mind is absolute and non-dual, why are there so many interpretations of it? The first answer is that although there are many interpretations, one essence underlies and unites them all. However, the Buddha taught aspects of this essential nature according to the varying capacities of beings, so there are five interpretations. In other words, the one mind which is absolute reality is the totality within which the parts exist, and these parts take the form of the five doctrines. Thus, in the second reason, that the one mind was taught in view of the differences in the abilities of beings, *śrāvakas* understand mind as functioning in six ways, in relation with the six senses. The early Mahāyāna set mind apart from *tathatā*, and regarded it as a phenomenal object subject to conditions and impermanent. And so on throughout the five doctrines, as was discussed above. However, as was pointed out, these aspects of the whole exist within the whole, which unifies and unites them. The fundamental becomes the derivative, but it does not stop being fundamental, and on the other hand, the derivative are eternally this fundamental, but they do not lose their derivative character.

The last sentence refers to the *K'ung*-*mu*-*chang*, according to the *Fu*-*ku*-*chi*, but the *Shiji* mentions as the source Fa-tsang's ten kinds of mind-only in explanation of the passage from the *Daśabhūmika*, "The triple world is false and constructed of only one mind." The first is the more likely, since Fa-tsang's explication, if it is the one in the *T'an*-*hsüan*-*chi*, comes much later, and could not be the reference here.

Taikei II.190-92; *Kōgi* 214-16

2. Distinctions of Seed Nature

Text. Two, showing the distinctions of seed nature [種性 *kula*-*vaṁśa*, *gotra*]. As far as the small vehicle is concerned, there are six kinds of seed nature: retrogressive 退, apprehensive 思, protective 護, static 住, progressive 進, and immovable 不動. There are three classes in the immovable; the superior is the seed nature of the Buddha, the middling is the seed nature of the *pratyekabuddha*, and the inferior is the seed nature of the *śrāvaka*, like Śāriputra. [485c] Even though it is said here that the seed nature of the Buddha exists in the single person of the Buddha, still, it is not that nature of great *bodhi*, because they do not mention with regard to the qualities of the Buddha that he arouses great activity forever, etc.. Therefore, you should know that as far as this doctrine is concerned, with the exception of the one individual, the Buddha, all other living beings are said not to have the potentiality for great *bodhi*. The other ideas are as mentioned in the treatises of the small vehicle [such as the *Abhidharmakośa*].

Notes. The argument centers around seed nature, or potentiality, as viewed by each of the five doctrines, but the real issue is the attitude towards the potentiality in beings for Buddhahood. "Seed nature" is a rather literal translation for 種性; the meaning is clan, or family. In the small vehicle, there are six types of potentiality, and these are, according to the *Abhidharmakośa*, determined from the beginning of their careers. They are, in reality, six types of Arhat; their names in Sanskrit are *parihāna*, *cetanā*, *anuraksanā*, *sthitākampya*, *prativedanā*, and *akopya*. The Buddha, Sākyamuni, reached the last of these six stages through the cultivation of the course outlined in such works as the *Kośa* and *Vibhāsā*; i.e., the curriculum or program of the small vehicle. He did not have the Buddha nature as an inherent potentiality existing from all time, but acquired it as a result of his exertions. As far as the small vehicle is concerned, he is a one member class; though past Buddhas are recognized, for all practical purposes, he alone acquires Buddhahood. He is therefore different from the Buddha of the *Saddharmapundarīka* or *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*, who has existed always as the eternal Buddha who is never born or enters *nirvāna*. He is therefore not the Buddha of the Mahāyāna, not to mention the Buddha of the one vehicle.

Taikei II.193-98; *Kōgi* 217-19

Text. [Two,] as far as the doctrine of the three vehicles is concerned, there are, in brief, three explanations of seed nature. First, in connection with the early doctrine; that is, because seed nature is established among compounded, non-eternal *dharmas* it can not be found universally in sentient beings. Thus, among the five kinds of seed nature, one part of sentient beings is without nature. Thus, [Asaṅga's] *Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra* says, "Why are there distinctions in seed nature? There are five reasons. [One,] because the distinctions of all [possible] realms[界 = *bīja*-cause] are possible, ...[and finally,]five, because that only the present time is not a matter of *parinirvāṇa* does not conform to reason," and so on through the full explanation. [T.31.581] Therefore, you should know that because the Dharma is such 法爾, all beings have five natures from beginningless time. Because the fifth seed nature lacks the cause for supramundane qualities, it never achieves *nirvāṇa*. For this reason, there is no termination of the qualities of Buddhas which consist of benefiting sentient beings.

Notes. The three explanations correspond to the three parts of the three vehicles: the early Mahāyāna, later Mahāyāna, and the sudden or intuitive school. Here, the early Mahāyāna is discussed, probably represented by the Vijñānavāda school, which held the theory of the five *gotras*. These are 1. those determined to be Bodhisattvas; 2. those determined to be *pratyekabuddhas*; 3. those determined to be *śrāvakas*; 4. those of unfixed nature; 5. those who lack a potentiality for any of these. The reason is that this is the nature of things; because among *dharmas* all possibilities can be found, there must be beings who are natureless, or who belong to no *gotra*. In the Vijñānavāda, the problem essentially was one of whether in our own *ālaya*-*vijñāna* we have the causal *bīja* which made any of the *gotras* possible, particularly the Buddha *gotra*, since this is really the important problem. The work of Asaṅga lists five reasons why there are five kinds of nature. Here, only the first and fifth reasons are given by way of summary. Actually, the first is the important reason; the remaining four are answers to possible arguments. The last reason denies, on the grounds of reason, that though in the present life one might be incapable of enlightenment and *nirvāṇa*, it might be possible in a later life. The *bīja* are of a certain cast from the beginning, and they will remain so in no matter how many succeeding lives. Those who are incapable of salvation are so by nature, and this nature is fixed. All other beings have some chance for salvation, even those in the hells.

Taikei II.198-204; *Kōgi* 219-22

Text. With regard to those who do have the seed nature, the *Yogācārabhūmi*-*śāstra* says, "There are, generally speaking, two kinds of seed nature. One is innate nature 本性住 ; two is that formed by cultivation 習所成. 'Innate nature' means that within the most superior of the six *āyatanas* of Bodhisattvas there are such characteristics [as the *bīja* of Buddhahood]. They have evolved from beginningless time and are acquired through the nature of Dharma. That which is formed by cultivation is [the nature or *bīja*] acquired by previous repeated cultivation of the roots of goodness." [T.30.478c] Herein, "innate nature" means that the *mana*-*āyatana* among the six internal *āyatanas* is the most surpassing; that is, the potentiality for enlightenment, which is innate enlightenment, included in the *ālaya*-*vijñāna* [which is included in the six *āyatanas*] is innate nature 性種性 . Therefore, the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "The influences [*vāsanā*] resulting from hearing [the Mahāyāna Dharma] united with the potentiality for enlightenment in the *ālaya*-*vijñāna* is the cause for holiness." 聖人 [T.31.173 Int.]

Notes. Here, nature and seeds, or bīja, are used synonymously. The two kinds of nature-bīja are equivalent to innate enlightenment and initial enlightenment. For some unaccountable reason, the text speaks of manāyatana as synonymous with ālaya. Also, the discussion here concerns Buddha nature specifically, rather than seed nature in general, because the subject is the Bodhisattva. The point to the whole passage is that so-called "innate nature" alone is not a cause for Buddhahood; it must be "moistened" by nature-bīja resulting from faith, hearing the Mahāyāna Dharma, etc.. When the innate and cultivated are combined, one has Buddha nature.

Taikei II.204-12; Kōgi 223-24

Text. On the other hand, the Yogācārabhūmi [also] says, "The person who possesses seed nature can at that time manifest the thought of enlightenment." [T.30.481b] That is to say, you should know that by possessing both dharmas, the innate and cultivated, one seed nature is formed. Thus, these two are not [really] two, because they arise in dependence [on each other]; if one is lacking, the other is not formed. Moreover, it is not possible to say that innate nature comes first and cultivated nature after. It can only be said that from the stage of endurance on [i.e., from the fulfillment of the stage of faith], it can be said with reference to the innate that there are innate bīja, and it can be said with reference to the cultivated that there are cultivated bīja. However, these are merely two concepts, there are not [really] two things, as the above quoted Mahāyānasaṁgraha says; the two combined make one cause. In this way we can understand [what the Yogācārabhūmi means by the above statement].

Notes. The above text is concerned with explaining what the *Yogācārabhūmi* means when it says that a person who possesses seed nature can produce the thought of enlightenment. The statement is explained as meaning that Buddha nature truly exists when the innate *bīja*, or innate enlightenment, is united with *bīja* resulting from practices. With regard to this mutual need, it is said that one does not undergo the necessary practices unless there is already an innate propensity for Buddhahood. Conversely, if one begins the practices, it can be assumed that the innate potentiality was there all the time. For more details on the stages, particularly the stage of faith, cf. the note following the next text.

Taikei II.213-14; *Kōgi* 225

Text. What is the difference between these [above mentioned] two seed natures and the cultivated nature and innate nature in the *Sutra on How Benevolent Kings May Protect Their Countries* [T.8.826 Int.] and those among the six natures in the *Sutra on Original Action*? [First *chüan*] Answer: Those sutras speak for the most part with regard to stages 位. [486a] Because the preliminary cultivation is considered to be cultivated seed nature, and cultivation for a long time, amassing and perfecting it, is considered to be innate seed nature, they [the sutras] claim that cultivated seed nature exists in the ten abodes 住, and innate seed nature belongs to the ten practices 行. [The state] anterior to the three *bhadras* is classified as only conducive to "good destination" [in another life], not seed nature. The *Yogācārabhūmi* calls cultivation over a long time cultivated nature 種, and considers it to be innate nature in connection with the innate 本. However, these two natures have no first, middle, or last. Therefore, the sutras [on *Original Action* and *on How Benevolent Kings May Protect Their Countries*] say that the innate is formed on the basis of cultivation, and the sastra says that cultivation is begot in reliance on the innate. Indeed, these two are formed in mutual cooperation, through dependent origination. Because there are not two characteristics, the sutras and sastra teach in cooperation and perfect the concept.

Also, the [two] sutras say that seed nature exists after the arousing of the thought of enlightenment. The sastra says that seed nature exists before the arousing of the thought of enlightenment. The reason for this is, when it [i.e., seed nature] attains the stages 位, its efficiency is revealed at that time, so the sutras say it exists in the stage of the three *bhadras*. Still, that efficiency necessarily has a support, so the śastra says that it exists prior to the stage [of the three *bhadras*]. Because it can certainly be said that it exists when its efficiency is revealed, the sutras do not contradict the sastra; because it can certainly be said that the efficiency is revealed as a result of the existence of the innate, the sastra is not at odds with the sutra. Again, the meaning is brought out through mutual cooperation, and the ideas are interconnected.

Question: How do you know that seed nature arrives in the stage of endurance? Answer: The sastra says that seed nature is necessarily endowed with [both] the innate and cultivated, so, since there is already cultivated nature, then there has necessarily been cultivation of the course; if the course has already been cultivated, then it culminates in the stage of endurance. If these habitual practices have not been cultivated in the interval between the state of foolish worldling and the stage of endurance, then in what stages are they cultivated? They have not been cultivated in the state of foolish worldling, and after one has acquired the stage [of the first abode] one is in the second abode. Therefore, you should know that in the cultivation of habitual practices from the state of foolish worldling up to the stage of endurance, habitual practices are perfected. Therefore, the acquisition of the mutual interfusion of the innate and cultivated is seed nature.

Notes. The first question involves the discrepancy between the two sutras on the one hand, and the sastra on the other hand over whether Buddha nature exists before the thought of enlightenment or after it. Fa-tsang's answer is that the texts in question are basically in agreement, that the solution to the problem lies in the synthesis of the two seemingly opposed views.

The various conceptions of nature and stages is, briefly, as follows: the 仁王經 discusses three kinds of nature: cultivated nature, innate nature, and path nature 道種性, which correspond respectively to the ten *vihāras* 十住, ten *caryās* 十行, and ten *pariṇāmanās* 十回向. The 本業經 gives six kinds of nature; the first three are the same as the above three, and the last three are holy 聖, perfect enlightenment 等覺, and wonderful enlightenment 妙覺, which are not pertinent here. The holy corresponds to the ten *bhūmis*, and the last two correspond to the fifty-first and fifty-second stages of the Bodhisattva respectively. The first two of each sutra are compared with the same ideas in the Yogācārabhūmi. In the sutras, cultivated nature belongs to the station of the ten vihāras, and innate nature comes in the ten caryās, and the previous station of the ten faiths only brings one a good destination in a future life, not seed nature. Also, in the sutras, bodhicitta occurs at the first of the ten vihāras at which time one is said to possess the Buddha nature. In the Yogācārabhūmi, on the other hand, innate nature exists before bodhicitta, which is coterminus with the fulfillment of the ten stages of faith, also called the stage of endurance 堪任 . Fa-tsang's explication of the whole matter can be understood better if we chart the events relative to the stages.



Yogācārabhūmi
仁王, 本業
First vihāra
(gotra-vihāra)
種性住
十信 1. 2. 3. | 10.
Innate plus cultivated unite, form Buddha nature
10. = 信滿, 堪任 = Bodhicitta
十信 1. 2. 3. | 10.
= Good destination only
入位
得位
Second vihāra = 3 bhadras
勝解行住
十住 1. = Bodhicitta
2. 3. 4. | 10.
Cultivated nature
3 bhadras
十行 1. 2. 3. 4. | 10.
Innate nature
十廻向 1. 2. 3. 4. | 10.
Path nature
Buddha nature exists for the first time
3. 4. 5. | 12.
vihāras 3-12 = Daśabhūmi Bodhisattva 住
十地 1. 2. 3. 4. | 10.
Daśabhūmi
Holy nature
13th vihāra = 佛住
佛地 = 1. 等覺 2. 妙覺

The second question asks how we know that there is Buddha nature in the last instant of the stage of faith. Since one does not cultivate the prerequisite practices in the state of foolish worldling, and since the acquisition of the stages proper is the second *vihāra*, which is not the *vihāra* of seed nature, or *gotra*, it follows that one must acquire this nature in the interval between the two points. At this point, according to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *bodhicitta* occurs, and then one enters the stage of the three *bhadras*. According to the sutras, the period anterior to the three *bhadras* is not endowed with seed nature. After one has undergone the period of faith successfully, one puts forth the thought of enlightenment. One is then said to have the seed nature in its cultivated form. When this is nourished and strengthened over a long time (and whole eons are involved) one is said to have the seed nature as innate nature. However, seed nature does not result from the union of the two natures, contrary to the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The Korean Yüan-hsiao says that in the sutras above, cultivated nature refers to practices of faith cultivated over many eons, and when one perfect this faith, seed nature then exists.

Taikei II.213-18; *Kōgi* 224-28

Text. Question: If it is said that the innate necessarily requires the cultivated [as a previously existing condition], the foolish worldlings who have not cultivated [practices] are without innate nature. If they do not have it, they could not have it later, because first being without it and having it later is not innate nature. If they do have it [as foolish worldlings], and can have the innate without any cultivation of practices, this would be unreasonable, so the treatise does not say this. Answer: Because these two [natures] form dependent origination, therefore, if one lacks cultivated nature, he lacks the other, the innate. Consequently, it is not true that first being without it and later possessing it is not nature, which establishes naturelessness among sentient beings.

From the vantage point of the perfection of cultivation it can be said that the innate exists from the beginning. In the state of foolish worldling there is still no cultivation, so we can not say that there is nature. Later, having started cultivation, we can not say there is no cultivation. Therefore, after the formation of cultivation, we can say there is the innate. Whatever repetitious practices may be cultivated in accordance with the various vehicles, we can say that at that time, the innate has existed from the very beginning.

Notes. The imaginary opponent raises three related problems: 1. If cultivated nature precedes innate nature, then worldlings who have not begun the necessary practices are without seed nature. 2. If they lack nature, they can not have it later, because that would not be commensurate with the accepted definition of innate nature. 3. If they have innate nature from the beginning, and later acquire seed nature without cultivation, this would fly in the face of the position of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The solution lies in the mutually dependent nature of the two kinds of nature. If one does not exist, the other does not either; conversely, when there is one, there is the other. Thus, as soon as one perfects cultivation of the program of the *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, etc., it can be said that such and such a nature has existed there from the very beginning; i.e., innately.

Taikei II.218; *Kōgi* 228-29

Text. Question: If that is so, then these [five natures] all are just one unsettled nature. How can there be the distinction of five seed natures, then? Answer: As a result of this idea [that there is only one unsettled nature], the five natures are established. [486b] Why? Having repeatedly practiced the six perfections [*pāramitā*] up until the stage of endurance, one perfects the seed nature of a Bodhisattva. If one cultivates the practices of the small vehicle until the stage of patience [kṣānti; i.e., third of the four nirvedha-bhāgīyas], one perfects the seed nature of a śrāvaka. Thus, the Ta chih-tu lun says, "Heat, summits, patience, etc., are called the stage of nature." [T.25.586 Int.] The Bodhisattva-bhūmi says, "When one attains to the stage of the foremost mundane dharmas [laukikāgra-dharma; i.e., the fourth and last of the nirvedha-bhāgīyas], this is the second stage. [T.30. 1007] Therefore, know that the previous three roots of goodness correspond to the stage of nature. According to the Abhidharmakośa, in the state where one acquires the roots of merit of conforming to liberation, nature is said to exist. [T.29.98] Therefore, that treatise says, "Conforming to liberation means the roots of merit of definitely being able to experience the results consisting of nirvana. Having begot these roots of merit, that sentient being is said to possess the dharma of nirvāṇa in his body." You can understand the pratyekabuddha in the same way. In this way, the seed natures of the three vehicles are established. If, with regard to the three practices, one cultivates one of them and still does not attain the basic stage [of nature], then one is established as being of unsettled nature. If, with regard to the three practices, the whole is never practiced, in that case one is considered to be without seed nature [for one of the three vehicles]. For this reason, know that the seed natures of the various vehicles are discussed in connection with cultivation.

Notes. The answer to the question means that precisely because there is in reality only a single unsettled, or undetermined nature, five natures are possible. Thus, one can start from this unsettled nature and by performing the course of practice of one of the vehicles may acquire the seed nature of that vehicle, by reaching the stage of nature. In the small vehicle, this point is the third of the four "aids to penetration" (_nirvedha_-_bhāgīya_). If, on the other hand, one does not reach the crucial stage, he is considered to be of yet unsettled nature. If the individual never starts the practices of one of the vehicles, he can be said to be without nature, as previous texts have noted. Nature exists or does not exist depending on whether or not practices are initiated. Thus, in a manner of speaking, there are no such things as the five natures; they are of conventional reality only.

Taikei II.219-20; _Kogi_ 230-31

Text. Question: If in the state of foolish worldling there is no cultivation, if [consequently,] [innate] nature is lacking, even though one begins cultivation, how can [innate nature] become existent later? Answer: Because the existence of cultivation is not the state of lack of cultivation. Therefore, if there is cultivation, [the innate] exists from the beginning, and if there is no cultivation, [innate nature] is itself eternally non-existent. Consequently, one does not make cultivation through non-cultivation, nor is the innate made through lack of the innate, because of the distinction of states [分位 = _avasthā_].

Notes. The two states of cultivation and non-cultivation are not the same; therefore, the states of the existence or non-existence of the innate are different. If one begins to repetitiously practice the course of a vehicle and reaches the determining stage, it can be said that the innate has existed always. If there is no cultivation, there is no cultivated nature, and if there is no cultivated nature, one does not create a nature. The _Fu_-_ku_-_chi_ says "The two states of the existence of cultivation and non-existence of cultivation are not the same; therefore, the existence and non-existence of nature itself are eternally distinct." The _Shiji_ says, "'Because of the distinction of states' means that because in the state of foolish worldling one has not yet cultivated practices , nature is not formed. Because of cultivation in the state up to the stage of endurance, nature is formed; therefore, nature exists. For this reason, the two states of having nature and not having nature are distinguished."

Taikei II.220-21; _Kōgi_ 232

Text. According to the _Mahāparinirvāna_-_sūtra_, "The completely doomed among the three kinds of individual is metaphorically called an '_icchantika_', one lacking the Buddha nature." [T.12.431 Int.] "Oh sons of the Buddha, whether an _icchantika_ meets a good friend, a Buddha, or a Bodhisattva, and hears him teach the profound Dharma, or whether he does not meet them, he can not divorce himself from the mind of an _icchantika_. Why? Because he has cut off the roots of goodness. [In reality] this _icchantika_ fellow also could acquire the thought of the highest, perfect enlightenment. Why is this? Because if he could arouse the thought of enlightenment, he would no longer be called '_icchantika_'. Oh good sons, what is the reason for saying that an _icchantika_ acquires the highest perfect enlightenment? Truly, this _icchantika_ fellow does not acquire the highest perfect enlightenment, like the person whose life has come to an end," etc., and so on through the whole discussion. [T.12.519a] Know that herein, the existence or non-existence [of Buddha nature] is eternally determined in connection with [the question of whether the individual is] prior to, or posterior to, the state [of *bodhicitta*] and [these two states] are not mutually inclusive.

Notes. The three kinds of person are: 1. the person who slanders the Mahāyāna; 2. the person who commits one of the five unpardonable sins, such as killing an Arhat; 3. the *icchantika*. The *icchantika* alone lacks the potentiality for Buddhahood; the others have some chance. However, as the text says, the existence or non-existence of this Buddha nature is determined by whether or not one has aroused the thought of enlightenment, *bodhicittotpāda*. Here again, the point is made that if one lacks faith and does not begin to cultivate the necessary practices which in turn plant the roots of merit, he also lacks innate nature. The text says that "[In reality] this *icchantika* fellow also could acquire the highest, perfect enlightenment," and what this means is that in a way there is really no such thing as an *icchantika* in the absolute sense. We are all *icchantikas* before the arousing of the thought of enlightenment, at which time Buddha nature becomes a reality, but with the arousing of *bodhicitta* and the realization of our Buddha nature, it becomes evident that we were really not *icchantika* at all. The real *icchantika* is simply the fellow who never believes or practices.

Taikei II.221-23; *Kōgi* 233-34

Text. Two, the later [Mahāyāna] doctrine; Because seed nature is established in connection with the nature of *tathatā*, [Buddha] nature exists universally in all living beings. Thus, the *Ta chih-tu lun* says, "A white stone has a silver nature, a yellow stone has a gold nature, water has a wet nature, fire has a hot nature, and all beings have a *nirvāṇa* nature." [T.25.292, 298 Int.] Because all false vijñānas are to be restored to their own true nature, [486c] the [Mahaparinirvāna] sutra says, "All beings thus have minds. All those with minds will surely acquire the highest, perfect enlightenment. For this reason, I always teach that all beings have Buddha nature." [T.12.524] Question: If they have it, there is a difficulty. If all beings with minds acquire bodhi, then the Buddha also having a mind, he should acquire bodhi. If you claim that even though the Buddha has a mind, he shall not acquire [bodhi], then in this case, beings without the [Buddha] nature shall not acquire it even though they have minds. Answer: Because the [above] sutra has already lessened the error, it simply says beings with minds, it does not include the Buddha. Because they are born in place after place, they are called "beings" [i.e., 衆生 , many births]; therefore, they are not the same as the Buddha.

Notes. According to the developed Mahāyāna, all living beings possess the Buddha nature. Now, Buddha nature is in reality two-fold: Buddha nature from the standpoint of absolute principle 理佛性 , and Buddha nature from the standpoint of practice 行佛性 . From the standpoint of the first, everything, including rocks, trees, etc., have the Buddha nature. When this absolute essential nature is seen from the other point of view, only sentient beings in the six gatis possess Buddha nature, because only they have minds, and consequently only they are able to begin the course of faith and practice which is the cause of actual Buddhahood. At any rate, here, in the later Mahāyāna, all sentient beings possess Buddha nature. The reason for this is that tathatā-Buddhatā complying with the condition of avidyā becomes phenomenalized in the form of beings in the six destinations. In other words, what are called "beings" are this tathatā in its phenomenal form. When the adventitious covering of ignorance is removed from the mind, the pure tathatā, or Buddha nature is revealed. Though in beings this tathatā is covered with avidyā, still, the pure Buddha nature exists in all beings without exception. In the first sentence of the text, "the nature of tathatā" means fundamental enlightenment and this fundamental enlightenment exists in all beings.

Taikei II.223-25; Kōgi 234-37

Text. If all possess Buddha nature, then how can beings without nature be established among the five seed natures? Answer: Various treatises themselves have the answer. Thus, the Uttaratantra says, "What does it mean when it was previously said that icchantika lack the nature of nirvāṇa and do not enter nirvāṇa? The reason is, it tries to show the cause [of non-acquisition of Buddha nature], slandering the Mahāyāna. What does this show? It says this in order to change the minds of the slanderers of the Mahāyāna, by speaking of immeasurable time, because in reality they possess the pure Buddha nature." [T.31.831]

Also, the Treatise on the Buddha Nature says, "Question: if that is so [that all beings have Buddha nature], why did the Buddha teach that beings without [Buddha] nature are forever without final nirvāṇa? Answer: Denying the Mahāyāna is the cause of being an icchantika. In order to make beings give up this practice, [it says this]. If one fall into this cause of icchantikahood, he will not stop being born and dying in this world for a long time. For this reason, various sutras say this [i.e., that some beings lack Buddha nature]. From the standpoint of reason, all beings possess pure Buddha nature [from the beginning]. It is not possible that one would not acquire final *nirvāṇa*. Thus, Buddha nature certainly exists from the beginning, because it is apart from existence and apart from non-existence." [T.31.788c]

Explanation: This treatise also, in a previous passage, refutes the notion of naturelessness at length. At last, in a final passage, it says, "Three is an error. The existence conceived of by those without the fold is definitely existence from the beginning; non-existence is definitely non-existence from the beginning. The existent can not perish, the non-existent can not be produced. These errors arise because of erroneous attachment to the notion of naturelessness," and so on through the whole explanation.

Notes. "Three is an error" refers to the third of three refutations of the notion of natureless, in Vasubandhu's treatise.

Taikei II.225-27; *Kōgi* 237-39

Text. Question: In the previous early Mahāyāna teaching, it was said flatly that [some] beings are without nature; in this developed doctrine, all possess nature. How can you reconcile this? Answer: Again, the treatises themselves have the answer. Thus, the *Treatise on the Buddha Nature*, *Chūan* 2, says, "Why do some sutras teach that the *icchantika* is without the potentiality 性

for nirvāṇa? If it is true, why are the two sutras [i.e., the Mahāpārinirvāṇa and Saṃdhinirmocana] at odds with each other? [Answer:] If you combine the two teachings, one is final, and one is non-final; therefore, they are not mutually contradictory." [T.31.800c] Explanation; in the small vehicle, only one person, the Buddha [Śākyamuni] has the Buddha nature. [487a] All other persons are said not to have it. In the early doctrine of the three vehicles, because there is a slight difference between it and the small vehicle, even though it says that many persons do have it, still, it is not totally different from the small vehicle. Therefore, they concur with the notion of naturelessness in one part [of living beings]. Thus, the treatise [by Vasubandhu] criticizes this as being a non-final expression of the provisional. Question: According to the developed Mahāyāna, all beings will become Buddhas. [1] Even though there are many beings, in the end, there would be no more [because all would be Buddhas]. [2] If it is the case that finally they do become Buddhas, there would be no one to teach and convert. [3] Because there would be no one to be taught and converted, there would be no practice of compassion [on the part of the Buddha]. If there is no practice of compassion, it is against reason that one could become a Buddha. [4] Because, also, it would terminate the qualities of the Buddhas, which consist of compassion. [5] If you say that all will become

Buddhas, yet say that there will not be an end of beings after, then there is the error of contradiction in your own words, because those who are not used up after will never become Buddhas. [6] Also, if one Buddha saves countless beings, would there be attrition in the realm of beings or not? If there was more and more loss, there would necessarily be an end later, because it does not stand to reason that there could be attrition but no termination. If there were no attrition, then there would be no salvation of nirvāṇa, because it does not stand to reason that there could be no nirvāṇa without [a corresponding] attrition. For these reasons, the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra, etc., posits natureless sentient beings and avoids the various errors above. What does this mean?

Answer: If you say that beings, as a result of having nature, therefore become Buddhas and eventually are used up, [1] then you beget the view of annihilation with regard to beings. Since the realm of beings diminishes, the realm of Buddhas necessarily increases; therefore, you beget the view of increase. This increase and decrease is not the correct view. Thus, the Sutra on Neither Increase Nor Decrease says, "Oh Śāriputra, a great erroneous view is the view that the realm of beings increases and that the realm of beings decreases," and so on through the full discussion. [T.16.466a] [6] Suppose that in order to avoid the views [of increase and decrease] someone were to establish naturelessness in one part of sentient beings to make a non-decrease. He would not be able to avoid the views of increase and decrease after. Why? Because he considers all those who have nature to become Buddhas. In this case, then, he produces a view of annihilation, a view of diminution. Because those without nature do not become Buddhas, he produces the view of eternalism, the view of increase, because he does not understand thoroughly the realm of beings. Thus, the [above] sutra says, "All foolish deluded common folk, because they do not know the one *dharma*-*dhātu* as it really is, because they can not really see the one *dharma*-*dhātu*, produce false views; i.e., [either that] the realm of beings increases, or that the realm of beings decreases." [T.16.466b]

[2] Also, the *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā*-*sūtra* says, "Suppose that a single Buddha lived in the world for an eon, or even beyond an eon, and there were countless unlimited Buddhas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges in worlds just like this one Buddha land, [487b] and each of these Buddhas preached the Dharma day and night without let-up even for a moment. Each [Buddha] would save countless numbers of beings and enable them to enter *nirvāṇa*. Yet, the realm of beings would neither increase nor decrease. It would be the same even in all the Buddha lands in the ten directions. Each Buddha would preach the Dharma and

convert beings as numerous as the sands of the Ganges, and enable them all to enter nirvāṇa, but there would be neither increase nor decrease in the realm of beings." [T.8.726c] [5] Why is this? Because one does not apprehend a fixed characteristic such as "beings." The meaning [of the above passage] is that the realm of beings is like space. It is just as though some beings of supernatural powers were each to fly through the air for innumerable eons, seeking the boundaries of the sky, and would never be able to cease. Even though [the sky] is endless, it can not be said that there is no going about; even though there is a going about, the limit can not be perceived. Know that the reason here is the same. Even though [Buddhahood] is to be obtained, beings can not come to an end; even though they are without end, it can not be said that there are some who do not obtain it. Therefore, all the difficulties are resolved.

Also, with regard to those who establish the thesis that one part of living beings lacks [Buddha] nature, in order to establish the fact that the qualities of Buddhas, consisting of benefiting others, are endless, in this case, they allow the Buddhas to have only the qualities of benefiting others in the capacity of Buddhas in their transformation bodies [nirmāṇa-kāya], but they negate qualities of the body of recompense [saṁbhoga-kāya], because there is no experience of the various stages of the

Bodhisattva. Also, in the conversion of others [as *nirmana*-*kāya*], there would only be the gross [kinds of conversion], and the subtle would be missing, because there would not be a single person to obtain the non-defilement 無漏 of the two vehicles. Also, not one Buddha from now henceforth would be able to teach the doctrine of the three vehicles, etc., because there would be no one to acquire the holy [results]. In short, [this notion] cuts off the common essence of Buddhas which is great compassion.

Notes. The answer to [5] is quite figurative (Numbers in brackets correspond to numbered questions.), but what Fa-tsang means is that there is no difference between beings and the Buddha, the unenlightened and the enlightened, seen from the standpoint of essential nature. There is no problem of increase or decrease because there are only sentient beings with Buddha nature; i.e., everyone is a Buddha already. "Beings" is an unreal characteristic. With regard to the problem of self-contradiction, Fa-tsang uses the simile of the beings searching for the boundaries of the sky to make the point that there will always be beings because Buddhahood is something to be obtained, but even though there will be no end to beings, all will become Buddhas.

The fourth problem is that if all beings become Buddhas, some day there will be an end to the Buddhas' work which is to benefit all living beings. It is, indeed, impossible to be a Buddha and not exercise the quality of compassion, *karunā*, because Buddhahood consists of the two qualities of compassion and wisdom working in tandem. The problem could be avoided by means of the doctrine that there will always be some people who do not become Buddhas and who will have need of a Buddha's *karunā*. However, if this were the case, an even greater problem would result, for those beings who lack Buddha nature would only acquire the rewards, or results, of worldly men and deities, and consequently the Buddha who ministers to this kind of being would only be a Buddha in his *nirmāna*-*kāya*, and there would be no *saṁbhoga*-*kāya* to minister to those on the ten *bhumis* of the Bodhisattva. Also, even within the limitations of the *nirmāna*-*kāya*, only the grosser rewards could be offered to beings, but the fruit of the three _bhadras_ of the two vehicles, the more refined reward, would be non-existent, because beings without the prerequisite nature could not progress so far.

Taikei II.227-32; _Kōgi_ 239-46

Text. [3] Also, if you think that because everyone has nature, therefore, all will be used up, and you are afraid that the last Buddha will lack the practices of benefiting others, and therefore you definitely propose that a part of living beings is without [Buddha] nature, still, the last Buddha would never perfect his practices of benefiting others, because even a single living being among those to be converted does not attain to sainthood. [However,] the Buddha and Bodhisattva consider only the practice of benefiting others among the two practices [of self benefit and benefit to others] to be the highest. How could they not cause even a single living being to acquire the holy and yet realize Buddhahood themselves?

Also, in originally making all the [four] great vows, [the Buddha] said that he would cause all beings to obtain _bodhi_. Thus, because they cause them to obtain it, their vows are not false. Yet, because the realm of beings can not be used up, their original vows do not come to an end. If it were otherwise, they would go against their original vows, because practice and vows would be false, and because it goes against reason to say that one may engage in false practices and yet become a Buddha. [7] Thus, even though you establish naturelessness in an attempt to avoid the above errors, I do not think that their faults [i.e., of the school concerned with essence = 性宗] should degenerate into this tenet [i.e., of the school concerned with characteristics = 相宗 ; i.e., naturelessness]. Therefore, naturelessness is not the final idea.

[487c] Question: When [the later Mahāyāna] discusses seed nature, it is certainly compounded [*saṁskṛta*-*dharma*]. How does this [later] doctrine make it nature with reference to *tathatā*? Answer: When *tathatā* obeys conditions, unites with the impure, and forms *ālaya*-*vijñāna* 本識, then, within the real there exists the immaculateness of innate enlightenment. By influencing beings internally and becoming the cause for reversing *saṁsāra*, nature is possible. The Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says it is the capacity for enlightenment in the *ālaya*. In the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, what it is is innate enlightenment in the teaching of the two meanings of *ālaya*. Also, in that treatise, the cause of pure dharmas is the endowment of the *Tathāgata*-*garbha* with immaculateness, which constantly influences beings [internally].

Notes. The question and following discussion concern nature as viewed by the later Mahāyāna, and is concerned with both the innate and cultivated. The question is, how can innate nature be established with reference to *tathatā*, particularly since the foregoing discussion has been in terms mainly of cultivated or "made" nature. Fa-tsang points out that within tathatā there are the two aspects of unalterability and change, or pure and impure. The ālaya is the result of the union of tathatā with impure conditions, and thus the ālaya comprises both tathatā, which is innate nature, and characteristics 相, or the true and false. Even though tathatā obeys conditions and assumes form, in its essential nature it is always pure and unchanging. In effect, then, innate nature exists within the phenomenal, in this case within ālaya, and this tathatā or innate enlightenment "perfumes" the ālaya, thus becoming the cause for the reversal of birth and death. It is this innate enlightenment which is innate nature, and it exists always, unchanging, within the compounded.

Taikei II.234-35; Kōgi 248-49

Text. Also, the Uttaratantra says, "'And that tathatā, or nature': according to the Lu-ken-tsu-ching 六根聚經 'The six interior bases of cognition 六根 in this way are beginningless, because they are final, the essence of all dharmas'." [T.31.835 Int.] To explain: because tathatā pervades all dharmas, here, because [the quotation] makes an exception of the inanimate, it therefore subscribes to the absolute principle of tathatā as being innate nature in connection with beings in the six destinations.

Notes. The point to the quotation, and indeed the whole text, is that all living beings are endowed with innate enlightenment, or Buddha nature. Inanimate things are excepted because for all practical purposes only that which can perform the necessary practices, or which has an ālaya, can really become a Buddha, though in an absolute sense, even the inanimate has Buddha nature. For a brief analysis of the distinction of 理佛性 and 行佛性, cf. Yusugi, Kegongaku Gairon, pp.85-86, and Oda, Daijiten, p.271. The sutra quoted by the Uttaratantra is unknown to me. According to Mochizuki, it has some relationship with the 占察善惡業報經 (2 chuan) which is apparently part of the larger Lu-ken-tsu-ching. Mochizuki says that its contents are unknown, and it was apparently never known in China. (Bukkyō Daijiten, vol.3, p.2962a) The reference to the six internal bases of cognition probably indicates *ālaya* in its pure, unconditioned aspect, though admittedly this is an odd way of putting the matter. If we take the six *indriyas* to mean *ālaya* as fundamentally pure, the passage would fall in line with the general tenor of the *Uttaratantra*, the teaching of which would be considered by Fa-tsang to be squarely "later Mahāyāna."

Taikei II.234-35; *Kōgi* 248-49

Text. This [above mention of "six *indriyas*"] is the same as that given by the *Yogacarabhūmi* [speaking of six *āyatanas*], but there it refers to the early doctrine [of Mahāyāna]. Because the noumenal is secondary to the phenomenal, and [seed nature] is spoken of by way of its gross characteristics 麁相, seed nature is discussed with regard to phenomena. Therefore, the *Bodhisattva*-*bhūmi* says, "I have spoken briefly about the gross characteristics 麁相 of [the Bodhisattva's] seed nature." [T.30.899] This is what is meant here. [However,] in the *Uttaratantra*, this refers to the later doctrine. Because phenomena are secondary to the noumenal and [seed nature] is discussed abstrusely, innate seed nature is discussed in connection with *tathatā*. Therefore, the *Treatise on Buddha Nature* [by Vasubandhu] says, "Mind originally pure 自性清淨心 is called the truth of the Path."道諦[T.31.802] Also, the *Mahāparinirvāṇa*-*sūtra* says, "Buddha nature is called the highest emptiness [*paramārtha*-*śūnyatā*]. The highest emptiness is called wisdom [*prajñā*] [T.12.523] These passages all speak of the innate wisdom of original enlightenment 本學性智 as innate nature.

Notes. In the early doctrine, only the gross characteristics of seed nature are discussed; the true meaning is only known by the Buddha himself. In the later doctrine, where seed nature is related to *tathatā*, the deep, abstruse meaning of seed nature is discussed. Thus, though the *Yogācārabhumi* and *Uttaratantra* both speak of the *alaya* in similar terms, they mean two entirely different things. The quotation from Vasubandhu's treatise associates *mārga*-*satya* with the original enlightenment which is here called "mind originally pure." The quotation from the *Mahāpārinirvāṇa*-*sūtra* first speaks of Buddha nature as *paramartha*-*śunyata*, which means that it relates to both the sentient and insentient, but in speaking of this emptiness as *prajñā*, limits it to sentient beings.

Taikei II.235-36; *Kōgi* 250-51

Text. Cultivated nature also is formed on the basis of *tathatā*. Thus, the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "The influence of much hearing [of the Mahāyāna Dharma] is the efflux of the purest *dharma*-*dhatu*," etc.. [T.31.173 Int.] Also, the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* considers the two great elements [of *tathatā*], essence and aspect 體相, to be the cause for internal influence, and considers the great element of function 用 of *tathatā* to be the condition for external influence. Through their union with the impure *dharma* which is ignorance, the three great elements are said to influence internally and externally. Because of the power of influencing, when ignorance terminates, [internal and external influence] unite profoundly in non-duality, as *tathatā* alone.

Notes. Cultivated nature relies on *tathatā* in the sense that one sees and hears the Buddha and his teaching, or, in other words, the transformation and recompense bodies of the Buddha, and this becomes the cause for cultivated nature. Therefore, there can be no cultivated nature without *tathatā* or *Buddhatā*, because these influences (*vasanā*) are themselves the efflux, or derivation, of *tathatā* itself. The *Awakening of Faith* speaks of the three great elements, or constituents, of *tathatā*; i.e., essence, aspects or characteristics, and function. Characteristics are the forms taken by *tathatā*, for instance, *prajñā*. Function refers to the dual body spoken of above, through which beings are able to achieve the holy. Essence and characteristics are causes of internal influence, while the third is cause for external influence. These two sides, in other words, are innate nature and cultivated nature; both operate on *avidyā* from their respective positions. Once ignorance is removed, these two unite into the one absolute *tathatā*, or, Buddha nature. Yet, first, within the *ālaya* of a person, both the innate and cultivated nature, or *bīja*, must come together, so this is referred to as Buddha nature by means of cultivation.

Taikei II.251-52; *Kōgi* 237-39

Text. Three, the explanation with regard to the sudden doctrine: absolute *tathatā* apart from words and divorced from characteristics is called seed nature. However, it is not divided into innate and cultivated, because *dharmas* do not have a dual aspect. Therefore, the *Sarvadharmāpravṛtti*-*nirdeśa* 諸法無行經 says, "Why is this thing called 'seed nature'? Oh Mañjuśrī, all beings have this single characteristic [of uniformity; i.e., *samatā*]. Being absolutely unborn, it is apart from all names and words [such as innate and cultivated], because distinctions are imperceptible; therefore, I call it seed nature." [T.15.755a] You should understand [the sudden doctrine] in this way. The foregoing, which was discussed in connection with the three vehicles, is finished.

Three, with regard to the one vehicle, there are two doctrines [i.e., the common and distinct]. [488a]

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The first includes the seed nature explained in the previous [three] doctrines. All are completely possessed by it, and the primary [i.e., distinct doctrine] and secondary [i.e., three vehicles] form the tenet [of the common doctrine], because it is the common doctrine, and because it includes the skillful means [of the three vehicles]. The second is the distinct doctrine. Seed nature is very profound, and cause and effect are not two things. [Nature] pervades both kinds of karma recompense, the material environment 依 and mental conformation 正 , throughout the three worlds, and includes all the dharmas such as noumenon, phenomena, enlightenment, and practice. It is perfect in the beginning and perfect at the end. Therefore, the Avataṁsaka-sūtra says, "The Bodhisattva's seed nature is extremely deep, extensive, and large, like the dharma-dhātu and space." [T.9.444] This is what is meant here. If we explain it in connection with the Dharma, then by "seed nature" is meant the six kinds of certainty in each of the five ranks [of a Bodhisattva]. Also, this dharma is called effect, because cause and effect have a common essence and are only of one nature. The full explanation is as in the [Daśabhūmika] sutra. The rest you can understand in the same way.

Notes. By "seed nature" the text means, of course, the cause of Buddhahood in the ālaya. In the earlier discussion of the three vehicles, the point was made that practically speaking, Buddha nature was to be found only in animate things, particularly men. However, in the distinct doctrine of the one vehicle, Buddha nature pervades both the sentient and insentient. Here, these two are called material environment and mental conformation 依正 ; that is, the material world, including the body, and the character or mental conformation inherited from *karma* in a previous life. Thus, all things have Buddha nature. The reference to the three worlds restates this doctrine, for the three worlds are the material world, beings, and enlightenment. Also, whereas in the three vehicles, nature is the cause of Buddhahood, in the one vehicle, cause and result are not two separate things, at least in essence. Thus, Buddhahood is coterminous with the possession of Buddha nature; when nature is existent at the completion of the stage of faith, one is a Buddha. This identity of cause and effect, the complete universality of Buddha nature, etc., is seen from the vantage point of enlightenment; from the vantage point of teaching, nature is said to exist as the six kinds of certainty 六決定 which exist in each of the five ranks of the Bodhisattva. The Bodhisattva who is traversing the stages of the Bodhisattva intuits the true and conforms to ultimate principle, all the time supported by *prajñā*, and in this way possesses the six kinds of certainty. In general, what Fa-tsang means is that when the Bodhisattva has been enlightened in ultimate reality, he abandons error completely and conforms to the true and real, and this is, in essence, the double quality of wisdom and practice. The Bodhisattva thus possesses Buddha nature. For details on the six certainties, cf. Mochizuki, *Bukkyō Daijiten* vol. 5, p.5050.

Taikei II.240-43; *Kōgi* 253-55

Text. Question: Why is seed nature different among the various doctrines? Answer: There are two reasons; the first explains the mutual inclusion of concealment and revelation, and is connected with the Dharma; the second shows the divisions of understanding the Dharma, and is connected with beings to be converted. First, since the dependent origination of this seed nature is completely free and possesses five meanings, therefore, each doctrine [among the five] explains one part, and converts in accordance with type of being. The concepts are not mutually exclusive. What are the five? 1. Non-existence [of Buddha nature] in consideration of attachment 隨執非有 , as taught by the small vehicle. 2. Deficient or full, in accordance with the phenomenal, as taught by the early Mahāyāna. 3. Universality [of nature] in sentient beings, in accordance with the noumenal, as taught by the developed Mahāyāna. 4. Eradication of characteristics and cutting off of discourse, as taught in the sudden doctrine. 5. Nature endowed with all qualities, as taught by the perfect doctrine. Still, even though there are five interpretations, seed nature perfectly pervades them all and accordingly includes them and embraces them everywhere. Concealment and revelation [of nature in the doctrines] is reconciled.

Second, the divisions of understanding the Dharma. 1. All lack [Buddha nature] except the Buddha alone, as taught by the small vehicle. 2. All possess it except such things as grass and trees, as taught by the developed Mahāyāna. 3. Some have it and some do not, as taught in the early Mahāyāna, because they acknowledge the naturelessness of one part of sentient beings. 4. One neither has it nor lacks it, as taught by the sudden doctrine, because they abandon characteristics. 5. [The doctrine] possesses all the previous four, as taught re the skillful means of the one vehicle. Or, [finally,] it is cause, possesses result, and pervades the three worlds, as taught in the perfect doctrine. The rest can be understood in the same way.

Notes. The reasons for the varying interpretations of Buddha nature, which is essentially one are: 1. Buddha nature in itself is capable of five interpretations; 2. the truth of Buddha nature had to be taught to beings of varying capacities for understanding.

Taikei II. No *cmy*; *Kōgi* 255-57

3. Distinctions of Practice and Stages

Text. Three, the distinctions of practice and stages 行位: all will be briefly shown in connection with the various doctrines through three categories: 1. the characteristics of the stages; 2. the matter of irreversibility; 3. the characteristics of practice.

First, as far as the small vehicle is concerned, there are four stages; i.e., skillful devices, insight [見= *darśana*-*mārga*], cultivation [修= *bhāvanā*-*mārga*], and the final stage. They also teach the twelve abodes 住 of the small vehicle as the ultimate. Moreover, they teach such things as the three realms, nine stages, eleven stages, etc.. The whole doctrine is as mentioned in the treatises of the small vehicle [such as the *Abhidharmakośa*]. Second, as for irreversibility, because one cultivates practices among these, and reaches the stage of patience [*kṣānti*], one acquires irreversibility. The characteristics of practice are also as explained in their treatises.

[488b] Question: Why don't you explain in greater detail the characteristics such as practice and stages of

the small vehicle? Answer: The point here is to show the dissimilarity of doctrines through different topics. However, since there is no barrier to understanding the differences between the small vehicle and great vehicle, there is no need to explain.

Notes. The first of the four stages, the seven *upāyas*, are practices such as breath control up through the four *nirvedha*-*bhāgīyas*; i.e., all practices prior to the *mārga* per se. The second stage, *darśana*-*mārga*, consists of reflection on the four Holy Truths. The third, *bhāvanā*-*mārga*, consists of the removal of *kleśa*. The fourth stage is Arhatship. The first stage has some resemblance, according to the Mahāyāna, to their own stage of the three *bhadras*, immediately anterior to the ten *bhūmis.* The last three stages presumably correspond to the *bhūmis*. The 12 *vihāras* are those beginning with *gotra*-*bhū* and ending with Arhatship. The three realms are the *kāma*-, *rūpa*-, and *ārūpya*-*dhātus*. The nine stages are the above three realms; the latter two each have four stages, making, with the one stage of *kāma*-*dhātu*, nine. The eleven stages come from assuming a "vestibule" stage immediately prior to the *dhyāna* of the first stage of *rūpa*-*dhātu*, and an intervalic stage between the first and second stages of *rūpa*-*dhātu*. For details, see Chapter 6, pp.119 ff., in La Vallée Poussin's translation of the *Abhidharmakośa.*

Taikei II.245-46; *Kōgi* 258-60

Text. The early doctrine of Mahāyāna is also explained through the three categories. First, in the characteristics of stages, there are two divisions. First, in order to attract the two vehicles of the Dharma of the ignorant and get them to turn toward the Mahāyāna, the doctrine of partial conversion to the Mahāyāna 迴心 is established; still, since they have only the four stages of insight, cultivation, etc., and such things as the nine stages, they are also called small vehicle. Or, five grades are established; i.e., within the seven kinds of skillful devices prior to insight, the first three kinds are separated out and made the stage of equipment [資糧位 = *saṁbhāra*], because it is a remote skillful device. The next four roots of merit [i.e., *nirvedha-bhāgīyas*] are made the stage of preparation [*prayoga*], because they are nearer skillful means. The other names are the same as before.

Also, the ten stages of dry wisdom, etc., are taught. As for the ninth stage being called the Bodhisattva stage, and the tenth stage the stage of the Buddha, this is because in trying to attract the two vehicles, [the two vehicles] feel insufficient from the superior position of the Bodhisattva, etc., and they are made to gradually cultivate practices and reach the goal of Buddhahood. Also, by not placing Buddhahood outside the ten stages, because this attracts them, there is an approximation to the small vehicle through this skillful device. Because the beings of the two vehicles acquire the fruit of sainthood in this life, therefore, [Buddhahood] is not made to come later [in a later life]. Also, these characteristics of the stages, the characteristics of practices, etc., are as discussed at length in the section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* on *srāvakas*, and in [Sthiramati's] *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā*.

Question: Why are the characteristics of practice and stages of śrāvakas as shown in the Yogācārabhūmi, etc., not the same as those in the Abhidharmakośa? Answer: There are two reasons for this difference of characteristics. One, in order to show those of the small vehicle that they are ignorant about dharmas and do not understand them completely. Two, simply in order to attract them gradually to the Mahāyāna, through skillful means. Therefore, the dharmas which are explained, such as practice, stages, etc., are all upāya and are preached while gradually attracting to the great vehicle, so they are not the same. That is, it is not the small vehicle of the Dharma of the ignorant, nor is it the Bodhisattva [vehicle]. Therefore, you should know, it is the vehicle of the śrāvaka within the three vehicles [i.e., 迴心].

Two, in connection with the explanation of stage-characteristics for those of direct access 直往, the distinctions of the ten stages 地 of the Bodhisattva are taught. Also, the ten stages are taught as insight and cultivation 見修. Moreover, they are considered as the twelve abodes of the great vehicle through use of practices anterior to the stages. Why do this? In order to approximate the small vehicle. Also, those practices anterior to the stages have forty moments 心, because the ten-fold stage of faith also becomes a stage. This is also similar to the four skillful means prior to the path [of insight] in the small vehicle. For this reason, the

Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "There are four stages prior to the path of the stream-winner [*śrota-āppana*]; i.e., heat, summits, patience, and foremost mundane *dharmas*. The four stages of the Bodhisattva anterior to the *bhūmis* are like these; that is to say, the ten faiths, ten comprehensions 解 [i.e., 十住], ten practices 行, and ten transfers of merit [迴 i.e., *pariṇāmanā*]." [T.31.229 Int.]

Also, in order to approximate the teaching of those partially converted to the Mahāyāna, the four stages of faith, etc., [prior to the ten stages] are made to be the stage of equipment. After the ten transfers of merit, [488c] four roots of merit are set up separately and considered to be preparation [*prayoga*]. Insight, etc., are as before.

Notes. "Direct access," as mentioned in a previous note, refers to the individual who enters the Mahayāna directly, without undergoing previous cultivation of practices in the small vehicle. The ten stages taught to this type are different from those taught to the previous category of beings. They are, in fact, the traditional ten *bhūmis* beginning with *pramuditā*. These ten stages are made to approximate the small vehicle scheme of *darśana*- and *bhāvanā-mārga*; i.e., *darśana-mārga* then corresponds to the first of the three moments (entrance, abiding, and exit) of the first *bhūmi*, and *bhāvanā-mārga* corresponds to the rest of the *bhūmis* after that first moment. These same ten stages are also made to correspond to the twelve abodes of the Bodhisattva, and thus to the stages of the small vehicle, by utilizing practices actually prior to the stages *per se*. That is, the ten *śraddhās* are linked with the corresponding *śrāvaka*-abode of nature, and the three *bhadras* are linked with the second abode, *adhimokṣa* 勝解, and the ten stages are linked with abodes three through twelve. By adding the stage of Buddhahood, we would have the thirteen stages of the Bodhisattva. By equating the four ante-stages consisting of ten faiths, ten abodes, ten practices, and ten transfers of merit with the four stages prior to the path of the small vehicle---the four aids to penetration, consisting of heat, summits, patience, and foremost mundane *dharmas*---an approximation to small vehicle methods is made. The passage from *Msg*. makes this quite clear. Finally, in order to approximate the teaching of those partially converted to the great vehicle. the four ante-stages are considered to be *saṁbhāra*-*mārga*, four roots of goodness are established after the *pariṇamanās*, and made to be *prayoga*, and the three stages of insight, cultivation, and final goal are the same as the doctrine of the partially converted. The main point is that for this type of individual, a *mārga* system is erected which is substantially Mahāyāna, but which at the same time will be comfortable to those who are essentially *śrāvakas*.

Taikei II.250-60; *Kōgi* 263-64

Text. Why, in many instances, are names and numerical categories established by this doctrine similar to the small vehicle? Answer: It is in order to have an excellent skillful device for responding, exerting skillful devices, and resembling them, because if it were completely different from [the small vehicle], it would be difficult to believe. If it were completely the same as theirs, it could not be called attraction. Question: If you attract the two vehicles [of the Dharma of the ignorant], there may be a need for an approximation to the other. If it is for those of direct access, why make a pseudo-resemblance? Answer: There are two reasons for the slight resemblance to the small vehicle. One, because those of direct access within the early Mahāyāna have gross, shallow faculties, they can not accept the deep Dharma of Mahāyāna; therefore, the characteristics of the Dharma which are shown, stages, etc., resemble the small vehicle, but name and meaning are different nevertheless. Two, in general, teaching through making the Mahāyāna resemble the small vehicle can be seen from two points of view which cover all cases: one, in order to attract the small vehicle; two, for the sake of those beings of meager abilities. Therefore, this is taught as the early doctrine.

As for what these forms are [by which the large vehicle resembles the small vehicle], they are as explained in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. What are the characteristics of the person [補特伽羅 = *pudgala*] who has been perfected in the past? Because *śrāvakas* have previously cultivated the roots of merit 諸善法 , if, at that time, they abide in perfections of a lower class, at that time they possess desires of an inferior class, preparation of an inferior class, and they [may] abide in a bad destination [*gati*] as well. In the present life they do not experience the [four] results of a religious person, nor, in the present life, do they obtain final *nirvāṇa*. If at that time they abide in perfections of a middling class, at that time they possess desires and preparation [*prayoga*] of a middling class. They do not abide in a bad destination, in the present they experience the results of the religious person, but they do not acquire final *nirvāṇa* in the present life. If, at that time, they abide in perfections of a superior class, at that time they possess the desires and preparation of a superior class. They do not abide in any of the bad destinations, they experience the results of the religious person in the present life, and in the present life they acquire complete, final nirvāṇa. What is said of the śrāvaka is equally true of the pratyekabuddha. Why is this? Because of the similarity of the nature of his method and that of the śrāvaka. And so on through the whole explanation.

These three perfections are also established in the stages of the Bodhisattva, in order to approximate the small vehicle. Thus, the [Yogācārabhūmi] treatise says, "If Bodhisattvas stand in the stage of comprehension and practice, it is called the perfection of the inferior class; if they stand in the stages of pure, superior mind and performance of right action 淨勝意樂 , it is called the perfection of the middling class; if they abide in the stages of decision and the final goal 墮決定究竟 , then it is called the perfection of the superior class. If a Bodhisattva dwells in the inferior class, he may abide in an evil destination. This lasts for the first incalculable great eon." And so on through the complete discussion. The other two great eons tally with the [other] two perfections. There are many such passages [from the Yogācārabhūmi]. They all have the same meaning as the above. You can understand it in the same way.

Notes. Three classes of perfection: in the small vehicle, the inferior class reaches the stage of summits, the second of the four *nirvedha-bhāgīyas*. The middling class reaches the fourth of these, *laukikāgra-dharmas*. The superior class reaches *darśana-* and *bhavana-marga*. Actually, interpretations vary somewhat, some texts assigning the three ranks to the seven skillful devices, *darśana-mārga*, and *bhāvanā-mārga* respectively, for instance. For details, cf. *Taikei* II.263-64. According to the *Tsūro-ki*, for the Bodhisattva the three grades correspond to 1. the three *bhadras*; 2. *bhūmis* 1-7; 3. *bhūmis* 8-10. In the text 淨勝意樂 really refers to two stages, 淨勝意樂 and 行正行, which encompass *bhūmis* two through seven. The third class, 決定究竟, refers to three stages, 決定, 決定行, and 究竟, and encompass *bhūmis* eight, nine, and ten.

Taikei II.260-67; *Kōgi* 265-68

Text. Two, the stage of irreversibility. According to the *Treatise on the Buddha Nature*, "When the *śrāvaka* arrives at belief in patience pertaining to suffering [*duḥkhe-dharma-jñāna-kṣānti*], when the *pratyekabuddha* arrives at [the stage of] foremost mundane *dharmas*, and when the Bodhisattva arrives at [the stage of] the ten transfers of merit, [489a] then they are all irreversible." [T.31.787 Int.] Know that here, the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* are not of the Dharma of the ignorant. Thus, all are members of the three vehicles in the early doctrine.

Also, it may be said generally that the Bodhisattva anterior to the stages [*daśabhūmi*] is capable of regression [according to the *Yogācārabhūmi*], because he may fall into the evil destinations. According to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, "If a Bodhisattva is in the stages of superior comprehension and practice, he can go to a bad destination. This lasts for the first incalculable eon." [T.30.498] And so on.

Three, distinctions of characteristics of practice among the stages: according to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, "When the Bodhisattva in the stage of superior comprehension and practice i.e., the three *bhadras* acts, what are his practices, and what are the characteristics? 1. He may be completely possessed of wisdom and easily accept and hold all *dharmas*. He can thoroughly comprehend their significance. Or, he may not be able to do this at one time. 2. At one time he may be mindful, and at another time he may be forgetful. 3. He still does not thoroughly understand the skillful devices for taming beings. As far as his own benefit is concerned, he still does not know how to apply skillful means in accordance with *tathatā*. 4. He is diligent in teaching the Dharma to others, confers the [Right] Dharma, and admonishes against the [false] Dharma; [yet,] in his diligence, he does not understand things as they really are [because he makes a false distinction between himself and others]. 5. He may abandon [his responsibilities]. It is like shooting in the dark and sometimes hitting the target and sometimes missing it, because he performs according to his desires. 6. He may at one time arouse the thought of enlightenment, but afterward he may regress. 7. As a result of his inner desires he tries to satisfy himself. As a result of reflection and decision, he tries to satisfy others. 8. He may hear the teaching of the profound, extensive, great Dharma at one time, yet, is frightened and amazed and may doubt it. These varieties are called the abode of superior comprehension and practice." [T.30.554] To explain, these are the characteristics of practice of the second among the twelve abodes [i.e., the first of the three *bhadras*]. The characteristics of practices of the first abode, that of nature 種性住 , are even more feeble. The characteristics of practice in the [ten] stages are as explained in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

The later doctrine [of Mahāyāna] also teaches the distinctions of the ten stages of the Bodhisattva, but it does not use such terms as "insight" and "cultivation" when it teaches. Also, there are only the three *bhadras* prior to the stages, because faith is only practice and not a stage, because irreversibility is not yet acquired. The *Sutra on Original Action* says, "These ten states of mind 十心 exist prior to accession to the abodes." [T.24. 1011 Int.] It does not call them "stages." It also says, "From the initial state of foolish worldling, when he meets a Buddha or a Bodhisattva and arouses one single thought of belief in regard to the true Dharma, he produces the thought of enlightenment. At that time, this person is called a Bodhisattva with the characteristics of faith prior to the abodes. He is also called a Bodhisattva by convention, and a Bodhisattva in name only. In short, this person cultivates the ten states of faith; i.e., faith, zealous progress, etc.." [T.24.1017] The full explanation is as found there. Also, the Sutra on How Benevolent Kings May Protect Their Countries says, "The Bodhisattva who practices the ten kinds of faith 十善 prior to patience apropos cultivated nature [習忍 i.e., the ten vihāras] advances and regresses, just like a light feather blown hither and thither by the wind," etc.. [T.8.831] Because by staying here [in the ten kinds of faith] and cultivating it for ten thousand eons one enters the stage of the ten abodes, and at that time acquires irreversibility; [489b] [therefore, the ten kinds of faith are not the stage of irreversibility].

Notes. "Patience apropos cultivated nature," mentioned in the passage from the Sutra on Benevolent Kings is a reference to five kinds of patience, consisting of 1. patience with regard to self control 伏忍 ; 2. patience which conforms to nirvana 順忍 ; 3. patience apropos faith 信忍 ; 4. patience with regard to the non-arising of dharmas 無生忍 ; and 5. patience that leads to cessation 寂滅忍 . The first corresponds to the three bhadras and also to the place where cultivated nature is acquired, hence the name. The second corresponds to bhūmis four through six; the third to stages one through three; the fourth to stages seven through nine; the fifth to the tenth stage and the stage of wonderful enlightenment. Thus, patience covers 41 Bodhisattva stages.

Taikei II.267-79; Kōgi 268-73

Text. After commencing the ten abodes, one will not degenerate into the inferior state of the two vehicles. How much less will one fall into the evil destinations or the state of foolish worldling. For instance, the Sutra on Original Action says, "There is relapse in the sixth moment of the ten abodes." [T.24.1014 Int.] In the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, that passage is explained as a relapse taught for purposes of demonstration [and not a real one], in order to give an incentive to the arrogant. [T.32.581] Yet, truly, when the Bodhisattva reaches the stage of arousing the thought of enlightenment, he then acquires irreversibility.

As for practices, the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* says, "He is able to see the Dharma-body slightly in the first stage of the three *bhadras*." "He is able to perfect the Path in its eight aspects [of a Buddha] and benefit beings in all worlds in the ten directions." "Through the power of his vows, he freely assumes a body, yet, he performs no acts." "Again, [on the basis of concentration,] he is able to see the Buddha slightly as the Recompense-body [*saṁbhoga*-*kāya*]." "All his activities conform to *tathatā*; i.e., he knows that there is no avariciousness in the nature of the Dharma [*dharmatā*] [which produces false belief], and in conformity with this, he practices the perfection of giving [*dāna*-*pāramitā*]." [T.32.581] The full discussion is as found in that treatise.

Also, the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* speaks of the ten kinds of faith as [the rank of] the Bodhisattva who is a common worldling 凡夫菩薩 and calls [the Bodhisattva of] the ten abodes a Bodhisattva who is a saint 聖人 . [T.31.174,177 Int.] You can understand the characteristics of practice in the stages in the same way, by taking the foregoing further. Therefore, know that these stages of practice and those of the previous undeveloped Mahāyāna are shown to be distinct as to shallow and deep.

Question: Would this doctrine be able to attract the two vehicles in common? Why are the stages of practice not taught to approximate the small vehicle? Answer: From now on, all the other doctrines are deep and superior, and the two vehicles who are attracted are also of ripe and excellent faculties, so [the other teachings] are not made to resemble them.

Notes. The answer to the last question means that the doctrines of the later, developed Mahāyāna, intuitive school, and perfect doctrine, and the two vehicles to be attracted in this case are all advanced, superior doctrines, and so there is no need for seemingly approximating the inferior in order to attract and lead on. In this case, however, the two vehicles are not the two vehicles of the Dharma of the ignorant, but are those who are already partially committed to the Mahāyāna; i.e., those of dull faculties within the three vehicles. These are probably the groups represented by the Prajñāpāramitā and Vaipulya texts.

Taikei II.279-90; Kogi 273-75

Text. According to the sudden doctrine, the stages of practice are inexpressible, because they are divorced from characteristics [such as deep, shallow, etc.], because to be without reflection for an instant is tantamount to Buddhahood, and because if one sees such characteristics as the distinctions of stages of practice, it is an error. If you try to express it with words, it is as the *Laṅkāvatāra*-*sūtra* says: "The first stage is identical with the eighth stage; they do not even exist, so what sequence would there be?" [T.16.509 Int.] Also, the *Viśesacintabrahma*-*pariprcchā*-*sūtra* says, "If a person hears of the true nature of these [compounded] *dharmas* and diligently proceeds in his practices according to the teaching, he does not go from one stage to another. If he does not go from stage to stage, he dwells in neither *saṁsāra* nor *nirvāna*." [T.15.36] And so on.

In the perfect doctrine, there are two categories: the first includes all the stages of practice shown in the previous teachings, because they are its skillful means. The second refers to the distinct doctrine and there are three meanings. The first is explained through the intermediary of the stages [of the three vehicles, etc.]; i.e., the six stages from the first stage of the ten kinds of faith up to the stage of Buddhahood are not the same [as those of the three vehicles]. If one stage is acquired, all stages are acquired. Why is this? Because [each stage] possesses the six characteristics, because of the infinite interrelationship of primary and secondary, because of mutual inclusion, because of mutual identity, and because of perfect interfusion. The [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra says, "One stage includes the qualities of all stages throughout." [T.9.395] Therefore, what is meant here is the acquisition of all stages as well as the stage of Buddhahood after the part [of the path] which is superior progress 勝進分 , which is the perfection of faith, [here alluded to in the sutra].

[489c] Also, because all stages and the stage of Buddhahood are identical with each other, etc., then cause and result are not different, and the beginning and end are mutually inclusive 無礙. On each stage, one is both a Bodhisattva and a Buddha. This is the meaning here.

Notes. The first category under the perfect doctrine is the one vehicle in its capacity as common doctrine, and the second is the distinct doctrine. Here, in the first meaning of the distinct type, the doctrine is discussed through the use of the terminology and system of the three vehicles, though from the standpoint of the Hua-yen, any given stage is easily identifiable with all other stages, and there is no piecemeal acquisition of the path. The main reasons for this, which are given here, are a capsule summary of the main tenets of Hua-yen. For a detailed discussion of the "six characteristics" by means of which the stages are mutually inclusive, and which is so crucial to the Hua-yen philosophy, see the Introduction and the texts and notes on pages 527 ff., in chapter 10.

Taikei II.293-96; _Kōgi_ 278-79

Text. Two, when the stages are shown in their relationship to the results of action, then there are three births. The first forms the stage of seeing and hearing [the Buddha and the Dharma]; that is, by seeing and hearing this inexhaustible Dharma, one forms indestructible impressions [_bīja_], etc., as taught in the chapter on

"The Arising of the Tathagata from Essential Nature" [in the *Avataṁsaka*]. The second [birth] forms the stage of comprehension and practice 解行 ; i.e., the sons of the gods of the Tuṣita Heaven, etc., having escaped from evil destinations [i.e., hells] arrive [at the stage] anterior to the "Soilless Concentration" [*vimala*-*samādhi*] and acquire patience with regard to the non-arising of *dharmas* [which occurs on the stage] of the ten stages, and the realm of the ten eyes, ten ears, etc., in a single birth. The full discussion is as found in the chapter on "Minor Characteristics." Also, it is like Prince Sudhana during a single lifetime and in one body, in the localities of the good friends, being endowed with all the practices of Samantabhadra from the first stage of faith all the way up to the tenth stage. This is also the meaning. Three is the stage of realization of the ocean of result; i.e., like Maitreya saying to the Prince, "When I achieve perfect enlightenment in the future, you shall see me." [T.9.783]. This is the meaning. You should understand that because these [three births] are divided into two stages in consideration of the before and after of cause and result, therefore, the former stage is only the perfection of cause, and the result is in the later stage; therefore, he says "You shall see me."

Notes. All the many previous lives during which a person hears the Dharma taught are considered to be one life or birth called the stage of seeing and hearing.

The lives devoted to practicing the one vehicle Dharma, understanding its truths, etc., is the second birth of comprehension and practice. The first birth presumably refers to the past, and the second birth to the present. The future time during which one achieves Buddhahood constitues the third birth of being enlightened in the ocean of result, or entering the dharma-dhātu. However, from the viewpoint of this enlightenment, these three births are mere convention, a manner of speaking, since, cause and result being the same, one is already a Buddha while one is passing through the birth of comprehension and practice; i.e., the cause stage. This is, in fact, one of the main distinctions between the one-vehicle view and three-vehicle view of Buddhahood. The two quotations illustrate the three-birth theory of the sequence of cause and result. Actually, there is some disagreement in various Hua-yen texts on whether the episode from the Gaṇḍavyūha shows three births or only two. From different point of view it can be argued that there are three, or two, or only one.

Taikei II.297-310; Kōgi 280-82

Text. Three shows the stages with reference to practice. There are only two parts; [practice] itself, and superior progress 勝進. This topic is explained covering the division of comprehension and practice of the above stages, as well as acquiring the Dharma. It is like the prince called "Universally Adorning" [or "Universally Adorned"], etc.. He abides in superior places in the world which is nature 世界性, etc.. This refers to the stage of the wheel-turning [universal] king with the pure jewel-net.

Notes. Here, stages are discussed with the emphasis on practice. There are only two parts, the practice itself, and the perfection of that practice, its final instant. Since both are still practice, they belong to the stage of comprehension and practice among the three births. Also, in the Hua-yen system of six stages (信, 住, 迴向, 地, 等覺, 佛地) each of the stages is divided into three parts: entrance, maintainance, or abiding, and exit, or perfection. Thus, practice is the second of the three, and superior progress is the third, in each stage. That is to say, each practice has these two parts. What this means in effect is that rather than to see the acquisition of Buddhahood in terms of stages, such as the actuality of Buddhahood upon the perfection of faith, it is considered purely in terms of practice. If this practice is abstracted from the system of the stages, then there is only practice and the final perfection of this practice, which is also result. (Of course from another point of view, all beings have already become Buddhas and do not need to do so ever again, and this is Hua-yen's third type of "becoming a Buddha.") The point to the text is, I believe, that we are here concerned with the causal stage, the stage of comprehension and practice in the scheme of the three lives. Though it is only practice, it is different from and superior to the practices of the three vehicles, as the next text will show, for inasmuch as the causal stage includes result, or, in terms of the text, since practice includes practice itself as well as the perfection of that practice, the Bodhisattva who abides at this point in his career is capable of many wonderful acts. The essence of this Bodhisattva is shown by the allusion to Sākyamuni during his causal stage; i.e., as Vairocana, here called "the Prince 'Universally Adorning'." The legendary prince in question was the second son of the king 愛見善慧, perhaps one of the 33 gods of Indra's heaven. The prince, who was Sākyamuni during his training or causal stage, became a Buddha in the one instant of the perfection of the stage of faith; i.e., upon entering the three bhadras which constitute practice. The "etc." refers to others of the same stage who achieved the same miraculous results. The four are: 1. A Nāga maiden, who achieved Buddhahood in one birth, at the age of eight; 2. the sons of the Tuṣita gods, who did it in two lives; 3. Prince Sudhana, who did it in three lives, and 4. the prince in question. The point is that all did it in the stage of comprehension and practice. (Cf. Oda, Bukkyō Daijiten, p.715, 四勝身) The abode of this Bodhisattva is the pure land outside the triple realm, or the pure land of Vairocana, here called "The world as nature" 世界性. The "etc." ("the world as nature, etc.") refers to the other nine kinds of world of this classification of worlds. According to some commentaries, the ten worlds correspond to the ten bhūmis, the one mentioned above corresponding to the first bhumi. Without going into greater detail here, it may be said that these are purified lands outside the great universe, the realms of Bodhisattvas who are on the bhūmis. For a greater detailed discussion, cf. Mochizuki, Bukkyō Daijiten, III. pp.2281-82. The stage of the wheel-turning universal monarch with the pure jewel net also refers to the Bodhisattva who has reached the _bhūmis_. The Bodhisattva of the four stages anterior to the _bhūmis_ is called the wheel-turning universal monarch of the iron (faith), bronze (abode), silver (practice), and gold (transferal of merit) respectively. Here, then, the individual in question is associated with the ten _bhūmis_, and the point is that even though this is the causal stage, it is endowed with the qualities of result; i.e., Buddhahood.

Taikei II.310-16; _Kōgi_ 282-83

Text. He obtains the corporeal eye of universal vision and sees oceans of universes as countless as the atoms in ten Buddha lands. If it were the corporeal eye of the three vehicles, it would not be like this. Therefore, the _Ta_ _chih_-_tu_ _lun_ says, "The corporeal eye merely sees things within the great universe. If one could see outside the great universe [with it], then of what use would the divine eye be?" [T.25.347] Thus, we know they are not the same. Also, [the Bodhisattva in the causal state] can teach indescribable numbers of beings in an instant and simultaneously causes them to arrive at the point just prior to the "Soilless Concentration." In other instants it is the same. That part of him which is divine responds to a crystal mirror [called] Dīpaṁkara, and he illuminates worlds as innumerable as the atoms in ten Buddha lands. You should know that these are the characteristics of practice within the stage of comprehension and practice of the above three births, because it is discussed in connection with the topic of cause.

Notes. The fact that the Bodhisattva of this stage can experience the crystal mirror shows that his divinity is considerable. I am not sure of the significance of the crystal mirror called Dīpaṁkara. It is said that when a Bodhisattva reaches the tenth stage, there is such a mirror. The Bodhisattva illuminates the universe and dispells ignorance, perhaps by reflecting the light of this mirror. It is probably emptiness.

Taikei II.317-19; Kōgi 284

Text. From the perfection of faith and the acquisition of the stages onwards, the activities [of this Bodhisattva] which have arisen fill up the dharma-dhātu. [For instance,] according to the [Avataṁsaka] sutra, "With one hand he can cover the great trichiliocosm, etc. The ritual implements which he extends from his hands are equal to space and the dharma-dhātu. He honors countless Buddhas simultaneously, [490a] performs the acts of a Buddha, and his benefit to beings is inexpressible." [T.9.434] The full discussion is as taught in the sutra passages dealing with the stages of faith. It further says, "He does not abandon a single universe, nor does he arise from a single seat [of meditation], yet, he reveals the practices of countless bodies," etc.. "In a single instant, in all the worlds in the ten directions, he becomes a Buddha, turns the wheel of the Dharma at the same time," etc.. And so on through the whole discussion. Therefore, know that this is completely different from the three vehicles. Why is that? Because the stages of practice of the three vehicles are taught that way in order to produce faith and comprehension within the framework of teaching.

Notes. The above passages dealing with stages inasfar as practice is concerned have presented ten arguments to show that practice in the one vehicle is completely different from that of the three vehicles. In the three vehicles, practice is merely part of teaching, meant to instill faith and understanding; it is, in effect, merely upāya. In the one vehicle, on the other hand, practice itself--- the phase of development which immediately follows the perfection of faith---is endowed with the qualities of the results of practice. That is, the Bodhisattva who cultivates comprehension and practice is already a Buddha, and performs the acts of a Buddha. He dwells in the purified land of a Buddha, etc.. By acquiring one dharma, he has, in Hua-yen fashion, obtained them all.

Taikei II.318-20; Kōgi 282-85

Text. What is the difference between this [immediately above] and, in the foregoing later Mahāyāna, mounting the stage of irreversibility and acquiring the function [of benefiting others] in its eight acts [i.e., becoming a Buddha]? Answer: When they [in the three vehicles] show the perfection of Buddhahood in connection with the stages, there is [in each stage] no sovereignty over the other stages, because they are not yet acquired. The reason is that there is only temporary activity in the stage in question [and then one goes on to another stage]. With us, it is different. When one produces these functions in the first stage [i.e., the first of the ten abodes], he simultaneously produces those of later stages, because all of them are already obtained, because it is activity in accordance with tathatā, and because [that first abode] contains all six stages within it.

Question: Since they are not the same in meaning, then why, since they are of identical types [as stages], is it taught that they [both] produce these functions in that part of the perfection of faith which is superior progress? Answer: The reason is that this [accomplishment of Buddhahood at the arrival in the first abode] was first taught in the other [three vehicles] in order to make it easy to believe that in the one vehicle one becomes a Buddha in the perfection of faith.

Notes. In the three vehicles it is taught that when one reaches the first of the ten abodes, he is a defacto Buddha, he is irreversible, but even though this resembles the one-vehicle doctrine of the actuality of Buddhahood in the instant when faith is perfected, in fact, it is only a way of preparing one to believe in the one-vehicle doctrine.

Taikei II.321-22; Kogi 286

Text. Question: Since all stages are included in one stage, and the stage of faith is tantamount to Buddhahood, why do you go along with the teaching of other stages? Answer: As for teaching the later stages, these are the all which are included in the first [stage of faith]. The later [stages] are the same as the first [in including all].

Question: If the first [stage] includes the later ones, then if the later ones are acquired when the first is acquired, the later ones should include the first. So, if the later ones are not obtained, then the first ought not be obtained. Answer: This is exactly the case. Because there is none who does not acquire the later ones when he acquires the first, therefore, there is no one who has acquired the later ones who has not yet acquired the first.

Notes. Due to dependent origination, there is complete identity of all the stages, and in reality there is no sequence of first and later. When one acquires the first stage at the perfection of faith, he possesses all the other stages in the same instant, so by the same token, if one has the later stages, he must already have the first.

Taikei II.322-23; Kōgi 287-88

Text. If that is so, how can you say that there is a sequence of stages? Answer: Because there are two skillful devices in this [Daśabhūmika] sutra in its establishment of stages. The first is connected with characteristics 相 and concerns the teaching 門; it divides stages into prior and later, approximates the three vehicles, and skillfully attracts them. This is the common doctrine [of the one vehicle]. The second is connected with essence 體 and concerns the Dharma. Previous and later being mutually inclusive, and completely interfused without obstacle, they are different from the three vehicles. This is the distinct doctrine. Still, the stages 門 are not disturbed, yet are mutually identified, and this identity is not destroyed, yet there is always a sequence; therefore, the two concepts are mutually inclusive, without contradiction between them.

Question: If it is so that the first stage is identical with all [stages], why don't you say that Buddhahood is acquired in the _first_ instant of the stage of faith, instead of saying that it is acquired in the perfection of faith [i.e., the _final_ instant of faith]? Answer: As far as the distinct doctrine itself is concerned, [Buddhahood] is not acquired in dependence on the stages. Now, it is taught through the intermediary of the stages of the later doctrine of the three vehicles. Because, in their doctrine, [490b] one is able to enter the stages [i.e. the ten abodes] at the time one acquires the irreversibility of the perfection of faith, now, because we discuss the acquisition of the characteristics of all prior or later stages simultaneously through the intermediary of their position on entering the stages, therefore, we do not say that [this occurs] during the first moment of faith. The reason is that one has not yet acquired irreversibility, so the characteristics of the stages are not yet formed, because it is merely practice.

Question: If this is so, you should say that one becomes a Buddha on the stage of the abodes. Why do you say it is the perfection of faith? Answer: Because it is the perfection of faith, it is therefore the Buddhahood of the perfection of practice, not the Buddhahood of the perfection of stages. You can understand the other meanings in correspondance with this.

Notes. Even though one acquires irreversibility on the first of the ten abodes, which follow the ten stages of faith, Buddhahood is spoken of in terms of faith, or practice, rather than the abodes, because Buddhahood in the Hua-yen is aroused through faith, or practice, not stages. The stages are piecemeal and imply necessarily that one wins Buddhahood in pieces. However, practice pervades all practice, and in the perfection of faith, all practices are realized. Also, practice is real, whereas the stages are merely conventional. The emphasis throughout the present Treatise, and all Hua-yen, is on practice, rather than on stages, which are only spoken of for convenience's sake.

Taikei II.326-27; *Kōgi* 289-90

4. The Time of Cultivation

Text. Four, the time of cultivation 修行 : In the small vehicle there are three [kinds of] individuals. [1.] The person of inferior capacities; the very quick among the *śrāvakas* achieves arhatship in three lives. That is, in the first life he plants [the roots of goodness of conforming to] liberation. In the second life he conforms to [the four aids to] penetration[決擇 = *nirvedha*]. In the third life his defilements 漏 are terminated, and he acquires the result. The very slow person passes through sixty eons [i.e., twenty eons to each of the three stages]. [2.] The person of middling capacities is the *pratyekabuddha*; the very quick acquires the result in four lives; the very slow takes a hundred eons. [3.] The person of superior capacities is the Buddha [Śākyamuni]; he becomes perfect in three incalculable eons.

Notes. This section deals with the problem of the time it takes, according to each of the five doctrines, to reach the goal. Here, as before, Fa-tsang's framework consists of the five doctrines, from small vehicle up to one vehicle. In the small vehicle, the length of time required is contingent on one's capacities. Three types are given, the *śrāvaka*, the *pratyekabuddha*, and the Buddha, who alone represents the third type. The good roots resulting from conforming to liberation refers to the stage anterior to the four *nirvedha-bhāgīyas*; i.e., breath control, the applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*), etc.. The roots of goodness of the second life are acquired through the four aids to penetration; i.e., heat, summits, patience, and foremost mundane *dharmas*. For a brief, clear, almost verbatim resume of this section, cf. Yusugi, *Kegon-gaku Gairon*, pp.169-70.

Taikei II.327-34; *Kōgi* 291-92

Text. With regard to the calculation of eons [*kalpa*] here, one [great] eon of water, fire, etc., is taken as one unit; ten of these combined make up the second unit; this carried up to sixty makes one incalculable eon. In this way, three incalculable eons are calculated.

Question: Why is the time which a person of inferior capacities takes short, and the time of those of superior capacity long? Answer: The ability to cultivate the practices of one of refined capacities over a long time is considered to be difficult, so [the time] is long.

Also, according to the *Vibhāṣā* and other texts, there are two bodies with which the Bodhisattva [i.e., Śākyamuni] achieves Buddhahood: the one is the Dharma-body; the other is the mortal body. The Dharma-body consists of the five parts of morality 戒, concentration 定, wisdom 慧, etc.. There are, in all, four periods during which one cultivates the Dharma-body. One, the time during the three incalculable eons when one cultivates the [first] four immaculate perfections [anāsrava pāramitā]. Two, the time during a hundred eons when one cultivates actions leading to the thirty-two marks and the eighty secondary marks of a Buddha. Three, the time when one leaves home, practices austerities, and cultivates concentration. Four, the time when one achieves perfect enlightenment under the bodhi tree.

The mortal body [born of a mother and father]: one only cultivates practices leading to the thirty-two marks and eighty secondary marks for a hundred eons, and in the last life receives a mortal body which is the result of [past] actions, is born in the family of King Śuddhodhana of Gayā, and mounts the path of enlightenment in Māghada. The rest is as told elsewhere in the texts of the small vehicle .

In the early Mahāyāna, cultivating the course and achieving Buddhahood necessarily takes [at least] three incalculable eons. However, the calculation of eons here is not the same as that of the small vehicle. The reason is, a great eon of water, fire, etc., is calculated up to a hundred thousand, and a hundred thousand times this makes a koṭi [= ten billion eons]. This makes the first unit. A koṭi of these koṭis makes the second unit. This done a hundred times makes one incalculable [eon]. This makes the first unit among the ten [kinds of] great eons.

Through this calculation, one arrives at three incalculables.

[490c] In this doctrine, this concept [of three incalculable eons] is understood with reference to the body of Śākyamuni. The Upāsakaśīla-sūtra says, "A long time ago, I completed the first incalculable eon under the Buddha Ratnaśikhin; under the Buddha Dīpaṁkara, I finished the second incalculable eon. Under the Buddha Kāśyapa, I finished the third incalculable eon. Long ago, under the Buddha Śākyamuni, I aroused the thought of the highest enlightenment for the first time." [T.24. 1039]

Also, according to the Sutra on Original Action [T.24.1019 Int.], the cultivation of actions leading to the thirty-two marks and eighty secondary marks takes a hundred eons. This is only [for purposes of] transformation [to the great vehicle], not cultivation according to tathatā. [And therefore, the Mahāyāna does not really teach the necessity for this hundred eons.] Also, by having praised the Buddha Puṣya with a single stanza, [the Buddha] cancelled nine eons and became a Buddha in only ninety-one eons.

Question: By cultivating practices according to tathatā for three incalculable eons, one should perfect a body of recompense [saṁbhoga-kāya]. Why, then, do you speak of the transformation body [nirmāṇa-kāya]? Answer:

I say this because the early Mahāyāna doctrine concerns inferior capacities, because there are the two vehicles [in it], because this body [with the thirty-two marks] is what is experienced by [the two vehicles], and because it is a provisional doctrine.

Notes. The early Mahāyāna, like the small vehicle, speaks of three *asaṁkhyeyas* as the time it takes to reach the goal, but the difinition of *asaṁkhyeya* is different. In the small vehicle, the basic unit is the great eon. This is then multiplied by ten, making the second unit. Ten of these, or a hundred eons, makes the third unit. Ten hundreds make a thousand, then there is ten thousand as a unit, then a hundred thousand, etc., for sixty repetitions, to make an *asaṁkhyeya*. This is a decimal system. However, the Mahayana squares their numbers. A hundred thousand eons is multiplied by a hundred thousand eons to make the basic unit of a *koṭi*. Then, a *koṭi* is multiplied by a *koṭi* to make the next unit. Thus, whereas the small vehicle adds a zero each time for sixty times, and thus arrives at an incalculable, the Mahayana not nly starts with a *koṭi* as their basic number, but each new resulting unit is multiplied by itself, finally arriving, after a hundred repetitions, to their concept of an *asaṁkhyeya*. The last-mentioned Buddha Śākyamuni is another Śakyamuni of a time prior to the historical Śākyamuni.

Taikei II.346-54; *Kōgi* 296-98

Text. According to the later Mahāyāna, there are two interpretations to the teaching [of time]. One, the three incalculables are fixed, because this is concerned with the method of conversion of one kind of world - 方化佛. Also, in this doctrine, because one cultivates the course in accordance with *tathatā*, one achieves the body of recompense. This is not taught with reference to the transformation body. Therefore, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* says, "From the time I truly became a Buddha, I have passed through countless, boundless, hundreds of thousands of ten thousands of koṭis of incalculable eons." [T.9.24] Some sutras say, "I received prediction [to Buddhahood] under the Buddha Dīpaṁkara," etc. This difference is a result of skillful means [in order to attract certain types of beings].

Notes. The two interpretations are that the three periods are fixed, as in the early Mahāyāna, and unfixed, or unsettled. The first interpretation, that it is definitely three eons, is a result of the methods that must be used in this world, the Sahā world, which is, of course, only one type among many. In this doctrine, practice according to tathatā results in the saṁbhoga-kāya, whereas according to the early Mahāyāna, the result is the nirmāṇa-kāya. In truth, according to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka the Buddha has been the Buddha since the beginning of time, and was not really born in the family of King Śuddhodhana, became enlightened, and entered nirvāṇa when he was eighty. The other texts which show the Buddha as the nirmāṇa-kāya are only for purposes of attracting a certain kind of person, and do not teach the final truth.

Taikei II.356-60; Kōgi 299

Text. Also, [in this doctrine,] one does not cultivate acts leading to the thirty-two marks, etc., for a hundred eons [outside the three incalculable eons]. Why is this? Because in the small vehicle they cultivate the part having to do with wisdom [leading to nirvāṇa] solely, but do not cultivate the part having to do with virtue 福 ; therefore, in dealing with the time it takes to become a Buddha, [they teach the necessity for] cultivation of the other acts [which lead to the thirty-two marks] separately for a hundred eons. The early Mahāyāna, in attracting them, approximates them [in their doctrine], and consequently this [problem] is discussed from the standpoint of the transformation body. In the later Mahāyāna doctrine, practice is discussed with reference to tathatā. From the initial arousing of the thought of enlightenment, virtue and wisdom are cultivated together, so there is no separate practice during the time of achieving Buddhahood.

Two, the non-fixed three incalculables: there are two reasons for this. One, because [time] pervades other different kinds of worlds, as is taught in the Śrīmālā-devī-sūtra. Two, because the Buddha's qualities are countless, as is discussed in the Ratnamegha-sūtra: "Good sons, the Bodhisattva can not conceive of the realm of the Tathāgata; the realm of the Tathāgata is inconceivable. Only for the sake of shallow beings do I teach that which is acquired during three incalculable eons of cultivation. In reality, the Bodhisattva can not be subject to calculation from the time he puts forth the thought of enlightenment." [T.16.235b] [491a] To explain, the incalculable mentioned here is an incalculable of incalculables, not just three [incalculables]. Question: Why are the three incalculables in the previous doctrine fixed, while here, in this doctrine, they are [both] fixed and unfixed? Answer: This is taught because the previous doctrine is immature and this doctrine is mature, because it gradually encourages the three vehicles and turns them in the direction of the one vehicle.

Notes. The two reasons for the three incalculables not being completely fixed is that (1.) because there are many different kinds of worlds, the time varies according to the world. (2.) The Buddha's qualities are unlimited, so the time it takes to reach Buddhahood is also unlimited. The point to this doctrine is that it prepares those of the three vehicles to accept the teaching of the one vehicle. "Incalculable incalculables" means that rather than just three incalculables there are an incalculable number of incalculables, and it should be remembered that although the meaning is that it is almost an eternity, an "incalculable" is a fairly fixed amount of time, and the first of ten kinds of ages.

Taikei II.360-64; Kōgi 301

Text. As for the sudden doctrine, all time is inexpressible. Because just one instant of the non-arising of thought is identical with Buddhahood, one thought is identical with no thought 一念即無念, and time is identical with no time. You can understand the rest [of this doctrine] in the same way.

In the perfect doctrine, all time is unfixed. The reason is, all eons are mutually inclusive, [various lengths of time] are identical with each other, and [time] completely pervades all worlds such as that of Indra. Consequently, in accordance with the circumstances [in the Avataṁsaka-sūtra], whether a single instant, or countless eons, etc., [may be spoken of,] there is no violation of the law of time. The rest can be understood in the same way.

Notes. In the intuitive or sudden school, there is no question of time, because all false distinctions, characteristics, etc., are dispensed with. In the perfect doctrine, any unit of time is identical with, and included in, all other units of time. Consequently, if the sutra says that one becomes a Buddha in a single instant, or, elsewhere, that it takes many eons, there is in reality no violation of temporal conventions. One instant *is* a million *kalpas*, and the reverse is, of course, equally true.

Taikei II.364-65; *Kōgi* 302

5. The Body Which Supports Cultivation

Text. Five, the body which supports cultivation: according to the small vehicle, there is only the limited body 分段身 , and it lasts until the final result [of Arhatship]. The Buddha [body] is also like this, but it is the body of recompense, not the transformation body.

Notes. The two kinds of body to be distinguished here are the body which comes as one's lot, as a result of *karma* in the triple world, subject to death when its span is exhausted, etc., 分段身 and the body (capable) of mutation 變易身 , which belongs to a Bodhisattva or Arhat, and results from wholesome *karma* outside the sphere of the triple world. Both bodies in fact participate in *saṁsāra*, but whereas the first, the ordinary body which we all inherit, is strictly limited insofar as lifespan is concerned, the Bodhisattva or Arhat who has acquired the mutable body can lengthen or shorten his lifespan at will (hence, it is also called mind-made 意成身). It can take subtle forms, etc.. Here, though the Buddha possesses the first kind, in the view of the small vehicle, it is the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya*, not the *nirmāna*-*kāya*. That is, in their view, the historical Śakyamuni was not an appearance of the absolute in time and space *via* a magically assumed body, but was the Buddha in a body resulting from past *karma*. He was, in short, the totally human teacher, not the eternal Buddha of the *Saddharmapundarīka*. He certainly did not appear in the mutable body as seen by the other doctrines. The two kinds of body are discussed in Oda, *Bukkyō* *Daijiten* p.779 三種生死 . The Sanskrit original of 分段 may be *pariccheda*, and this is what Suzuki gives in his index to the *Laṅkāvatāra*. An extended discussion of the two kinds of *saṁsara* and the two kinds of bodies can be found in the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, translated by L. de la Vallée Poussin, pp.501-13. There (p.502-03) the 分段 is said to be "limited existence (or "in pieces"), and is the fruit of retribution (*vipākaphala*: 5 *skandhas*), gross (easy to know), of the 3 *dhatus*, which creates impure actions (good or bad), which are *hetu*; thanks to the auxiliary power of *kleśāvaraṇa*, which is *pratyaya*. It is called limited because it is of short or long duration (a day, 80,000 *kalpas*) by reason of the power of *hetu* and *pratyaya*, because it includes (implies) limitations and determination (pariccheda)," etc..

The second type (given as *pariṇāmiki*) is said to be "the fruit of distinguished and subtle (invisible to gods, saints of the two vehicles, etc.) retribution, which creates *pure* actions, which are *hetu*, thanks to the power of *jñeyāvaraṇa*, which is *pratyaya*."

It is called *manomayakāya* because it is made on the basis of the vows of *manas*.

Taikei II.366-67; *Kōgi* 303-04

Text. In the early Mahāyāna, it is also taught for the sake of the *śrāvakas* with a tendency to the Mahāyāna that the limited body lasts until the final stage. The Buddha's body is the same. However, it is the transformation body, not the body of recompense.

As for those of direct access, there are two interpretations. 1. In order to show, through the intermediary of ranks, that in the ten stages [*bhūmi*] there are distinctions of the two stages of effort and effortlessness [*ābhoga*-*anābhoga*], the coarse and the fine, it is taught that in the first seven stages there is a limited body, and from the eighth stage on there is a body [capable] of mutation. 2. The body of recompense [*saṁbhoga*-*kāya*]: it is taught that the limited body lasts until the adamantine [stage; i.e., the completion of the tenth *bhūmi*], because the obstruction consisting of defilements [*kleśa*-*āvaraṇa*] is not definitively cut off, and is deliberately retained up to the adamantine [stage]. Since there is the passional obstruction, why wouldn't one be made to bear an allotted body? Thus, the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* says, "Up to the tenth stage there is an intermediate existence." 中陰 [T.10.1034] This is what is meant here.

Notes. In the early Mahāyāna there are those who lean toward the Mahāyāna teaching---ex-small-vehicle *śrāvakas*--- and those who enter the Mahāyāna directly, without first undergoing the course of practice in the small vehicle. In the second group, the pretext of stages is used to include both the limited body and the body capable of mutation. The rationale is that there is effort during the first seven stages, and no effort on the last three stages. This explanation is merely 寄顯; it is not real. The real explanation is made under the topic of the *saṁbhoga-kāya*. Part of the defilements are *deliberately* retained all the way through the ten *bhūmis*, and as a result, the individual keeps the limited body. This is considered to be a kind of intermediate existence (*antarā-bhāva*); this existence is not possible with the body capable of mutation. Thus, the Bodhisattva is able to be reborn in the world eon after eon and work for the eventual emancipation of all beings, an act possible only under these circumstances. His body is a result of *karma* and *kleśa* within the triple world.

Taikei II.367-79; *Kōgi* 305-06

Text. Question: Bodhisattvas from the eighth stage on have forever subdued the obstacle consisting of defilements, and do not permit them to function, because the result, consisting of immaculate wisdom [*anāsrava-jñāna*] continues on successively [in the consciousness] as in the Arhat. Since they are without functioning defilements, how can they receive bodies resulting from acts in the triple world [i.e., the limited body]? Answer: The foolish worldling receives birth when his acts are enriched by functioning defilements. The holy person is not the same. He receives birth [in *saṁsāra*] only through the retention of the latent potential of the defilements 惑種. Thus, the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* says, "All holy persons are bound to continuous rebirth through the power of the defilements." 隨眠 [T.31.714] Also, the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "Because he is different from a foolish worldling, he forever subdues functioning defilements; because he is different from the two vehicles, he retains the latent potentialities." 種子 [T.31.259] To explain, when the holy person receives rebirth, it is not through the nourishment of functioning defilements; yet, he retains the latent potentialities. Why wouldn't he receive an allotted body? [491b] If it is claimed that from the eighth stage on, on the basis of the condition of the obstruction to wisdom [*jñeya*-*āvaraṇa*], one receives a body capable of mutation, then the latent potentialities of defilement would be useless. Then, why aren't the latent potentialities of defilement eliminated forever at the beginning of the eighth stage? Since that is not so [that the *bīja* are eliminated], then how can this be so [that one acquires the body capable of mutation]? In the case of one who has already eliminated the defilements when he was a *śrāvaka* and then opts for *bodhi* [i.e., turns to the Mahāyāna], he can take on a body capable of mutation through [the conditions of] the obstacle to wisdom and pass through all the stages [of the Mahāyāna].

Notes. The answer to the first problem is that even though *kleśa-āvaraṇa* has been cut off, there is still the *bīja* which result from the previous acts, and so one receives the limited body, which continues until all traces of *karma* are removed. Active *karma*, which perfumes, or strengthens, the latent *bīja* continues through the first seven *bhūmis*, but from the eigth stage on, functioning *karma* is subdued and will not start up again. The Bodhisattva can not acquire new *karma*, for in the holy person, only the latent potentialities, the *bīja*, remain, and these serve as basis for the limited body. If the *kleśa* were not destroyed, the Bodhisattva would be no different from any foolish commoner; if he did not intentionally retain the *bīja*, then he would enter nirvana, which is contrary to the nature of a Bodhisattva. The text does agree, however, that if while a *śrāvaka* one had eliminated all traces of the defilements and had achieved Arhatship, then had acquired faith in the Mahāyāna, he would then be able to pass through all the stages of faith, the three *bhadras*, and the ten stages with a body capable of being manipulated at will .

Taikei II.379-86; *Kōgi* 306-09

Text. If that is so, why do some holy works [such as the *Saṁdhinirmocana* and the *Sutra on Benevolent Kings*] say that one receives a body [capable]of mutation because from the eighth stage on nothing but the obstacle to wisdom is the support? Answer: This is said in the sutras because they compare the two vehicles [i.e., the great and small] in order to show their superiority and inferiority. However, this [method of] comparison will be discussed briefly in ten topics in connection with the non-sameness of stages according to various holy doctrines.

Notes. The explanation of why various works say that from the eighth *bhūmi* on, the Bodhisattva has a body capable of mutation on the basis of his retention of *jñeya*-*āvaraṇa* is that the texts try to show the superiority of the Mahāyāna and the inferiority of the small vehicle by showing that the small vehicle is associated with the first seven *bhūmis*, and the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva with the last three stages, a familiar enough concept in Mahāyāna literature. Along with this, the "limited body" is associated with the first seven stages and the "body [capable] of mutation" is associated with the last three stages. As the text says, this is not the reality of the situation, but only a hermeneutic or perhaps polemic device. In reality, the stages are quite dissimilar among the five doctrines, and so a discussion in ten divisions follows, in which this expedient device is discussed as it pertains to each topic.

Taikei II.387-88; *Kōgi* 309

Text. 1. When it is said that the Arhat is the same as the Buddha, the ranks are not divided. The *Vinaya* says, "After the Buddha had saved the five *bhikṣus*, then with the Buddha there were six Arhats who escaped the world." [T.22.105 Int.] Also, you should know, the "same seat," etc., is said in connection with the teaching of the small vehicle.

Notes. The Buddha and the Arhat are alike in having eliminated *kleśa* and achieving liberation. The "same seat" refers to another statement in the *Vinaya* to the effect that the Buddha offered Kāśyapa to sti on the same seat with him in equality, because he had become proficient in asceticism. In short, in the small vehicle, the Buddha is an Arhat.

Taikei II.388-89; *Kōgi* 310

Text. 2. Also, the Arhat is separated from the stage of Buddhahood. The *Abhidharmakośa* says, "When he acquires *bodhi*, he suddenly destroys the obstacle consisting of defilements and the obstacle to wisdom, and suddenly achieves Arhatship and Buddhahood." [T.31.763]

Herein, even though he is called "Arhat" in connection with terminating the defilements [just as the Buddha is], still, there is a comparison with the result of Buddhahood in order to arouse a high resolve in the minds of the _śrāvakas_. In this way, the great and small is divided.

Notes. The Buddha destroys both _āvaraṇa_, the _kleśa_ and _jñeya_, while the small vehicle Arhat destroys only the first. The teaching holds forth Buddhahood as a result, but in reality this is only in order to increase the resolution of the individual, so it is finally only a strategem.

Taikei II.390; _Kōgi_ 310-11

Text. 3. The tenth stages is called [the stage of the] Arhat. The stage of Buddhahood is superior [to the tenth stage], so [Arhatship] is not that. The _Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra_, in speaking of the four supports, says, "The Arhat abides on the tenth stage." [T.12.397 Int.] Here, the great and small are divided by comparison of the cause and differentiation of result. The above two topics are discussed with regard to the teaching which turns the two vehicles [toward the Mahāyāna].

Notes. The four supports are stream-winner, once-returner, non-returner, and Arhat. Here, the goal of the Arhat, the tenth stage, is that of the Bodhisattva, via comparison with Mahāyāna categories, but the result is different. Buddhahood surpasses the tenth stage.

Taikei II.391; _Kōgi_ 312

Text. 4. Up to the seventh stage is provisionally equated with Arhatship; the eighth stage on is provisionally equated with Bodhisattvahood. The _Sūtra on How_

Benevolent Kings May Protect Their Countries says, "The Bodhisattva on the seventh stage, called "Far-going" [i.e., *Dūraṁgama*], subdues the cause of the triple world consisting of the infusions 習 , and extinguishes the result which is action. In the final body only [i.e., the limited body which is result] he abides in the state of Arhatship of the seventh stage." [T.8.832 Int.] Here, great and small are divided through the pretext 寄 of the states of freedom or lack of freedom within the cause [i.e., the ten stages]. This is discussed with regard to those of direct access in the early Mahāyāna. Herein, since it is pretended that the *śrāvaka* reaches the seventh stage, therefore, he reaches this stage along with the obstacle consisting of defilements and the limited body. The eighth stage and beyond is temporarily assigned to the Bodhisattva. The stages of practice are superior to the previous [seven stages]; for this reason, he has only the obstacle to wisdom and a body [capable] of mutation.

Notes. The Arhat is associated with the first seven stages and the Bodhisattva with the last three stages; the first is inferior and the latter is superior because there is effort, or non-freedom in the first seven stages, and effortlessness, or freedom (*ābhoga-anābhoga*) in the last three stages. *Kleśa*-abandonment and type of body therefore correspond to this situation. Throughout this text and elsewhere, I have translated *chi* 寄 as "pretext," "pretend," "temporary equation," and "temporarily assigned," etc.. The meaning is that this is not the true nature of the situation in question, but rather a temporary expedient for purposes of discussion. It is a pretended correspondence or equivalence. For instance, the Hua-yen does not recognize the stages as a true part of training, but for the sake of comparison with the other doctrines, it will discuss itself in relation with these others on the basis of stages.

Taikei II.391-93; *Kōgi* 312-13

Text. 5. The first, second, and third stages are pretended to approximate the mundane, because of the acquiesition of the mundane four concentrations. The fourth stage is pretended to approximate the stage of stream-winner, etc., because of the acquisition of the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment, because here, one escapes the world for the first time. [491c] The fifth stage is pretended to approximate the [stage of the] Arhat of the *śrāvakas*, because of the four Holy Truths. The sixth stage is pretended to be the stage of the *pratyekabuddha*, because of the understanding of the law of dependent origination in its twelve aspects. The seventh stage and on are pretended to be [the stages of] the Bodhisattva, because of acquisition of patience with regards to the non-arising of *dharmas* [*anutpattikadharma-kṣānti*]. This is as taught in the *Sutra on Original Action*. The above is discussed only in connection with the doctrine of the three vehicles, because the one vehicle is not separated out yet.

Notes. The first six stages are equated, through pretext, with the foolish worldling and the small vehicle; the last four stages are considered in terms of the Bodhisattva. Actually, the sutra mentioned in the text does not assign the seventh stage to the Bodhisattva, but Fa-tsang does this because the first six *bhūmis* are equated with the small vehicle. Here, the one vehicle is not yet separated out from the three vehicles, so all are considered together; *i.e.*, there is then only the small vehicle and the Mahayāna three vehicles *cum* one vehicle.

Taikei II.393-94; Kōgi 313-14

Text. 6. As above, the worldly and the two vehicles reach six stages. The seventh stage is pretended to be [the stage of] the Bodhisattva of the three vehicles, because there is still no freedom 自在 . The eighth stage and above is assigned in pretext to the one vehicle, because [in this stage] one acquires freedom. It is as said in the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṁgraha. This is said in connection with the one vehicle, three vehicles, etc., in separating their characteristics.

Notes. Here, the one vehicle is separated out from the three vehicle Bodhisattva on the basis of freedom and non-freedom. Separation of characteristics 分相 alludes to the section by that name among the two sections in Chapter 1.

Taikei II.394-95; Kōgi 314

Text. 7. Because in the first stage, the worldly and the two vehicles are surpassed, [therefore, the first stage is pretended to be that of the Bodhisattva, and the ante-stages are consigned to the two vehicles and the foolish worldlings]. This is as taught in the Treatise on the Daśabhūmika-sūtra [of Vasubandhu]. This is said in connection with the divisions of [the two stages of] analogy and personal experience 比證 within the three vehicles.

Notes. The "stage of analogic knowledge" refers to the stage of the three bhadras, which precede the ten stages. The "stage of experiencial knowledge" 證 refers to the ten stages. This is the basis for this division within the three vehicles.

Taikei II.395-96; Kōgi 314-15

Text. 8. The stage of the three bhadras anterior to the [ten] stages surpasses the stages of the two vehicles, [so the stage of faith is pretended to be that of the two vehicles, and the three bhadras and beyond are attributed to the Bodhisattva]. It is as discussed in the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna. Also, the Sutra on How Benevolent Kings May Protect Their Countries says, "Within cultivated nature 習種性 there are ten kinds of thought. They surpass all the wholesome stages of the two vehicles." [T.8.826 Int.] This is said in connection with irreversibility in the two vehicles.

Notes. The ten stages of faith are equated with the two vehicles, the following three bhadras to the Bodhisattva. "Cultivated nature" becomes actual at the beginning of the ten abodes, just after the ten stages of faith. The ten states of mind or thoughts of this stage are faith, energy, recollection, wisdom, concentration, giving, pure precepts (śīla), protection of the Dharma, vows, and transference of self-merit. The ten stages of faith are seen as the period during which one may revert to a lower stage of development. The ten kinds of mind in the ten abodes (faith, energy, etc.) are linked with the state of irreversibility.

Taikei II.396-97; Kōgi 315

Text. 9. After the perfection of faith, one surpasses the small vehicle, three vehicles, etc., entirely. This is as taught in the "Chapter on Samantabhadra" [in the Avataṁsaka-sūtra]. This is said in connection with the one vehicle.

Notes. According to the one perfect vehicle, all qualities and virtues are contained in the perfection of faith, because the acquisition of one dharma implies the acquisition of all dharmas, and because there is identity of cause and effect.

Taikei II.397; Kōgi 315-16

Text. 10. When one is in the preliminary stage of foolish commoner and puts forth the thought of enlightenment for the first time, he surpasses the two vehicles. The *Ta chih-tu lun* says, "The Arhat *bhikṣu* who perceives that the thought of enlightenment has awakened in the *śramaṇa* [i.e., novice], raises him up before himself." [T.25.610 Int.] This is said of the one vehicle and three vehicles in common.

The order of the various teachings can be understood in correspondence with these categories of comparison.

Notes. Here, the criterion is the awakening of the thought of enlightenment itself; it alone establishes whether one's qualities are great or small. The conclusion means that in all the doctrines, division of qualities, etc., can be understood in the light of the foregoing comparisons.

Taikei II.398-99; Kōgi 316

Text. [492a] According to the later doctrine, prior to the stages, one retains the defilements [intentionally], and receives a limited body 分段身. Within the first stage, one definitively terminates all the seeds of the defilements 煩惱使種 [i.e., 使種 = 種子], and also, these are not divided into the innate and acquired 分別俱生. Also, [simultaneously] one eliminates one part of the obstacle to wisdom, consisting of the coarse grade of defilements; therefore, in the stages, one receives a body [capable] of mutation, and it lasts until the adamantine stage [i.e., the termination of the tenth stage]. The rest of this concept [of the two kinds of defilement, etc.,] is discussed below in the section on extinction of defilements [which directly follows].

Notes. In the later Mahāyāna, one has a limited body prior to the stages through the deliberate retention of the *kleśa*. This arises out of the compassionate nature of the Bodhisattva, and has as its end the aiding of beings in the six destinations. However, once one has reached the first stage, the obstacle consisting of defilements which was intentionally retained previously is definitively eliminated, and simultaneously the coarse part of defilements of the obstacle to wisdom is eliminated. For that reason, during the stages, one has the body 'capable of mutation, and this occurs from the first instant of the first stage. In the early Mahāyāna, though it is recognized that the essence of defilement is unitary, they nevertheless make a distinction between the seeds which are innate, arising with the body 俱生起 , and those which are acquired through the effects of bad teachers, bad thinking, etc. 分別起 . I have translated 分別 as "acquired" to clarify the contrast with the 俱生 , the *sahaja* or innate. It actually translates the Sanskrit *vikalpa*, and refers to its origin in discrimination, as explained elsewhere. These two exist in both the *kleśa-āvaraṇa* and the *jñeya-āvaraṇa*, and are eliminated at different stages during the *darśana-mārga* and *bhāvanā-mārga* respectively. However, in the later Mahāyana, the seeds, or essence, of defilement is not discussed in this manner. *Kleśa-āvaraṇa* consists of the actual functioning process of defilement, while the latent influences existing from beginningless time are considered to be *jñeya-āvaraṇa*, consisting of coarse and fine grades. On the first stage, the coarse grade of defilements is eliminated; from the second stage, the fine is eliminated, and stage by stage one part of the defilements is eliminated, until the tenth stage is completed.

Taikei II.399-400; *Kōgi* 317

Text. Question: If the defilements are not retained during the [ten] stages, how can one convert beings through great compassion and adaptation to circumstances? Answer: Whether [a Bodhisattva of the later Mahāyāna] prior to the stages or [a Bodhisattva of] the early Mahāyāna [on the stages], the power of wisdom and vows is slight, so one retains the defilements, reinforces the vows, and receives birth [in the form of the limited body]. Here, however, it is not the same. Since the vows and wisdom are strong, one freely becomes born among other beings [without need of the defilements].

Notes. "Adaptation to circumstances" is the fourth of the four saṁgraha-vastu, or means of conversion. The answer to the question means that although the Bodhisattva in this stage, in later Mahāyāna, no longer retains the kleśas which allow him to be born in the six destinations, still, even though he dwells in the purified land in the form of the body capable of transmutation, he can, because his vows and wisdom are strong, assume any form he wishes.

Taikei II.400; Kōgi 318

Text. Question: According to a teaching [of the Fa-hsiang] there are two kinds of Bodhisattva up to the eighth stage: 1. he in whom compassion predominates; 2. he in whom wisdom predominates. What does it mean that he of predominating compassion retains the defilements and receives the limited body, and he in whom wisdom predominates defeats the defilements and receives the body [capable] of mutation? Answer: I doubt that such a teaching as this is really true. The reason is, if compassion predominates, wisdom would of necessity be weak. If weak wisdom guides compassion, then compassion would be hindered by insight [and final liberation]. Would you call compassion which is hindered by insight predominating? Even if wisdom and compassion were equal, you could not speak of the predominance of compassion; how much less can you speak of predominance when compassion is guided by a weak wisdom! [Conversely,] if wisdom predominates, compassion is of necessity weak. If wisdom is guided by a weak compassion, then wisdom would be hindered by cessation [in *nirvāṇa*]. How could a wisdom hindered by cessation be called predominating? Because all Bodhisattvas are different from foolish common people and the small vehicle from the first stage on, compassion and wisdom guide each other and are both practiced instant by instant, like the two wheels of a cart or the two wings of a bird. How can you say that there is increase or decrease? Know that as a result of the difference of gross and fine between the early and later Mahāyāna, there are two *saṁsāras*. It is not a result of the alternate predominance of compassion and wisdom.

Notes. The problem posed in the question is not very clear as stated, but essentially it is a counter claim by the Fa-hsiang school, the *Vijñānavādins*, that although a Bodhisattva may retain a limited body by retaining the *kleśa* as an act of compassion, still another Bodhisattva who has a superfluity of wisdom, *prajñā*, may defeat the *kleśa* and receive a body capable of mutation. Thus, it is not true that only the limited body is kept throughout the ten stages. Cf. de la Vallée Poussin's translation of the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* pp.502-13. The body capable of transformation is discussed there (p.503) as follows: "In fact, by the power of pity (*karuṇa*: the desire for existence with a view to saving creatures) and vow (*pranidhāna*: aspiration to *bodhi*) the bodies-life of limited existence are transformed: from ordinary people ("vulgar") they become distinguished; from gross they become subtle; from limited they become unlimited and undetermined. The existence issuing from this transformation is therefore *pāriṇāmikī*. Proceeding from pure meditation and vow which condition-produce it, it functions in a marvelous manner, impenetrable to the vulgar: hence *acintya*." The *Siddhi* claims that the *pāriṇāmikī* body is acquired as a means of being able to help other people, but, instead of claiming that it results from a superfluity of wisdom, says that this body has as a condition (*pratyaya*) *jñeya-āvarana* (p.503). Fa-tsang's answer is that neither *karuṇa* nor *prajñā* can predominate over the other, but both must work together, like the two wings of a bird. The only reason the teaching mentioned in the question exists is that the early doctrine is coarse and shallow, the later Mahāyāna is fine and deep, and because of this difference, there is a different teaching as to the type of body acquired at various stages. The early doctrine says there is the 分段 body; the later doctrine says there is the 變易 body.

Taikei II.401-02; *Kōgi* 319-20

Text. If it is asserted that the person in whom wisdom predominates definitively humbles the *kleśas* because he cultivates the small vehicle [practices] and fears the defilements, then it can be claimed that he is this type of person in connection with his original repetitious practices, because he is still not enlightened in reality, because he is not yet completely matured. From the first stage on, his practices and comprehension are completely mature, and in enlightenment, practices, cultivation, and extinction [of defilements] he is the same, so how could there be distinctions such as this? Thus, the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahā-*

yāna says, "The Bodhisattva on the stages is without distinction with regard to seed nature, the thought of enlightenment, and cultivation of practices." [T.32.581 Int.] Also, in this [later] doctrine, the body [capable] of mutation on the stages is not the same in its relation to ranks [of superior and inferior]. There are four kinds, [492b] as indicated below.

Notes. It is granted that such a type as the Bodhisattva in whom wisdom predominates exists, by virtue of his having formerly been attached to the small vehicle, where, having been taught to fear the kleśas, he has completely eradicated them and arrived at the first stage of the Bodhisattva as a "wisdom" type. However, from that point on, by virtue of his new allegiance to Mahāyāna principles, he develops compassion to an equal degree. Thus, again, the distinction of types does not really hold. The four kinds of non-sameness of the body capable of mutation will be explained in Section 6, pp. 338 ff.

Taikei II.403-04; Kōgi 320-21

Text. In the sudden school, since ranks of practice are inexpressible, the body which is the support [of practice] can be understood in the same way. The full discussion is as discussed in the part of the Large Prajnāpāramitā-sūtra called Nāgaśrī-parivarta [T.7.975].

Notes. The sudden school does not rely on characteristics, nor does it make distinctions between saṁsāra and nirvāṇa; therefore, there is no discussion of the two types of saṁsāra; i.e., the two kinds of body discussed in the above texts.

Taikei II.405; Kōgi 321

Text. In the perfect school, the body [capable] of mutation is not discussed; only the limited body arrives at the point prior to the Soilless Concentration, in the ten stages. Because one acquires the corporeal eye of universal vision when one arrives at that stage, know that it is the limited body [that arrives at this point]. Also, it is like Prince Sudhana [in the last chapter of the *Avataṁsaka*-*sūtra*], etc., because one terminates this causal stage with the limited body.

Question: Why isn't the body [capable] of mutation discussed here [in the perfect doctrine]? Answer: The body such as that of the world as nature, etc., 世界性 is extremely subtle and fine, surpasses those of even the deities, and would be equivalent to the body [capable] of mutation. But, this doctrine does not separate the gross and subtle characteristics of *saṁsāra*, but takes it generally as a single extreme in connection with transgressions and calamities [of the causal stage of development], and when one reaches the point posterior to the perfection of faith, that extreme is suddenly reversed, so [the body capable of mutation] is not discussed. The rest can be understood in the same way.

Notes. The reference to Prince Sudhana alludes to the fact that in that chapter of the sutra, the Prince wins Buddhahood in one life, in the ordinary body born of mundane *karma*. Also, since according to the sutra one finishes the causal stage with a corporeal kind of eye, the body at this point must be the corporeal, limited body. In actuality, as was mentioned previously, existence at this point is a kind of intermediate existence, in which the body is seeking rebirth in one of the six *gatis*. Also, whereas in some teachings one does acquire the second type of body because samsaric existence is considered to be of a finer quality after some point, the one vehicle teaches that the whole period of *saṁsāra* is generally considered to be one of two extremes, or limits. The corresponding body, the limited body, thus continues up to the perfection of faith, and when one reaches this point, one has the body of a Buddha; consequently, the body capable of self-willed mutations is not even needed. In true Hua-yen terms, then, one exchanges the limited body for a Buddha-body at the moment of the perfection of faith, because at this time one is indeed a Buddha. However, if the stages are used as a teaching device, it can be said that the limited body lasts until the *vimala*-*samādhi*, which is a mere hair's breadth from result, Buddhahood.

Taikei II.407; *Kōgi* 322

6. The Divisions of Extinguishing Defilements

Text. The small vehicle [is as discussed in their own texts].

The three vehicles: there are two interpretations. One, characteristics of the extinction of defilements 迷 in connection with stages; two, characteristics of revealing the stages through the pretext 託 of the defilements.

Notes. The small vehicle is not explained. Presumably, Fa-tsang felt that the preceding section had discussed the essentials of the matter in adequate detail; also, he probably felt that the practices of the small vehicle were common knowledge, and since the emphasis in this section is really on the Mahāyāna anyway, there was no need to elaborate. Possibly, something is missing in the text, though both texts lack some missing words. In the second category, the three vehicles, the discussion is divided in this section into two major sections. The first shows the extinction of defilements in relation with the stages of practice. The second interpretation uses the *kleśa* as a mere device, or pretext 託 for explaining the intricacies of the stages. The first interpretation is made from the standpoint of reality.

Taikei II.407-10; Kōgi 323-25

Text. The first interpretation: The early doctrine completely possesses the distinctions of the extinction of defilements of the three vehicles, because this is the teaching of the three vehicles. There are two kinds of obstacle [āvaraṇa]: the obstacle consisting of defilements [kleśa-āvaraṇa], and the obstacle to wisdom [jñeya-āvaraṇa].

First, I will discuss the extinction of the obstacle of defilements by the two vehicles, and this has two parts: first, the name and number of the defilements; second, the acquisition of the result from the extinction of defilements. With regard to the first, there are two kinds of defilement, those which arise as a result of discrimination 分別 , and those which are born with the 7 body[俱生 i.e., innate]. In general, there are ten kinds; those resulting from attachment 貪 , antagonism 瞋 , ignorance 無明 , pride 慢 , doubt 疑 , perverted views about a self 身見 , perverted view consisting of eternalism and annihilationism 邊 , perverted views [about causation] 邪見 , attachment to one's own accomplishments 見取 , and the belief that Buddhist and non-buddhist morality and ritual is efficacious 戒禁取 . Of these [ten], four are a result of discrimination only---doubt, perverted views [on causation], attachment to one's own accomplishments, and belief that

Buddhist and non-buddhist morality and ritual are [in themselves] efficacious. The other six result from both causes. [The first] five *vijñānas* produce the first three [defilements]. [These defilements] arise both from discrimination and with the body. They can arise from discrimination because they are linked with the three causes [for the appearance] of the *manovijñāna*; i.e., wrong teachers, etc..

The *manovijñāna* has ten kinds [of defilement]; four are of [the kind arising from] discrimination, and six are common to both [causes].

The *manas* has only the four born with the body. They are [the four] among the six [which arise also with the body] excepting antagonism and the perverted view of the two extremes, because antagonism is merely the non-good, and this *vijñāna* is indeterminate of an impure nature [*nivṛta*-*avyākṛta* 有覆無記]. Also, there is no attachment to the two extremes, because [*manas*] is a continuum of homogeneous kind, dependent on the eighth *vijñāna*, and grasps at a self from instant to instant. Also, because the last three kinds of wrong view, and doubt, are aroused by [external] conditions, and this *vijñāna* lacks them, it does not beget [these *kleśa*]. Also, because it continues on in continuous succession in dependence [on the *ālayavijñāna*], it is not linked to the sixth [*mano*-] *vijñāna*, and so is not similar to the five *vijñānas*. Therefore, there are only four [defilements].

The eighth [i.e., *ālayavijñāna*] does not produce them at all, because it is only the maturation of acts [*vipāka*] and of the nature of indeterminacy without impurity 無覆無記.

Notes. The three-vehicle adherents are the two-vehicle adherents who have been partly converted to the Mahāyāna, and the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva. They are taken here as a single three vehicles doctrine. The early Mahāyāna two vehicles is taken first. The two causes for defilement were discussed previously, in section five. The ten *kleśa*, or *anuśaya*, are, in the order given in the text, *raga*, *pratigha*, *avidyā*, *māna*, *vicikitsā*, *satkāyadrsti*, *antagrahadrsti*, *mithyadrsti*, *drstiparamarśa*, and *śīlavrataparamarśa*. (Cf. de la Vallée Poussin's translation of the *Abhidharmakośa* Ch.V, pp.1, ff., particularly p.9.) Of these, 5,8,9, and 10 arise from "external" causes such as wrong teachers, wrong conceptions, etc.. 1,2,3,4,6, and 7 can arise from either cause; i.e., exterior causes or innate propensities. In relation to the eight *vijñānas*, the first five (sense) *vijñānas* are connected with the first three defilements. *Manovijñāna* is associated with all ten. *Manas* is associated with 1,3,4, and 6, while the eighth *vijñāna*, the *ālaya*, is not associated with any of them. The first five consciousnesses do not discriminate, so they are not associated with such defilements as perverted views, but they are nevertheless associated in the sense that they are connected with the sixth consciousness, which itself arises from the three exterior causes. *Manas*, on the other hand, is associated with the above mentioned four defilements which are innate; it is not associated with those arising from bad teachers, etc., because it is only conditioned by the internal *ālaya*, not by *manovijñāna* and the five other senses. Also, it does not arouse perverted views about the two extremes because it is constantly being conditioned by *ālaya*, and in its attachment to the concept of a real, subsisting self, which continues in constant succession, has no interval for such a view. Also, antagonism does not arise in the *manas* because it is morally neutral, and antagonism is non-good. *Ālaya* is not connected with the *kleśa* because it is only the morally neutral result of previous action, and is neither good nor bad. It only stores the *bīja*.

Taikei II.410-20; *Kōgi* 324-28

Text. These [two types of defilement] born of discrimination and born with the body are common to the three realms. [492c] Antagonism occurs only in the realm of desire, because all the defilements of the superior two realms are indeterminate, of soiled nature. [Therefore, only hatred is unrelated to the *rūpa*-*dhātu* and *arūpya*-*dhātu*.]

With regard to defilements arising from discrimination, each of the four holy truths associated with the realm of desire has the ten defilements, so there are forty [defilements] in the realm of desire. In the two superior realms, where antagonism is missing, each of the four holy truths has nine, so there are seventy-two. Together with the realm of desire, there are [therefore] one hundred and twelve. With regard to the defilements born with the body, there are six in the realm of desire. There are, with antagonism missing, only five in each of the superior two realms, so all together, there are sixteen. Combined with the foregoing defilements arising from discrimination, there are one hundred and twenty-eight.

Question: Why, in the small vehicle of the Dharma of the ignorant, are the four holy truths not mistaken by the ten defilements in common, while now they are? Answer: There are two reasons. First, because in the three vehicles the power of the defilements becomes increasingly vast and extensive, they obstruct everything. Second, because such concepts as "error" permeate all realms.

Notes. The question is, why don't all ten *kleśa* obstruct insight into the four holy truths in the small vehicle, while in the three vehicles they do? In the view of the three vehicles, the power of *kleśa* obstructs everything, while in the small vehicle, it is said that not all *kleśa* obstruct the four holy truths; in fact, only 98 do. Also, no realm is exempt from error. The first interpretation is made from the viewpoint of the one vehicle; the second is made from the point of view of the interpretations of the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*; i.e., since everything is only mind, or mental representation, then everything can be colored by error. For a full discussion of what *kleśa* are related to what truth of the four holy truths, cf. *Taikei* II (*Tsūro*) pp. 423-32.

Taikei II.421-32; *Kōgi* 328-29

Text. Two, extinction of defilements and acquisition of result: first, with regard to extinction of defilements arising through discrimination, there are three kinds of people. One, a person enters the path of insight [*darśana-mārga*] in reality from the state of foolish commoner 具縛 , and in an instant, suddenly extinguishes the defilements of the three realms which arise as a result of discrimination, with regard to the four holy truths, and acquires the result of entering the path [*śrota-āppana*]. Two, a person who abandons the greater part of the defilements of the realm of desire 倍離欲, enters the path of insight in reality, simultaneously extinguishes six of the nine classes of defilements pertaining to the realm of desire, and acquires the result which is to return to this world only one more time [*sakṛdāgāmin*]. "Abandoning the greater part of the defilements of the realm of desire" 倍離欲 means that at the time one is a foolish worldling, he subdues the first six classes of the nine classes of defilements to be extinguished through cultivation [*bhāvanā*, 修], so it is called "abandoning the greater part of the defilements of the realm of desire." When he enters the path of insight [*darśana-mārga*], he definitively extinguishes what was previously [only] subdued, and in this way acquires the result [of once-returner].

Notes. The *kleśa* to be extinguished are those resulting from the exterior conditions of discrimination. The persons who extinguish these are classified in three groups, two of which are discussed in the text. The first person has been a Buddhist from the beginning of his training. He proceeds to increasingly higher stages in an orderly sequence and reaches the first result, *śrota-āppana*. Prior to this, he had subdued up to the fifth class of *kleśa*, but one small fraction remained, the sixth class, which made him a worldling. The latter two types, of which the first is given here, is of sharp faculties. He may have originally been a practitioner of a non-buddhist system of concentration and asceticism and reached a rather high level of attainment. When he becomes a member of the Buddhist *saṅgha*, he can thus skip many of the preliminaries, and when he enters the path of insight, he again extinguishes the *kleśa* which were previously only subdued, also extinguishes two more classes of *kleśa*, and at the same time he enters the path of insight, simultaneously enters the higher path of cultivation, and thus in effect also skips over the first stage, *śrota-āppana* and acquires the next higher stage, *sakṛdagamin*. He has not only extinguished *kleśa* which are to be extinguished by insight, but also, some of those to be extinguished by the path of cultivation. Because he thus doubly extinguishes *kleśa* belonging to the realm of desire, he is said to doubly extinguish the defilements belonging to the realm of desire. I have translated the term as I did because the point seems to be that he has extinguished more than half, or most, of the *kleśa* of *bhāvanā*-*mārga*; i.e., up to eight classes of defilement. However, he belongs to this group of practitioners because he extinguishes the same *kleśa* twice and skips from the state of worldling past the stage of *śrota*-*āppana* to the next higher stage, *sakṛdāgāmin*. For 倍離欲 cf. Mochizuki, *Bukkyō* *Daijiten*, IV. p.3681.

Taikei II.432-45; *Kōgi* 329-31

Text. Third, the person who has already [completely] extinguished the defilements of the realm of desire enters the path of insight in reality, simultaneously extinguishes [all] nine classes of defilement, and acquires the result which is to never again return to this world [*anāgāmin*]. According to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, "The persons who enter the result which is the path of insight are of three kinds, because they experience three results in accordance with what is fitting." [T.30.436]

Next, extinguishing the defilements born with the body: the defilements born with the body which are related to the sixth [*mano*-] *vijnāna* are of nine classes in each of the nine stages. Also, there are two kinds of persons who proceed to the path of cultivation. First, the person who gradually abandons [the triple world]; he utterly extinguishes the first six of the nine classes of defilement of the realm of desire and acquires the result of once-returner. He utterly abandons the nine classes and acquires the result of never again returning to the world. By utterly abandoning the [defilements of the] upper two realms [i.e., of form and formless-ness], he acquires the result of Arhatship. Second, sudden abandonment [of the triple world]: having acquired the first result [i.e., *śrota*-*āppana*], he then suddenly abandons [the defilements of] the three realms, and gradually removes the nine classes and acquires Arhatship, with nothing left to acquire. The reason for this is, the nine classes of defilement of the realm of desire, which are to be removed by cultivation, and those of the upper two realms are combined into three kinds of nine classes, of which the first class of each [i.e., superior-superior] is abandoned simultaneously and suddenly, so this is called "suddenly abandoning the [defilements of the] three realms." It is said that he gradually removes [the nine classes] because if you consider the nine classes in vertical order, each class is removed separately. If this is the case, then why is there gradual abandonment? Because it is not possible to suddenly lay hold of the *dharmas* of the three realms. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*-*vyākhyā* says, "'To abandon suddenly' means that having entered the stage of seeing the four holy truths clearly [i.e., the *darśana*-*mārga*], [493a] he rests at the vestibule of the first concentration [*anāgamya* 未至定], puts forth the [wisdom of the] supramundane path, suddenly abandons all the defilements of the three realms [belonging to the superior-superior class 上上品 , and so on down to the last class which is inferior-inferior 下下品]. By abandoning them [suddenly] class by class, only the two results of stream-winner and Arhat are established." [T.31.756]. And so on through the whole explanation, as explained there in quoting the 指鬘經 and others.

Notes. There is no space here for a detailed description of the very complicated map of the *mārga* system. It can be profitably examined in de la Vallée Poussin's translation of the *Abhidharmakośa*, chapter five. However, to explain briefly, the nine stages refer to the one stage of the *kāma*-*dhātu*, the four stages of *rūpa*-*dhātu*, or the four *dhyanas*, and the four stages of *arupya*-*dhātu*, comprising the four *samāpattis*, in that order. In each of these nine stages there are nine classes of defilement to be removed, making a total of eighty-one *kleśa*. In each stage, the nine classes of *kleśa* are classified according to their degree of coarseness. From the coarsest down, they are ranked superior-superior, superior-medium, superior-inferior, medium-superior, medium-medium, medium-inferior, inferior-superior, inferior-medium, inferior-inferior. The last class is the last to be extinguished because it comprises the subtlest, and therefore hardest to remove, kind of defilement. This classification also occurs in each of the nine stages. The first type of individual mentioned above removed the *kleśa* of the three realms in succession, gradually, and thus reaches each "fruit" in succession. The second individual skips from the stage of *śrota*-*āppana* to Arhatship; he is called "one who skips the middle two results" 超中二果. "Sudden extinction of defilements" means that instead of a progressively greater mastery over the defilements from the coarsest to the finest, they are extinguished in horizontal order class by class, each class being abandoned suddenly. That is, each of the two superior *dhātus* and the realm of desire, three realms in all, would each have the above nine classes of defilement. First, all the *kleśa* of the superior-superior class of each of the three realms would be extinguished at the same time. Then, the next class, superior-medium, of each of the three realms would be suddenly extinguished, and so on until the last class was extinguished. Presumably, instead of eighty-one separate classes to be abandoned, there would only be nine. This person skips the middle two stages of sainthood because by the above method, when he abandons the superior-superior class of defilements of the realm of desire, he simultaneously abandons the same class of the upper two realms. Consequently, he becomes qualified for Arhatship sooner. The "vestibule" refers to the preparatory stage intervening between the last of the four aids to penetration (*nirvedha*-*bhāgīya*) and the first *dhyāna*.

Taikei II.448-52; *Kōgi* 333

Text. The difilements of the *manas* are extremely subtle in their activity. The above two types of persons, the sudden and the gradual, extinguish them simultaneously, suddenly, at the same time as those of the stage of neither conception nor non-conception 非想地. Thus, the *Yogācārabhūmi* says, "The defilements born with the body and connected with *manas* are extinguished only with [those of] the stage of neither conception nor non-conception, so they are extinguished simultaneously, suddenly. They are not extinguished gradually in the way the other defilements are." [T.30.651,652]

Question: Why is there no sudden extinction in the previously mentioned two vehicles, the Dharma of the ignorant, while here there is? Answer: In order to show the deficiency of the former and the superiority of this [doctrine]. The two vehicles of the Dharma of the ignorant do not have this superior wisdom, so their teaching is shown to be inferior. This [sudden abandonment] is taught as a skillful device which gradually attracts them, arouses a desire for the superior, and causes them to give up the small and adopt the great [vehicle]. With regard to the lack of teaching about extinction of the defilements of the *manas* in the small vehicle, you can understand it in connection with this [i.e., they have no concept of *manas* because they are inferior in doctrine]. This has explained the abandonment of the obstacle of defilement in the two vehicles [among the three vehicles].

The obstacle to wisdom: when those destined for *nirvāṇa* enter [the *nirvāṇa*] without remainder [i.e., the two vehicles], all defilements of the obstacle to wisdom are extinguished. [However,] this is only cessation resulting from incompleteness of necessary conditions [*apratisaṃkhyā*-*nirodha*]. All others [who do not have a tendency towards *nirvāṇa*] either may or may not extinguish them. The person who is liberated through wisdom 慧解脫 does not extinguish them. The person who is liberated by both [wisdom and concentration 俱解脫] extinguishes them in part. That is to say, because the obstacle to the eight liberations---non-soiled ignorance---is combatted through cultivation of the eight superior liberations. According to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, "Also, the [eight] liberations are manifested through liberation of the obstacle to wisdom, because *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, etc., acquire the liberation by mind of the obstacle to wisdom." [T.30. 645] You should understand that this teaching is established by the early doctrine [of Mahāyāna] in order to attract those of the Dharma of the ignorant and gradually turn them towards the great vehicle. Because it is very much superior to them, therefore, with regard to the obstacle to wisdom, partial extinction is acknowledged.

Notes. *Apratisamkhyā*-*nirodha* is one of the three uncompounded *dharmas* and as such is one of the highest states attainable. However, it is not complete extinction of defilements because in that state, there is only the prevention of *kleśas* from arising again through the incompleteness of the necessary conditions. However, it is not said to be complete extinction of defilements. (Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, trans. de la Vallée Poussin, Ch.I, pp.8-10) Of the second group of Arhats, the first type uses the method of *prajñā*, but he can not extinguish all the defilements, because there is an obstacle to concentration (*samādhi*) which prevents him from acquiring the highest of the eight liberations, where complete extinction of defilements is possible. The person who is liberated through both wisdom and concentration removes the obstacle to *samādhi* and thus removes the barrier to the eight liberations, which is ignorance of a non-soiled nature. He thus has access to the highest state of cessation, *samjñāvedita*-*nirodha*, and consequently to liberation. If I have read the text correctly, this type of person is said to extinguish the obstacle to wisdom in part 是故說斷智障少分 , so apparently part of the obstacle remains, at least according to *Tsūro*, in Taikei II.p.465. It should also be noted that the person liberated by *prajñā* only, a person of dull faculties, will eventually acquire complete freedom. For details on these types, cf. *Abhidharmakośa* VI. pp.274,276, VIII. p.181.

Taikei II.457-64; *Kōgi* 336-37

Text. However, the above defilements which are extinguished are not those of the Dharma of the ignorant, because they merely extinguish the power of the defilement 煩惱得 . Here, it is otherwise, because they extinguish the latent potentialities.

Notes. From the point of view of the small vehicle, the essence of the *dharmas* is eternal (i.e., *sarvāsti*), and therefore only the power, or efficiency of *dharmas* can be annulled. However, the two vehicles who have opted for the Mahāyāna (as exemplified by the Wei-shih school) also extinguish the essence, the *bīja*.

Taikei II.465-66; *Kōgi* 337-38

Text. The extinction of defilements by the Bodhisattva of direct access: he extinguishes both obstacles. Also, the obstacle of the defilements is not like that of the two vehicles with regard to the division of classes [of *kleśa*] among [the three] realms. He subdues only the manifested, functioning defilements which arise from discrimination among the two obstacles while he is prior to the stages; at the time of the path of insight in reality of the first stage, he suddenly extinguishes the latent potentialities in an instant. Even though he has the ability to freely extinguish the obstacle of defilement among those which arise with the body from the first stage on, he deliberately retains them and does not extinguish them. Why? In order to nourish rebirth and attract and convert others , in order not to deteriorate into the stage of the two vehicles, in order to extinguish the obstacle to wisdom [at a later time], and in order to acquire great enlightenment. For this reason, the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "As a result of deliberately retaining the defilements, he achieves the complete termination of the defilements and is enlightened in the omniscience of a Buddha." [T.31.261] To explain, "complete termination of the defilements" means the termination of the obstacle to wisdom. That is, as a result of retaining the obstacle of the defilements and arousing superior practices, he reaches this stage and is enlightened in Buddhahood. [493b]

Also, because the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says "he deliberately retains the latent potentialities," therefore you should know that the latent potentialities of the obstacle of defilement remains up to the adamantine [Buddha] stage.

Notes. The defilements are those associated with the first six *vijñānas* and are common to both obstacles. By retaining the *bīja*, the Bodhisattva acquires a limited body 分段身 in each birth and can thus appear in any of the six destinations and try to help beings. The emphasis is on the *deliberate* retention of the *bīja*. The earlier part of the text is a general statement to the effect that the Bodhisattva of direct access does extinguish both *āvaraṇas* which arise as a result of discrimination. With regard to the two obstacles which are born with the body and connected with the sixth *vijñāna*, it is said that he retains the *bīja* until the very last instant of the causal stage. Fa-tsang has relied on the interpretation of Vasubandhu to be able to interpret "defilements" as "*bīja*".

Taikei II.466-87; *Kōgi* 338-39

Text. Because the obstacle to wisdom is subtle in its activities, it undeniable obstructs the path to enlightenment. Therefore, it is partially extinguished stage by stage, one finally reaches the stage of Buddhahood, and is able at that time to completely terminate it. For this reason it is taught that the cultivation of the defilements of both obstacles lasts until the stage of Buddhahood. Therefore, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*-*vyākhyā* says, "Also, all Bodhisattvas in the stage of the path of cultivation [*bhāvanā*-*mārga*] during the ten stages only cultivate the antidote to the obstacle to wisdom. They do not extinguish the obstacle of the defilements. When they acquire enlightenment, they suddenly extinguish both [the bīja of] the obstacle consisting of defilements, and the obstacle to wisdom [in its functioning form], and suddenly become Arhats and Buddhas [simultaneously]." [T.31. 763]

Because the activity of manas is subtle, [defilements] born with the body, also, as in the foregoing, are completely terminated at the stage of Buddhahood.

Notes. The defilements of manas in their innate form last, generally speaking, up to the stage of Buddhahood, when their definitive eradication is achieved. Kleśa-āvaraṇa is completely abandoned on the eighth bhūmi, and jneya-āvaraṇa is prevented from functioning and bearing results on this stage also, though the bīja are retained. The previous texts indicate that throughout the ten stages, there is a progressive eradication of defilements and their latent potentialities, with a small portion of very fine bīja being retained until Buddhahood. This ensures that the Bodhisattva will not slip either into nirvāṇa, or back to the stage of the two vehicles, whereby in either case he would lose his ability to aid beings.

Taikei II.487-92; Kōgi 340

Text. Question: The defilements of the two obstacles which are to be removed by cultivation pervade the ten stages, and the sixth and seventh vijñānas each have these two obstacles. If this is so, what are the similarities and differences in the functioning defilements in the ten stages, with regard to the vijñānas? Answer: With regard to the obstacle of the defilements, because the defilements of the sixth [mano-] vijñāna are deliberately retained, therefore, both the functioning forms and the latent potentialities are controlled by wisdom, and in this way one perfects superior practices and does not allow misfortune to arise. It is just as a poisonous snake can, by means of a spell呪 , be prevented from killing or causing any misfortune, yet, he is not prevented from performing his other activities. The skillful retention of defilements by the Bodhisattva is the same. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "It is just as poison is prevented from killing by means of a spell," etc.. [T.31.261] Therefore, you should know that one is master over [all the defilements which are retained] whether functioning or latent potentialities.

The defilements of the seventh *vijñāna* [*manas*] are not of a nature to nourish rebirth, so they are not retained. Because their activity is subtle, sometimes they are manifested for a while as far up as the seventh stage, because there are intervals in the wisdom of insight.

Notes. I have translated the first two sentences quite freely, relying heavily on the paraphrase of the *Tsūro*, *Taikei* II.492. The defilements of the sixth *vijñāna* are deliberately retained in order that the Bodhisattva may put off entrance into *nirvāna*, receive a limited body, and work in the six destinations for the good of others. However, these defilements do not create any consequences because they are controlled by the *prajñā* of the Bodhisattva. The defilements of the *manas* do not cause one to be reborn in *saṁsāra*, because their function is rather to condition the *ālayavijñāna*. For this reason, they are not retained, but they occasionally appear again up to the seventh *bhūmi*, because there are lapses in the insight into the two kinds of emptiness.

Taikei II.492-96; *Kōgi* 341-42

Text. The [defilements of the] obstacle to wisdom may all arise in the later stages [from eight on], or may arise in the previous stages [i.e., the first seven], because they are extinguished piecemeal, stage by stage, whether in their functioning form, or as latent potentialities 現種.

Question: If that is so, why is it said in some places [such as the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*] that "soiled mind [*sāsrava-citta*] occurs up to the seventh stage"? Answer: In connection with considering the obstacle of defilement in the sixth *vijñāna* to be soiled [*sāsrava* 有漏], this is [only] a resemblance to soiling, because the defilements are intentionally retained; in considering the obstacle to wisdom to be soiled, this is real soiling. These two pervade the ten stages. In the case of the defilements of *manas*, there is real soiling. Soiling and non-soiling are not fixed up to the seventh stage, because soiled mind arises for a short time. The other concepts can be understood in the same way.

Notes. The question has arisen because the text has stated that the obstacle to wisdom is extinguished piecemeal throughout the ten stages. Consequently, there should be no defiled mind in the ten stages. On the other hand, the *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* say that defiled mind, and the consequent arising of *kleśa*, occur not only prior to the eighth stage, but from the eighth stage on as well. The answer seems to agree that the two *āvaraṇas* do indeed cover the whole of the ten stages, some as true defilement, *sāsrava*, and some as only appearing to be defilement 似有漏, but whether true or seeming, they do pervade the ten stages. Thus, for instance, the functioning forms of *kleśa* associated with the sixth *vijñāna* are extinguished on the first stage, but the *bīja* are intentionally retained, and because of complete sovereignity over these retained seeds, they can not become a source of bondage. On the other hand, the obstacle to wisdom is acknowledged to be true defilement and is little by little removed all the way to the tenth stage. The defilements of the seventh vijñāna are true defilement and may or may not appear in their functioning forms up through the seventh stage, but when the Bodhisattva acquires effortlessness (anābhoga) on the eighth stage, these innate defilements do not appear again. They do arise in the first seven stages because the insight into the two-fold emptiness falters at times, and as a result of this, defilement of the manas is possible. The last sentence refers to other concepts such as the ten śūnyatās, ten āvaraṇas, etc.. The answer to the question seems to be that though the defilements do indeed last, in some cases, all the way up to the tenth stage, these defilements are of such a nature that generally they do not create functioning, manifest defilements; i.e., the corrupted mind in its various aspects.

Taikei II.496-98; Kōgi 342-43

Text. Also, with regard to the relationship, in this [early] doctrine, between extinguishing defilements and producing wisdom, when the latent potentialities of the defilements are in the phase of extinction, wisdom is in the phase of birth. They are simultaneously present. It is just as rising is identical with sinking and sinking is identical with rising. The full explanation is as discussed in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā.

Notes. The "rising" and "sinking" are an illusion to a simile of weighing scales, or a shoulder pole for carrying. When one side goes down, the other goes up simultaneously. One action is exactly coterminous in time with the other. Thus, there is no sequence in the processes of extinguishing the defilements and giving birth to prajñā; prajñā is the extinction of defilements, and the extinction of defilements is prajñā.

Taikei II.498-99; Kōgi 343

Text. Also, because the dharma "obstacle" relies on mind and is without an essence of its own, then it is empty [śūnya] and without differentiation. This is the real meaning of "obstacle". The Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa says, "The five grasping aggregates [skandha] are like a cave, empty, without anything that is produced. This is the meaning of suffering [duḥkha]." [T.14.541] Now, you can understand the present concept of "obstacle" in relation with that [quotation].

The later [Mahāyāna] doctrine: [493c] śrāvakas are not able to extinguish the obstacle of the defilements; they can only control it. How much less can they extinguish the obstacle to wisdom! Therefore, the treatise on the Sutra of the Questions of Maitreya says, "None of the śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas cultivate the four immeasurable practices in accordance with tathatā. They can not completely extinguish the defilements; they can only control them," etc.. [T.26.265 Int.] A passage in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra also says the same.

Question: Why isn't this teaching the same as that of the previous [early] doctrine? Answer: Because the previous doctrine does not discuss profound [concepts], because it tries to attract the two vehicles; therefore, the superior [early doctrine] is likened to the inferior [two vehicles] and it is taught that, as in the two vehicles, the obstacle of defilements lasts until the stage of Buddhahood and is terminated at that time. Also, the inferior is likened to the superior, and it is agreed that the two vehicles completely extinguish the obstacle of the defilements and partially extinguish the obstacle to wisdom.

Now, here, we are concerned with the truth. Because the two vehicles of the Dharma of the ignorant are lacking in broad, great minds, [it is said that] they do not extinguish the obstacle of the defilements. Moreover, it may be said that the previous concerns the *śrāvakas* within the three vehicles, but because here we are concerned with the Dharma of the ignorant, there is a difference.

Notes. The question is, why was it said with regard to the early Mahāyāna that *śrāvakas* extinguish all *kleśa* and part of the obstacle to wisdom, while here, in the context of the developed Mahāyāna, it is denied that they even extinguish *kleśa*-*āvaraṇa*? As usual, the answer is that the previous early doctrine said that *śrāvakas* extinguished *kleśa*-*āvaraṇa* and part of *jñeya*-*āvaraṇa* as an expedient device to attract the two vehicles. Here, in the later doctrine, the true situation is being described; consequently, extinction is denied.

Taikei II.505-06; *Kōgi* 346

Text. The Bodhisattva [of the developed Mahāyāna] does not divide the two obstacles into the innate and those resulting from discrimination, but only as the substance of defilement 正使 and the remaining influences 習氣. Prior to the [ten] stages, he subdues the substance of defilement in its functioning form 使現, and on the first stage, he extinguishes the latent potentialities. After the first stage, he gets rid of the remaining influences and is completely purified on the stage of Buddhahood.

However, from the first [abode] in the stage of the three *bhadras*, prior to the stages, he does not fall back into the stage of the two vehicles, and even though he can extinguish the obstacle of the defilements with complete freedom, he retains it and intentionally does not extinguish it, in order to get rid of the obstacle to wisdom [at a later stage]. Therefore, the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "From the ten abodes 解 on, he acquires the supramundane pure eye." [T.31.174 Int.] It also says, "[The person] from the ten abodes on is called a holy person," because he does not deteriorate into the stage of the two vehicles. Therefore, the *Sutra on How Benevolent Kings May Protect Their Countries* says, "Prior to the stages, one understands the emptiness of the self [*ātma-śūnyatā*]," [T.8.831 Int.] yet, one does not seize *nirvāṇa* 證 , etc.. Also, the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* says, "He is able to see the Dharma-body slightly, and he performs the eight acts of a Buddha," etc.. [T.32. 581 Int.] All [these quotations] mean [the same as] this [passage].

Because this Bodhisattva fears only the obstacle to wisdom, he cultivates insight into things as merely mental, as *tathatā*, etc., and subdues that obstacle. However, he not only does not fear the obstacle of the defilements, and does not develop its antidote, he intentionally retains it and perfects superior practices [of benefiting others]. Because he extinguishes the coarse part of the obstacle to wisdom on the first stage, he does not retain the obstacle of the defilements afterwards; therefore, [494a] without making a division of the two obstacles into [those to be extinguished] by insight and cultivation [*darśana-* and *bhāvanā*-*mārga*], he terminates the substance of both [obstacles] at the time he arrives at the first stage. Therefore, the treatise on the *Sutra of the Questions of Maitreya* says, "The question is, if a *śrāvaka* first extinguishes the defilements which are extinguished by the path of insight, and later gradually extinguishes the defilements to be extinguished by the path of cultivation, why doesn't the Bodhisattva do the same as the *śrāvaka*? Answer: For countless ages [prior to entering the stages], the Bodhisattva has performed beneficial acts for all beings. Later, when he perceives the ambrosial *dharma*-*dhātu* of *tathatā* he perceives that the bodies of all those living beings are truly no other than that which we have sought [i.e., the *Dharma*-*kāya*].

Therefore, because the defilements which are to be eliminated by the paths of insight and cultivation obstruct the practices of benefiting living beings, the Bodhisattva extinguishes them all in [the path of] insight." [T.26.239 Int.] This passage is proof [that the defilements are extinguished on the first stage].

Notes. The two obstacles are not divided as to cause, the innate and acquired, and consequently there is no division of the two *margas*, insight and cultivation. In the later Mahāyāna the defilements are, however, divided into coarse and fine; the coarse is called the "substance, or essence of defilement" 正使 , and comprises *kleśa* in their functional aspect 現行 and as latent potentialities (*bīja*). What I have translated as "functional forms" consists of *kleśa* not in their causal forms but rather as they are already affecting mind and the other senses; i.e., as result. The fine aspect of *kleśa* consists of the *vāsanā*, the "remaining influences." Before he has reached the first *bhūmi*, during many eons of the practice of the three *bhadras*, the Bodhisattva has intentionally retained the obstacle of the defilements so as not to achieve the *nirvāṇa* of the small vehicle Arhat, and thus be prevented from fulfilling his desired role as a Bodhisattva. However, from the first stage, the Bodhisattva extinguishes the coarse aspects of the defilements (i.e., *jñeya-āvaraṇa*), and therefore does not need to retain *kleśa* anymore; so, in effect, the coarse aspects of both obstacles are removed at the first stage. Thereafter, he removes the *vāsanā* bit by bit, until he reaches the Buddha stage and is completely purified.

Why doesn't the Bodhisattva extinguish the two obstacles during the two *mārgas*---*darśana* and *bhāvanā* respectively---as the *śrāvaka* does? The *kleśa* are an obstacle to the compassionate practices of the Bodhisattva, because the defilements are the root of the attachment to the concept of a real self, and this attachment is in direct opposition to compassion and other-directed activities. Therefore, these defilements must be dumped early. However, even though the Bodhisattva is in effect without defilements, he is prevented from slipping into the stage of the small vehicle by the possession of *prajñā*. It should also be noted that even though here it is said that the coarse aspects of both obstacles are abandoned in *darśana-mārga*, this is only a useful utilization of the name in order to orient us; the later doctrine does not really divide the path of practice in this way.

Taikei II.507-10; *Kōgi* 348-50

Text. The defilements of *manas* in their coarse aspect are also extinguished on the first stage, and afterwards, the remaining influences [i.e., the fine aspect] are removed. Thus, Asvabhāva's translation of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says, "He transforms the soiled *manas* and acquires the knowledge of sameness [of himself and others]. When insight is actually manifested for the first time, and he experiences it and appropriates it, then, during the stage of the path of cultivation, the transformed is increasingly purified." [T.31.438] To explain, "is increasingly purified" means removing the remaining influences [*vāsanā*]. Because the substance of defilement is removed at the beginning, it is said to be only increasingly purified later, but it is not said to be extinguished.

Notes. "First stage" actually means the first instant of the first stage, and at this time, which corresponds to the entrance into *darśana-mārga*, the *kleśa* in their coarse form are removed. *Manas* is morally neutral, of a soiled nature *nivṛta-avyākṛta* , but when one enters the first stage, the *manas*, as well as the sixth *vijñāna*, become purified *anivṛta* when the coarse form of defilements is removed. During the remainder of the Bodhisattva's career, he increasingly purifies the already transformed *manas* by gradually removing the subtle form of the defilements, the *vāsanā*. However, he does not remove all traces of the defilements, but rather intentionally retains part so as to be able to be reborn among living beings and work for their emancipation.

Taikei II.520-22; *Kōgi* 350-51

Text. If in this case you [adherents of the Wei-shih school] claim that when one enters the path of insight in *tathatā*, one *temporarily* subdues [the defilements] and does not permit them to arise, but does not truly extinguish them, then you can say that [later] the transformed [*manas*] is increasingly purified. Since they are not wholly extinguished, how can it be said that there is increasing purification? Such a thing as that can be said in connection with the early Mahāyāna. Therefore, you should know that in this [later] doctrine, one only gets rid of the remaining influences during the stages.

Notes. The problem is raised by the adherents of the Wei-shih school who hold that the defilements are kept until the final moment of the tenth stage. They object that if the defilements are only temporarily subdued on the first stage, it can not be said that the *manas* is increasingly purified on the later stages, because they have not been wholly exterminated. The answer is that this objection is only valid according to the early doctrine, as represented by the Wei-shih school, specifically by Dharmapāla. In the later Mahāyāna, it is said that on the first stage, the defilements of *manas* are completely exterminated, and later, only the remaining *vāsanā* are extinguished. The Wei-shih presumably denies that *manas* defilements are wholly exterminated on the first stage, because in their way of thinking, the defilements themselves last until the adamantine stage of Buddhahood.

Taikei II.523; *Kōgi* 351

Text. The *Uttaratantra* says, "'Not pure' 不淨 means all foolish common folk possess the obstacle of the defilements. 'Possessing taint' 有垢 means all *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, etc., have the obstacle to wisdom. 'Possessing stain' 有點 means all Bodhisattvas, Great Beings, etc., have these two kinds of obstacle as remaining influence." [T.31.823] To explain, the explanation of the treatise is that the person on the stages is called a "Great Being"; therefore, know that there is only the obstacle as remaining influence [there]. The remaining influence follows upon extinguishing the latent potentialities of the substance of defilement 正使種子 and at that time the remaining influence is without interval. Why? Because prior to the extinction [of the latent potentialities], there is no fine subtle [kind], because once the latent potentialities are extinguished, then at that time a fine subtle [kind] exists without interval. The treatise calls it "remaining influence which is born without interval."

Question: How can he terminate the defilements in the stages and still not slip back to the stage of the two vehicles? Answer: Because the power of wisdom is superior, and because the substance of the obstacle to wisdom has already been extinguished and got rid of. It is just as persons of the early doctrine and small vehicle who have sharp faculties and make a sudden escape from the world utterly extinguish the six classes of defilements belonging to the realm of desire and also utterly extinguish the six classes of the upper two realms, so they do not acquire the result which is to return to this life only one more time [i.e., they directly go to Arhatship and skip the middle two results]. How much more does this Bodhisattva have an extraordinary power of the path, and how much more because he has already extinguished the substance of the obstacle of the defilements. If we are concerned with the time prior to the stages, or the early doctrine, degeneration can exist. Here, it does not.

Also, in this doctrine, [494b] it is evident that when the defilements are extinguished, when wisdom arises, the defilements stop, and there is no prior, during, and after, and prior, during, and after are accepted 收 . How do they cease? They cease in the same way that the sky is fundamentally pure. The full discussion is as taught in the *Treatise on the Daśabhūmika-sūtra*.

Notes. The later doctrine interprets the process of extinction of defilements and the arising of *prajñā* in line with the general doctrine of the identity of defilement and wisdom as two phases of _tathāgata_-_garbha_. Thus, defilement is the _tathāgata_-_garbha_ obeying conditions, is based on _tathāgata_-_garbha_, and does not exist outside it. In essence, defilement and wisdom are the same, and the removal of the defilement is itself the wisdom. Consequently, there is no sequence in the two processes; wisdom is not something entirely different, of different essence, which causes the _kleśa_ to be removed, nor is the reverse process the case. Thus, there is in reality no extinction of defilement because they both have an identical essence; on the other hand, because _tathatā_ obeys conditions and appears as defiled mind and form, there is extinction of defilement. The 'prior, during, and after' refer to the sequence of the two processes, and it is said that all three times are unacceptable; i.e., _prajñā_ can not preceed extinction of _kleśa_, because it will have already ceased to exist as a _dharma_ before the extinction takes place; therefore, it can not cause the second, etc.. By _accepting_ the sequence, extinction is accepted; thus, there is extinction and no extinction. Apparently, the rational basis for this acceptance of the possibility of extinction is the theory that the _dharma_ of _prajñā_ continues to exist in a continuous stream prior to, during, and after the extinction has taken place. Actually, however, the _prajñā_---i.e., _tathatā_---is there all the time.

Taikei II.526-28; _Kōgi_ 353-54

Text. Also, in this doctrine, _dharmas_ such as "defilement," etc., are created when _tathatā_ obeys conditions; therefore, they are not different from _tathatā_. This is the meaning of "defilement." This is as taught in the _Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna_. Also, the [_Vimalakīrti_] sutra says, "All _dharmas_ are identical with _tathatā_," etc.. [T.14.542] The defilements should be considered in the same way. Therefore, you should know that this construction is different from the previous doctrines. You should understand this in the same way.

Notes. This summarizes and concludes the first part of this section, and at the same time emphasizes the basic identity of defilement and Buddha nature. This is, in fact, the basic rationalization of the position in the previous text.

Taikei II.528; *Kōgi* 354-55

Text. Two, explaining the stages through the pretext of the defilements; there are, in summary, eighteen topics in the holy doctrine.

Notes. This is the second main division in this section. The previous part used the stages to discuss extinction of defilements. The present part discusses stages and uses extinction of defilements as a device to clarify the many difficulties of the stages. As such, it is not "true"; that is to say, extinction of defilements is real, but stages are not; therefore, this is an explanation through pretext 寄顯 .

Taikei II.530; *Kogi* 355

Text. 1. Showing the two stages through the pretext of the two obstacles; i.e., the two obstacles consisting of the obstacle of defilements and the obstacle to wisdom are distinguished in order to show the two stages of insight by comparison 比, and true, personal experience 證. Therefore, the Liang translation of the *Mahayanasaṁgraha* says, "Prior to the stages, one gradually gets rid of the obstacle of the defilements; on the stages, one gradually gets rid of the obstacle to wisdom." [T.31.215 Int.] It also says, "After the ten abodes 解 one acquires a supramundane pure mind." [T.31.174 Int.] It also says, "Even though prior to the stages, one perceives the emptiness of the individual, because one is still not purified with reference to the emptiness of *dharmas*, one is neither purified with reference to the emptiness of the individual." [T.31.236,248] It also says, "The attachment to a personal self having been abandoned during the previous ten abodes, now, he only gets rid of the attachment to a self of *dharmas* [on the stages]." [T.31.202] Also, the *Sutra on How Benevolent Kings May Protect Their Countries* says, "After [the stage of] cultivated nature 習種 , he enters the stage of [knowledge of] the emptiness of persons, because he acquires the nature of a saint." [T.8. 831] The *Sutra on Original Action* and the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* say the same.

2. The pretext of the three-fold defilement of skin, etc., [i.e., skin, flesh, and heart] in order to show [the stages of] the three immeasurable [eons]. The Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says, "In the first immeasurable [eons], he extinguishes the defilements of the skin; in the second immeasurable, he extinguishes the defilements of the flesh; in the third immeasurable, he extinguishes the defilements of the heart." [T.31.180, 230, 231 Int.]

Notes. In number 1, the stage of insight by comparison corresponds to the ante-stage three *bhadras*, while the stage of direct personal experience corresponds to the stages per se. The various quotations indicate this. Number 2 mentions only *kleśa-āvarana*, but the obstacle to wisdom is understood to be extinguished also. The figurative use of skin, flesh, and heart points to three varying degrees of defilement, from superficial to deep.

Taikei II.531-35; *Kōgi* 356-57

Text. 3. Explaining the differences between the three states of mind in successive stages by means of the pretext of these [above] three defilements. This is as explained in the thirty-three immeasurable [eons] in the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*: "The state of mind of entrance 入心 in each stage gets rid of [the defilements of] skin. The state of mind of abiding 住心 gets rid of [the defilements of] flesh. The state of mind of exit 出心 gets rid of the [defilements of] heart," etc.. [T.31.*Ibid*.]

Notes. The 33 *asaṁkhyeyas* of the *Msg*. consist of three in each of the ten *bhumis*, and the three *bhadras* anterior to the stage taken as a whole also have three, making 33 in all. In each stage, there is a phase of entrance, a phase of maintainance, or abiding, and a phase of exit, or perfection.

Taikei II.536-38; *Kōgi* 357-58

Text. 4. Explaining the three stages through the pretext of coarse and fine of the two obstacles. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi-śāstra* says, "The two obstacles pervade the three places; i.e., prior to the stages, the stages, and the Buddha stage." [T.30.945]

Notes. Presumably, what the text means is that upon entering the first stage, the coarse aspect of the two obstacles is extinguished; from there to the Buddha stage, the fine aspect is extinguished.

Taikei II.538-40; *Kōgi* 358

Text. 5. Showing the three bodies through the pretext of the defiled mind in its coarse and fine aspects in the three states. The *Suvarnaprabhāsottama-sūtra* says, "Relying on the path of subjugation, he terminates mind which gives rise to things, and reveals the transformation body [*nirmāṇa-kāya*]. Relying on the path of extinction of *dharmas*, he terminates mind which is reliant on the fundamental mind [i.e., *ālaya*], and manifests the body of recompense [*sambhoga*-*kāya*]. Relying on the path of triumphant uprooting [of defilements], he terminates the fundamental mind and manifests the Dharma body." [T.16.364] Some explain this by saying that the path of subjugation is prior to the stages, and the mind which gives rise to things is the sixth *vijñāna*. The path of the extinction of *dharmas* consists of the stages from one on, and the mind which is reliant on the fundamental [mind] is the *manas* because it is conditioned by the fundamental mind, the *ālaya*-*vijñāna*. The triumphant uprooting is the adamantine stage. Fundamental mind is the *ālaya*-*vijñāna*.

6. Directly revealing the three bodies through the pretext of the three obstacles. Thus, the [*Suvarṇaprabhāsottama*] sutra says, "The obstacle of the defilements being purified, [494c] one manifests the body of recompense [*sambhoga*-*kāya*]. The obstacle of action being purified, one manifests the transformation body. The obstacle to wisdom being purified, one manifests the Dharma body." [T.16.363]

Notes. Fa-tsang misquotes the sutra, which says that the Dharma body is revealed when *kleśa*-*āvaraṇa* is purified, the body of recompense is revealed when the obstacle of action is purified, etc.. I am not sure why, unless it is simply a failure of memory of Fa-tsang's part.

Taikei II.543; *Kōgi* 359-60

Text. 7. Revealing the three bodies by means of the pretext of the defilements which arise as a result of being deluded about the three kinds of naturelessness 三無性. Thus, that [*Suvarṇaprabhāsottama*] sutra says, "Due to [lack of understanding of] the three characteristics, all foolish common folk are in bondage, have obstacles, are separated from the three bodies, and do not perfect the three bodies. What are the three [characteristics]? One, the characteristic of being discriminated by thinking. Two, the characteristic of being dependent on others. Three, the perfected nature. Because these three characteristics can not be [respectively] understood, because they can not be extinguished, because they can not be purified, one can not perfect the three bodies. The Buddhas can understand, can extinguish, and can purify; therefore, they perfect the three bodies." [T.16:363] To explain, "can understand" means the discriminated nature, because it should be understood. "Can extinguish" means the nature which arises in dependence on another ought to be extinguished. "Can purify" means that the *tathatā* which is under bondage 在纏 should be cultivated and purified.

8. Showing the four stages through the pretext of the four obstacles. There are two interpretations to this.

One, the pretext of showing the four stages, four practices, four causes, and four rewards *prior to the stages*, in connection with the substance of defilement 正使.

What are they? The first shows through the pretext of having extinguished the defilements of the obstacle of lack of faith in the icchantika, that perfecting faith and joy in the Mahāyāna during the stage of the ten faiths is the cause for the quality of purity [of nirvāṇa], and the result which is to be a wheel-turning king of the iron circle. The second shows through the pretext of the extinction of the unbeliever's obstacle of attachment to a self that the practice of wisdom [prajñā] in the stage of the ten abodes [lit. ten comprehensions = 解] is the cause for the quality of personality [of nirvāṇa] and the reward which is to be a wheel-turning king of the copper circle. The third shows, through the pretext of the extinction of the śrāvaka's obstacle of fearing suffering, that in the stage of the ten practices 行 , the practice of the concentration which crushes the vessel of the sky is the cause for pleasantness [of nirvāṇa] and the reward which is to be a wheel-turning king of the silver circle. The fourth shows, through the pretext of the extinction of the pratyekabuddha's obstacle of neglecting great compassion, that the perfection of the practice of great compassion in the stage of the ten transferals of merit is the cause for the quality of eternity [of nirvāṇa], and the result which is to be a wheel-turning king of the golden circle.

Notes. The first of the two interpretations concentrates on the four stages prior to the bhūmis. In each case, an obstacle is removed, a practice is performed, and there is a cause and a result. In all cases, the obstacle is in the form of the substance of defilement, the coarse aspect. In each case, the practice is an antidote to the obstacle. Thus, the four stages are unbeliever, non-buddhist believer, *śrāvaka*, and *pratyekabuddha*. The four practices are faith, wisdom, concentration, and compassion. The four causes are *bīja* which are stored in the mind of the practitioner, and which will ensure that *nirvāṇa* will be eternal, pleasant, personal, and pure. The four results are to be the four kings who rule over the four circles of the universe, starting with the iron circle of the world of Mt. Sumeru; i.e., the world we all know. The four stages thus cover initial faith in the Dharma, understanding the Dharma, cultivating self benefit, and cultivating benefit for others. The *samādhi* is of a nature that negates or cancels the simple *śunyatā* of the two vehicles. For more on the four *cakravartins*, cf. text and notes, pp.

Taikei II.544-46; *Kogi* 362-63

Text. Also, the four practices which are acquired by overturning these obstacles are the four meanings of "son of the Buddha." The son of the Buddha who overturns the first obstacle and perfects faith and joy in the Mahāyāna is the cause; i.e., he is like the father. Two, the condition which is wisdom is like the mother. Three, the manifestation of the concentration which crushes the sky and gets rid of the attachment to the small vehicle and makes the Dharma-body firm is like the womb. Four, great compassion and benefit to others is like the suckling child. Because one is endowed with these four conditions, one is able, from prior to the [ten] stages, to be born in and remain in the family of all the Buddhas from the first stage on, so he is called "son of the Buddha." Also, these four combined are like the wheels of a cart which can advance forward to the place of liberation. It is just as a wheel-turning king's cart [wheel] has four things: a hub, a rim, spokes, and an axel. You can understand the four meanings in this sequence.

__Notes__. The four meanings are cause, condition, support, and completion. By the last sentence, Fa-tsang means that the four parts of the wheel correspond to the four practices in the sequence given.

__Taikei__ II.546-47; __Kōgi__ 363-64

__Text__. Two, showing the four stages, four concentrations, four qualities, and four rewards __on the stages__, through the pretext of the [extinction of the] remaining influences [__vāsanā__] of the four obstacles. First, on the first, second, and third stages, one extinguishes the remaining influences of the __icchantika__'s lack of belief; i.e., the characteristics of this one stage [495a] are shown to be mundane. Also, one acquires a concentration called "Brilliance of the Mahāyāna," perfects the quality of purity, and removes the recompense of a body capable of mutation 變易生死 resulting from causes [pure actions] and conditions [ignorance]. Second, the extinction on the fourth, fifth, and sixth stages of the remaining influences of the heretic's attachment to a self shows that the characteristics of this one stage are equated with the two vehicles. One acquires a concentration called "Lord of the Accumulation of Divine Qualities," perfects the quality of personality, and removes [the recompense of] a body born of skillful means 方便生死 . Third, on the seventh, eighth, and ninth stages, one extinguishes the remaining influences of the *śrāvaka*'s fear of suffering; the characteristics of this one stage are shown to be those of the great vehicle. One acquires a concentration called "Protector of the Good," and perfects the quality of pleasantness, and removes [the recompense of] a compounded body. Fourth, from the tenth stage to the Buddha stage, one extinguishes the remaining influences of the *pratyekabuddha*'s negligence of great compassion; this shows that this one stage is perfect as to cause and complete as to result. One acquires a concentration called "Heroic", perfects the quality of eternality, and removes [the recompense of] an uncompounded body. Because the four qualities are complete, birth-and-death is forever terminated; therefore [birth-and-death] is said to be non-existent. The above concepts are extensively treated in the *Sutra on Supreme Support* 無上依經 , *Sutra on Fundamental Action* 本業經 , *Treatise on the Buddha Nature*, *Uttaratantra*, and and the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, etc.. Also, of these four, the first two cover the two obstacles [i.e., *kleśa*- and *jñeya*-*āvarana*], and the latter two are connected only with the obstacle to wisdom. The substance of defilements is removed prior to the stages, and the remaining influences are purified in the stages. These passages also prove it.

Notes. The second part of this category also shows the four stages, four concentrations, etc., but the emphasis is on the four stages. Here, the ten stages are divided into four stages, each making a separate stage.

Taikei II.548-52; *Kōgi* 364-66

Text. 9. [The pretext of the two obstacles] in order to distinguish the [two] characteristics [of mundane and supramundane] of the ten stages. Prior to the last moment of the third stage, one completely extinguishes the substance of the defilements which are to be extinguished through cultivation [*bhāvanā*]. From the fourth stage on, there are only the fine remaining influences. The reason for this is that the first three stages are mundane, and those from the fourth stage on are supramundane. Therefore, the last passage of the third stage in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* says, "All the defilements 縛 of [the realm of] desire are extinguished 轉 , and after that there are only fine ones. All the defilements of the realm of form are extinguished, and after there are only fine ones. All the defilements [which are the cause] of existence are extinguished, and after there are only fine ones. All the defilements of ignorance [i.e., *jñeya-āvarana*] are extinguished, and after there are only fine ones. The defilements connected with insight [*darśana-mārga*] have already been extinguished at the beginning." [T.9.552 Int.] The *Treatise on the Daśabhūmika-sūtra* explains this by saying, "'The defilements of the realm of desire are extinguished and there are only fine ones left' etc., means that all the defilements of the realms of desire, form, and the formless, and their cause, which are to be extinguished by the path of cultivation, are extinguished at the same time with the remaining influences of [the obstacles of] ignorance. All [the remainder] are fine defilements because [the substance of defilement] has been removed. 'Defilements connected with insight' means they have already been extinguished on the first stage, the path of insight." [T.26.158] To explain, "and their cause" means the latent potentialities [*bīja*] of the obstacle of the defilements. "Remaining influences of ignorance" means the latent potentialities of the obstacle to wisdom. Since the latent potentialities of the two obstacles are removed at the same time, it says "same". Therefore, you should know that the latent potentialities of the substance of the defilements of the two obstacles are all terminated at this stage. The foregoing [nine] parts are all discussed primarily in connection with the later doctrine [though five, six, and seven also concern the early doctrine].

Notes. The first three stages are considered to be mundane. Because one practices giving (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), and concentration (*samādhi*), one extinguishes the coarse aspect of the two obstacles, which includes *dharmas* resulting from past actions, and the latent potentialities. From the fourth stage on is supramundane. By being in possession of the 37 limbs of enlightenment, knowledge of the twelve-linked chain of causation, etc., one extinguishes the *vāsanā*. The concluding passages of the *Daśabhumika* are quoted in substantiation. Vasubandhu's commentary explains most of the difficulties of the sutra passage. There, he speaks of the remaining influences of ignorance, but only because he is referring to the fine as opposed to the coarse form of defilement, but, as Fa-tsang explains, he means *bīja*, because it is the *bīja* of the obstacle to wisdom which are removed on the third stage, and only the fine form, the *vāsanā*, which is removed from the fourth stage and beyond. It should be noted that both the finctioning *kleśa* and their *bija* are considered to be coarse, and only the fine remainder, the *vāsanā*, are the fine, subtle form.

Taikei II.552-53; *Kōgi* 366-67

Text. 10. Also, the distinctions of the three states of worldling, the two vehicles [a = 三乘], and the Bodhisattva are explained through the pretext of the distinction of characteristics of the ten stages. Therefore, the *Sutra on How Benevolent Kings May Protect Their Countries* says, "In the first three stages one extinguishes the defilements of the realm of form among the three realms. In the fourth, fifth, and sixth stages, one extinguishes the defilements of [the realm of] mind among the three realms. In the seventh, eighth, and ninth stages one extinguishes the remaining influences of the defilements of [the realm of] form among the three realms. In the tenth stage and in the Buddha stage, one extinguishes the remaining influences of the defilements of [the realm of] mind of the three realms." [T.8.826] To explain, because in the final moment of the third stage [495b] one obtains the concentration of the superior realms [of *arūpya*-*dhātu*] and penetrates all the way to the four [formless] concentrations [*samāpatti*], and because one is separated from the form of the lower two realms, it is therefore called "extinguishing the defilements of form." As a result of acquiring the immaculate supramundane stage of the two vehicles from the fourth stage [through the sixth], because mundane form and mind are both terminated, [it is called the "extinction of the defilements of mind"]. From the seventh stage on is the stage of the Bodhisattva; because [the defilements] have become increasingly more subtle than the former, that stage is shown through the pretext of the extinction of the remaining influences of [the defilements of] form and mind.

Notes. The three stages of worldling, the two vehicles, and the Bodhisattva are shown through the expedient device of dividing the ten stages into three on the basis of characteristics. Though the three stages are discussed, the point of the passage seems to be the superiority of the Bodhisattva stage. In the first stage (stages 1-3), that of the worldling, one extinguishes kleśa belonging to the two realms of desire and form; although the realm of form is alone mentioned, it of course covers the realm of form below it. The second stage (stages 4-6), the stage of the two vehicles, is the period during which one extinguishes the kleśa belonging to the arupya-dhātu, here called "mind" because there is no longer any form in this realm. The next two stages, those of the Bodhisattva, covering stages seven through nine and ten plus the Buddha stage respectively, are the periods during which the vāsanā of defilements of the realms of form and the formless (mind) are respectively extinguished. Thus, as in previous texts, there is an extermination of progressively subtler forms of defilement as one advances through the ten stage.

Taikei II.553-54; Kōgi 368-69

Text. 11. In order to show differences in the two stages of freedom and non-freedom 自在未自在 within the stages of the Bodhisattva, up to the seventh stage is conventionally associated 寄 with the extinction of defilements of form and mind in the three realms, and its recompense; the stages from eight on are conventionally as-

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sociated with the extinction of the ignorance, the two remaining influences of form and mind. Therefore, the *Sutra on Fundamental Action* says, "Up through the seventh stage, one extinguishes the recompense of the two kinds of remaining influence of form and mind in the triple world, and they are utterly extinguished, with nothing remaining. On the eighth stage, the ignorance which is the remaining influences of form is terminated. Since on the ninth stage the ignorance which is the remaining influences of mind is cast off, on the tenth stage, the ignorance in its two forms of remaining influences [of form and mind] is utterly extinguished." [T.24.1015 Int.]

Notes. Here, as above, "form" refers to the first two realms of desire and form, the *kāma-* and *rūpa-dhātus*, and "mind" refers to the third realm, *arūpya-dhātu*. "Freedom and non-freedom" are *abhoga-anabhoga*, freedom or sovereignty or the lack of it over the ability to progress. The recompense eliminated during the first seven stages is the allotted body. When the sutra says that the remaining influences are removed during the first seven stages, it means *bīja*, and when it says that on the eighth and ninth stages ignorance is removed, it means the remaining influences.

Taikei II.555-56; *Kōgi* 369

Text. 12. On the basis of [Vasubandhu's] *Treatise on the Three-fold Naturelessness*, the distinction of the two stages of insight and cultivation [*darśana-* and *bhāvanā-mārga*] is shown through the pretext of the extinction of two natures. Therefore, that treatise says, "As a result of the method of insight, discriminated nature [*parikalpita-svabhāva*] is non-existent 無 ; therefore, it is said to be unacquired 不得. As a result of the method of cultivation, the nature which is dependence on another [*paratantra*-*svabhāva*] is extinguished; therefore, it is said to be unperceived 不見." [T.31.870]

13. On the basis of such works as the *Abhidharma*-*samuccaya*-*vyākhyā*, the two stages of insight and cultivation are shown through the pretext of [the extinction of] the two kinds of defilement, that born of discrimination, and that which is innate. [The later Mahāyāna asks,] How do we know that these stages [are correlated with the two kinds of defilement] only through a pretext, and are not true [stages of] extinction? For example, the erroneous view of a self is born of discrimination, and is based on three conditions; that is, false teachers, false doctrine, and false conceptions. One erroneously judges that the self is the aggregates [*skandha*], is different from the aggregates, etc.. However, someone like a son of the Buddha, even though still a foolish common person, because he relies on correct teachers, correct doctrines, and correct thinking, not only does not beget attachment to "It is the aggregates," etc., but he also seeks the state of non-self. Having [in effect] extinguished [these views], shouldn't he enter the path of insight? If it is asserted that even though he is without functioning defilements, because he does have the latent potentialities, he therefore does not enter the path of insight, then since he is with-

out functioning defilements, he should enter the earlier stages of equipment and added effort [*saṁbhāra*- and *prayoga*-*mārgas*]. The meaning [here] is not so.

Therefore, you should know that [in the early doctrine], there is an expedient use of the coarse defilements of discrimination and error in order to show the [experience of the] principle of the non-self of the path of insight; also, because the defilements which arise of their own accord [i.e., innate] are subtle and difficult to extinguish, there is an expedient use of the distinction of the gradual sequence of the path of cultivation. The real meaning is that in the one defilement there is coarse, and there is fine; in the stage of insight the coarse are extinguished, and in the stage of cultivation, the fine are extinguished.

Notes. Other texts of the early Mahāyāna which explain the two stages through the expedient of the two kinds of defilement, the acquired and the innate, are the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Vijñaptimātratā*-*siddhi*. In those texts, *darśana*-*mārga* is associated with the extinction of *kleśa* born through discrimination, and *bhāvanā*-*mārga* is associated with the extinction of innate *kleśa*. The question arises due to the fact that earlier this was accepted as *a* reality, but now, from the point of view of the later Mahāyāna, the two kinds of defilement are seen as merely convenient devices for explaining the distinctions of the two paths, insight and cultivation. How, asks the later Mahāyāna, do we know that this is merely a device, and not the real situation? The first reason is that one who has in effect extinguished the *kleśa* of discrimination arising from attachment to the *ātman* should enter the first stage, but the fact is that he is still a foolish common person and therefore can not enter *darśana*-*mārga*. If it is answered that the only reason he doesn't enter this path is because he still has the *bīja*, then because he has at least extinguished *kleśa* in their functional form, he should at least enter the preparatory stages prior to *darśana*-*mārga*, but he can not do this either. For these reasons it is denied that the two stages can be seen in terms of the two kinds of defilements. The truth is that in defilement, there is coarse and fine, and in order to show this, such a device as this is used.

Taikei II.556-58; *Kōgi* 370-71

Text. The defilements of the *manas* are extinguished throughout the two stages [of insight and cultivation]. The *Trimśika*-*vijñaptimātratā*-*siddhi* says, "The second grasping *vijñāna* and the [four] *dharmas* in association with it are finally terminated utterly upon reaching Arhatship. The *vijñāna* which is internally defiled and the mental *dharmas* [i.e., defilements] are finally extinguished on the path of insight at the time of acquisition of the sixteenth moment of the supramundane path. The remainder which is not terminated belongs solely to [the path of] cultivation 思惟. This is called the second *vijñāna*." [T.31.62 Int.] Asvabhāva's translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says the same. [495c] Therefore, you should understand this in connection with the above quotation [from the section on extinction of defilements in the later Mahāyāna].

Notes. The 無相論 of the text is an earlier translation of the *Trimśika* by Paramārtha. It is called 轉識論 in his translation, and appears along with several other similar texts as the 無相論 (T.31. No.1587). The "second *vijñāna*" is the *manas*; the first is the *ālaya*-*vijñāna*. The 16 moments of the supramundane path are the 16 moments of *darśana*-*mārga*. The "remainder" is the *vāsanā*. The "*vijñāna* which is internally defiled" 內煩惱識 means *manas*, because *manas* receives its defilements by being conditioned by the *ālaya*, but it is not conditioned from external sources.

Taikei II.559; *Kōgi* 372

Text. 14. Showing the distinction of the stages of the three *bhadras*, prior to the stages, through the pretext of [the extinction of] the three conditions which are the supports of defilements arising from discrimination. That is, the ten abodes, etc., remove [defilements resulting from] wrong teachers, etc., in that order. This is said with reference to [the Bodhisattva of] direct access. Also, extinction of [defilements] which arise from wrong teachers and wrong doctrines is provisionally related to the stage of equipment for the path [*sambhāra-mārga*], because their activity is coarse. The extinction of those which arise from wrong thinking is provisionally related to the stage of added effort [*prayoga*-*mārga*] because their activity is subtle. This is said in connection with the two vehicles who are partially converted to the Mahāyāna 迴心二乘 .

Notes. The first relation is made in terms of the Bodhisattva who enters the Mahāyāna directly, without first undergoing training in the small vehicle. In this system, the three stages of the three *bhadras* are explained in connection with the three sources for defilements arising from discrimination. One stage corresponds to one condition:

十解 = wrong teachers
十行 = wrong doctrines
十迴向 = wrong thinking

In the second part, explained with reference to the partial Mahayanists, almost the whole of the three *bhadras* is equated with *sambhāra*-*mārga*, except for the last moment of the ten transferences of merit, which is equated with *prayoga*-*mārga*. During the first stage, the coarse defilements are removed; during the other stage, the fine ones are eliminated.

Taikei II.560-61; *Kōgi* 373

Text. 15. Defilements of the sixth and seventh *vijñānas* which are born with the body are provisionally explained as functioning up to the seventh stage, and with complete subjugation and non-arising from the eighth stage on. This is taught in order to provisionally show that the entrance into introspection [into the emptiness of the person] has the different stages of interruption and non-interruption 有間無間.

Notes. The *kleśas* are active, functional, up through the seventh stage; consequently, there are periods of time in which the introspection into, or meditation on, *ātma*-*śūnyatā* is interrupted. These defilements are completely subjugated on the eighth stage, so there are no longer any intervals such as these.

Taikei II.561; *Kōgi* 373

Text. 16. Also, the defilements of the sixth *vijñāna* are provisionally linked with [the first] up to the fourth stages, the defilements of the *manas* are provisionally linked with [stages five] up to seven. After the eighth stage, there is only the obstacle to wisdom. This is also taught in order to show the stages of worldling, two vehicles, and Bodhisattva.

17. The eleven [kinds of] ignorance [*avidyā*-*sthūla* 麁重] are used as a device to show the distinction of the ten stages and the Buddha stage.

Notes. Each of the ten *bhūmis* and the stage of Buddhahood has an "*avidyā*" connected with it, and these are the eleven mentioned in the text. As the next text and note will show, these eleven are the coarse substance, *sthūla*, of ignorance, and each of these eleven is subdivided into two. Presumably, what is meant here is that there are ten of these coarse forms of ignorance in the stages and only one in the Buddha stage, and, also, the two stages differ in quality.

Taikei II.563; *Kōgi* 374

Text. 18. The two kinds of wisdom, the true and the conventional, are shown through the device of the 22 kinds of ignorance [*moha* 愚痴]. The *Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra* says, "The stages are established on the basis of these 22 kinds of ignorance 愚痴 and 11 coarse [bases]. [T.16.704] Since it says "are established," therefore, you should know that this is explained by way of pretext. The full form of this concept is as taught in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā*, *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, and *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*. The foregoing was discussed for the most part in connection with the early Mahāyāna [though some topics also apply to the later doctrine].

Notes. True wisdom consists of viewing things as they really are, in the light of *tathatā*; conventional wisdom is conventional only in the sense that it relates to mundane matters acquired after the former kind. In the ten *bhūmis* and Buddha stage, there are eleven obstacles to wisdom to be overcome, and these consist of the 11 *sthūla* mentioned in the previous note. Each of these eleven is subdivided into two kinds of ignorance. Thus, for instance, in the first stage the two forms of ignorance are 1. attachment to the notion of an *ātman* or *pudgala*, and attachment to *dharmas*, 2. the actuality, or functioning manifestation of that attachment, and these two are supported by the essence, the *sthūla*, which is in the form of *bīja*. With the removal of the two kinds of ignorance, one acquires wisdom in the two forms mentioned.

Taikei II.564-65; *Kōgi* 374-75

Text. All the above topics are topics of the doctrine [*āgama*]. The distinctions of the characteristics of the stages are contrasted and shown through the pretext of the defilements. Why? In order to preserve [the sequence of] the ten stages, in order to make beings get rid of the attachment to pride with regard to [their understanding of] the stages, and, because the characteristics of the stages are very profound and extremely difficult to understand, by showing these stages through the device of the defilements, pure faith is aroused. The other concepts can be understood in the same way.

Notes. By the last statement Fa-tsang means such other topics as the five vehicles, the three-fold learning, the 10 perfections, different kinds of enlightenment, etc.. This conclusion once more makes the point that the explanation of the complexities of the stages through the expedient of the defilements is *only* an expedient.

Taikei II.565; *Kōgi* 375-76

Text. The sudden doctrine: all defilements are in themselves fundamentally apart [from all discourse]. They can not be said to be extinguished or not extinguished. The *Ratnakūṭa-sūtra* says, "The Buddha said to Mañjuśrī, 'How do you teach all the good sons of the Buddha and arouse the thought of enlightenment?' Mañjuśrī replied, 'I teach the arousing of the thought of a self. Why? Because the limit of the view of a self is identical with *bodhi*'." [T.12.234 Int.] You can understand this doctrine in the light of this quotation.

Notes. The suddenists, speaking from the vantage point of the highest truth, rather than from the point of view of limited, conventional truth, see the kleśas as empty and non-existent. They do not exist outside the absolute bodhi, and therefore, if the kleśa are plumbed to their final limit, they are discovered to be identical with enlightenment.

Taikei II.565; Kōgi 376

Text. The perfect doctrine: the essence of defilement is beyond expression. If you merely refer to their function, they are profound, extensive, great. Because the dharmas which are obstructed [are such that] one and the many are identical, and are endowed with the infinite interrelationship of primary and secondary, etc., then that which obstructs, the defilements, are also like this. Therefore, they are not divided into substance 使=正使 , remaining influences 習 , and functioning manifestations 現行 . Because when one thing in the dharma-dhatu is obtained all are obtained, therefore, when one defilement is extinguished, all are extinguished. [496a] Thus, the "Samantabhadra" Chapter [of the Avataṁsaka] shows that one obstacle is identical with all obstacles, and the chapter called "Minor Characteristics" shows that when one is extinguished, all are extinguished. That is what is meant here.

Also, there are four meanings in the divisions of the extinction of defilements as seen in early and later passages in the [Avataṁsaka] sutra. The first is connected with enlightenment 證 ; i.e., [defilements] are extinguished in the ten stages. The second concerns stages; i.e., they are extinguished in the ten abodes. The third concerns practice; i.e., they are extinguished in the final moment of the ten kinds of faith. The fourth concerns truth; i.e., they are not to be extinguished, because of fundamental purity. The full explanation is as taught in the sutra.

Also, if in the extinction of defilements in the previous three vehicles, etc., one obstacle is identical with all obstacles, then they are included in this doctrine [of the one vehicle]. If there is a sequence within a certain category then it is the doctrine of the three vehicles, etc.. This is said with reference to the distinct doctrine.

With reference to the inclusion of skillful means 攝方便, all the previous teachings which were shown are included in this, because they are the skillful means of this [common doctrine of the one vehicle], and its efflux and property 所流所目 . Other concepts can be understood in the same way. End of the section on extinction of defilements.

Notes. From the viewpoint of the enlightened person, the essence of defilement is beyond discussion; if we discuss the characteristics of defilement, they pervade the ten directions and the three periods of time. Also, in the one vehicle, one *kleśa* is identical with all *kleśa*; therefore, to extinguish one is to extinguish all. This is shown in the chapter called "Minor Characteristics," where a son of the Tuṣita gods who was previously in one of the hells was released from there and was born at once among the gods of the Tuṣita heaven. He was also at the final point in the ten *bhūmis*, just prior to the *Vimala-samādhi*, which is the final point in the causal stage. When the inmate of hell has extinguished one *kleśa*, he has extinguished all of them.

Throughout the Avataṁsaka there are to be found four different interpretations of the whole matter of extinction of defilements. Of these four mentioned in the text, numbers three and four are the interpretations according to the truth of the one vehicle. The first is made with an eye to making the acquisition of Buddhahood intelligable to the unenlightened; i.e., it is a device for the sake of teaching. It resembles the systems of the small vehicle and three vehicles. It is, for instance, the Mahāyāna doctrine that complete freedom from defilement is acquired at the end of the ten stages. The second is like the three-vehicle doctrine that extinction of defilement is complete at the end of the three bhadras. Again, the fourth interpretation, a Hua-yen view, sees all as the Dharma-kāya, Vairocana.

Taikei II.566-67; Kōgi 377-79

7. The Change of Heart of the Two Vehicles

Text. Seven, the change of heart of the two vehicles: there are six explanations.

One, none of the two vehicles has a change of heart, because of the desire for [nirvāṇa] without remainder [and lack of desire for Buddhahood]. It is as taught in the small vehicle.

2

Two, or else, the whole of the two vehicles has a change of heart, because the complete possession of Buddha nature is the cause for influencing 熏 from within, because the external condition of the power of the Tathāgata's great compassion is not rejected, because fundamental ignorance is not exhausted [even upon entering nirvāṇa], and the small vehicle nirvāṇa is not final. Therefore, there is none who does not have a change of heart and turns towards great bodhi. This is said in connection with the later Mahāyāna teaching.

Notes. "Fundamental ignorance is not exhausted" means that even when the Arhat, purified of *kleśa*, enters *nirvāṇa*, the subtle residues of the *ālaya-vijñāna* remain to project the person back into this life, where he has another opportunity to strive for Buddhahood. "Change of heart" 迴心 means conversion or transformation, in this case, to the undeveloped Mahāyāna thought exemplified by the *Prajñāpāramita* sutras.

Taikei II.568-71; *Kōgi* 381

Text. Question: The *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* and the *Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra* say that among the four alternatives concerning the intactness or non-intactness 成熟 不成熟 of the [eight] *vijñānas*, the *ālaya-vijñāna* and the transforming *vijñānas* [*pravṛti-vijñānas*] of the person who enters *nirvāṇa* without remainder among the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* are all non-intact. Since the *ālaya-vijñāna* and transforming *vijñānas* have all ceased, with nothing left, what would be the cause for a subsequent arising of mind, because it does not stand to reason that a result is produced without a cause?

Answer: Because these texts are attracting the small vehicle through concepts of the early Mahāyāna, and the activity of the *ālaya* mentioned is explained in a coarse manner [as a mundane *dharma* subject to birth and death], and does not arise out of a true Nature, therefore, it is said to cease. Moreover, in order to conform to the small vehicle, the finality of *nirvāṇa* is confirmed. Therefore, it is taught that having entered [*nirvāṇa*], [mind] does not arise again. Now, in the later doctrine, this matter is taught from the standpoint of the truth. Since fundamental ignorance infuses the *Tathāgata*-*garbha* and forms *ālaya*-*vijñāna*, and the men of the two vehicles do not extinguish fundamental ignorance or experience the fundamental enlightenment of the *Tathāgata*-*garbha* [because they are unaware of their existence], then on the basis of what would they be able to cause the *ālaya*-*vijñāna* to cease to exist? Also, as a result of that non-extinction [of *ālaya*] and non-experience [of fundamental enlightenment], how could the *nirvāna* which they acquire be final? The simile of the illusory city would be an error [if the two-vehicle *nirvāna* were final]. Also, as a result of the above four causes [i.e., mentioned in the first text] they are able to produce thought.

Notes. The four alternatives: 1. When *ālaya* is intact and the *pravrti*-*vijñānas* have ceased, one enters *saṁjñā*-*nirodha*, etc.. 2. If the *pravrti-vijñānas* are intact and the *ālaya* is not, one is a *śrāvaka*, *pratyekabuddha*, or Bodhisattva abiding in the *nirvana* with remainder. 3. If both are intact, one is nothing but a foolish common person. 4. If both are in a state of complete cessation, one enters the *nirvāna* without remainder. In the question above, the person of the two vehicles is considered to be of the fourth category. If all *vijñānas* have utterly ceased, then how can he, at some later time, have a change of heart and enter the Bodhisattva path? The simile of the illusory city is from the *Saddharmapundarīka*. (Cf. Kern's translation, p.181, in the chapter on "Ancient Devotion", Dover Publications.) In the simile, a wealthy merchant (= Buddha) attempts to get some people to travel to a distant city where they will find a great treasure (= Buddhahood). The people start out, but soon become tired and discouraged. As a strategem, the merchant miraculously creates an illusory city part way to the real city, and here, in the illusory city (= two-vehicle *nirvāna*) the travellers rest, thinking they have arrived. After they have rested, the merchant tells them it is only an illusory city, and they must go on a little further. Fa-tsang argues that the episode in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* would be an error if the *nirvāṇa* of the two vehicles were really final.

Taikei II.572-75; Kogi 382-84

Text. Question: What are the divisions of the time when [beings] produce the thought [of enlightenment] and turn towards the Mahāyāna? Answer: Because faculties are not equal, [496b] there is either delay or speed in abandoning [*nirvāṇa*]. The slow person passes through eons and then produces it. Therefore, the *Laṅkāvatāra*-*sūtra* says, "By savoring and being attached to the delights of concentration, one abides in the undefiled realm, without reaching the final destination. He also acquires irreversibility, and all the bodies of concentration, but for eons he remains unenlightened. For example, just as a man might be dead drunk, but may later regain his senses, so with the law of enlightenment. One obtains a Buddha's unexcelled body [after foregoing *nirvāṇa* and converting to the Mahāyāna]." [T.16.497] To explain: this passage only speaks generally. Specifically speaking, according to whether faculties are sharp or dull, a person passes through a different length of time and arrives at the stage of the thought of the unexcelled *bodhi*. The *Mahāparinirvāṇa*-*sūtra* says, "Because the Stream-winner [*śrota*-*āpanna*] is not fixed [as to length of time], he passes through 80,000 eons, and then can attain to the thought of the supreme *bodhi*. [T.12.494 Int.] It goes on to say, "The *pratyeka*-

buddha passes through 10,000 eons, and can then reach the stage of the thought of supreme *bodhi*." To explain, this shows that the slowest person, the Stream-winner, having had seven births, enters *nirvāṇa* at that time, extinguishes mind and mental constituents, and enters the first attainment of cessation [*nirodha*-*samāpatti*]. [Afterwards,] he also passes through 80,000 eons and then puts forth the thought [of enlightenment]. He receives the teaching of the Buddha and can put forth the thought of enlightenment. If, with a single body, he acquires the second reward [of being a Once-returner = *sakṛdāgāmin*], then upon receiving the one more birth, he enters *nirvāṇa*. He passes through 60,000 eons and then can arouse the thought. If, in a single body, he acquires the third reward [of never again being born in this world = *anāgāmin*], he does not return to the realm of desire. He enters *nirvāṇa*, passes through 40,000 eons, and can then arouse the thought. If in a single body he acquires Arhatship, then in the present time he enters the attainment of cessation [*nirodha*-*samāpatti*], passes through 20,000 eons, and then produces the thought [of enlightenment]. In the case of a *pratyeka-buddha*, being of sharp faculties, he passes through ten thousand eons and then can produce the thought. The time when these five individuals put forth the thought means that when they enter the Bodhisattva stage of the ten kinds of faith, this is called putting forth the thought of enlightenment.

Also, there is an interpretation [of Hui-yüan, according to which] the above-mentioned five people obtain the results of the small vehicle following the state of profane worldling and enter nirvāṇa. Afterwards, they are changed and cultivate the practices of the ten kinds of faith. Having perfected faith, from the time they are worthy of entering the abode of the first arousing of the thought [of enlightenment], in the ten abodes, they then pass through those [above enumerated] eons in accordance with the sharpness or dullness of their faculties. (They do not necessarily pass through the eons in the way asserted [above] while abiding in nirvāṇa). Like the person of direct access who has already passed through 10,000 eons, fulfilled his practices, and is able to arouse the thought, the other person, the pratyekabuddha, because his faculties are the sharpest, and because he resembles the Bodhisattva of direct access, passes through 10,000 eons. The other four are of dull faculties. Also, since they are all different, there are therefore many differences in the time [of acquiring conversion to the Mahāyāna]. The above shows the slow kind of person.

Notes. The last interpretation is that of Hui-yüan (523-592) of the Sui Dynasty; i.e., Hui-yüan of the Ching-ying monastery. The essential difference between his interpretation and the previous one is that the individuals mentioned do not pass through the requisite number of eons while in the state of nirvāṇa. According to Hui-yüan, after one has passed through a temporary nirvāṇa, one is again reborn in the world. After begetting faith in the

Mahāyāna and arousing the thought of enlightenment, one passes through as many _kalpas_ as are required in view of one's own abilities. The note in parenthesis is, according to the commentaries, an additional "footnote" inserted by Fa-tsang within the exposition of Hui-yüan's interpretation.

Taikei II.575-93; _Kōgi_ 384-88

Text. The extremely fast person: the _Saddharmapuṇḍarīka_ says, "After my _nirvāṇa_, if there are disciples who do not hear this sutra, who do not understand or know about the practices of the Bodhisattva, who beget a conception of cessation through merits which they have acquired of themselves, they shall enter _nirvāṇa_. When I become a Buddha in other lands [outside the Sahā world], I will have different names. Even though these persons beget a conception of cessation and enter _nirvāṇa_, [496c] they will seek the wisdom of the Buddha in those other lands, and hear this sutra. One obtains cessation only by means of the Buddha-vehicle, not by any other vehicles, except the _Tathāgata's_ Dharma of teaching through expedients." [T.9.25] All the above is taught in connection with the later Mahāyāna.

Notes. The fast person enters _nirvāṇa_ and then in another Buddha land, perhaps a purified land, he will seek the highest enlightenment and come to hear the Lotus Sutra. In this way, he will attain to the highest goal without passing through many eons. Even though he acquires the _nirvāṇa_ of some provisional vehicle, he will, like all beings, win the highest reward by means of the one true Buddha vehicle.

Taikei II.593-601; _Kōgi_ 388-89

Text. Three, the two vehicles may or may not have a change of heart; i.e., those persons of a fixed nature seek nirvāṇa and do not have a change of heart. The persons of unfixed nature all turn to the Mahāyāna. This is as taught in the section of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra on śrāvakas. This is taught in connection with the early Mahāyāna's attraction of the two vehicles.

Notes. The pertinent section of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra can be found at T.30. pp.744 and 747.

Taikei II.601-02; Kōgi 387

Text. Four, they neither have a change of heart nor do not have a change of heart, because they are apart from [imputed] characteristics. It is as taught in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra Spoken by Mañjuśrī, and others. This is taught from the standpoint of the sudden doctrine.

Notes. The passage alluded to is T.8.734; "The dharma called 'Buddha', the dharmas called 'Bodhisattva' and 'profane worldling' are unperceivable, because they are completely empty; and 'empty' and 'non-empty' are also unperceivable." Also, T.8.727: "'Profane worldling', 'śrāvaka', 'pratyekabuddha', 'Bodhisattva', and 'Buddha'---all these dharmas are without characteristics."

Taikei II.602; Kōgi 389-90

Text. Five, the previous four doctrines are held together, because they are the skillful means of the great Dharma [of the one vehicle of the common doctrine]. This is taught in connection with the inclusion of skillful means, of the common doctrine.

Six, all the above five doctrines are terminated. There are two kinds of this [termination]. One, the two vehicles are without anything that converts [to Mahāyāna].

From the point of view of the one vehicle, they are all empty, and without anything to be converted. This is like the deaf and blind in the [Avataṁsaka] sutra. Two, the whole of the two vehicles, etc., have already completely turned [to the Mahāyāna], and do not have to do so again. What this is is seeing that all beings have already done this, by means of the eye of Samantabhadra in the sutra. This is all said in connection with the distinct doctrine of the one vehicle.

Notes. The two references in the last text are T.9.679, "Entering the Dharma-dhātu," and T.9.624, "The Arising of the Tathāgata from Essential Nature." In the first, the meaning is that there are in reality no such things as two vehicles, three vehicles, etc.. All are embraced in the great ocean of result of Vairocana; outside the one vehicle, there is no other. The second passage simply means that one possessing the vision of Samantabhadra can see that all beings have already become Buddhas.

Taikei II.603-04; Kōgi 390-91

Text. Question: What are the divisions of the Dharma which is acquired by those who have a change of heart in connection with the common doctrine of the one vehicle and in connection with the three vehicles? Answer: In the case of the change of heart from the standpoint of the three vehicles, from the time of entering [the stage of] the ten kinds of faith, one cultivates the Dharma-method of the thought of enlightenment, great compassion, etc., and arrives [at Buddhahood] gradually, in sequence. [However,] in the one vehicle, according to a passage, the 6,000 monks consisting of Śāriputra, Indrabuddhi, etc., under the guidance of Mañjuśrī, experienced a change of heart; i.e., they acquired the great Dharma-teaching of inexhaustibility [lit. 十; i.e., the inexhaustibility of the interrelationship of primary and secondary], the realm of the ten eyes, ten ears, etc.. The meaning refers to the body [of the one life] of comprehension and practice, and to the *dharmas* of the five stages. The other concepts are as discussed elsewhere [in Ch'ih-yen's *K'ung-mu-chang*].

Notes. In the three vehicles, from the time one enters the initial stage of faith, which is the same as having a change of heart and turning towards the path of the Bodhisattva, the Bodhisattva requires three *asaṁkhyeyas* in order to achieve Buddhahood. The process is gradual, from stage to stage. As far as the one vehicle common doctrine is concerned, as shown in the chapter on "Entering the *Dharma-dhātu*," at the time one undergoes conversion to the one vehicle, one is in simultaneous possession of all five stages of the one vehicle program. Thus, the monks who have reached this point in the three lives it takes to win Buddhahood are doing so in the body possessed during the life of comprehension and practice, the second life, which is the causal stage. In the sutra, the *śrāvakas* who left the main assembly and were taught separately by Mañjuśrī outside are examples of this.

Taikei II.604-05; *Kōgi* 391-92

8. Essence and Bodily Marks of the Buddha

Text. Eight, the essence and [bodily] marks of the Buddha. There are two parts to this: first, eternal and non-eternal essence is shown; second, distinctions with regards to bodily marks are shown.

Notes. All previous seven sections have been concerned with the causal stage of Buddhahood; the next three sections, beginning with this section, are concerned with result. This section will be concerned with the question of whether Buddha-nature is eternal or non-eternal, from the point of view of the five doctrines. Secondarily, it will discuss the 32 *laksana* and 80 *upalaksana* which constitute the exterior aspect of the Buddha. Section nine deals with the realm where the Buddha's activity is carried on, and the tenth section goes into the question of the number of the Buddha's bodies.

Taikei II.605-06; *Kōgi* 393

Text. With regard to the first, as far as the Buddha of the small vehicle is concerned, he is only non-eternal, because they do not discuss the qualities of original nature 本性. The *Treatise on the Buddha Nature* says that the small vehicle only considers cultivated nature, because they have no [doctrine of] Buddha-nature as intrinsic qualities. [T.31.787 Int.]

Notes. The discussion is in terms of Buddhahood as innate, or natural, and Buddhahood as something acquired by the human Śākyamuni as a result of past practices. The small vehicle recognizes only the second.

Taikei II.606; *Kōgi* 393-94

Text. The early doctrine of the three vehicles: 1. The *Dharma-kāya* is eternal, because it is self-essence 自性. Also, it is non-eternal, because it is

[both] divorced from and not divorced from [ignorance]. [2.] Qualities arising from cultivation [over a long time] are non-eternal, because they arise out of causes and conditions, because they are compounded and undefiled [*saṃskṛta*-*anāsrava*]. They can also be eternal, because they are not interrupted [in the teaching of the Dharma], and because they are born in continuous succession. The *Mahāyānasūtra*-*alaṁkāra* says, "The three Buddhas as self-nature, having no interval, and being in continuous succession all eternally abide." [T.31.606]

Notes. This is the point of view of the early Mahāyāna on the essence of the Buddha. The *Dharma-kāya* is eternal because it is self-essence, and it is also non-eternal because it is capable of being obscured when it obeys conditions and deteriorates into mundane forms. "Qualities arising from cultivation" refers to the other two bodies, the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya* and the *nirmāṇa*-*kāya*; they are non-eternal because they come into existence for the first time on the basis of practices. However, they are also eternal, because there is no interruption in the teaching of the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya*, and the *nirmāṇa*-*kāya* is revealed in continuous succession. Therefore, the three bodies are both eternal and non-eternal, when taken as a whole.

Taikei II.607-08; *Kōgi* 394-95

Text. The later Mahāyāna: there are two interpretations. The first is a specific explanation; the second is a general discussion. [497a] With regard to the specific, the qualities born of cultivation are non-eternal, because they are born of cultivation. They are also eternal, because having once been obtained, afterwards they are identical with *tathatā*. Why?

Because they originally derived from *tathatā*, and because once ignorance is terminated, [these qualities] return to the true essence. The Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "There is nothing that does not derive from the *Dharma*-*kāya*, and there is nothing that does not return to and become enlightened in this *Dharma*-*kāya*." [T.31.249, 250 Int.] The *Uttaratantra* and the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, as well as others, abundantly set forth this concept. You should understand [the above] in accordance with those [texts].

Also, the *Ta chih*-*tu lun* says, "Omniscience is not united with the triple world. Why is this? Because the past, etc., are fabrications [i.e., false], *saṁsāra*. Omniscience is a real *dharma*, not *saṁsāra*." [T.25.229 Int.] To explain, "omniscience" means knowledge of everything. You should know that because the perfect wisdom of the stage of Buddhahood is none other than *tathatā*, it is not [of the nature of] *saṁsāra*.

Also, the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* says, "Just as the sky fills up the whole realm of forms, and has no alterations such as arising, maintainance, and subsidence, just so is the *Tathāgata*'s wisdom: it pervades all *dharmas* 所知, but in it there is no confusion or change." [T.31.196] Therefore, you should know that [the *Tathāgata*'s wisdom; i.e., his qualities] are not eternal just because they are incessant, but they are eternal because, being identical with tathatā, they do not alter.

Notes. By specific and general, the text means that first the three bodies will be taken separately, then all together. The saṁbhoga-kāya and nirmāṇa-kāya are discussed first. Born of cultivation means, as was explained above, that originally the qualities constituting Buddhahood did not originally exist, but later they came to exist on the basis of practices. For this reason, they are impermanent. However, they are also permanent, because once one has achieved Buddhahood, they become identical with tathatā. The reason for this is, as is shown in great detail in the Awakening of Faith, etc., innate enlightenment, or innate Buddhahood, is in reality identical with acquired enlightenment, or acquired Buddhahood. Influenced by primal ignorance, Urdummheit, the original enlightenment of tathatā descends into the form of the ālaya-vijñāna, or, in other words, becomes limited, subject to the eternal round of saṁsāra. However, by this same mind, the ignorance is removed through initial, acquired enlightenment, and this initial enlightenment is reunited with its source, original enlightenment, which are in fact not two things as far as their essence is concerned. Put in another way, the two acquired bodies---the body of recompense and the body of transformation---are in reality the Dharma-kāya. For this reason, they are also eternal. The passage from the Ta chih-tu lun says the same: the initial enlightenment of the Buddha is reunited with original enlightenment.

Taikei II.608-10; Kōgi 396-97

Text. The Dharma-kāya is eternal, because when it obeys conditions, it does not change its own nature 自性. Also, it is not eternal, because it obeys impure [conditions] and responds to the capacities of beings. Why? Because all its qualities are identical with tathatā, therefore, the arising of its function [i.e., responding to living beings] is merely the function of tathatā. Thus, the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna explains the two bodies of recompense and transformation as belonging to the function aspect 用大 of *tathatā*. The *Treatise* also says, "When the minds of beings are pure, it is like the reflection of the *Dharmakāya*." It also says, "Next, when innate enlightenment [i.e., *tathatā*] obeys impure [conditions] and is divided, it produces two forms which are not apart from that innate enlightenment; i.e., one, wisdom in its purity, and, two, inconceivable action," and so on through the detailed explanation. [T.32.579 Int.]

Notes. The *Dharma*-*kāya* is explained as at once eternal and impermanent, and this interpretation, again, is based on the *Awakening of Faith*. It subscribes to the doctrine that *tathata* becomes bifurcated while still retaining its own self nature; i.e., it remains pure, unchanging, and undifferentiated and at the same time appears in the world of space and time in response to the needs of people. Thus, the text explains the *saṁbhoga*- and *nirmāna*-*kāyas* as the functions of the *Dharmakaya*, or *tathata*. The last quotation from the *Awakening of Faith* also explains the *Dharma-kaya* and the other two bodies as respectively pure *prajña*, and inconceivable action, which is compassion. Thus, though the three bodies are described as having three separate states, with different attributes, in reality there is only *tathatā*-*dharma*-*kāya*, which includes the other bodies as its function.

Taikei II.610-11; *Kōgi* 398-99

Text. Two, the general discussion: on the basis of the concept that the *dharma*-*kāya* obeys conditions, the distinction of qualities is possible. On the basis of the concept of non-alteration, all qualities are identical with *tathatā*. Because the two concepts of [1.] the whole essence obeying conditions, and [2.] non-alteration of the totality of characteristics being interfused, without obstruction, therefore, Buddhahood is eternal and non-eternal. [Therefore,] there are four alternatives, or else the four alternatives can be denied. You should understand [this doctrine] in accordance with the meaning [of the four alternatives or their denial].

Notes. The general discussion considers all three bodies as a totality. The Buddha is at once eternal and non-eternal, and again, the position is that of the *Awakening of Faith*. The four alternatives are: 1. it is non-eternal, because it obeys conditions; 2. it is eternal, because it is unchanging; 3. it is both eternal and non-eternal, because the two conditions of being subject to conditions and being unchanging exist in complete interfusion; 4. it is neither eternal nor non-eternal, because both aspects are denied. The denial of the four possibilities is based on the interfusion of the two conditions.

Taikei II.611; *Kōgi* 399

Text. Question: If that is so, how can you say that [the three bodies] are neither identical nor different? Answer: In the early doctrine, because *tathatā* is universally present, and wisdom realizes *tathatā*, therefore, they are not different. Because the compounded and uncompounded are not the same, they are not identical.

In the later doctrine, the qualities [i.e., *prajñā*, etc.] have two interpretations. First, they become manifest in dependence on conditions, because the merits [accumulated in] three incalculable eons are not false. Second, they are without self-nature, because there is no self-nature apart from tathatā. Herein, the first meaning [of appearing in dependence on conditions] and [the meaning of] the obeying of conditions of the dharma-kāya, [497b] and the other meaning [of self-naturelessness] and the non-alternation of the dharma-kāya, is the category of non-difference, because the whole is embraced totally. Also, the first meaning and the [meaning of] non-alternation, and the other meaning of self-naturelessness and the obeying of conditions [by the dharma-kāya] is the category of non-identity, because the concepts are different. This, then, shows the non-identity without disturbing the non-difference. It is evident upon consideration.

Notes. The question is, if the four propositions are negated, so that there is no contradiction between the bodies of the Buddha, then how can it be maintained that they are neither identical nor non-identical? In the early Mahāyāna tathatā is said to be universally present in all things; therefore, it is equally present in both ignorance and enlightenment. Furthermore, tathatā as prajñā experiences tathatā. Thus, since tathata has the dual capacity being the experiencer and the experienced, there is complete identity of the seemingly different forms of the one tathatā. Still, tathatā is uncompounded, while prajñā is compounded; therefore, there can be no identity between the compounded and uncompounded. It should be noted that here, tathatā is spoken of in terms of the Dharma-kāya, while prajñā and other qualities are equated with the bodies of recompense and transformation.

In the later Mahāyāna, the qualities or merits of the dharma-kāya are considered from two points of view: one, as appearing as a result of conditions; and, two, as being without an essence of their own. Therefore, even though the characteristics of the dharma-kāya---here spoken of in terms of the other two bodies---appear in time and space in response to the conditions consisting of the needs of living beings, these characteristics are in essence not apart from their source, which is the *dharma-kāya*. Non-difference is arrived at through the equation of the derivatives with their source, while non-identity is posited on the basis of the difference between non-alternation on the one hand, and obedience to conditions on the other. This attitude is squarely based on the central doctrines of the *Awakening of Faith*, and it is also basically the Hua-yen doctrine of the identity of arising from conditions and arising from essential nature (緣生即性起). If we look into the reasons for this doctrine, it would seem to be based on the necessity for maintaining the absolute, immutable nature of the Buddha, or *tathatā*, in the face of the historical fact of Śākyamuni, and the religious need for the *saṁbhoga-kāya*. At the same time, this doctrine supports the Mahāyāna insistence on the universality of Buddhahood, for it explains the apparently paradoxical fact that we appear to be confused, wicked men, but are in reality already Buddhas.

Taikei II.612-13; *Kōgi* 400-01

Text. The sudden doctrine: because all characteristics are terminated and conceptualization is abandoned, there is only one jewel-like body, and being completely uniform, the distinctions are beyond discussion, nor can one speak of the eternal or non-eternal. If you try to explain the matter through words, the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says, "This present body of mine is the *Dharma-kāya*." [T.12.388] Also, the [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra says, "All the bodies of the Buddhas are only the one *Dharma-kāya*," etc.. [T.9.429] You should understand it accordingly.

The perfect doctrine: there are three meanings to such categories as the permanence, etc., of the Buddha. First, in connection with function: since Buddhahood pervades all dharmas such as the three times, therefore, it is wholly endowed with the [above] four alternatives of permanence, etc.. Second, with reference to qualities, Buddhahood has four meanings: 1. born of cultivation; 2. intrinsically existing; 3. original existence born of cultivation; 4. born of cultivation originally existing. [These four] being mutually interfused and without obstruction, [Buddhahood] is endowed with limitless qualities. Therefore, it also permeates the four alternatives of permanence, etc.. You can understand this in connection with the above four alternatives.

Three, in connection with essence, this also relates to the four propositions. That is to say, in this [Avataṁsaka] sutra, the inexpressible is considered to be revealed; therefore, it is eternal. Because it is related to teaching, therefore, it is not eternal. Because the two concepts are interrelated, they both exist. Also, because they accord with the limit of dependent origination [i.e. origination from essential nature], neither exists.

If we speak of the above three points [i.e., function, characteristics, and essence] from the standpoint of essence, then all are essence. And even if you take them all from the standpoint of function, all are function. You should consider that because [these three] are mutually inclusive, without obstruction, all are endowed with [the four propositions] eternal, etc., without obstruction.

Notes. The three divisions of Buddhahood listed under the category of the perfect doctrine are the three aspects of the *Dharma*-*kāya*, or *tathatā*, as analyzed by the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana*; i.e., essence 體, function 用, and 相 characteristics, the 三大. Here, in this text, Fa-tsang is thinking about Vairocana, the Buddha of the ten bodies, who pervades the universe. With regard to *function*, the ten bodies pervade the whole universe, such as past, future, and present. Therefore, Buddhahood is permanent, because its function eternally, without intermission, conforms to the *dharmadhātu*. It is also impermanent, because it is manifested in accordance with mundane *dharmas* such as time. It is also both permanent and impermanent because both meanings are always present. It is neither permanent nor impermanent because, in its status as dependently originated *dharmas*, it has no self-nature. With regard to *characteristics*, all characteristics of Buddhahood arise from the causal stage of practice and cultivation; first they did not exist, then they did; therefore, they are impermanent. They are also permanent, because, being no different from their essence, the *Dharma*-*kāya*, they do not really arise in the world. They are both permanent and impermanent, because they appear out of innate existence through cultivation. They are, finally, neither, because as products of cultivation, they are not eternal; because they exist innately, they are not non-eternal. With regard to *essence*, the four propositions also apply. The sutra says that the result, Buddhahood, is inexpressible, and only the causal stage of practice is expressible, but the inexpressible result is revealed in the form of expressible cause; therefore, it is permanent. It is also impermanent, because in the form of teaching for beings of limited and varied capacities, it is either obscured or revealed in proportion to the existence or non-existence of the beings' appeals. It is both permanent and impermanent because cause and result are not mutually opposed to each other. Finally, the cause, dependent origination, is coterminous with origination from essential nature, and this origination from essential nature is beyond permanence and impermanence; therefore, essence is neither permanent nor impermanent. In the final analysis, each of the three aspects includes all three freely, and so all three are included within the four propositions of permanence, impermanence, etc.

Taikei II.613-15; *Kōgi* 402-03

Text. Two, showing distinctions in regard to bodily marks [*lakṣaṇa*].

The small vehicle: there are 32 major marks and 80 minor marks. All are real *dharmas*.

The three vehicles may only teach the 32 marks and 80 minor marks. These are the marks of the body of transformation. Also, there is the concept that these marks are empty [*śūnya*]. This is like the teaching of the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā*, etc. This is said in connection with the early Mahāyāna's attraction of the small vehicle. Or, they teach, in connection with the body of recompense, 84,000 marks. They are qualities of the true [*saṁbhoga-kāya*]. This is said in connection with those of direct access and the later doctrine.

Question: Why does the *Ta chih-tu lun* etc., discuss the wood splinter, the horse grain, etc., which came from past action, with regard to this body of transformation, and also explain the cause of each of the 32 marks, etc.? Answer: This is taught in order to attract the two vehicles, by becoming similar to the inferior [two vehicles], because it reveals the fact that the recompense for action is not lost, because the holy path cuts off defilement, but does not extinguish the recompense. The Arhat who ate sand, [the episode of] the wood splinter, etc., are such cases. The small vehicle considers this [body] to be true recompense. The early doctrine says it is empty, because it is [only] skillful means. It is as taught in the *Mahāyāna*-*upāyakauśalya*-*sūtra* 大乘方便經. There are two reasons for explaining the cause of the marks. [497c] One, it is skillful means, for the sake of attracting the two vehicles; i.e., it shows the marvellous causes [i.e., past acts] and the result [i.e., the marks] of this body [of transformation], because the true body of recompense is not seen by them. Two, these are the marks of the true body of recompense. Because [the Buddha] condescends to dwell in this [body of] transformation and becomes manifest, the cause can be expressed.

Notes. The small vehicle views the *lakṣaṇa* as those of the body born of past actions, and as really existing things. The three vehicles also teach the 32 and 80 marks, but only as a device for attracting the two vehicles, and these marks belong to the *nirmāṇa*-*kāya*. They also teach the existence of 84,000 marks, but these belong to the body of recompense in its real state, which exists eternally on the Vulture Peak; i.e., the *saṃbhoga-kāya* seen only by advanced Bodhisattvas. By *nirmāṇa-kāya*, the three vehicles mean the body of Śākyamuni historically revealed in India, a body intentionally created for the sake of helping living beings. It is not the true body of recompense, the reward of past action. Therefore, there is apparently no need for discussing causes for the *lakṣaṇa* or misfortunes which befell the body as a result of past action. However, some texts do discuss such matters, and the explanation is again in terms of *upāya*. The two examples of misfortunes are two of a traditional list of nine which befell Śākyamuni as a result of past *karma* left unexhausted. The first, given in the text as 金鏘, is apparently an illusion to the time he was wounded by a splinter which flew off some wood being worked by a wood-carver. The second refers to the time he went visiting and was given horse grain to eat. The sand-eating monk could not find food even though an Arhat, so he ate some sand and entered *nirvāṇa*. The small vehicle considers this to be real *karma* retribution, though the early Mahāyāna considers it to be a device for teaching purposes. The other reason for explaining the marks of the *nirmāna*-*kāya* is that in reality, this body is simply a form of the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya* condescending to appear in the world for the benefit of others; therefore, the marks really belong to the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya*. The characters for "body wounded by a splinter,"金鏘 are perhaps due to an error or writing 鏘 for 槍. Taikei II. 619-20 says that both characters have the same sound, and if we read it 金槍, then in typical Chinese allusive fashion these would refer to the golden body of the Buddha, and the wood splinter which wounded him. For the episode alluded to, cf. 興起行經 T.4.168, 172 *passim*.

Taikei II.615-20; *Kōgi* 405-07

Text. Question: Why does the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* say that the 32 marks, etc., are included among the qualities of the *Dharma*-*kāya*? Answer: There are two reasons. First, it is a gradual teaching of skillful means, in order to convert the two vehicles. Because the real, genuine *Dharma*-*kāya* is probably difficult for them to believe in, teaching these qualities as the *Dharma*-*kāya* makes it easy to believe, because [the marks] are an experience [of the small vehicle]. Second, because they consider the [five] qualities to be the *Dharma*-*kāya*, [the marks] are included among them. All the above is taught in connection with the early doctrine. Also, because the 32 marks, etc., are birthless and naturelessness 無生無性, they are also the *Dharma*-*kāya*, *tathatā*. This is said in connection with the later doctrine.

Notes. The small vehicle considers the *Dharma*-*kāya* to consist of the five qualities of morality (*śīla*), concentration (*dhyāna*), wisdom (*prajñā*), liberation (*vimoksa*), and the knowledge of liberation (*vimoksa*-*jñāna*). The 32 and 80 marks are included among these five qualities as a concession to small vehicle mentality. In the later doctrine, however, the marks are those of the *Dharma-kāya*, and are its characteristics.

Taikei II.621; *Kōgi* 407-08

Text. The one vehicle: there are marks [on the body of the Buddha] as innumerable as the atoms in the ocean of the ten worlds contained in the lotus. Each of these marks pervades the *dharma-dhātu*. Their activity does likewise. The reason for saying "ten" is in order to express inexhaustibility. This is as taught in the chapter called "Ocean of Marks" [in the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra*].

Notes. The *saṁbhoga-kāya* of each of the ten Buddhas inhabits one of the worlds contained in the cosmic lotus. As the text itself explains, the number "ten" is used to symbolize inexhaustibility, so we must think of an inexhaustible number of worlds. We must also picture these worlds as all resting on an opened lotus, which in turn grows out of the great circle of water which rests on the circle of wind at the lowest depths of the universe. Therefore, the marks of the body of Vairocana are unimaginably numerous. This may just be another way of saying that all things in the *dharma-dhātu* are endowed with the marks of the *Dharma-kāya*.

Taikei II.621-22; *Kōgi* 408

Text. Also, in the *Sutra on the Concentration of Contemplating the Buddha* 觀佛三昧經, the marks of the Buddha are divided in three ranks in connection with the tenets of the three vehicles. Thus, the sutra says, "The briefest of the brief: I teach the marks briefly for the great assembly and [King] Śuddhodhana who are meeting at this time. The Buddha being born among men, this shows that he is human. Because he has characteristics in common with men, he teaches the 32 marks. Because he is superior to the gods, he teaches the 80 marks. For the Bodhisattvas, he teaches the 84,000 marks. When I first perfected the Way at the place of enlightenment in Māghadi, I extensively distinguished the true marks of the Buddha for all the great Bodhisattvas such as Samantabhadra, Bhadramukha, etc. in the *Avataṁsaka*-*sūtra* [in the chapter, "Ocean of Marks" T.9.605]. To explain, here, the 32 marks, etc., refer to the briefest of the brief. This is for men, gods, the two vehicles, etc.. That is to say, it refers to the first [rank]. The 84,000 refers only to the brief [i.e., the second rank]. It is for the Bodhisattva of the three vehicles, etc.. It concerns the next [rank]. The Buddha's real marks, as taught in the *Avataṁsaka*-*sūtra*, is concerned with the extensive teaching; that is, it points to the teaching of the chapter called "Ocean of Marks" in this sutra. These are the marks of the distinct doctrine of the one vehicle; i.e., it refers to the last [rank], because the sutra mentioned [i.e., 雜華經]is the *Avataṁsaka*. The other meanings are evident.

Notes. The three ranks correspond to the small vehicle, three vehicles, and one vehicle respectively. Also, the marks of the three ranks are those seen by the practitioner prior to the *bhūmis*, on the *bhūmis*, and the five ranks of the one vehicle respectively. Also, the three ranks correspond to the *nirmāna*-*kāya*, *saṁbhoga*-*kāya*, and *Dharma*-*kāya*. Thus, for instance, the briefest of the expositions of *Buddha*-*lakṣaṇa* is taught to the small vehicle, non-buddhists, etc., they are taught in connection with the *nirmāṇa*-*kāya*, and those to whom the teaching is directed are in stages prior to the *bhūmis*.

Taikei II.622-23; *Kōgi* 409-10

9. Divisions of the Buddha's Material Surroundings

Text. Nine, the divisions of the Buddha's material surroundings. The small vehicle: only this impure place, the Sahā world, is the Buddha's land of recompense. Within it, Jambudvīpa is the support of the Buddha as [body of] recompense [*saṁbhoga*-*kāya*]. The other million [places in the great trichiliocosm] are realms of transformation [i.e., the *nirmāṇa*-*kāya*].

Notes. The title, 攝化分齊 , refers to the beings who are embraced and converted by the Buddha, but this section really deals with the land, or realm, where this activity takes place, so I have translated accordingly. The previous section was concerned with one kind of recompense, the marks belonging to the Buddha's body; this section deals with the other kind of recompense, the physical surroundings which come to the Buddha as a result of past actions. The Buddha Śākyamuni, who, as a result of arduous efforts, was born in the family of King Śuddhodhana in India, left home, became enlightened, etc., is, according to the small vehicle, the Buddha as *saṁbhoga*-*kāya*; i.e., the body earned by means of the many practices which culminated in Buddhahood. In the remaining worlds of our world system, of which there are a million, this series of events also occurs in identical fashion, except the Buddha in each case is the *nirmāṇa*-*kāya*, a magically-created body assumed intentionally for purposes of enacting the great drama of Buddhahood. In the eyes of the small vehicle, there are no purified lands outside the trichiliocosm where the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya* as conceived by the Mahāyāna dwells. All the worlds are, like this one, impure worlds.

Taikei II.623-24; *Kōgi* 411-12

Text. In the three vehicles, there is a land of *dharma*-nature [法性土 i.e., *dharmatā*, or *dharma*-*dhātu*], and a land of [the body of] personal use 自受用土, but we shall not discuss them here.

Notes. Both these two kinds of land are indescribable; the first is the habitation of the *Dharma*-*kāya*, and the other is one form of purified land, in which the Buddha, in the form of the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya*, enjoys his own attainments, and this land, not to mention the first, is beyond the ken of even Bodhisattvas of the upper *bhūmis*. The texts will go on to describe, instead, the other kind of purified land, that in which the Buddha appears as *sambhoga*-*kāya* for the benefit of others (他受用土). The discussion centers on the three vehicles, and contains six doctrines.

Taikei II.624; *Kōgi* 412

Text. The purified land of the true [body of] recompense of the Buddha Śākyamuni, which is for the benefit of others: [498a] some say it is in the heavens of Great Iśvara, and the body of transformation fills up a million Jambudvīpas, and this is the scope of [the body of] transformation. The *Brahmajāla*-*sūtra*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*-*vyākhyā*, etc., say the same. Know that this is taught in connection with the early doctrine. Why is that? Because the two vehicles consider Śākyamuni's body to be [the body of] true recompense, now it is changed, and here it is shown to be a body of transformation. The true [body of] recompense is separately established in that heaven. Also, because it is feared that the two vehicles will not believe that there is a real purified land *outside* the world, this is taught through the strategem of using the most excellent place *in* the world. As for the body of transformation filling only a million [worlds], etc., this is also in conformity with that doctrine [of the small vehicle].

Notes. Here, the body which appeared in India in the family of King Śuddhodhana is the body of transformation, and the true body of recompense abides in the most exalted place in the *rūpa*-*dhātu*, the heaven of Maheśvara. This is a purified land where Bodhisattvas can prepare for later activity, and where the Buddha teaches them, in contradistinction to the previously mentioned land where the Buddha enjoys his own enlightenment. The question arises from the earlier statement that the body which appeared in India was the true body of recompense, while the *nirmāna*-*kāya* appeared in the other million lands in the great trichiliocosm. Now, however, the text has said that the body which appeared in Jambudvīpa was only a *nirmāna*-*kāya*, while the source of that body, the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya* dwells eternally in the heavens of Maheśvara. This is explained as a device for gently drawing the two vehicles away from their beliefs; also, because the small vehicle has no concept of purified lands outside the great world system, the purified land where this body abides is placed in the furthest reaches of the vertically arranged worlds of desire and form, the heavens of great Iśvara.

Taikei II.614-15; *Kōgi* 413-14

Text. Some say, on the other hand, that the land of the Buddha Śākyamuni's [body of] recompense is outside the triple realm, as said in the *Mahāparinirvāna*-*sūtra*: "In the West, distant from here [i.e., the Sahā world] by as many Buddha lands as there are sands in 32 Ganges Rivers, there is a world named "Without Superior." [T.12.508] This is the purified land of the true [body of] recompense of the Buddha Śākyamuni. This is said in connection with the later doctrine.

Because this is not taught in response to the inferior [two vehicles], because it is for the sake of showing that the Sahā world is only [the realm of the body of] transformation, therefore, you should know that the body at the summit of the realm of form [rūpa-dhātu] is not the true [body of] recompense.

Or else, it is said that the realm of [the body of] transformation is not only the million [lands]. The Ta chih-tu lun says, "The great trichiliocosm 三千大千世界 is one unit. As many of these as there are sands in the Ganges makes one world essence 一世界性. As many of these as there are sands in the Ganges makes one world ocean 一世界海. As many of these as there are sands in the Ganges in the ten directions makes one world seed 種. As many of these as there are sands in countless Ganges [Rivers] in the ten directions makes one Buddha realm and the scope of [the body which is] transformed." [T.25.418 Int.] This is also said in connection with the later doctrine, because [in comparison with the early doctrine] attraction and conversion becomes more and more extensive than previously. It is also said only with reference to worlds that have a Mt. Sumeru, because it is restricted to this realm. Because they do not speak of such universes as those in the forms of trees 樹形, etc., it is not the one vehicle.

Or, it is said that the land of Śākyamuni's [body of] recompense is on the Vulture Peak. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* says, "I eternally abide on the Vulture Peak," etc.. [T.9.43] The Treatise on the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* explains it as [the place of] the *bodhi* of the body of recompense. [T.26.9] You should know that this is said in connection with the common doctrine of the one vehicle. Why? Because the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* also shows the one vehicle. Therefore, in accordance with the teaching, the impurity of the place is equated with purity. Therefore, the place where the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* is preached is made to be [the place of] the true [body of recompense]. It is just as in teaching the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra* beneath the *bodhi* tree, the place is identical with the realm of the ten Buddhas of the [world] contained in the lotus. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* is the same. Because [this doctrine] barely conforms to this [doctrine of the distinct doctrine], it is the common doctrine. However, because it does not teach that that place [in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*] is the [world] contained in the lotus, [the world of] Indra's net, etc., it is not the distinct doctrine.

Notes. The last part, dealing with the common doctrine of the one vehicle shows that the place where the *saṁbhoga-kāya* dwells is the Vulture Peak. This is considered to be the teaching of the common doctrine of the one vehicle because the conception of the Vulture Peak as an identity of purified land and impure land closely approximates the teaching of the distinct doctrine of the one vehicle, which gives the same qualities to the world contained in the lotus. It is not the distinct doctrine, however, because they do not teach that that place really is the world contained in the lotus, where, as in the world of the net of Indra, each thing is identical with and includes all other things. If I follow the reasoning in this text, what Fa-tsang means is that doctrine, teacher (or body), and place are all of a kind, and since the *Saddharmapunḍarīka* teaches a variety of one vehicle doctrine, then the place of teaching must be a purified land and the teacher must be the Buddha in his *saṁbhoga*-*kāya*. The identity of pure and impure in the Vulture Peak is based on the quotation from the *Saddharmapunḍarīka*, which says that even though beings see that world consumed with flames at the end of the *kalpa*, to the Buddha it is always pure and cool, filled with men and gods.

Taikei II.626-31; *Kōgi* 416

Text. Some say that Śākyamuni's body is the true body of recompense received for use 實報受用之身 . The *Buddhabhūmi*-*sūtra* says at the beginning, "The Buddha Śākyamuni is endowed with the 21 qualities of the true [body of] recompense." [T.16.720 Int.] [496b] The treatise to that [sutra] explains it as the body which is received for use 受用身 . This is also said in connection with the common doctrine. Why? In the three vehicles, the Buddha Śākyamuni is only the body of transformation; the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine considers it to be the absolute body of the ten Buddhas. Now, this doctrine encourages the three vehicles through the use of a skillful device and shows that Śākyamuni's body is not merely the body of transformation. Probably because this is difficult [for the three vehicles] to believe, that [*Buddhabhūmi*] sutra shows, in connection with explaining the profound qualities of Buddhahood, that in accordance with the teaching, the provisional [body of transformation] is equated with the true [sambhoga-kāya], and teaches it as the body of recompense. That is to say, [teaching the body of recompense] is a skillful device. At the time of teaching the Dharma of the one vehicle of the Avatamsaka-sūtra, [the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra] shows that this body of Śākyamuni also complies with that [Hua-yen] doctrine; i.e., it is the absolute dharma-dhātu body of the ten Buddhas. Therefore, in this way, it is included in the common doctrine [of the one vehicle].

Notes. In this text, the Buddha Śākyamuni, born a prince in the family of King Śuddhodhana, in India, is itself the true body of recompense, and the sutra tries to show this by attributing to the body the 21 marks or qualities belonging to the true sambhoga-kāya. This doctrine is also attributed to the one vehicle, common doctrine. The three vehicles are lured away from the belief that Śākyamuni appeared in his nirmāṇa-kāya by the device of attributing the 21 qualities to him. It should be noted that this doctrine speaks of the true body of recompense, which means that this body is the one which inhabits the purified land, and not the sambhoga-kāya of the small vehicle, which is simply a mortal body resulting from past karma. The sūtra mentioned in the text really means to say that Śākyamuni's body is the absolute body of the ten Buddhas; i.e., Vairocana, but this being too difficult for the three vehicles to accept, Śākyamuni is said to inhabit a sambhoga-kāya, which is half way between the nirmāṇa-kāya of the three vehicles and the Dharma-kāya of the distinct doctrine of the one vehicle. Because the sutra comes very close to the point of view of the distinct doctrine without actually teaching the full truth, this is considered to be common doctrine material.

Taikei II.631-32; Kōgi 417-18

Text. Some say that Śākyamuni's body is the

Dharma-*kāya*. The *Mahāparinirvāna*-*sūtra* says, "This body of mine is the *Dharma*-*kāya*." This is said in connection with the sudden doctrine, through the use of words, because [essentially, the body of the Buddha] is without characteristics and apart from thought.

The one vehicle of the distinct doctrine: This body of Śākyamuni is not just three bodies; it is also ten bodies. In this way, it is shown to be infinite. However, the realm, or support, of those ten Buddhas is two-fold.

First, the ocean of domains 國土海. It is the realm of perfect, unobstructed interrelationship. This concerns the inexpressible. If you explain it through recourse to the Dharma, it is shown in the first [chapter] of the second assembly [of the *Avataṁsaka*-*sūtra*, in the chapter, "Names of the *Tathāgata*"].

Notes. "Ocean of domains" refers to the universe as subsumed under ten categories---again meaning infinitude---and these ten categories or domains are the ten bodies of Vairocana; in other words, the inexpressible result which is Buddhahood, shown through the figure of Vairocana, contains within it the entire universe, which for convenience's sake is divided into ten categories. This world can not be expressed, really, but if an attempt is made to make it intelligible, *it* is as found in the chapter on the names of the *Tathāgata*: "Oh sons of the Buddha, the Buddha land is inexpressible. The abode of the Buddha, the Dharma of the Buddha, the purity of the Buddha land, the Buddha's preaching of the Dharma, the appearance of the Buddha, the arising of a Buddha land, the Buddha's highest perfect enlightenment, all are beyond words." The sutra goes on to explain that this is Buddha-result, and includes two kinds of recompense for *karma*, the Buddha nature itself, and the material environment of that nature. These both are known only to Buddhas, therefore are inexpressible. In the light of this, we must assume that "ocean of domains" is what might be called the Buddha-land of Vairocana and is the abode of Buddhahood in its pure essence, apart from its manifestation to others. For more details, cf. Mochizuki, *Bukkyō Daijiten*, vol.2 p.1148.

Taikei II.632-33; *Kōgi* 419

Text. Two, the ocean of worlds 世界海 : there are three kinds. One, the ocean of ornamented worlds contained in the lotus [*Kusuma*-*tala*-*garbha*-*vyūhālaṁkara*-*lokadhatu*-*samudra*]蓮華藏莊嚴世界海. It is endowed with the infinite interrelationship of primary and secondary 主伴具足 and is coterminous with [the world of the net of] Indra, etc.. This concerns the realm of the ten Buddhas, etc.. Two, outside the great trichiliocosm, there is a ten-fold world-ocean. 1. The world of [identical] nature 世界性. 2. The world of the ocean [of many varieties of forms] 世界海 . 3. The world of the wheel [where there is uniform function] 世界輪. 4. The world of perfection [of all virtues] 世界圓滿. 5. The world of distinction [where things are not mixed] 世界分別 . 6. The world of [right] revolution 世界旋. 7. The world of circling [like a wheel] 世界轉 . 8. The world of the lotus 世界蓮華. 9. The world which is [surpassing like] Mt. Sumeru 世界須彌. 10. The world of forms 世界相 = 形貌. These [ten] are connected with the realm of the wheel-turning king of the [stages of] ten thousand sons 萬子已上.輪王境界.

Three, countless varieties of worlds pervade the _dharma-dhātu_. For instance, the limits of the one kind of world of Mt. Sumeru take up the sky and pervade the _dharma_-_dhātu_. Also, the one variety which is of the form of trees (and so on up to) such worlds as that which is of the form of beings, are the same; they fill up the whole _dharma_-_dhātu_, yet, do not interfere with each other. These above three states are all the one locale of Vairocana of the ten bodies. Consequently, the root and derivative of these three states are in perfect harmony with each other and freely include each other. Why is this? Because these three are set up in accordance with the coarseness and subtleness of a single world. You should understand that this is completely different from the three vehicles.

Notes. These three subdivisions of the ocean of worlds are not substantially different from the preceeding world of domains, but whereas the world of domains was concerned with the inexpressible realm of the _Dharma_-_kāya_---in fact really is the _Dharma_-_kāya_ in a sense---this text is concerned with the causal aspect of Buddhahood, and the emphasis is on beings in the causal state of practice, dependent origination, varying degrees of coarseness and fineness, etc.. However, as the text takes pains to explain, all three of these realms or states are the one single abode of the Buddha Vairocana, and because of the perfect interrelationship of cause and result, are not at all distinct from the previous result stage. These three kinds of realm are those seen by Bodhisattvas of varying degrees of attainment, the first being the highest and most subtle, and the other two being increasingly coarser. In fact, the latter two are really only explanations of the first, for the benefit of beings who are not so quick. The second type, comprising ten realms, is, like the first, a purified land, and is outside the great trichiliocosm.

The number ten, in Hua-yen fashion, symbolizes inexhaustibility, here, inexhaustibly large and numerous. In fact, our world system, the great trichiliocosm, is but a small part of this larger world. The ten kinds of worlds correspond to the ten _bhūmis_, each world being the experience of the Bodhisattva on that stage. Of the three kinds of worlds mentioned, the first is the experience of Śākyamuni as a practitioner beneath the _bodhi_ tree; the second, comprising the ten types just mentioned, make up the purified land of the practitioner who is in the stage of comprehension and practice; i.e., the second of the three lives it takes to become a Buddha. The third type of world is the purified land of the practitioner who sees and hears the one vehicle Dharma; i.e., it is the first of the three lives. The "root" is the first of the three types, the "derivative" are the second and third types. They are all mutually inclusive because they are all nothing but the coarse and fine aspects of a single world. The body of the Buddha who takes this large realm as his arene of teaching and conversion is not merely the Buddha of the traditional three bodies, he is Vairocana, possessed of the ten bodies, which is to say infinite numbers of bodies. It also goes without saying that this ocean of worlds is not different from the preceeding ocean of domains, because cause and effect are completely identical.

Taikei II.634-36; _Kōgi_ 420-21

10. Analysis and Synthesis of Buddha-body

Text. Ten, the analysis and synthesis of the body of the Buddha: there are two parts. First, the essence; then, the enumeration.

Notes. I.e., the diversity and essential unity of the Buddha's body is the subject of this section. The previous section was concerned with the material surroundings of the Buddha; this part is about _Buddhakāya_. The greater part of the discussion is devoted to the _Dharma_-_kāya_.

Taikei II.635-36; _Kōgi_ 422

Text. With regard to essence, first, the _Dharmakāya_. The _Dharma_-_kāya_ may be considered to be nothing but the realm of *tathatā*. For instance, in the *Buddha-bhūmi-śāstra* [T.26.325 Int.] the stage of great enlightenment is included in the five *dharmas*. [498c] The pure *dharma-dhātu* includes the *Dharma-kāya*, and the fourfold wisdom includes the other [two] bodies. This is said in connection with the early doctrine.

Notes. The five *dharmas* are 1. the pure *dharma-dhātu*, 2. great, perfect mirror wisdom, 3. uniform wisdom (*samatā-jñana*), 4. wisdom of marvellous close discernment, 5. wisdom of perfect activity. I.e., *ādarśana-jñana*, *samatā-jñana*, *pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna*, *kṛtyanuṣṭhana-jñana*. The *dharma-kaya* is included in the pure *dharma-dhatu*, while the bodies of recompense and transformation are included in the four kinds of wisdom. To further analyze them, *ādarśana-jñāna* is associated with the *saṁbhoga-kāya* for personal use, *samatā-jñāna* with the *saṁbhoga-kaya* for the benefit of others, *pratyavekṣaṇa-jñana* with both the *saṁbhoga-kāya* for the benefit of others and the *nirmāṇa-kaya*, and *kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna* with the *nirmāṇa-kaya*. The main point of this text is that the *Dharma-kaya* is equated with pure *dharma-dhātu*. The stage of great enlightenment is Buddhahood possessed of the three bodies. The allotment of the two other bodies to various of the *jñānas* is connected with the revolution, *parāvṛtti*, of the various *vijñānas*. Thus, the *Dharma-kaya* is just ultimate reality, essential nature, and the remaining two bodies are embodiments of wisdom. It is worth noting that in Shingon Buddhism, the four kinds of wisdom are headed by a fifth type, *dharma-dhātu-prakṛti-jñāna*, which would seem to correspond to the pure *dharma-dhatu* of the present system. In Shingon, the first is called the *garbha-dhātu*, and the other four are called *vajra-dhātu*, and just as in Shingon there is a fundamental identity of the two *dhātus*, here, too, the bodies of recompense and transformation are not apart from the *Dharma-kāya*.

Taikei II.636-38; *Kōgi* 422-23

Text. Or, only marvellous wisdom is the *Dharma-kāya*, because it is the wisdom consisting of innate enlightenment 本覚智 , and because cultivated wisdom is the same as innate enlightenment. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha [trans. Asvabhāva] considers immaculate, unimpeded wisdom to be the Dharma-kāya. The Suvarṇaprabhāsottama-sūtra includes the three bodies in the four wisdoms, because the Dharma-kāya is included in mirror wisdom.

Or, realm [or object] and wisdom combined are considered to be the Dharma-kāya, because realm and wisdom are both tathatā. The Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, "Tathatā alone and tathatā as wisdom falsely existing [as a duality] are called Dharma-kāya." [T.31.249] These above two alternatives are taught in connection with the later doctrine.

Notes. "Only marvellous wisdom" means there is no distinction between tathatā as that which is experienced in enlightenment and tathatā as the experiencer of tathatā. This means there is identity of innate enlightenment and acquired enlightenment. In the Suvarṇaprabhāsa, "great perfect mirror wisdom" is the wisdom of innate enlightenment, and this is equal to Dharma-kāya. The second alternative more completely expresses the unity of tathatā as object and tathata as subject, for as far as essence is concerned, they are both included within tathatā.

Taikei II.639-40; Kōgi 414

Text. Or, the Dharma-kāya is the result of abandoning both realm and wisdom. The sutras say that the Tathāgata's Dharma-kāya is not mind or realm. This is said in connection with the sudden doctrine.

Or, the previous four alternatives are held combined, because [the one vehicle of the common doctrine] possesses all the qualities [of these doctrines].

Or, the previous five [doctrines] are transcended, because of inexhaustible interrelationship [of the body of the Buddha with all things].

These [last] two alternatives are as taught in the chapter on "The Arising of the *Tathāgata* from Essential Nature" [in the *Avataṁsaka*-*sūtra*]. This is said in connection with the one vehicle.

Next, showing [the body of the Buddha] in connection with the body of Śākyamuni in particular. The body of Śākyamuni 1. is [the body of] transformation, not the *Dharma* [-*kāya*] or [body of] recompense. This is as taught in the early doctrine. 2. It is [the body of] recompense, not the *Dharma* [-*kāya*] or body of transformation. This is as taught in the one vehicle and small vehicle. The only difference is in deep and shallow [interpretations]. 3. It is the *Dharma* [-*kāya*], not [the bodies of] recompense or transformation, as taught in the sudden doctrine. 4. It is both *Dharma* [-*kāya*] and [bodies of] recompense and transformation, as taught in the three vehicles as a whole. 5. It is neither *Dharma* [-*kāya*] nor [the bodies of] recompense or transformation, like the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine, because it is [the body of] the ten Buddhas.

Notes. 1. Early Mahāyāna: the body of Śākyamuni is the *nirmāna-kāya*. The body abiding at the top limit of the *rupa*-*dhātu* is the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya*, and the Buddha who was born in India in the family of King Śuddhodhana is merely one of many transformations of this *saṁbhoga-kāya*, a compassionate gesture for the sake of helping people. 2. Both the common doctrine of the one vehicle and the small vehicle consider Śākyamuni to be the *saṁbhoga-kāya*, but the interpretation of this fact is respectively deep or shallow. For the one vehicle, the *saṁbhoga-kāya* dwells in its purified land, and therefore, Sakyamuni of India dwelt in a purified land, though to others such as the small vehicle, it was an impure land. To the small vehicle, since this was an impure land, though Śākyamuni existed as the *saṁbhoga-kāya*, it was a factual kind of body, which really was born and which later died, not immortal, not the glorified body of a purified land. 3. The intuitive school calls it the *Dharma-kāya*, by taking a position on the absolute truth and eschewing worldly truth, disregarding distinct characteristics, etc.. 4. Among the three vehicles as a whole all three beliefs are held. 5. It is none of these, according to the one vehicle of the distinct doctrine, because it is not simply the *Dharma-kāya* of the three vehicles, since the Buddha really is ten Buddhas; i.e., his body includes but also goes beyond the traditional three bodies. By ten, of course, an infinite number of bodies is meant.

Taikei II.642-43; *Kōgi* 426

Text. [Next,] the analysis and synthesis of the numbers [of bodies]. [First,] one Buddha may be established; i.e., the single Buddha who is of the nature of *tathatā*. This concerns the sudden doctrine.

Or, two Buddhas are established. This has three interpretations: 1. The [mortal] body of birth and the body of transformation. This is taught in connection with the small vehicle. 2. The body of birth and the *Dharma-kāya*; i.e., the body received for personal use, and the *Dharma-kāya* combined are called *Dharma-kāya*, as taught in the *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra*. This is taught in connection with the early doctrine. 3. The *Dharma-kāya* in its own essence 自性法身 and the *Dharma*-*kāya* which is transformed in response [to the needs of beings]. This is as taught in the *Sutra on Original Action*. This is taught in connection with the later doctrine.

Notes. I.e., the body of Śākyamuni, according to the small vehicle, is a "birth" body, but its likeness is miraculously reproduced all over the universe in other worlds where a Buddha is needed. 2. The birth body includes the *nirmāṇa*-*kāya* and the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya* which is received for the benefit of others. The *Dharma*-*kāya* is both itself and the body of recompense received for personal use. 3. *Dharma*-*kāya* in its own essence means non-duality of *tathatā* as subject and object. The *Dharma*-*kāya* which is transformed in response to the needs of living beings is still the *Dharma*-*kāya*, though seemingly limited in time and space.

Taikei II.643-44; *Kōgi* 427-28

Text. Or, the Buddha of three bodies is established, as is commonly taught. This is said in connection with the early and later doctrines in common.

Notes. These are the commonly accepted three bodies, *Dharma*-, *saṁbhoga*-, and *nirmāṇa*-*kāya*. In the early doctrine, the three are distinct, because subject and object are two, as are the compounded and uncompounded. In the later doctrine, however, three bodies are taught, but as interrelated, because there is no real difference between *tathatā* as subject and *tathatā* as object.

Taikei II.644; *Kōgi* 418

Text. Or, four Buddhas are established. This is of three kinds. One, the body of recompense among the [traditional] three bodies is divided into self [use] and [use] for others, so there are four. This is as taught in the *Buddhabhūmi*-*śāstra*. This concerns the early doctrine. Two, the body as self-essence

自性 is established outside the [traditional] three bodies, in order to show that the *Dharma*-*kāya* is a *dharma* with merits as numerous as the sands of the Ganges. Thus, the Liang translation of the *Mahāyāna*-*saṁgraha* says, "The body as self-essence is a support for the *Dharma*-*kāya*." [T.31.155 Int.] Three, there are four, because the body of recompense is divided into virtue 福 and wisdom 智 . This is as discussed in the *Laṅkāvatāra*-*sūtra*. [There then exists] the Buddha of transformation, the Buddha of merits, the Buddha of wisdom, and the Buddha of *tathatā*. [499a] This is said in connection with the later doctrine.

Notes. In the second category, the *Dharma*-*kāya* as self-essence apparently is the Buddha as absolute universal essence 理 who serves as the support for the *Dharma*-*kāya* Buddha exemplifying *prajñā*. Hence, principle supports wisdom. In the third category, the *saṁbhoga*-*kāya* is considered to be two-fold, one part exemplifying *prajñā*, the other exemplifying virtues or qualities. These correspond to *saṁbhoga*-*kāya* for self use, or enjoyment, and *saṁbhoga*-*kāya* for the benefit of others. They furthermore are the two aspects of Buddhahood, wisdom and compassion. (Cf. Oda, *Bukkyō Daijiten*, p.1513)

Taikei II.645; *Kōgi* 429

Text. Or, ten Buddhas are established, in order to show inexhaustibility. It is as explained in the chapter on "Abandoning the World" [in the *Avataṁsaka*-*sūtra*]. This is said in connection with the perfect doctrine of the one vehicle [distinct doctrine].

Notes. As explained elsewhere, the number ten, or ten bodies, means inexhaustibility. The bodies of the Buddha are without end, each thing in the world being a Buddha. The world is subsumed under ten categories, but in reality it is endless in its individual forms. This Buddha is Vairocana, the universal essence.

Taikei II.645; Kōgi 429

Chapter 10

Divisions of Principles

Text. Ten, the divisions of principles; there are four topics. One, the identity and difference of the three natures [*trisvabhāva*]; two, the Dharma of the six meanings of dependent origination in the causal aspect; three, the Dharma of the freedom of the ten-fold profound dependent origination 十玄緣起無礙法; four, the perfect interfusion of the six characteristics 六相圓融.

Notes. This chapter is devoted to the fundamentals of the Hua-yen system. The above four topics, indeed, are the basis for the unique world-view of Hua-yen, and are at the root of the Hua-yen teaching on the nature of the Buddha, the nature of mundane things, the path to Buddhahood, etc.. As such, it is a prime source of Hua-yen thought. The three natures are discussed first because they are the basis for the other topics; that is, all other matters are only understandable on the basis of the peculiarities of the three natures.

Taikei I.491-96; *Kōgi* 431-32

1. The Identity and Difference of the Three Natures

Text. First, the discussion of the identity and difference of the three natures. There are two categories; first, they are shown specifically; then, they are discussed generally.

Notes. The three natures comprise all *dharmas*. As far as essence is concerned, they are identical; from the standpoint of characteristics, they are different. In the system of the *vijñānavādins*, of the three natures, *parikalpita*-*svabhāva*, *paratantra*-*svabhāva*, and *parinispanna*-*svabhava*, the first is empty, and the other two exist. Of these latter two, *paratantra* is of a compounded nature which is subject to alteration, arising and ceasing. It comes into being through the conjunction of several causes and conditions. *Parinispanna* is uncompounded and not subject to alteration. It is permanent and immutable. Therefore, even though it is said that these two exist, they are really different. *Parikalpita*-*svabhāva* is further divided into three aspects. The first is the discriminator 能遍計 ; i.e., the sixth and seventh *vijñānas*. The sixth sees all *dharmas* as possessing an independent essence, or own-being, and as being real things. The seventh, the *manas*, which is in reality the subjective aspect of the eighth *vijñāna*, clings to the eighth *vijñāna* as the real self, or personal self-essence. Second, that which is discriminated 所遍計 ; i.e., the *dharmas* which arise from the conjunction of conditions, whether as form or as mental *dharmas*. Also, *tathatā* can be discriminated, according to the Hua-yen. The third is the nature which is grasped 所執性 ; this is the non-existent, false nature of things grasped as real by the sixth and seventh *vijñānas*. *Paratantra* has a quasi-real existence, and is the nature of things in their capacity of being results of conjoining conditions. The *vijñānavādins* see it as mental construct only. It is, of course, not real in the ultimate sense because it is the result of conditions, and whatever arises as a result of conditions can not exist of itself, therefore is not real. *Parinispanna*, the perfect, is *tathatā*. It is eternal, universal, and immutable. The "school of characteristics" always discusses the three natures in the above order. The movement is from the false to the true.

The Hua-yen, representing the "school of essences" always discusses the three natures in the reverse manner, from the true to the false. The reason for this is that the other school is ultimately concerned with the practical act of removing the false aspect of *paratantra* by means of yogic effort and finally seeing *paratantra* in its true light, as *parinispanna*, or *tathatā*. The movement is thus from the mundane to the supramundane, from error to enlightenment, from worldling to Buddha. However, the Hua-yen discusses the three natures in an entirely different order, not to mention an entirely different manner. The reason for this is, I believe, that Fa-tsang is stressing the ontological relationship of the true and permanent with the false and impermanent; that is to say, his main concern is to show how all things derive from the perfect, *tathatā*, how they are supported by this essential, immutable nature, and how this situation serves as the rationale for the doctrine of the interrelationship of each *dharma* with all other *dharmas*. Perhaps these two different ways of dealing with the three natures show as much as anything else that whereas in the Chinese system of *vijñānavāda* the whole elaborate system did, finally, rest on practical, religious considerations, Fa-tsang's system was really almost totally philosophical and theoretical.

In the Hua-yen system, as the following texts will show, the three natures are discussed in a highly original manner. First, all three natures have a common essence, through which they are seen as identical. *Parinispanna* has the two meanings of unalterability and obeying conditions. In its first meaning it is said to exist; in its second meaning it is said to be empty, for *tathatā* becomes pure and impure *dharmas* because of the conditions of *avidyā*, primordial ignorance. *Paratantra* is not essentially different from that of the *vijñanavadins*. Also, *parikalpita* is similar in the two schools. The main difference is in the Hua-yen doctrine of the conditionability of *tathatā*. In this school it is not only essence, but also has the natures of function 用 and emptiness 空, as well as existence 有, essence 體, and principle 理. Also, whereas the school of characteristics sees the dependent nature and perfect nature as essentially different in that the former is impermanent and the latter is permanent, the school of essences sees them as finally not two separate things.

Taikei I.497; Kogi 433-35

Text. In taking them specifically, there are two parts: first, they will be discussed directly and without detail; later, they will be elucidated in detail. With regard to the former, there are two meanings to each of the three natures.

The two meanings of *tathatā* [i.e., *parinispanna*] : 1. non-alteration 不變, 2. obedience to condition 隨緣. The two meanings of the nature which is dependent on others: 1. similar existence 似有, 2. without [self-] nature 無性. The two meanings of the nature which is discriminated: 1. common sense existence 情有, 2. nonexistence from the standpoint of reality 理無.

Notes. "Non-alteration" means immutable and permanent. "Obedience to conditions" means becoming mundane pure and impure *dharmas* because of the influence of original ignorance. Thus, factual, mundane things remain mundane and factual, but do not lose their true status of being *tathata-parinispanna-dharma-kāya*. As I mentioned in the previous note, this situation is underscored by the peculiar order with which the three natures are discussed here. In fact, this double character of any *dharma* is not really different from the T'ien-t'ai doctrine of the interpenetration of the phenomenal and noumenal 事理. As will be seen throughout this treatise, Fa-tsang is really concerned with this same relationship, and it is on this basis that the Hua-yen posits the interfusion of phenomenon and phenomenon 事事. Next, with regard to *paratantra-svabhava*, "similar existence" means that phenomenal things exist as if, or similar to, the perfect. "Without self-nature" means that as products of *pratītya-samutpāda*, *dharmas* have no essence, or self-nature (*svabhava*) of their own; in fact, they have no nature apart from the perfect nature. With regard to *parikalpita-svabhāva*, "common-sense existence" means that imagined things exist to perverted senses, or exist from a common-sense standpoint. "Non-existence from the standpoint of reality" means that these things do not really exist from the viewpoint of *tathatā*. Thus, in each of the three natures there are two aspects. Fa-tsang equates the first part of each nature with existence, and the second part with emptiness. They can also be equated with principle and fact, or noumenal and phenomenal 理事 respectively.

Taikei I.497-541; *Kōgi* 436-38

Text. As a result of the three meanings of non-alteration of *parinispanna*, the naturelessness of *paratantra*, and the non-existence of *parikalpita* from the standpoint of reality, the three natures are coterminous, identical, and without any differences. In this case, the derivative is not destroyed, but is eternally the fundamental. The [*Vimalakīrti*] sutra says, "Beings are identical with *nirvāna*; they do not have to enter *nirvāṇa* again." [T.14.542 Int.]

Notes. The identity is established on the basis of comparison with *parinispanna* on the one hand, and *paratantra* and *parikalpita* on the other. The naturelessness of the second and the non-existence in reality of the third shows that they are the same as the first, and so all three natures are of a common essence. We therefore have the equivalence essence=naturelessness= non-existence in reality. The very naturelessness of things means that they have no independent essence outside essential nature, or perfect nature. In terms of root and derivative, the derivative (= *dharmas* resulting from dependent origination) is only a function of the root (= perfect nature) and not apart from it. Thus, the derivatives stand as given facts, as *données*, but are nevertheless still root. As the *Vmk* shows, beings *just as they are* are already Buddhas in *nirvāṇa*. In the next text, a similar process of identification takes place.

	(A)	(B)
Parinispanna---	non-alteration	obeys conditions
Paratantra-----	naturelessness	similar existence
Parakalpita----	non-existent in reality	common-sense existence

The identity in essence rests on the equivalence of the three aspects listed vertically under A; i.e., among the root meanings of the three natures. The same is true of the aspects listed vertically under B, the derivative. Thus the three natures are *essentially* the same. Then, Fa-tsang says that there is a difference between the two aspects of each nature; i.e., between rows A and B. That is, as far as characteristics are concerned, there is a dissimilarity, because the uncompounded and compounded, moumenon and phenomenon, are not the same. However, it can be also said that in the final analysis, there is no difference between the aspects of *each* nature either, because the derivatives are derivatives of the root, are based on it, and are only phenomenal functions of it, and this root in turn includes them, supports them, and permeates them. I believe that what Fa-tsang has done is to reduce the three natures to two, and we have only two no matter whether we compare the two aspects of each nature, or whether we compare the aspects of the three natures vertically, for Fa-tsang clearly draws a line between the perfect on the one hand, and the dependent and discriminated together on the other. Thus, whereas the *vijñānavādins* often make a distinction between the discriminated on the one hand, and the dependent and perfect together on the other, because the first does not exist, whereas the other two do exist in at least some degree, Fa-tsang makes a distinction between the perfect and between the other two, because the perfect is the essence, root, and basis, and the other two are functions, derivatives, and the supported, in some degree or another. For a more thorough discussion of various problems in Fa-tsang's treatment of the three *svabhāvas*, see the Introduction, pp. 1-29.

Taikei I.541-42; *Kōgi* 439-40

Text. Also, as a result of the three meanings of *tathatā*'s obedience to conditions, the similar existence of the dependent nature, and the common-sense existence of the discriminated nature, they are also not different. In this case, the fundamental is not disturbed, yet it is eternally derivative. The sutra [*On Neither Increase Nor Decrease*] says, "The *dharmakāya* transmigrating in the five paths [of sentient existence] is called sentient beings." [T.16.467 Int.]

These three meanings and the previous three meanings are not the same category [and are completely different]. Therefore, the true embraces the false derivative, and the false penetrates the true source. Essence and aspect are perfectly interfused, without obstacle or impediment between them.

Notes. Something of what Fa-tsang means can be seen in his comments in the 法界無差別論疏, where as an illustration he speaks of gold and its made forms. "Gold has the two aspects of non-alteration and compliance with conditions. It has the meaning of non-alteration because it does not lose its weight [i.e., it is not diminished]; it means compliance with conditions because it easily becomes finger-rings [etc.]. Also, the ring has the two meanings of emptiness and present existence; it has no existence apart from the gold, so it is empty; it exists before us because the ring form looks like a ring form. Because the meaning of the ring's emptiness depends on the meaning of the non-alteration of the gold, even if the ring loses its form as ring, the gold does not diminish. Consequently, beings are the *dharma*-*kāya*. Also, because the present existence of the ring relies on the gold's obedience to conditions, the gold's whole essence is a ring; consequently, the *dharma*-*kāya* is beings." It is for this reason that Fa-tsang says that in essence all things are identical, though they differ in characteristics.

Taikei I.541-43; *Kōgi* 440-42

Text. Question: How can the similar existence 似有 etc., of the dependent nature be the same as the common sense existence 情有, etc., of the discriminated nature? Answer: For two reasons they are not particularly different. First, because the discriminated nature 所執 grasps the similar 似 as the real, therefore, they are not different *dharmas*. Second, because apart from the discriminated nature the similar does not arise. The obeying of conditions in perfect nature, you should know, is the same, because if there is no discriminated nature, there is no obeying conditions.

Notes. According to the *vijñānavādins*, the natures of the discriminated and the dependent on another are completely dissimilar; therefore, they raise the question of how the qualities belonging to *paratantra*-*svabhāva* can be similar to those of *parikalpita*-*svabhava*. The answer is, of course, that of the school of essences. By discriminated nature is meant not only the discriminated nature of the three natures, but in terms of true and false it is the false. Within this falsity, there are two kinds of ignorance, the fundamental, or basic 根本無明, and the derivative 枝末. These are included in *parikalpita*-*svabhāva*. Fundamental ignorance means not knowing *tathatā* as *tathatā*, and on the basis of this ignorance, *tathata* becomes active and assumes the forms of mundane pure and impure *dharmas*; i.e., the similarly existing dharmas of *paratantra*-*svabhava*. Derivative ignorance is the mistaken notion that these *dharmas* are ultimately real, thus producing common-sense existence of *parikalpita*-*svabhāva*. But these two, the similarly existing of *paratantra* and those things existing sensibly of *parikalpita* are in essence not two different things. That is, that which grasps falsely is, from another point of view, the grasped. There is merely a distinction of coarse and fine, or root and derivative. Also, *paratantra*-*svabhāva*, the similarly existing, only comes into existence due to the influence of the discriminated nature in its essential quality of *avidyā*. *Tathata* and its derivative forms have the same relationship; if there were no *avidyā*, *tathatā* would not comply with conditions and form the dependent nature.

Taikei I.543-44; *Kōgi* 443

Text. Question: Each of the three natures having two meanings, why don't they contradict each other? Answer: Because these two meanings do not have different natures. Why are they not different? To take the example of the perfect nature for awhile, even though it also obeys conditions and forms the impure and pure, [499b] still, it never loses its essential purity [i.e., its immutability]. Only because it does not lose its essential purity can it obey conditions and form the impure and pure [of dependent origination]. To take an example, it is just as a bright [pure] mirror reflects the impure and the pure. Even though it reflects the impure and the pure, it never loses the bright purity of the mirror. Only because it does not lose the bright purity of mirror can it then reflect impure and pure forms. By its reflecting the impure and pure, we understand the purity of the mirror; by the bright purity of the mirror, we know it reflects the impure and pure. Therefore, the two meanings are of only a single nature. Even though the mirror reflects pure dharmas, its brightness does not increase; even though it reflects impure dharmas, the mirror's brightness does not become stained. It not only does not get stained, but on the contrary shows the mirror's bright purity through this.

Know that the truth of tathatā is the same. Not only does its essential purity become agitated and move and form the impure and pure, but because it forms the impure and pure, it reveals its essential purity. Not only does it not destroy the impure and pure and reveal its essential purity, but, as a result of its essential purity, it forms the impure and pure. Therefore, the two meanings are in their entirety mutually inclusive, of a single nature, not two. How could they contradict each other?

Notes. The ability of the perfect nature, or tathatā, to comply with conditions and evolve into the impure and pure forms of saṁsāra does not obstruct its essential nature of non-alteration, and this non-alteration itself makes the obeying of conditions possible. The simile seems to indicate that the two aspects are mutually supporting, for if tathatā were not pure (immutable), it could not evolve the conditioned forms, and, conversely, if the forms could not evolve, this would show a deficiency in tathatā. In terms of the mirror, the purity of the mirror and its ability to reflect any kind of form are in meaning different, but in essence, the reflection of forms is itself the purity of the mirror. It is not too hard to see what Fa-tsang has in mind with this analogy if we keep in mind that he wants to illustrate the interdependence of the two aspects of perfect nature. However, if we look at the simile closely, it is difficult to see what the objective correlatives of the elements of the simile might refer to, especially when we recall that the pure mirror must refer to "mind essentially pure," somewhat analogous to the system of the *Awakening of Faith*. (This has been discussed by Prof. G. Nagao, in his article "Some Problems in Fa-tsang's Discussion of the Three Natures" in *Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative Anthology of the Department of Arts and Letters, Kyoto University*, Kyoto, 1957, pp. 189-90). However, as I said, in context Fa-tsang's point is clear enough; the two aspects of *parinispanna* are not only not self-contradictory, but are in fact mutually complementary.

Taikei I.544-45; *Kōgi* 444-45

Text. [Next,] the nature which is dependent on others [*paratantra*-*svabhāva*]. Even though similar existence is manifested in reliance upon conditions, still, this similar existence is certainly without any nature of its own, because all things produced from conditions are without a nature of their own. If they were not without nature [of their own] they would not require conditions [for their appearance], and because they did not rely on conditions, they would not be [just] similar existence [i.e., things which arise from conditions but appear to be real]. When similar existence is formed, it necessarily obeys conditions, and because it obeys conditions, it is necessarily without a nature of its own. Therefore, as a result of being without self-nature, similar existence can come into existence.

As a result of becoming similar existence, it is without self-nature.

Thus, the Ta chih-tu lun says, "In clearly discerning 觀 that all dharmas arise in dependence on conditions, if they arise in dependence on conditions, then they are without a nature of their own; because they are without a nature of their own, they are absolutely empty. 'Absolute emptiness' is the perfection of wisdom [prajñāpāramitā]." [T.25.631 Int.] In this case, because [dharmas] arise in dependence, they are explained as being without a nature [of their own].

The Madhyamaka-kārikās say, "Because there is emptiness, all dharmas can come into being." [T.30.33 Int.] In this case, because [dharmas] are without a nature [of their own], they are shown to arise from conditions.

The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says, "Because of conditions, [dharmas] exist; because they are without a self-nature, they are empty." [T.12.516 Int.] In this case, being without self-nature is identical with conditionedness, and conditionedness is identical with being without a self-nature, because these are the same.

Therefore, not only are the two categories not mutually opposed, but they are totally mutually inclusive, absolutely non-dual.

Notes. Here, the two apparently opposed aspects of paratantra-svabhāva are harmonized; i.e., similar existence 似有 and without self-nature 無性. "Similar existence" refers to things which come into existence through conditions, and since all things which come into existence are without any nature of their own, they are also natureless, empty. In other words, *paratantra*-*svabhāva* means *śūnyata*. Fa-tsang's arguments in defense of this situation are squarely based on Indian Mādhyamika arguments; in fact, this view of *paratantra-svabhāva* is substantially the view of *pratītyasamutpada* in Nagarjuna's *Middle Treatise*. The meaning is, however, quite different. It is necessary to remember that because Fa-tsang is positing an identity between the three natures, here, even though he is discussing *paratantra*-*svabhāva*, we have the same relationship which we find between the two aspects of *parinispanna*.

Taikei I.545-47; *Kōgi* 446-48

Text. [Next,] the nature which is discriminated [*parikalpita*-*svabhāva*]. Even though existing things 有 are revealed through the grasping of the senses, still, from the standpoint of reality they absolutely do not exist, because the non-existent situation is conjectured as existing, just as a tree stump is perversely conjectured as being a demon. However, the demon in the tree is absolutely non-existing. If the demon in the tree were not non-existent, then it could not be asserted that the existence of the demon is conjectured without reason, because if the tree were a demon, it would not be a result of conjecture. Now, because one conjectures without basis in reality, [499c] we should clearly know that it is non-existent from the standpoint of reality. Because it does not exist from the standpoint of reality, perverse conjectures are formed. Because perverse conjectures are formed, we therefore know that it does not exist from the standpoint of reason. Therefore, they are not two, but are only of a single essence. You should know that the truth of the discriminated nature is the same. The above simple explanation is finished.

Notes. This view of parikalpita-svabhāva is really not too different from that of the orthodox vijñānavādins; i.e., there is no contradiction in saying that a thing appears to exist as far as the senses are concerned but does not exist from the point of view of reality or reason. Thus, we surely do "see things", but these "things" are only mental constructs and do not really exist exterior to mind. Fa-tsang is saying much the same, with his own Hua-yen twist. That is, the non-existence from the standpoint of reality, which equals the naturelessness of parikalpita and the non-alteration of parinispanna is the root, or essence, from which is derived the sensible existence of ordinary experience. As Fa-tsang has already mentioned above, all three natures are identical in essence. His reasoning here has the appearance of circularity, but Fa-tsang is only saying that to say a thing appears to our senses as real is to say that it is not real in reality.

Taikei I.547-48; Kogi 448-49

Text. Two, the detailed elucidation through questions and answers. There are three categories. One, guarding against the attachment that comes from discrimination; two, showing the errors of attachment; three, explaining concepts.

First, guarding against attachment. Question: Does tathatā exist? Answer: It does not, because it obeys conditions. Question: Is tathatā non-existent? Answer: It is not [non-existent], because it does not change. Question: Is it both existent and non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it does not have two natures. Question: Is it neither existent nor non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it is endowed with qualities [as numerous as the sands of the Ganges].

Again, a question: does it exist? Answer: It does not, because it does not alter. The reason is, because it does not change, it obeys conditions and appears. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: It is not [non-existent], because it obeys conditions. The reason is, because it obeys conditions, it is non-changing. The other two alternatives are evident.

Notes. The four attachments to be guarded against are the four Nāgārjunan alternatives. The form of the answers will not be nearly so enigmatic if it is remembered that at all times, Fa-tsang is denying the four alternatives because each possibility---existence, non-existence, etc.---is posed from the point of view of mundane truth. The second set of answers is more sophisticated than those of the first set, which is made on a rather simple level. The second set raises the same set of question and answers again; i.e., does the perfect nature exist, is it non-existent, etc., as before. The first answer to the second round of questions is that *tathatā* does not exist because it does not alter. It can not be said to exist as common worldlings understand the word, so existence in that sense has to be negated. The fact is, because *tathatā* does not change, it is *empty*, and because it is empty, it can obey conditions. The answer to the second question is that *tathatā* is not non-existent, because it obeys conditions. It is therefore in contrast to a one-sided non-existence, and therefore non-existence is negated.

Taikei I.548-49; *Kōgi* 450-51

Text. Again, a question: Does it exist? Answer: No, because it is divorced from what is discriminated 所謂 = 所計. The following three alternatives are the same by analogy. Again, a question: Does it exist? Answer: No, because of empty _tathatā_. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: No, because of non-empty _tathatā_. Question: Is it both existent and non-existent? Answer: No, because it is apart from contraries [such as existent and non-existent, and in our view, the two are mutually inclusive]. Question: Does it neither exist nor not exist? Answer: No, because it is divorced from such idle talk [_prapañca_]. Again, a question: Does it exist? Answer: No, because it is divorced from false conceptions. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: No, because it is the arena of activity of holy wisdom. The other alternatives [i.e., both existence and non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence] may be understood in the same way [i.e., in the first case, no, because it is divorced from false conceptions; in the second case, no, because it is the arena, etc.].

The nature which is dependent on others [_paratantra_-_svabhāva_]: Question: Does the nature which is dependent on others exist? Answer: It does not, because conditioned arising is the same as [self-] naturelessness. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: It is not [non-existent], because arising from conditions is naturelessness. Question: Does it both exist and not exist? Answer: It does not, because it does not have a dual nature. Question: Is it neither existent nor non-existent? Answer: It is not, because this is a category with many interpretations.

Notes. The answer to the first two propositions gives an equation as answer; i.e., a = b. The third answer denies a dual nature in _paratantra_-_svabhāva_. The fourth says that denial of both existence and non-existence is just idle talk, because in fact there are many meanings involved, so the question is not answerable by a simple yes or no. For instance, existence refers to many things, such as the five _skandhas_, 12 _āyatanas_, 18 _dhātus_, four kinds of _prajña_, etc..

Taikei I.550; _Kōgi_ 453

Text. Question: Does [_paratantra_-_svabhāva_] exist? Answer: It does not, because it arises in dependence on conditions. The reason is, all things which arise in dependence upon conditions are without [self-] nature. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it is natureless. The reason is, because it is natureless, it makes dependent origination. The other two alternatives are evident.

Also, because of dependent origination, it is apart from the four alternatives. Again, because it is natureless, it is also apart from the four alternatives. [500a] These may all be understood correspondingly.

Notes. "The other two meanings are evident": i.e., is it both existent and non-existent? No, because there are many meanings. Is it neither existent nor non-existent? No, because it does not have a dual nature. Second, all four alternatives are again denied, this time on the basis of dependent origination and naturelessness. Dependent origination is apart from existence and non-existence as commonly conceived.

Taikei I.550; _Kōgi_ 454

__Text__. Again, a question: Does the nature which is dependent on others exist? Answer: It does not, because it is banished by means of insight 約觀道. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it has the ability to reveal naturelessness [a = 無生]. The next two alternatives are obvious, because it is divorced from contraries, and it is apart from idle discourse. Again, a question: Does it exist? Answer: It does not, because it is different from the perfect nature, also because it is a part of the nature which is discriminated, and also because it is divorced from idle discourse. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it is different from the discriminated nature, because it is a part of perfected nature, and because it is the realm of wisdom. The other alternatives can be understood accordingly.

__Notes__. The first answer means that false existence is banished by means of __vipaśyanā__, the insight into __śūnyatā__. The second answer means that the insight into the true nature of the dependent nature will reveal that it is nothing but the perfect nature, or __tathatā__. __Paratantra__ seen by the unenlightened is __parikalpita__; seen by the enlightened, it is itself __parinispanna__. The sixth series of negations also deals with __paratantra-svabhāva__. This nature is very important in the scheme of the three natures because, as mentioned above, it is the pivotal point between the other two extremes. As mentioned here and there in the text, we can see that this nature is, in a manner of speaking, made up of two parts, the impure part, and the pure part; it contains within it both error and enlightenment, unreconstructed mortal beings and the Buddha. How it seems to us depends on what our vantage point is. This is clear if we recall that the source of dependently originated things is __tathatā__. Even though tathatā becomes influenced by conditions and "descends" into phenomenal forms, thus having its true nature obscured, this essence, tathatā, is never really lost; thus, the things of this world have both a compounded and uncompounded aspect, both a pure and an impure part. Insight through cultivation of the path will remove the really non-existent, false aspect of the dependently originated and reveal its true aspect.

Taikei I.551-52; Kōgi 455

Text. The discriminated nature [parikalpita-svabhāva]: [1.] Question: Does it exist? Answer: It does not, because it does not exist from the standpoint of ultimate principle. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it exists to the senses. Question: Is it both existent and non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it does not have two natures. Question: Is it neither existent nor non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it is the nature which is discriminated [and therefore exists to the perverted senses of the unenlightened, but is non-existent in reality]. [2.] Again, a question: Does it exist? Answer: It does not, because it is without basis in reality. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it is without any basis in reality. The other alternatives can be understood accordingly. [3.] Again, a question: Does it exist? Answer: It does not, because there is discrimination. Question: Is it non-existent? Answer: It is not, because there is discrimination. Again, does it both exist and not exist? Answer: It does not, because there is discrimination. [4.] Again, does it exist? It does not, because its characteristics are non-existent [in reality]. Again, is it non-existent? Answer: It is not, because it is the realm of insight into the characteristicless. The other alternatives can be understood in the same way. [5.] Again, does it exist? It does not, because it is without essence 體. Is it non-existent? It is not, because it has the ability to obstruct *tathatā*. The other alternatives can be understood in the same way.

Notes. 2. It does not not exist because it has no basis in reality, and therefore does not come under the category of non-existence in reality. 3. None of the four possibilities are correct because, due to discrimination or attachment through sense experience, commonly held notions of existence and non-existence are all wrong.

Taikei I.552-53; Kogi 456-57

Text. Two, showing the errors of discrimination: If you judge that *tathatā* absolutely exists, there are two errors. The first is the error of eternalism; i.e., because it does not obey conditions, because even though existing in the impure, it is not obscured, and because it does not need the illuminating cause 了因, one falls into the error of eternalism.

Notes. If confused beings attempt to seize upon *tathata* as existent or non-existent, they will fall into various kinds of errors; two of the most common kinds are dealt with here. Part of the following refutation is aimed at the *vijñānavādins*, who believe in the absolute existence of *tathata*. Their reasons for believing this are given and are shown as the cause for the error of eternalism. The "illuminating Cause" is prajña, and if one believes that the revelation of tathata does not require the prerequisite of prajña, which is to say cultivation, then one believes that tathatā is eternally revealed without reliance upon conditions. This is one of two types of cause, the other being the "productive cause" 生因, which is internally existing tathatā itself. Cf. next question.

Taikei I.554-56; Kōgi 458

Text. Question: All holy teachings say that tathatā is immutable and eternal. If it does not obey conditions, how can there be an error [in calling it eternal]? Answer: When the holy teachings say that tathatā is immutable and eternal, what they mean is that when it obeys conditions and becomes impure and pure [dharmas], it eternally becomes impure and pure, but it does not lose its own essence. In this case, the eternal which is not different from the non-eternal is called "inconceivable permanence." It does not mean immutability in the common sense of the word, which does not become dharmas. If you claim that it is eternal and does not become dharmas, then because this is a commonsense judgement, you make a mistake about real eternalism. Because the real eternal is not different from the non-eternal eternal, and because the non-eternal eternal appears outside the senses [of deluded folk], it is called the real eternal.

Thus, the [Śrīmālādevī] sutra says, "'Not impure yet impure' means that the eternal becomes non-eternal.

'Impure yet not impure' means that when it becomes non-eternal, it does not lose its eternality." [T.12.222 Int.]

Question: Since in the teaching you have said with reference to the eternal which is not different from the non-eternal that *tathatā* is immutable and eternal, [500b] why don't you say with reference to the non-eternal which is not different from the eternal that *tathatā* is not eternal? Answer: This concept is also discussed in the teaching. Thus, the [*Laṅkāvatāra*] sutra says, "The *Tathāgata*-*garbha* experiences pain or pleasure, and arises and ceases together with the cause." [T.16.512] The *Treatise* [*On the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*] says, "Mind which is pure in its own essence moves and becomes impure mind because of the winds of ignorance," etc.. [T.32.576] Because of this teaching and reasoning, you should know that because *tathatā* is the non-eternal which is not different from the eternal, its essence is hidden in accordance with the conditions. [Therefore,] it does not exist [eternally].

Notes. The "cause" mentioned by the *Laṅkāvatāra* is the seven transforming *vijñānas* outside the *ālaya*; thus, the *ālaya*-*tathāgata*-*garbha* transmigrates in the six *gatis* along with the other *vijñānas*. In the treatise, impure mind means beings; i.e., *tathatā* becomes beings as a result of the influence of *avidya* upon it. "Teaching and reasoning" mean sutra and treatise.

Taikei I.560-62; *Kōgi* 460-61

Text. Question: *Tathatā* is a *dharma* which does not arise or cease. Since you say it is eternal because it is the eternal which is not different from the non-eternal, then you can also say that it is non-eternal because it is the non-eternal which is not different from the eternal. Shouldn't you also be able to say that paratantra-svabhāva, this dharma which arises and ceases, also is the non-eternal which is not apart from the eternal, and the eternal which is not apart from the non-eternal? Answer: This can be said. The reason is, because all impermanent dharmas which arise and cease are without a nature of their own and form dependent origination, therefore, not being different from the eternal, they can be impermanent. Thus, the [Vimalakīrti] sutra says, "Non-origination and non-cessation means non-eternal." [T.14.522] In this case, since they are not different from the eternal, they become impermanent, [and thus arise and cease].

Also, because all [dharmas] which arise and cease are without a nature of their own, you do not call dependently originated [dharmas] natureless just when they are extinguished. In this case, they are the eternal which is not different from the non-eternal. Therefore, the [Large Prajñāpāramitā] sutra says, "Form is empty. It is not the emptiness consisting of the extinction of form." [T.8.22 Int.] Also, the [Vimalakīrti] sutra says, "Beings are identical with nirvāṇa; they are not made to enter nirvāṇa again." [T.14.542 Int.] This is clear if you combine the two meanings here [i.e., the impermanent which is not different from the permanent = similar existence, and the permanent which is not different from the impermanent = naturelessness] with the two meanings of tathatā [i.e., the permanent which is not different from the impermanent = non-alteration, and the impermanent which is not different from the permanent = obedience to conditions]. Here, the true and the false are both related to each other as two, yet, they are not two. Thus, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha [a = 智論] says, "The blind carry to extremes the obstacle to wisdom, and discriminate the true and false." [T.31.153] This is the meaning here.

Therefore, if you discriminate tathatā as immutable and eternal as conceived ordinarily, then its own essence is not obscured when it obeys conditions, and it does not profit from the illuminating cause 了因 . That is to say, you fall into the error of eternalism. Also, if it does not obey conditions and form impure and pure [dharmas], then such dharmas as the impure and pure are without any support. You also fall into the error of eternalism if you suppose that dharmas exist without a support, because impure and pure dharmas are without a nature of their own, and are established in reliance on the real.

Notes. Paratantra-svabhāva, also, can be said to be both eternal and non-eternal. Paratantra, like parinispanna, shares the dual quality of permanence (tathatā is non-changing, and paratantra is without self-nature) and impermanence (tathatā obeys conditions, paratantra exists similar to tathatā). However, tathatā is said to be eternal with regard to essence, or principle, while paratantra is said to be eternal with regard to characteristics. Paratantra is impermanent, but not entirely different from the permanent. If it had a nature of its own, it would not be a part of conditioned arising, but since it is a part of pratītyasamutpāda, which is to say impermanent, it has no nature of its own. Thus it arises in dependence on others. However, the real essence of paratantra is the tathatā which is non-changing but which obeys conditions and becomes impermanent conditioned arising. Also, these dharmas are the permanent which is not different from the impermanent. Since they are all without natures of their own, they are impermanent and empty just as they are; i.e., as similar existence and permanence, they are, nevertheless impermanent by nature. They need not wait for cessation to become empty. The quotation from Pp. shows the same by the equation of form with emptiness, for form is impermanent, but a seeming reality, while emptiness is permanent and without nature. Therefore, paratantra---things which come into existence in dependence on other things---is, just as it is, permanent, because its essence is the tathatā which is permanent. Since paratantra and tathatā each have the two above aspects, paratantra can also be said to be permanent and impermanent.

Taikei I.562-67; Kōgi 462-64

Text. Two, the error of annihilationism: the existence [of tathatā] as conceived by perverted senses is not real existence. Because it is not real existence, it is the cutting off of [true] existence. Also, if it exists, it does not comply with the impure and pure [dharmas]. Since impure and pure dharmas are without natures of their own, if tathatā does not also comply [with conditions], the existence of dharmas would not be possible. This is also annihilationism.

Notes. To make a false attribution to something is to rob it of its real attributes. "Also, if it exists" refers to paratantra-svabhāva; if tathatā does exist really, then since the truly existent is immutable, it does not become dharmas. Therefore, dependently originated dharmas would not exist, because their real essence is tathatā. Thus, this view indirectly entails annihilationism.

Taikei I.567; Kōgi 464

Text. Two, attachment to non-existence: there are also two errors.

First, the error of eternalism: i.e., if tathatā does not exist, then there is no support for the realm of birth and death. If dharmas exist without a support, this is eternalism. Also, if tathatā did not exist, holy wisdom would not have a cause. This also is eternalism. [500c] Also, dharmas could not exist without a support; this would be annihilationism. Also, to discriminate tathatā as non-existent is annihilationism.

Three, [tathatā] both exists and does not exist: this has all the above errors. That is to say, tathatā is non-dual. If it is discriminated as existent or non-existent, this existence and non-existence which the mind discriminates is contrary to the real, so, because the essential principle of the true is lost, this is annihilationism. If you claim that such a discriminated [tathatā] is [the real] tathatā, then because tathatā exists without its true principle, this is eternalism.

Notes. Three, tathatā is non-dual. To say it is both existent and non-existent is to attribute a dual essence to it. This discrimination results in the loss of the real *tathatā* and so entails annihilationism. Also, the above objections to the existence or non-existence of the real apply here to both existence and non-existence in combination.

Taikei I.568-69; *Kōgi* 465-66

Text. Four, neither exists nor does not exist: this is muddled talk about *tathatā*. Because this is the judgement of confused minds, the principle 理 of *tathatā* is lost. That is to say, this is annihilationism. [That which is the object of] muddled talk is not *tathatā*, and if you say it is, then because *tathatā* exists without its real principle, this is eternalism.

Notes. Muddled talk is *prapañca*, also discrimination or judgement. The referent of this kind of talk can not be real; therefore, the principle of *tathatā* as it really is is lost, resulting in the extinction of the real. To insist that such a *tathatā* nevertheless exists entails eternalism, because in this case the real exists without a basis in reality.

Taikei I.569; *Kōgi* 466

Text. Two, production in dependence on others [*paratantra*]. If you discriminate it as existing, there are also two errors. First, the error of eternalism: i.e., since it has an essence already, it does not require conditions, so if *dharmas* exist without conditions, this is eternalism. Also, as a result of discriminating it as existent, it does not depend on conditions, and because it does not depend on conditions, *dharmas* can not exist, so this is annihilationism.

Question: If to say that the nature which is dependent on others exists is an error, then why does the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, etc., say that *paratantra*-*svabhāva* exists? Answer: With regard to the divines saying that the nature which is dependent on others exists, this is the existence which is not different from emptiness. The reason is, on the basis of the conditions, there is no essential nature. Because within each condition there is no agent作者, they can arise dependently. Therefore, existence which is not different from non-existence is called the existence of the dependent on others. Consequently, the divines [such as Asanga and Vasubandhu] establish *dharmas* without disturbing the realm of the real. If it is claimed that that which is dependent on others exists in the common sense of the word, then dependent origination has a nature [of its own]. If conditions [i.e., things originating from conditions] had a nature [of their own], they would not be mutually dependent. If they were not mutually dependent, then that which is dependent on others [i.e., *paratantra*-*svabhāva*] is abolished. If that which is dependent on others is abolished, indeed, the result is attachment to existence [of *dharmas*].

Therefore, you [later masters of the school of characteristics] being afraid of falling into [the error of] emptiness and annihilationism, postulate existence with all your might. You do not believe that because you are not versed in the fact that dharmas which arise in dependence on conditions are without a nature of their own, you destroy dependent origination and still fall into [the error of] emptiness and non-existence, and cut off that which is dependent on others.

Notes. The last question raises the question of how it can be wrong to say that paratantra-svabhava exists, since certain texts say it does. Fa-tsang's answer is that if we say that dharmas exist, this means they have a nature of their own, since only what really exists has a svabhāva. If this were the case, then there would be no need for origination from the concurrence of conditions, and in that event, there would be no such thing as paratantra-svabhāva. The final result would be truly existing dharmas, the error of eternalism. The concluding sentences show the dilemma of the position of those who try to avoid annihilationism-emptiness by asserting existence. True existence derives from the fact that the real essence of dharmas is tathatā.

Taikei I.570-73; Kōgi 467-69

Text. Two, if it is grasped as non-existent, there are also two faults. If you say it is a non-existent dharma, then conditions do not give rise to anything. Dharmas can not exist without something that arises. [501a] This is annihilationism.

Question: If you say that considering dependent origination to be non-existent is to fall into annihilationism, why do the Mādhyamika-kārikās, etc., teach extensively that dependent origination is completely empty? Answer: When the divines say that dependent origination is empty, they mean the empty which is not different from existence. Why is this? Because dharmas are born of conditions, it can be said that they are without a nature of their own. Therefore, the existence of that which is born of conditions is able to be empty. If that were not so, there would be no cause, which is to say dependent arising. Then by what reason would you be able to say they are empty? Therefore, the emptiness which is not different from existence is called the emptiness of dependent origination. In this case, the divines teach the Dharma of the characteristics of the real without disturbing dependent origination.

If you say that dependent origination is empty in the ordinary sense of the word, then there is no origination from conditions. Because there is no dependent origination, the true principle of emptiness does not exist. If the true principle of emptiness does not exist, indeed the result is attachment to emptiness.

Therefore, you [adherents of the San-lun school], fearing that you will fall into the erroneous view of existence, establish emptiness with all your might. You do not believe that because you do not understand natureless dependent origination, you make errors about real emptiness 性空, and because you miss the real emptiness, you end up falling into the wrongly grasped emptiness of people with perverted senses [and thus cut off real emptiness].

Notes. Along with the Middle Treatise, the commentaries also mention the *Dvadaśa-nikaya-śāstra* and the *Śataśāstra* as teaching the emptiness of dependent origination. The text as a whole refutes the San-lun or *Śūnyavāda* position. The main point in the refutation is that it is the *dharmas* which exist thanks to conditions which are empty. If there were not something which exists at least in some sense of the word---and Fa-tsang means *dharmas* which exist in a manner similar to the really real 似有 ---then there would be nothing of which it could be said that they were empty.

Taikei I.573-76; *Kōgi* 470-71

Text. Question: On the basis of the two meanings [i.e., the emptiness of naturelessness, and existence or similar existence of *paratantra*], earlier philosophers [such as Nāgārjuna, Asanga, and Vasubandhu] each explained one meaning [of dependent nature] and fused [the two parts of] the dependent nature, without any disagreement among themselves. Why did later philosophers such as Bhāvaviveka [and Nanda 難陀 and Dharmapāla 護法] each discriminate a single meaning and [in this way] refute each other? Answer: They did not refute each other, they completed each other. Why is this? The faculties of beings in the degenerate times gradually became duller, so when they heard that the dependent nature exists, because they did not attain to the existence which is not different from emptiness, they grasped it as commonly conceived existence. Therefore, Bhāvaviveka and others refuted the existence of the dependent nature and made it non-existent. By understanding the absolute non-existence [of the dependent nature], they then understood the [subtle] existence of that which is dependent on others. If they had not understood the final, real emptiness, they would not have been able to perfect the existence of the dependent nature. Therefore, in order to perfect its existence, they refuted its existence.

Also, these beings heard the doctrine of the absolute, real emptiness of the dependent nature, and because they did not understand that it was the emptiness which is not different from existence, they grasped it as empty in the common sense of the word. Therefore, Dharmapāla and others refuted the common-sense emptiness and maintained the illusory existence [of the dependent nature]. Because they established its illusory existence, they then understood the emptiness which is not different from existence. Because when existence is negated there is no real emptiness, in order to perfect [the meaning of] emptiness, they refuted emptiness.

Because form is empty, Bhāvaviveka's interpretation stands. Because emptiness is form, Dharmapāla's interpretation stands. The two interpretations are in complete harmony. If there were no mutual relationship of the two principles by these later philosophers, the deep Dharma of the nature which is dependent on others of dependent origination could not be shown. Therefore, in refuting each other [501b] they completed each other.

Therefore, the non-existence which is discriminated in common usage makes the error of annihilationism. Also, if it is asserted that _dharmas_ which are dependent on others are non-existent, then there are no conditions. If there are no conditions, there ensues the error of eternalism [because things are spontaneously produced].

Notes. Earlier philosophers such as Nāgārjuna had a thorough understanding of _paratantra_-_svabhāva_, and even though they described it as empty, they understood the real meaning of emptiness. Beings of the degenerate times, however, misunderstood the meanings of emptiness, existence, etc., and so philosophers such as Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla asserted one side or the other in order to combat attachment to the opposite view. In doing this, they brought about a better understanding of _paratantra_-_svabhāva_. The "early philosophers" mentioned comprise both _śūnyavādins_ and _vijñānavādins_; i.e., Nāgārjuna on the one side, and Asanga and Vasubandhu on the other. Fa-tsang is either unaware of the real differences in their respective systems and methods, or chooses to gloss over them to make his own point.

Taikei I.576-82; _Kōgi_ 472-73

Text. Three, both existence and non-existence: this has all the above errors. You can understand it accordingly.

Question: According to what was said before, if the existence or the non-existence of the nature which is dependent on others is grasped onesidedly, it would be impermissible, but if _both_ existence and non-existence are grasped, this should conform to the truth. Why [in this event] would the above errors occur? Answer: Even though in _paratantra_-_svabhāva_ there is both existence and non-existence, still, they are totally interfused, emptiness and existence are interfused. Yet, the "both exists and does not exist" which are discriminated are contraries, and have the above errors.

Four, neither existence nor non-existence: this is confused talk about dependent origination, and is untrue. Why? Because the discriminator does not form a judgement about [both] existence and non-existence, he considers neither existence nor non-existence of common sense to be the truth. Since this is not true, it also has the above errors. You should understand it accordingly.

Three, the discriminated nature 偏計所執性 : if you judge that which is grasped 所執 as existing, there are two errors. That is to say, if that which is grasped exists, the truth which is illuminated by holy wisdom would not be emptiness; i.e., this is eternalism. If the universal judgements of false grasping really exist, then existence as seen from the point of view of common-sense is lost. Therefore, there is the error of annihilationism. Second, if you discriminate universal judgements as non-existent in the common-sense meaning of the term, then common worldlings are not in error and not different from the saints. This is eternalism. Also, because there are [consequently] no common worldlings, this is annihilationism. Also, if there were no delusion, there would be no enlightenment. Also, without enlightenment, there would be no holy persons. This is annihilationism.

Three, with regard to both existence and non-existence, since the essential nature [of _parakalpita-svabhāva_] is non-dual, if you say it both exists and does not exist, there is mutual opposition [between the two]; therefore, there are the above two errors.

Four, neither existent nor non-existent: this is confused talk about the discriminated nature. It also has the above errors. You can understand this accordingly. End of the second section, making errors through discrimination.

Notes. If you say that the discriminated nature really exists, then it would not be shown to be empty in the process of enlightenment. If it is not empty, it exists. This entails the error of eternalism. I presume that what Fa-tsang means when he says that if _parakalpita_ is non-existent in the common sense view of things then worldlings are not different from saints, and this means eternalism, is that sainthood would not come into being or cease to be, and would therefore entail eternalism. It is noteworthy that throughout the text, Fa-tsang seems to equate non-emptiness with eternal existence; thus he can say that if things truly exist as they are through discrimination, they can not be shown to be really empty to the enlightened individual.

Taikei I.584-85; _Kōgi_ 475-76

Text. Three, showing their meanings: _tathatā_ means existence, because it is the basis of error and enlightenment. Also, it means not empty, because it is indestructible. The rest is as explained above. Also, _tathatā_ means emptiness, because it is apart from characteristics, because it obeys conditions, and because it is opposed to the impure. The rest is as explained above.

Also, tathatā both exists and does not exist, because it is endowed with [both] qualities [of emptiness and existence], because it is perfectly free in its opposition and conformity [to becoming mundane dharmas], and because [the two aspects are] mutually related. Also, it does not exist and it does not not exist, because it is two and not two, because it can not be apprehended definitely [as either one]. The rest can be understood in accordance with previous explanations.

Notes. In the previous two sections, each of the four positions was consistently denied because the questions were made from the common sense point of view. The present section affirms each of the four positions from the point of view of enlightenment. Thus, tathatā-parinispanna exists, does not exist, etc.. The last alternative means that it is neither existent nor non-existent because from the point of view of characteristics it is dual, but from the point of view of essence it is non-dual, so neither alternative can be said to pertain to tathatā.

Taikei I.586-87; Kōgi 476-77

Text. Second, the nature which is dependent on others means existence, because it is formed by conditions, because it is without a nature [of its own]. The rest can be understood in correspondence with the above. Also, the nature which is dependent on others means non-existence, because that which is formed from conditions has no nature [of its own]. You can also understand this in relation with the previous. The nature which is dependent on others both exists and does not exist, [501c] because it is formed from conditions and has no nature of its own. It is like the above. The nature which is dependent on others does not exist and does not not exist, because it is two and not two, and accordingly, one [side] can not be apprehended. It is like the foregoing.

Notes. The "previous" is the earlier section where the three natures were discussed in detail. The same arguments apply here.

Taikei I.587-88; *Kōgi* 478

Text. Third, the discriminated nature 遍計 : it exists, because [it exists] to the senses. Discriminated nature does not exist, because [it is non-existent] in reality. The discriminated nature both exists and does not exist, because it is based on what is grasped. The discriminated nature does not exist and does not not exist, because it is based on what is grasped. The rest can be understood in the same way as the foregoing [four alternatives with regard to the discriminated nature]. The foregoing concludes the showing of the three natures separately.

Notes. The third alternative means that because it is grasped, it exists to the senses, and is non-existent in reality. The fourth alternative means that because it is grasped---because it is the discriminated nature---even though it is sensibly existent, it does not exist, and even though it is grasped as non-existent, it is not non-existent, because it exists to the senses.

Taikei I.588; *Kōgi* 478

Text. Three, the general discussion: the three natures being of one limit, if one is presented [for discussion], the totality is included, the true and false are mutually interfused, and the essential nature is without impediment. The Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, quoting the *Sutra of the Questions of the Brahmana*, says, "Oh Blessed One, what do you mean when you say such things as 'The *Tathāgata* does not see *saṁsāra*, the *Tathāgata* does not see *nirvāṇa*'? [The Buddha replied,] 'The nature of discrimination and the nature of reality within the nature which is dependent on others are based on the non-distinction of *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. The reason is, because of the one part, discrimination, this nature which is dependent on others forms *saṁsāra*, and because of the one part which is *tathatā*, forms *nirvāṇa*.' The explanation is, the nature which is dependent on others is not *saṁsāra*. Because this nature forms *nirvāṇa* on the basis of *tathatā*. This nature is not *nirvāṇa*. The reason is, this nature being based on the one aspect of discrimination, it is *saṁsāra*. Therefore, you can not definitely say that it is one part. If you see one part, the nature of the other part is not different. Therefore, he [the Buddha] does not see *saṁsāra*; also, he does not see *nirvāṇa*. For these reasons, the *Tathāgata* answered the Brahmana in this way." [T.31.192]

Notes. The question is raised by the Brahmana. The answer is made by the Buddha, and the explanation, from "The explanation is...", is that of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*.

The burden of this passage, as well as the remaining ones, is to show the mixed nature of *paratantra*-*svabhāva*, that it is the pivotal point between *saṁsara* and *nirvaṇa*; as Fa-tsang says, within this nature exist both the impure and the pure. *Nirvāṇa* is not something apart from mundane facts of existence, this world. To the eyes of the enlightened, the world is *nirvāṇa*; to the eyes of the deluded worldling, it is the realm of birth and death. Because *paratantra*-*svabhāva*, the nature of things consisting of being dependent on the confluence of several conditions for its existence, contains both these parts, or, better, has the potential of being transformable into either part, the Buddha does not see things as pure or impure, neither as *saṁsāra* nor *nirvāṇa*. What is true of *paratantra*-*svabhāva* is true of the other two natures; in this concluding section, Fa-tsang makes a series of general statements about the three natures, using *paratantra*-*svabhāva* as his *point* *d'appui*. It is worthy of note that his treatment of the dependent nature is quite orthodox in its outline, whereas the previous discussion of *pariniṣpanna*-*svabhāva* owes much more to the *tathāgata*-*garbha* line of thought than to the *vijñānavāda*.

Taikei I.588-92; *Kōgi* 479-80

Text. [The *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*] also says, "The *Abhidharma*-*sūtra* says, 'there are three kinds of *dharmas* taught by the Buddha: one, a soiled part; two, a pure part; three, a part which is both soiled and pure. What is the reason for teaching three parts? Within the nature which is dependent on others, the nature of discrimination is the impure part. The nature of *tathatā* is the pure part. The nature which depends on others is [itself] the impure and pure part. For this reason, he taught the three parts.' The explanation is, with regard to the nature of discrimination mentioned in the *Abhidharma*-*sūtra*, defilement [*kleśa*] is considered to be nature. As for the nature of *tathatā*, the pure part is considered to be nature. As for the nature which is dependent on others, because it possesses both parts, the two natures are considered to be nature. Therefore, it says that *dharmas* are tripartite. One, defilement is the part; two, purity is the part; three, the two *dharmas* are the part. This is the reason it says this." [T.31.193]

The above passages also show that the real wholly includes the characteristics of the false derivative without exception. The false permeates the real source, and there is not a bit of its essence which is not completely in a state of extinction. True and false permeate each other, the two aspects are interfused, freely related, wholly included [in each other]. There is no need to go into greater details.

Notes. *Paratantra-svabhāva* appears here in the conclusion as the neutral meeting ground of two extremes, error and enlightenment, *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa.* In terms of the *ālaya-vijñāna*, the neutral *ālaya-vijñāna* has the potentiality for enlightenment or error. The three parts, or three *dharmas*, are this *ālaya*, its unchanged essence, which is the *tathatā* from which it derived, and the discrimination which obscures its true nature. Fa-tsang's contribution to this system is, I feel, to reduce the three aspects to two, the true or real, which is *tathatā*, and the false and derivative, in this case the products of dependent origination and their unreal appearance to the deluded mind. However, even though *tathatā* becomes conditioned by *avidyā* and appears in the six destinations as beings, this essential nature itself does not change, so that animals, demons, those in the hells, and living humans are all endowed with this *tathatā*, or Buddha-nature. It is on the basis of this thought that the Hua-yen presents us with the figure of Vairocana, the primordial Buddha, who permeates all things. It is remarkable, also, that in the conclusion of this very important section, Fa-tsang concludes with a doctrine which is remarkably close to that of the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, *Uttaratantra*, and allied texts; in other words, this is the doctrine not of the infinite interfusion of phenomenon and phenomenon 事事, but the interpenetration of phenomena and noumenon 事理, the doctrine of the "later Mahāyāna," in the terminology of the Treatise. Why Fa-tsang chose to use the theory of the three natures as a rationale for his system is not entirely clear, since he does not incorporate the orthodox interpretation of the theory, but rather reduces the three natures to two. Of course, what he wanted was an emanational theory, in which he could explain universal Buddhahood, or immanent Buddhahood, and so he needed only the root and the derivatives. Perhaps as the Hua-yen apologists claim, he really exploited the theory of three natures for its true meaning, and therefore the true understanding of the three natures involves this sort of emanationalist system. This system as it is is not, then, particularly "one vehicle," but without doubt it serves as the basis for Fa-tsang's own vision of one vehicle. I can not help thinking that behind Fa-tsang's system lies something very Chinese in its inspiration; I mean the old Taoist picture of the myriads of things emanating from a primordial nexus 無, and it is evident in the writings of Fa-tsang that the old Chinese pair *li* and *shih* played a big part in his thinking. A tentative description of Fa-tsang's system would be that it is a Buddhist superimposition on a Taoist model, clothed in the *vijñānavāda* theory of the three natures, which in turn is discussed by means of the Mādhyamika tetralemma. A fuller discussion of this matter can be seen in the Introduction. Several pertinent problems with regard to Fa-tsang's treatment of the three natures are discussed in Prof. G. Nagao's article, "Several Problems in Fa-tsang's Discussion of the Three Natures," in the *50 Year Anniversary Commemorative Anthology of the Kyoto University Department of Arts and Letters*. Kyoto, 1957, pp.183-205. (In Japanese)

Taikei I.592-96; *Kōgi* 481

2. The Six Meanings of Dependent Origination in the Causal Aspect

Text. In explaining these six meanings, I will divide them into six topics: 1. Explanation of the characteristics; 2. theory [502a] 3. enumeration of the alternatives; 4. analysis and synthesis; 5. mutual inclusion; 6. [the six meanings] with reference to the [five] doctrines.

Notes. The title is derived from the fact that whereas the preceeding section was concerned with the meaning of dependent origination in its _result_ aspect, this section discusses the same matter from the standpoint of _cause_. The above six topics are not to be confused with the six meanings of cause; they are only divisions of the discussion. The six meanings are apparently based on _Mahāyānasaṁgraha_ 2 (T.31.165) where they appear under different forms. The essential system can also be found in Vasubandhu's commentary on the _Daśabhūmika_, as will be seen in the following chart. The six meanings are the basis for the Hua-yen doctrine of the identity of all _dharmas_, and being of such importance, have of course been dealt with by other Hua-yen masters such as Chih-yen and Ch'eng-kuan. The point to Fa-tsang's treatment here of _pratītyasamutpāda_ is to show that any and all _dharmas_ may qualify as causes. Fa-tsang has pointed out in his _T'an-hsüan-chi_ that _dharmas_ are all mutually identical on the basis of the identity of the three natures (_trisvabhāva_) as indicated in the foregoing section. Moreover, because the causal essence of any given _dharma_ may alternately possess or not possess power to bring about a result, there is mutual inclusion of all _dharmas_. In arriving at this position, Fa-tsang indicates the completely fluid and free nature of things in their capacity to be causes. As will be seen, this capacity is derived from the possession by any given _dharma_ of the six meanings. Below is a chart of the correspondences of the six meanings with cognate formulations. (From _Kōgi_ pp. 482-83)

Treatise on the Daśabhūmika	緣不生自因生故	因不生緣生故	不共生無知者故	不無因隨緣有故
Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhya	自種有故不從他	待衆緣故非自作	無作用故不共生	有功能故非無因
Wu-chiao-chang	因有力不待緣 因 ---- 因 體 力 ---- 力 用 緣 ---- 緣	因無力待緣	因無力不待緣	因有力待緣
	1 空 有力 不待緣 4 有 有力 不待緣	3 空 無力 待緣 6 有 無力 待緣		2 空 有力 待緣 5 有 有力 待緣
Mahāyānasaṁgraha	1 剎那滅 4 性決定	3 待衆緣 6 恆隨轉		2 果俱有 5 引自果

In the Fa-hsiang schools, the six meanings refer specifically to cause as *bīja*, and while nowhere in Fa-tsang's treatise does he explicitly connect cause with *bīja*, the commentaries leave no doubt that this is what is meant. Cf. for instance *Taikei* II (*Tsūro*) pp. 1, 2. The Fa-hsiang school uses this system to draw a very close distinction between *dharmas*, but the Hua-yen, basing itself on the intuition of a primordial phenomenalization of *tathatā*, in which this absolute does not lose its purity and immutability in the process, uses the same system to show the complete identity of *dharmas*. While assuredly they may differ in characteristics or function, they are in essence one, or, we might say, One. Since there is no essential difference among *dharmas*, any one may qualify as a cause; what may under some circumstances appear as a condition or a result may, under other circumstances, be a cause with its own attendent conditions and result. This will become clearer as Fa-tsang develops his system.

Taikei II.1-2; *Kōgi* 482-85

Text. There are two parts to the first topic: first, I enumerate the names; next, I explain the characteristics. First, the names: all causes have six meanings. 1. [Cause] is empty, has power, does not require conditions. 2. Is empty, has power, does not require conditions. 3. Is empty, lacks power, requires conditions. 4. Exists, has power, does not require conditions. 5. Exists, has power, requires conditions. 6. Exists, has no power, requires conditions.

Notes. "All causes" = all *dharmas*. All *dharmas* are causes. While the Fa-hsiang school considers only the *bīja* in the *ālaya* to be causes, the Hua-yen school considers cause to pertain not only to these *bīja* but to the functioning manifestations of these seeds; i.e., the other seven *vijñānas*, normally considered to be *results*. Emptiness and existence refer to the double aspect of the causal *dharma* considered to be the *static* aspect, while the existence or non-existence of power and the requirement or non-requirement of conditions refer to the *dynamic* aspect. (Cf. Kamegawa, *Kegon-gaku* p.189) Emptiness means that the *dharma* has no self-nature or *svabhāva*, and existence means that it appears to really exist. Possessing power or not possessing power means that the causal element either does or does not have the efficiency or function 用 to produce a result. Under some circumstances, the function of the cause may be completely absorbed into the conditions; in other cases, the opposite is true. In actuality, when the cause has power, cause and conditions produce the result through mutual cooperation, but when the cause does not have power, the power resides in the conditions. Requiring conditions, etc., means that when the cause does not require the conditions, the total ability to produce a result lies in the cause. When conditions are required, again, there needs to be mutual cooperation between cause and conditions. Here, conditions are the traditional ones of *adhipati*, *samanantara*, and *ālambana*. Six meanings are derived from associating both emptiness and existence with each of the basic three possibilities of 1. cause having power and not needing conditions, 2. cause having power and needing conditions, and 3. cause lacking power and requiring conditions. In the chart above, 1,3, and 2 have the meaning of emptiness, while 4,6, and 5 have the meaning of existence. This association is based on Fa-tsang's doctrine of the identity of compounded and uncompounded in the three natures (cf. previous section). Thus, the six meanings pertain to the *dharma* as empty and as existent, i.e., as noumenon and as phenomenon.

Taikei II.3-10; *Kōgi* 485-86

Text. Two, explanation of characteristics: the first [i.e., empty, has power, does not require conditions] means instantaneous extinction 刹那滅. Why is this? Because of instantaneous extinction, [cause] is shown to be without self-nature. This is emptiness. Because of this extinction, the production of the result is possible. This means having power. However, because this extinction does not result from the power of conditions, it is said that there is no need of conditions.

Notes. The six meanings will be discussed one by one, and in each case the explanation is in terms of the categories of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*. Here, in the first meaning, emptiness is asserted on the basis of the instantaneous nature of the dharma. As existing in the past, it no longer exists, it does not yet exist as a future dharma, and it has no duration in the present. In terms of bīja, this means that though the bīja are instantaneous in arising and stopping, they can still produce their result, the vijñanas, so they have power even though empty. No conditions are required. (Cf. Kamegawa, Kegon-gaku pp. 192-93) In this case, the cause absorbs the function of conditions.

Taikei II.10-13; Kōgi 486-87

Text. The second [empty, has power, requires conditions] means [that the cause] exists together [with the result]. Why is this? Because they exist together, [cause] exists at that time. That means [that the cause] is non-existent. This means empty. Because it exists together [with the result], it can form existence. This is the possession of power. Because it exists together [with the result], it is not alone, so it requires conditions.

Notes. Because the cause and its result exist simultaneously, the cause can be said to exist, but since its existence is contingent on the simultaneous existence of its result, it is really empty. Even though empty, it produces the simultaneously existing result, so it is said to have power. The simultaneously existing result actually serves as a condition for the cause, so the cause requires conditions. (Cf. Kamegawa, Kegon-gaku, pp.193) This situation can be clarified by the example of a house (the result). The house (result) exists due to the cause which consists of pillars, beams, etc.. However, the pillars and beams do not exist as pillars and beams until there is a house, so it can be said that the cause and the result are mutually supporting. In this case, what is normally seen as the result also serves as a condition for the cause. The cause is empty, but it does bring the result into being, so it has power. However, it requires conditions to perform its office, in this case the result itself. In terms of bīja, the bīja as cause do not cease to be causal bīja before they bring about their result. They can function as a cause by the capacity of the result to be conditions.

Taikei II.14; *Kōgi* 487

Text. The third [empty, without power, requiring conditions] means it requires all conditions. Why is this? Because [cause] is without a nature of its own, it is empty. Because the cause does not produce [result] and the conditions do, it has no power. For this reason, it requires conditions.

Notes. This means, in the wording of the commentary on the *Daśabhūmika*, that a result derives from many conditions, not from cause. The cause does not, of itself, produce the result. If it did, then the ever-present *bīja* could produce the result at any and all times. Therefore, only when many conditions are present can the result be produced. When the conditions are not present, the *bīja* are not causes; i.e., they are not *bīja*, according to the *Tsūro*, Taikei II.17.

Taikei II.16-17; *Kōgi* 488

Text. The fourth [exists, has power, does not require conditions] means [the nature of the cause is] fixed 決定. Why is this? It has the meaning of existence because its own species does not change. Because it has the power to produce the result of itself, without altering, it has power. However, this non-alteration is not the result of the power of conditions, and this means that it does not require conditions.

Notes. The nature of cause is three-fold: good, bad, and indeterminate. For this reason, a cause which is of good nature produces a result which is good, just as a rice seed will produce a rice plant. Because its nature is fixed, it is not possible for all results to come from any cause. Cause is said to exist because it does not lose its nature under the influence of conditions, and it has power because it produces a result like itself. The commentary of the *Daśabhūmika* therefore says that the result is not produced from conditions because it is produced from its own homogeneous cause.

Taikei II.17-18; *Kōgi* 488

Text. The fifth [exists, has power, requires conditions] means [the cause] attracts its own result. Why is this? It exists because it attracts and manifests its own result. Even though it requires conditions when it produces a result, it does not produce a result which has the nature of the conditions. This means it has power. Therefore, it requires conditions.

Notes. "Attracts its own result" means that the cause produces a result which is like itself; i.e., like *hetu*-*pratyaya*. Therefore, a cause in the form of *citta* produces a *citta*-*dharma*, form produces form, etc.. (Cf. Kamegawa, *Kegon-gaku*, p.194) Even though the cause must have the assistance of conditions, the result is always like the cause, not like the conditions. Because the result resembles the cause, the cause is said to have power. According to the commentaries, this section apparently supports the thesis that a thing is not produced without a cause. (Cf., for instance, the equivalent from the Cmy. to the *Daśabhūmika*, in the above chart.) However, it also certainly means that a single cause does not produce all kinds of results.

Taikei II.18-19; *Kōgi* 489

Text. The sixth [exists, has no power, requires conditions] means [the cause] continuously evolves in dependence [on other conditions]. Why is this? Because of dependence on something other, it would not be nonexistent 不可無. Because it cannot diverge from conditions, it has no power. For this reason, it requires conditions.

Notes. The cause is not able to produce a result of its own power, but necessarily requires conditions. These conditions may be *bīja*, *avidyā*, the other *vijñānas*, etc.. This means that the *bīja* continue to evolve in a continuous stream all the way to the final stage of spiritual development, and this evolution of the seeds is dependent on the right conditions, which serve as a support for the seeds. Cause is denied the power to produce a result without the cooperation of conditions. Fa-tsang seems to be saying that a cause is only a cause as long as it has the help of conditions, and if the conditions are absent, the *bīja* are not causes, but just continue to evolve in a homogeneous series supported by the *ālaya-vijñāna*. The commentaries are not agreed as to what the support of this evolving is. The *Shiji* (*Taikei* II.20) denies that the "other" is composed of *adhipati-pratyaya*, etc., because if these were the support, then when they were absent, the *bīja* would not continue to evolve. This would imply that the support is the *ālaya* itself.

Taikei II.20-24; *Kōgi* 489

Text. Thus, in order to show these six meanings, the *Mahayanasaṁgraha* gives this verse: "Instantaneous cessation, existing together [with the result], continuously evolving in dependence, you should know, and fixed [nature], requiring many conditions, and attracting only its own result [are the six meanings of cause]."

Notes. This passage appears in similar form in several translations of the *Msg.*. Cf. for instance T.31.389. See, also, *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* T.30.302.

Taikei II.24; *Kōgi* 490

Text. Two, the theory. Question: Why are just six meanings taught, and not increased to seven or decreased to five? Answer: If you combine the direct cause with the conditions, there are only three possibilities. 1. The cause has power and does not require conditions, because it produces [the result] completely from its own essence, and does not combine with the power of conditions. 2. The cause has power and requires conditions, because it gives rise [to a result] through mutual assistance [of conditions]. 3. Cause has no power and requires conditions, because it is completely non-efficient and is absorbed into the conditions. Also, with regard to these three meanings, in each cause there are two meanings; that is to say, emptiness and existence are each combined with the three above meanings. Because this makes six, there is no increase or decrease. Question: Why isn't the fourth meaning---without power, not requiring conditions---proposed? [502b] Answer: It is not proposed because it doesn't have the meaning of cause. There is no need to go into details.

Notes. This section will also be divided into six parts, in the form of question and answer. The above text consists of the first two questions and answers. In the text, the first of the three meanings shows that conditions are absorbed into the cause. In two, cause and conditions are mutually supporting and assisting. Three shows that the power of cause is absorbed by the conditions. The fourth is not included because it does not qualify as a cause, and the question is whether cause can produce a result.

Taikei II.25-27; Kōgi491-92

Text. Question: "Requires conditions" means requires what conditions? Answer: It requires the three conditions such as predominant condition [*adhipati-pratyaya*] which are exterior to the causal condition 因事 [i.e., *hetu*-*pratyaya*]. It does not demand the mutual need of its own six meanings.

Notes. The four conditions are *hetu*-*pratyaya*, the condition as cause; *adhipati*-*pratyaya*, the predominant condition; *samanantara*-*pratyaya*, the condition which is antecedent and of similar species; and *ālambana*-*pratyaya*, the condition in the form of the object. Cause means *hetu*, and it requires the other three conditions which are external to itself. It does not require its own six meanings as conditions.

Taikei II.27-33; *Kōgi* 492

Text. Question: The cause has six meanings from the point of view of conditions, but it is not clear as to whether conditions may have them or not from the standpoint of cause. Answer: In this case, there are two points. The predominant condition [*adhipati*-*pratyaya*] can have the six meanings from the standpoint of its own predominant result, because then it is included under [the category of] main cause. From the standpoint of other results [than its own direct one] it is a remote cause and so it does not have the six meanings. This is also true of the cause in relation to other [results besides its own main one].

Notes. *Adhipati*-*pratyaya* also can have the six meanings of cause because from a certain standpoint it functions as *hetu*. That is to say, when the predominant condition itself can be seen to have its own results, it is then *hetu*, but it is only a distant cause when seen from the standpoint of other results than its own direct result. Even *hetu*-*pratyaya* does not have these six meanings when considered in relationship with results other than its own direct one. Using the example of rice, the rice plant has a rice seed as *cause*, and the necessary *conditions* are sun, soil, and water. The rice seed is *hetu* and the resultant rice plant is *nisyanda-phala*, a result like the cause. From the standpoint of its result and attendent conditions, the causal seed has the six meanings. However, the sun as a condition, from the standpoint of cause, does not have the six meanings. The sun, soil, etc., can, however, also have results of their own; for instance, the sun produces brightness, warmth, etc., the soil produces firmness, and the water produces dampness. These are all direct results of their own cause. Thus, the predominating condition, seen in conjunction with its own predominating result, has the relationship of *hetu* to *nisyanda*-*phala*, and thus has the six meanings. However, in this case, the dominant condition is being considered in isolation and therefore may qualify as a cause, but seen as only a condition of a result arising from the *hetu*, it does not have the six meanings. The general answer to the question is no, conditions do not have the six meanings.

Taikei II.34-36; *Kōgi* 492-93

Text. Question: Does the result have the six meanings? Answer: The result has only the two meanings of emptiness and existence. That is to say, because [the result] is born of another and is without an essence of its own, it is empty. Because it comes into being thanks to the cause, it exists. If you speak of their reciprocally becoming cause and result, then when this certain *dharma* [i.e., as result] becomes the cause of another, it has the six meanings. When it is the result of another, it has only the two meanings. Therefore, the six meanings exist only in a cause. Question: If that is true, then when present manifestations [現行 i.e., the *vijñānas* as functioning results of *bīja*] become the cause of *bīja*, would they not have the six meanings? Answer: They do not have them, in accordance with the superior condition. A treatise [i.e., *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*] says that *bīja* have the six meanings. [T.31.9] This is said in connection with the undeveloped Mahāyāna. With regard to the hidden meaning of dependent origination, all [*dharmas*] have the six meanings. This is said in connection with the developed Mahāyāna. In this teaching, the sixth and seventh *vijñānas*, etc., are the *Tathāgata-garbha* which has obeyed conditions, and have no nature of their own. Therefore, the sixth and seventh *vijñānas*, etc., are endowed with the six meanings in the fundamental [*ālaya*-] *vijñāna*. There is no need to go into details.

Notes. The "present manifestations" are the seven *vijñānas* as results of *bīja* in the *ālaya*. However, these forms of consciousness themselves create new *bīja*, and therefore should, as cause, have the six meanings of cause. According to the undeveloped Mahāyāna, meaning the Fa-hsiang school, they do not have the six meanings, because the seeds in the *ālaya* are the stronger cause of the two. The other *vijñānas* are weak as causes, compared to the seeds of the *ālaya*, and therefore only the seeds, as the superior, are given the meaning of cause. Presumably what this means is that while the seeds are able to produce the *vijñānas*, the latter can only create seeds with the help of other seeds as conditions, and therefore the seeds are seen as indubitable causes. The later Mahāyāna rejects this distinction because the seven transforming consciousnesses share with the *ālaya* the common state of being the phenomenalization of the ultimate reality, and in their common emptiness, are alike in their ability to have the six meanings.

Taikei II.38; *Kōgi* 494

Text. Three, the enumeration of alternatives: there are two kinds. The first has to do with essence;

the second concerns function. First, in connection with the existence or non-existence of the essence [of cause], there are four alternatives. 1. It exists; i.e., this means that its nature is fixed. 2. It does not exist; this means instantaneous cessation. 3. It both exists and does not exist; this is a unity of the combination of [the meanings of] attracting its own result and existing simultaneously [with the result]. 4. It neither exists nor does not exist; this is the unity of the combination of [the meanings of] constantly evolving in dependence and requiring conditions.

The four alternatives in connection with function are: 1. [The function is] not born of itself, because of the unity of the combination [of the meanings] of constantly evolving in dependence and requiring conditions. 2. It is not born from something other than itself, because of the unity of the combination of instantaneous cessation and fixed [nature]. 3. It is not born of both [itself and another], because of the unity of the combination of existing together [with the result] and attracting its own result. 4. It is not born without a cause, because of [emptiness and existence] possessing the three alternatives and uniting to make the six meanings and becoming a cause. Consequently, as a result of the six meanings, cause and conditions are wholly absorbed [into each other], and show the marvellous qualities of dependent origination.

Notes. The meaning of this perplexing section can be summarized by quoting Fa-tsang's *T'an-hsüan-chi*, where the same picture of the cosmos is being drawn. There, he says, because a *dharma* alternately does or does not have the power to produce a result, all *dharmas* unite in mutual aid to bring about a result. Also, because the *dharma* in question is both empty and existent, all *dharmas* are identical with each other. That is, as existents, *dharmas* (including things) appear as real, each different, each presenting its own special characteristic. However, at the same time, each of these *dharmas* is ultimately nothing but the appearance of the absolute *tathatā* in time and space; thus, all are *essentially* alike. Here, emptiness and existence are defined in terms of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* as being respectively instantaneousness in arising and ceasing, and as of a fixed nature. The third alternative, both existent and empty, is defined as attracting its own result, and existing together simultaneously with its result. Since in both cases the cause has power and requires conditions in order to give rise to the result, the cause and the conditions have a mutual need, and thus are essentially non-dual. In the fourth alternative, the cause does not exist because it lacks power and requires conditions; i.e., its power is totally absorbed in the conditions. It is not non-existent because it helps to bring out the result with the aid of conditions. In both instances, it lacks power and requires conditions, and in this way it is non-dual and the cause and conditions are absorbed into each other. The first two simple possibilities do not, in the text, show this kind of identification and mutual inclusion, but in effect they do absorb the qualities of each other and thus fit the pattern of mutual identity. (Cf. particularly *Kōgi* 494) It is necessary to reemphasize that the above four alternatives apply to any one *dharma*, and thus to each of all *dharmas*, because, as the *Tsuro* (Taikei II.41) points out, *each dharma* is on the one hand empty and without any self-essence, and on the other hand is a product of many conditions and appears to us *as if* ultimately real.

With regards to the ability or non-ability of a *dharma* to create a result, two definitions are combined to make one lemma of the tetralemma, and the final, fourth lemma is the general one consisting of the denial of causelessness, based on the obvious implications of cause in the prior three lemmas. The first alternative is that the result does not arise out of its own cause alone. This is based on the fact that (1) the cause continuously evolves in dependence on the other, and (2) it requires many conditions. In the first instance, the cause lacks power and requires conditions. In the second, it also lacks power and requires conditions. In both, the conditions absorb causal power, and thus one alternative is that result does not come from its own cause alone. In the second alternative, the result does not derive from any influence outside its own cause; i.e., the cause takes on any power the conditions might have. The reasons for this are (1) the cause has power and requires conditions; i.e., it is instantaneous in arising and ceasing; and (2) it has power and requires conditions, meaning that its nature is fixed. In both cases there is power to produce the result and a need for conditions. The third alternative is that the result is not produced of both its own cause and another outside the cause. In existing simultaneously with its result, the cause has power and requires conditions. Also, in attracting its own homogeneous result, it has power and requires conditions. In both cases, again, there is efficiency and a need for conditions. Because there is power, it produces a result; because it requires conditions, it produces the result with the aid of something outside itself. Thus, the result is not produced from both. Finally, the result is not produced without a cause, because six meanings of cause result from the combination of the two meanings of emptiness and existence with each of the three meanings of having power, etc..

Taikei II.42; *Kōgi* 495-96

Text. Therefore, the *Treatise on the Daśabhūmika* says, "[Result] is not produced from the cause because it is produced from conditions. It is not produced from conditions because it is produced from its own cause. It is not produced from both because there is no connection between them 無知者 [502c] because at the time of activity, [cause] does not remain. It is not born without a cause because [the result] exists in dependence on conditions."[緣 a = 順 T.26.170]

Also, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā* says, "Because [a result] has its own seed, it does not arise out of another. Because it requires conditions, it does not arise out of itself. Because [the cause] lacks power, [the result] is not produced from both [itself and another]. Because [the cause] has power, [the result] is not produced without a cause." [T.31.712]

Notes. The third alternative from the commentary on the Daśabhūmika denies that the result arises out of the combined force of a cause and conditions, and the implication seems to be that there is no cause for a result. Vasubandhu's reason is that there is no relation between the cause on the one hand and conditions and the result on the other hand, because when the result appears, the cause is already past, and when the cause exists, the result is in the future, etc.. The fourth alternative denies causeless origination of dharmas, because when dependent origination is seen in its twelve-limbed form (dvadaśānga-pratītyasamutpāda), it is clear that things have a cause. According to the Taikei, the first alternative refutes origination from self, as in the case of Brāhman; the second refutes origination from others, meaning Iśvara; the third denies origination from the confluence of cause and conditions, such as the uniting of atoms with the great elements (mahābhuta); and the fourth denies spontaneous---i.e., causeless---production. This is, however, Vasubandhu's explanation, not Fa-tsang's. His interpretation is that the first alternative means that the cause absorbs all the power of conditions and does the creating alone. In two, the conditions absorb the power of the cause. In three, there is no cause, and in four, there is mutual benefit of cause and conditions. He then arrives at the fourth possibility---things are not produced without a cause---by taking the above four alternatives as a general implication of causality. Now, a comparison of Fa-tsang's conclusions with those of the commentary on the Daśabhūmika and the Vyākhyā will show an interesting discrepancy. The discrepancy comes from the fact that whereas the treatises of Vasubandhu and Asanga conclude that the result doesn't come from both cause and conditions together, Fa-tsang concludes that in this case there is no meaning of cause. In the fourth column of the chart which follows, the previous two treatises arrive at the conclusion that things are not born without a cause, but Fa-tsang concludes on the basis of the same material that there is production if causes and conditions aid each other. He then states a separate general conclusion on the basis of the implications of the foregoing analysis. This is shown in a chart taken from Yusugi's Kōgi, p.498.



Treatise on the Daśabhūmika	緣不生自因生故	因不生緣生故	不共生無知者故	不無因隨緣有故
Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā	自種有故不從他（不他生句）	待衆緣故非自作（不自生句）	無作用故不共生（不共生句）	有功能故非無因（不無因生句）
Wu-chiao-chang	因有力不待緣（不他生句）	因無力待緣（不自生句）	因無力不待緣（不成因義）	因有力待緣（不共生句）

不無因生句

Part of the discrepancy is certainly due to the fact that different schools used this type of analysis of causation for different purposes. A group like the Fa-hsiang, for instance, uses this analysis to dispose of erroneous, common-sense interpretations of causality by refuting the four possible positions anyone can take on causality. Fa-tsang's purpose, on the other hand, is to demonstrate a positive picture of causality in which there is a completely free exchange among _dharmas_ of the functions of cause and conditions. With this purpose in mind, he excludes the third alternative of the treatises as not having the meaning of cause, and in fact, this is the traditional interpretation of that clause. Then, because he is interested in the positive interpretation of cause, he reads the fourth alternative in a positive manner as meaning that when cause and conditions aid each other, a result will appear, and by "not born of both" he apparently means not from either cause separately or by conditions separately. This he derives from Vasubandhu's statement, on which he bases his conclusion of "not born without a cause," that "things are not without causes because the result exists in accordance with conditions." Fa-tsang restates this as "cause has power and requires conditions." Thus, the discrepancy is a result of the reuse of traditional materials. His handling of this material makes more sense if we keep in mind his desire to show here the identity of all _dharmas_. The first alternative of the chart above shows that things are not born of conditions _because the ability to create the result is totally absorbed into a causal dharma_. The second shows that a result does not derive from its own _dharma_, or, in other words, from itself, _because causal power is totally absorbed by conditions_. The third does not mean cause. The fourth shows that a result comes from the total mutual aid of causes and conditions, and this is nothing but a combination of alternatives one and two. The discrepancy is not noticed by the old commentaries, so perhaps no real problem should be seen here.

Taikei II.43-46; _Kōgi_ 497-98

Text. Question: What is the difference between these six meanings and the eight negations [of Nāgārjuna]? Answer: The eight negations are based on negation; the six meanings are concerned with affirmation. Also, in the eight negations, the principle is manifested by opposing common-sense judgments. In the six meanings, the common-sense judgments are disposed of by showing the principle. They are only two sides of the same coin 左右耳 .

Notes. The eight "noes" of Nāgārjuna negate production, cessation, departure, arrival, identity, difference, annihilation, and eternality, and in the process show that all dharmas are empty. Thus, in the Śūnyavādin view, reality is this emptiness of all dharmas. Fa-tsang, on the other hand, also wishes to show the emptiness of things, and by this emptiness he means the immanence of the noumenon, tathatā, or Buddha-nature, in all things. It is clear that Fa-tsang was no Mādhyamikan, and his ontology is a great remove from that of Nāgārjuna. He is much more interested in emphasizing existence along with emptiness, and through an identity of saṁskṛta and asaṁskṛta an emphasis on the identity of saṁskṛta with saṁskṛta 事事無礙 . Yusugi (Kōgi p.499) feels that Fa-tsang and Nāgārjuna are essentially in agreement, but it may be questioned whether Nāgārjuna would have agreed with this really non-Indian vision of things.

Taikei II.46-47; Kōgi 499

Text. Four, analysis and synthesis: 1. Re. essence, there is only one, because cause does not have two essences. 2. Re. meaning, this is two-fold; i.e., it is empty and existent, because it is without a nature of its won, and because things appear as a result of conditioned production. 3. With regard to function, it is divided into three: one, it has power and does not require conditions; two, it has power and requires conditions; three, it is without power and requires conditions. In one, there is total power; in three, there is no power at all; and in the middle one, there is both power and no power. A fourth alternative, no power and not requiring conditions, is not discussed because it is not a cause. Therefore, there are only three alternatives. 4. It may be divided into six: i.e., because each of the two meanings [of emptiness and existence] is included in the three meanings [enumerated in 3.], as was discussed previously. 5. It may be divided into nine. That is, each of the above three meanings possesses in itself the three meanings. Why is this? If [for instance] there were no possession of power, there would not be any lack of power. Therefore, because each of the three possesses the three, there are nine. 6. It may be divided into twelve; i.e., because the two parts, empty and existent, in the above six meanings are not separated from each other, emptiness is identical with existence and existence is identical with emptiness. There are six "existences" in emptiness and also six "emptinesses" in existence, so there are 12. 7. It may be divided into eighteen. That is, in each of the above six meanings there are three meanings. Thus, one, the existence and non-existence of essence; two, the existence and non-existence of power; three, [existence and non-existence] in connection with requiring or not requiring conditions. Three sixes make eighteen. 8. It may be divided into thirty-six. That is, all six meanings are included in each of the six. Why is this? Because if one were lacking, all would be lacking. Other categories may be understood accordingly.

Notes. 1. Though cause has six meanings, cause is cause, without any other essence. 2. As explained above, cause exists as a *thing* due to preceeding causes and conditions. However, at the same time, it is empty; i.e., its true nature is the absolute which remains unchanged. 3. Cause and conditions are mutually aiding. Though the cause has power, it works in collaboration with conditions. 4. This is the point of the present second section of Chapter 10. The cause, both as empty and as existent has the three meanings of having power and not requiring conditions, etc.. 5. Each of the three meanings of having power and not requiring conditions, etc., possess the same three meanings. This seems to mean that having power implies the absence of power, due to the identity of *dharmas*. An example of this would be a boxing match. The fact that one person wins automatically implies that the other person loses. The reverse situation is also true. Thus, without defeat there is no victory, and without victory there is no defeat. 6. Emptiness and existence are identical. Existence is the existence of emptiness, and emptiness is the emptiness of the existent. Thus, there are six meanings in the emptiness which is not different from existence and six meanings in the existence which is identical with emptiness. Emptiness has its own three meanings of having power, etc., as well as the three meanings of having power, etc., which belong to existence. The same is true of existence. 7. Each of the six meanings has the meaning of 1. existence and non-existence of essence; 2. existence and non-existence of power; 3. need of conditions and no need of conditions. 8. Because of the complete interdependence of things as part of the process of dependent origination, if one thing is missing, all things are missing. There is complete mutual need among all things. This process can be carried on *ad infinitum*; the thirty-six may each possess thirty-six, etc.. As is clear, there is no end of this multiplication; any given *dharma* can be seen from any viewpoint from one, or One, up to infinity.

Taikei II.47-49; *Kōgi* 500-02

Text. Five, fusion 融攝: on the other hand, the six meanings can be grasped by combining them with the six characteristics 六相 . That is, fusion of the six meanings in a single cause is universality 總. The division of a single cause into six meanings is speciality 別. [503a] The six meanings equally called cause is identity 同. The six meanings in their capacity of not losing their characteristics [of each being different] is diversity 異. Because the six meanings are able to make a cause, there is the characteristic of integration 成. The remaining of each of the six meanings in the meaning of its own class is the characteristic of disintegration 壞.

Question: What are the boundaries of the six meanings and the six characteristics? Answer: The six meanings are based on the self essence of dependent origination 緣起自體; the six characteristics are based on the meaning of dependent origination. When the *dharma* essence [of the six meanings] is included in the six characteristics 義門 then there is a distinction. If the six meanings are included in the four alternatives [i.e., not produced from self, others, both, neither], then because negation is used to show this, this falls in line with the three vehicles. If they are included in the six characteristics, then since this shows the merits [of the mutual reliance of cause and conditions] itself, this conforms to the one vehicle. Therefore, the four alternatives and the six characteristics together are the skillful means of enlightenment in the *dharma* [-*dhātu*].

Notes. The six characteristics are the characteristics possessed by each dharma, so that at one time it is universal, special, identical, diverse, integrated, and disintegrated. The Fu-ku-chi (Taikei II.49) defines the universal as the totality of the cause which forms the result. The special refers to the six meanings which make up the totality of cause. Identity is its unified integrity which makes it a totality, and the diversity of the six meanings are the formants of the unity; i.e., because of the difference or diversity of the six meanings, the unity which is a causal dharma exists. Integration refers to the qualifications which the dharma possesses of being a cause, because it has the six meanings. Finally, disintegration again refers to the causal dharma possessing six meanings which remain separate meanings even while united in a single causal dharma. The six characteristics are obviously composed of two sets of three characteristics, 1,3, and 5 referring to the totality or unity of the cause, and 2,4, and 6 referring to the fact that the unified cause is what it is by virtue of its six meanings. However, the totality and the partiality are two ways of looking at the cause; they are united in a single bīja-cause.

When these six characteristics are associated with the six meanings of the present section, the one-vehicle teaching of the mutual causality of dharmas is shown. When the same six meanings are associated with the four alternatives, the three-vehicle negative dialectic is shown, because the six characteristics are not employed. Thus, the Hua-yen emphasis on the mutual causality of dharmas is derived from the combination of the six meanings and the six characteristics. In other words, the six meanings themselves are, as was shown above, reducible to the four alternatives, but they take on another meaning when the dharma containing these six meanings is also seen as having the six characteristics of wholeness, partiality, etc..

Taikei II.50-51; Kōgi 502-03

Text. Six, as far as the [five] doctrines are concerned, in the small vehicle, the characteristics of cause [must be considered from the standpoint] of attachment to dharmas [as having only the meaning of existence]. The names and significance of the six meanings do not exist. In the three vehicles, in the ālaya-vijñāna and the tathā-

gata-garbha as cause for the [belief in] emptiness of *dharmas*, the name and meaning of the six meanings exist, but still there is no possession of the interrelationship of primary and secondary.

Notes. The small vehicle has no concept at all of the six meanings, which derive from the coexistence in a *dharma* of both emptiness and existence. The small vehicle has abandoned the false notion of a personal self, but is still attached to the reality of the *dharmas*. With regard to the three vehicles, the *ālaya* is an oblique reference to the early doctrine, and *tathāgata-garbha* is a reference to the developed Mahāyana. Though the undeveloped Mahāyāna does not speak of the interfusion of the noumenon and phenomenon, there is such a concept in the developed schools, but they still lack the concept of the infinite interrelationship of all phenomena on the basis of the six meanings of a *dharma*.

Taikei II.51-52; *Kōgi* 504

Text. In the perfect causation of the one vehicle, [symbolized by the realm] of Samantabhadra, [the teaching of causation] reaches perfection in the infinitely repeated possession of the secondary by the primary and the infinity of [the activity of] dependent origination. Because of the concepts of emptiness and existence, there is mutual identity; because of the concepts of having power and not having power, there is mutual pervasion; because of the concepts of requiring conditions and not requiring them, there is the category of identical essence and different essence. Because these concepts exist, oceans of Buddha-lands can be put in the follicle of a hair. This is evident if you think about it.

Notes. Causation in the one vehicle---that is, in

Hua-yen---means that all things in the universe are identical with each other, and this identity is based on the six meanings that a dharma has in its capacity of being a cause. In fact, each thing is a cause for everything else. Samantabhadra symbolizes this aspect of the one vehicle. "Identical essence" and "different essence" mean that, in the case of the first, when the cause does not require conditions in order to bring forth the result, the would-be power of the conditions is totally usurped by the cause, and therefore there is no causal essence outside itself. However, in the second instance, the causal dharma can bring forth the result only with the cooperating help of external conditions, and therefore, causal power exists separately from the dharma considered to be the cause *per se*. The whole problem of identical essence and different essence will be covered in greater detail in the following section.

Taikei II.53-54; *Kōgi* 504

3. The Dharma Teaching on the Freedom of the Ten-fold Profound Dependent Origination

Text. The concept of the Dharma teaching on the freedom of the ten-fold profound dependent origination: the dependent origination of the *dharma-dhātu* is free and infinite 自在無窮 . Now, I shall make a rough division of two parts through the use of essential topics. First I show the result, final enlightenment, which is to say, the ten Buddhas' own realm. Second, I discuss doctrine in connection with cause, the compliance with conditions [consisting of the needs of living beings]; i.e., the realm of Samantabhadra. With regard to the first part, [*dharmas*] being perfectly free in their interrelationship, one is identical with all, and all are identical with the one, but the form [of this realm] can not be discussed. What this is, is the mutual inclusion of the final result of the ocean of realms 國土海 and the self-essence of the ten Buddhas, etc., in the [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra. The non-discussion of [the realm of] Indra, or of the minuscule [including large things within it] concerns this inexpressibility. Why is this? Because it is not related to teaching. The treatise on the *Daśabhūmika* says, "Cause is expressible; the result is beyond words." This is what is meant here. Question: If this is what you mean, why does the [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra discuss result in the chapter on "The Inconceivability of Buddhahood" and elsewhere? Answer: This result is discussed because result is depicted in contrast to conditions, in order to achieve [the meaning of] result. It is not the final, independent result. For this reason, because it is discussed in the same assembly with [beings of the] causal stage, we know it is only a contrastive device.

Notes. This third section deals with result, in contrast to the emphasis on cause in the preceeding section, and shows the total mutual identity of *dharmas*-things as the results of prior causes and as constituting the *dharma*-*dhātu*. This is really the central section of the chapter, to which the foregoing two sections serve primarily as preparative expositions. The mutual identity and mutual inclusion of *dharmas* in this section are based on, in the previous sections, first, the emptiness and existence of causal essence, second, the presence or absence of power to produce results, and, finally, through the six meanings of cause, the complete freedom of *dharmas* to interrelate. Whereas in those sections, Fa-tsang attempted to explain the basis for his view of interpenetrability, the section at hand is an attempt to demonstrate this state, and in doing so, Fa-tsang brings to bear on the problem the famous analogy of the ten coins. He has, in the present treatise, used the "old" form of the ten-fold profound *pratītyasamutpāda*, inherited from Chih-yen and Tu-shun. A "new" form appears in the *T'an-hsüan-chi*, which he composed at a later time, and where it appears for the first time. I have discussed these two different forms in the Introduction. As elsewhere in the Treatise, Fa-tsang here uses the number ten to symbolize inexhaustibility, and thus in showing interrelatedness in ten different ways, he is postulating an infinite interrelationship of things with things. He arrives at this state of things mainly on the basis of a preliminary identity of the noumenal and phenomenal, *li* and *shih* 理事, but this state of interrelatedness is not based on an *ex post facto* deduction based on the pervasiveness of *li*, but is rather affirmed on the basis of things just as they are, as the existing products of causes and conditions. The "mutual inclusion of the final result of the ocean of realms and the self-essence of the ten Buddhas" is an oblique reference to the two kinds of *karma* result, the world receptacle and body, and the psychic character. These are the results which constitute Buddhahood and are considered to be indescribable.

The question and answer revolve around Fa-tsang's statement that result, consisting of the totality of the Buddha's enlightenment, is beyond words, as he has repeatedly asserted here and there in the treatise. If it is asked how it is that result is indeed discussed in the *Avataṁsaka*'s sixth assembly, the answer is that there, result is discussed only in juxtaposition with the main topic, which is cause. The main burden of that section of the sutra, however, is cause, or the causal stage of the Bodhisattva's development, as we know that there is no real attempt to explain the result stage, or perfect enlightenment, the nature of which is only completely known by a Buddha. In saying that this present section deals with result, there is no self-contradiction with Fa-tsang's assertion that result is inexpressible. The previous section dealt with *dharmas* purely from the standpoint of their qualifications for being causes. Now, rather than discussing these qualifications, Fa-tsang will discuss *dharmas qua* existing facts having a peculiar relationship among themselves. It does not mean that the focus of the section will be the ten Buddhas' own realm, the inconceivable realm of *nirvāna* which is beyond us.

Taikei II.56-64; *Kōgi* 505-09

Text. The second concept has two parts: the first is shown briefly through the use of a comparison. [503b] The second is extensively discussed in connection with the Dharma [i.e., the application of the figure of speech]. First, the comparison: it is like the method of counting ten coins. The reason for speaking of ten is that it satisfies the requirements for a perfect number for purposes of showing inexhaustibility [or infinity].

Notes. For Fa-tsang, the number ten is appropriate for the purpose of expressing infinity, or inexhaustibility. It will be noted that the number ten has been used extensively in the Treatise, always with the same intent. Often, however, it is used with the intent of suggesting some kind of infinity where infinity is not really involved, and in these cases, as in the enumeration of topics or the structuring of a chapter, the result is only a vague suggestion or allusion to the religious connotations of the ten. These are artificial uses, and tend, I believe, to overinflate the text. Here, however, ten is used to suggest infinity or all-inclusiveness, much as Chih-i used ten in his own system. For Fa-tsang, ten implies perfection because no matter how far beyond ten one goes, there is still only ten plus one, ten plus two, etc., up to infinity. Even a very large number is nothing but a series of tens which in turn include the smaller numbers making up the ten.

Taikei II.64-65; Kōgi 510

Text. In this section, there are also two parts. One is different essence, two is common essence. The reason there are these two divisions is that there are two meanings in all [dharmas] of dependent origination. The first is the meaning of not being mutually reliant; i.e., because [a dharma] of itself possesses [countless] qualities, such as not requiring conditions, in the cause. The second is the meaning of mutual reliance, such as the need for conditions [by the cause], etc.. The first is common essence, and the second is different essence.

Notes. Common essence and different essence are here defined in terms of requiring conditions and not requiring conditions, as was treated in the previous section. In brief, common essence means that all *dharmas* share the same essence, so that any given *dharma* possesses all the qualities of all other *dharmas*. Different essence means that *dharma* "A" and the others are different in essence and function. In the first case, a *dharma* has no need for the help of external conditions and produces a result by its own power. In the second case, *dharma* "A" in collaboration with all other *dharmas* produces a result. On the analogy of the ten coins, when we speak of different essence we mean that each of ten coins is completely different, so that if one coin is removed, there can not be two coins or ten coins. This implies that if any one thing is removed from the totality of all things, that original configuration will be changed, or conversely, each separate thing in the universe plays its part in the whole. When, on the other hand, we speak of common essence, we mean that coin "A" contains the power or quality to create two coins, or three, or ten, so that from situation to situation, "A" includes the others within it. Thus, one *dharma* is identical with the others which it includes within itself. Dharmas "B", "C", *ad infinitum*, included in "A" as "others" are thus each "A" from a different point of view. Any particular thing is alternately a cause or a condition, resulting in a very fluid state of *dharmas*. This is shown by Fa-tsang later on in this section where he applies this system to such things as time, space, etc..

Taikei II.65-67; *Kōgi* 510

Text. In connection with different essence, there are two parts: 1. Mutual identity; 2. Mutual inclusion. The reason there are two parts is that all *dharmas* which arise from conditions have two meanings. [These are] 1. Empty and existent; this is from the point of view of self-essence. 2. Having power and having no power; this is from the point of view of efficiency. Because of the first meaning, mutual identity is possible. Because of the last meaning, mutual inclusion is possible.

Notes. Things are identical because they all are essentially empty, though appearing as existent. Thus, the one is identical with the many, the many are identical with the one. Things include each other because each thing possesses the characteristics of having power and lacking power to produce an effect independently (Cf. the preceeding section). Because any *dharma* can function as a cause (i.e., includes the characteristics of others within it), it can produce an effect. Because each *dharma* is unique in essence and function, the cause needs the collaboration of conditions external to itself, which means *all* *dharmas*. If I understand Fa-tsang correctly, he is simply saying that when a thing assumes the position of a cause in a cause-effect nexus, it exists and others are empty (of a causal essence), and in so doing, it possesses complete power in the sense that, in becoming a cause, it takes on the inherent ability of conditions, the "other", to do the same when they become causes, in which case the other can be said to lack the power. However, the new cause requires the collaboration of all other things to be a cause.

Taikei II.67-68; *Kōgi* 511

Text. With regard to the first [i.e., mutual identity, different essence], because when "A" 自 exists, the others 他 necessarily do not exist, the others are identical with "A". Why is this? Because as a result of the others being without a self-nature, the "A" creates [the result]. Second, because at the time "A" is empty, the others necessarily exist of themselves, "A" is identical with the others. Why is this? Because as a result of "A" being without self-essence, the others create [the result]. Because each of the two existences and two emptinesses are not simultaneous, ["A" and the other] are identical with each other. They are always identical with each other because of the identity of the non-existence of the existing and the existence of the non-existing. If this were not so, dependent origination would not occur and there would be the error of self-essence, etc.. This is clear upon consideration.

Notes. A certain dharma, "A", is considered to be a cause in a certain context, and at this time it is said to be existent with regard to causal essence. All other dharmas do not qualify to be causes in this one context, and so they are said to be empty or non-existent, again insofar as causal essence is concerned. In this situation, "A" has the sole and total power or potential to create its own homogeneous result. However, if the context changes, another dharma previously considered to be "other" now becomes "A" or the center of the cause-result complex, and the dharma previously considered to be "A" is merely the "other", so that in the totality of things which we call the dharma-dhātu, each thing is constantly serving as a cause for something else, resulting in a completely interdependent totality. All things are thus identical in being simultaneously empty and existent, and are mutually inclusive or interdependent in being able to individually absorb the causal power of all others into themselves. The Tsūro (Taikei II.69) says in regard to the statement "Because at the time 'A' exists the others do not exist, therefore, the others are identical with 'A'," that a dharma occupying the position of cause can exist as cause only if all the others do not exist (which is to say that if others served as cause, "A" would not be the cause). Thus, a dharma is simultaneously empty and existent in relation to all other dharmas. "A" and the other dharmas are identical because even though dharmas manifest themselves in a causal capacity, they are empty, without self-essence; however, even though they are empty, they manifest themselves as causes. Thus, a single dharma is simultaneously empty and existent. With this state of things, dharmas are mutually empty and existent. If they were simultaneously, say, existent with respect to each other, dependent origination would not be possible.

Taikei II.68-69; Kōgi 511-12

Text. Two, with regard to power, because "A" 自 has complete power, it can therefore include the other 他. Because the other is [on that occasion] totally without power, it can therefore be included in "A". The other having power, and "A" lacking power, can be understood in contrast to the above. This is not mutual identity because it is not based on self-essence. Because power is exchanged, mutual inclusion is established. Also, because each of the states of having power and not having power are not simultaneous [in a certain context, within a single *dharma*], all necessarily include each other. Because of the identity of the powerlessness of power and the power of powerlessness, they are always mutually inclusive. Also, when essence is subsumed under function, because there is then no separate essence, there is only mutual inclusion. When [on the other hand,] function is subsumed under essence, because there is no separate function, this is just mutual identity. This is related to the six meanings of cause.

Notes. This section concerns mutual inclusion within the topic of different essence. The latter part raises the problem of the relationship between essence and power. When in terms of function *dharmas* are mutually inclusive, what is the situation of essence? When in terms of essence there is mutual identity, what is the situation of essence? There is no real problem here, however, if it is kept in mind that causal essence and causal power are merely the static and dynamic aspects of a *dharma*. There is no essence outside the function, no function outside the essence. The argument of this latter text follows the previous one with the exception that mutual inclusion is based on the exchange of power or efficiency rather than on the existence and non-existence of causal essence.

Taikei II.70-71; *Kōgi* 512-13

Text. Herein, [within the topic of different essence,] first, mutual inclusion will be shown. First of all, in progressive order of counting, there are ten categories. First, one is the basic number. Why is this? Because it is formed by conditions. Finally, [after going through coins two through nine,] The ten are the ten within the one. Why? Because if one did not exist, ten would not be formed. Because one has complete power, it includes the ten. Still, [the ten] are ten and not one [and hence are not identical]. The remaining nine [basic numbers] are also like this; each one [of the remaining basic nine coins] possesses ten. You can understand this in the same way [as the original coin and its inclusion of ten]. In the descending order of counting, there are also ten categories [or coins]. One, ten includes [coin number] one. Why is this? Because of conditions; i.e., if there were no ten, [503c] one would not be formed. That is to say, one being completely without power, it is included [illegible] in the ten. Still, it is one, not ten. The rest is the same [as the discussion above with reference to ascending order].

Notes. Here, in his famous analogy of the ten coins (meaning, really, an infinity of dharmas), Fa-tsang tries to show the relationship of the one and the many, which is to say the one in the many and the many in the one. The above text will be more easily followed through the following chart, which is adapted from Yusugi's Kōgi, pp. 516-17.

Ascending order

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX	X	Large 10
Includes coins 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10	Includes coins 1,2,3---9	Small 10

Descending order

X IX VIII VII VI V IV III II	I	Large 10
Includes coins 9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1	Includes coins 10,9,8---2	Small 10

The chart is abbreviated to show, in both the ascending order and descending order, only the relationships of coins one and ten with the other coins, but the process is uniform throughout each of the coins in the "large" series. It should be recalled that there are here only ten coins, here called the "large 10". The "small 10" coins are, of course, the same large 10 as including each other. Thus, in ascending order, coin I includes within itself coins two through ten. Throughout the series, each coin includes all other nine within itself. The same process occurs in the descending series, in which, for instance, coin number ten includes within it the other nine coins. The commentaries are unclear as to why there is both an ascending order and descending order. The Tsūro simply and flatly says that they are two different divisions. However, it would appear that the ascending order emphasizes the ability of each coin to absorb the qualities of the other coins into itself. Thus, when one dharma appears, the others which follow it are already absorbed into the first, so that, again in terms of the coins, number one must exist before there can be number two. But this would tend to overemphasize the dependence of coins two through nine on coin one, and so forth. The descending order attempts to rectify this by showing that while coin one is a cause for coin ten, let us say, coin ten is simultaneously a cause for coin one. Thus, just as there can not be a coin ten without coin one, there also can not be a coin one without ten, because only in the context of ten coins can a coin number one be possible. At any rate, in both orders, Fa-tsang attempts to show how the many are included in the one, and the one is included in the many. The ascending order shows that the one includes the many, and the descending order shows that the many include the one. Some insight can be gained at this point into the matter of the infinity of mutual inclusion if we see that, to take one instance, the coin two which is included in coin one also includes coin one plus the other eight coins. This is what Hua-yen symbolizes by means of Indra's net of jewels, each one of which reflects all others, *ad infinitum*. We thus have a situation whereby the one and the many, or the part and the whole, are perfectly interrelated, mutually supporting.

Taikei II.72-76; Kōgi 514-16

Text. Within each of the two divisions, the fundamental and the derivative [i.e., a coin and the inclusion of the remaining nine within it], there are ten categories. Each of the other coins can be seen in the same way. This is discussed simply in connection with the topic of difference [of essence].

Notes. Each of the ten coins in turn includes within it the other nine, so that there are ten categories apropos each coin, making a total of a hundred.

Taikei II.76-77; *Kōgi* 516

Text. Question: If you speak of "one", how can there be ten in this one? Answer: Because with regard to the great Dharma of the *dhāraṇī* of dependent origination, if the one does not exist, then the whole can not be formed. You must surely understand it in this way. What does this mean? The so-called "one" is not an independent "one", because it is made by conditions. Therefore, the "one" with ten in it is a "one" formed by conditions. If this were not so, it would be independent and not dependent on conditions, and then it could not be called "one". Finally, the ten are not an independent ten, because they are formed by conditions. On this account, the ten which have the one within them are without self-nature and formed by conditions. If this were not so, they would be independent, they would not be dependent on conditions, and could not be called "ten". Therefore, all [dharmas of] dependent origination are without a nature of their own. Why is this? Because if one condition is removed, the whole is not formed. Therefore, the "one" possessing many within it is simply called the "one of dependent origination."

Notes. "Dhāraṇī" is not used here in the sense it has in certain other schools of "spell", or something similar, but is used in the strict sense of a "supporter", apparently meaning that any dharma supports, or carries, all qualities, or virtues, thus including all other dharmas, so that one dharma includes all dharmas and all include the one, in perfect mutual support. Fa-tsang's answer to the query is that the many are included in the one because the totality comes into being through the mutual conditioning of the many, and, conversely, the one is one only in its context, and thus included in the many, or conditioned by the many. A single thing, "one", can thus only be one in functional dependence on the many.

Taikei II.77-78; Kōgi 517-18

Text. Question: If in removing the one condition, [the totality] is not formed, this is to be without self-nature [i.e., non-existent, empty], and if there is no self-nature, how can the origination from conditions of the one and the many be achieved? Answer: Only because of lack of self-nature can the origination of the one and many from conditions be achieved. Why is this? Because this dependent origination is the real quality of the family [of things] which is the dharma-dhātu, and the realm of Samantabhadra is endowed with [all] qualities, completely free and unhindered. The Avataṁsaka-sūtra says, "If a Bodhisattva skillfully perceives the dharmas of dependent origination, he understands that in one dharma there are many dharmas, he clearly understands that in many dharmas there is one dharma." [T.9.580] Therefore, you should know that the ten in the one and the one in the ten are freely mutually inclusive; still, they are not the same. Because within one there are ten, you should clearly know that in one there is an infinity of things. The others are just like this [one].

Notes. The question comes from the assertion in the previous text that if one condition is removed, the totality can not be formed. This is in effect saying that the condition which no longer serves as cause is empty or nonexistent of causal essence. The Fu-ku-chi (Taikei II.78), in explaining the question, says that to say that a dharma is empty is to say of all dharmas that they are empty, and therefore it might be asked how the dependent origination between the one and the many is possible. This universal emptiness is itself the reason why the dependent origination of the dharma-dhātu is possible. This is only to reassert the obvious Mahayana Buddhist truth that dependent origination means emptiness. Thus, dependent origination is the true quality of the universe, in which the one and the many eternally interact without any increase or decrease.

Taikei II.78-79; Kōgi 518-19

Text. Question: Are the ten wholly included in the one or not? Answer: Both wholly and not wholly. Why is this? They are wholly included because the ten are within the one. They are not wholly included because the one is within the ten. These four alternatives guard against error [of discrimination], eliminate [the error of] annihilationism [and eternalism], reveal qualities, etc.. You can understand this accordingly. All the categories [of the ten in two, ten in three, etc.] each can be understood in the same way. You should understand the marvellous principles of dependent origination in this way. This is the end of the first topic [i.e., mutual inclusion].

Notes. This last question is devoted to removing erroneous conceptions about dependent origination. The question is, does one thing completely include all things. The answer is an abbreviated form of the four alternatives; it does, it does not, both does and does not, neither does nor does not. The reasons are the same as those given in the earlier discussion of the three natures. Thus, Fa-tsang's answers should be construed as negating each possibility.

Taikei II.80-81; Kōgi 519-20

Text. In this first division of different essence, the second meaning, mutual identity, has two parts. The first is the progressive order, the second is the regressive order. The first [progressive order] has ten categories [i.e., coins]. The first is one. Why is that? Because it is formed by conditions. [Finally,] one is ten. Why is that? Because if there were no one, there would be no ten. One has an essence and the others are all empty, so for this reason, this one is ten. In this way, each of the categories of the progressive order up to ten [504a] can be understood in the same way [as the original one].

Notes. The "first division" is the topic of different essence, which has two inner topics; the first, mutual inclusion, was discussed in the above texts; now, the topic at hand is mutual identity. Progressive order is the manner of counting the ten coins from one to ten, and reverse order is the opposite. The previous texts asserted mutual inclusion on the basis of the completely free interchange of causal power. This part of the chapter asserts mutual identity on the basis of a thing's possession of existence and emptiness. The one which is one, etc., is, as in above discussions, the large one which contains the others within itself, or which is identical with the others. One is one because it is formed in dependence on the other not-one; in other words, one has no separate real essence, it only exists as a functional relatum in the total environment. However, at the same time, the one is identical with the ten, because without the one, there can be no ten. In the first instance, the one is empty; in the second instance, it exists; i.e., in a causal capacity. What is true of the one coin, "A" 甲 is true of each of the others in the totality.

Taikei II.81-82; *Kōgi* 520-21

Text. When we speak of the descending order, there are also ten categories. The first is ten. Why is this? Because of its formation by conditions. [Finally,] ten is identical with one. Why is this? Because if there were no ten, there could not be a one. Because one is empty and the others all exist, therefore, the ten are identical with the one. In going down this way to one, you can understand everything in the same way as the foregoing. As a result of this concept, you should know that each coin is many coins.

Notes. Ten is now the basic number and the process of counting is in reverse order. Ten is nine, ten is eight, etc., down to ten is one. Next, nine is the basic number, and this is progressively identified with ten, eight, seven, etc., down to one. In this way, each coin is identical with each and all of the remaining coins. As before, the descending order removes the implication possibly made by the ascending order that there is any priority involved in the mutual identity and inclusion.

Taikei II.82-83; *Kōgi* 521-22

Text. Question: What is the error if one is not ten? Answer: If one is not ten, there are two errors. The first is the error of not forming the ten coins. Why is that? If one were not ten, many ones would not make ten. Why is that? One being one [i.e., having the self-essence of one], all [the collective ones] do not make ten. Now, since they do make ten, you should clearly know that one *is* ten. The second is the fault of not making one. Why is that? If one were not identical with ten, ten could not be formed. Because there would be no ten, the concept of one could not be formed. Why is that? If there were no ten, whose one would it be? Therefore, now, since you clearly perceive one, you should understand clearly that one is ten. Also, if they are not identical, the two meanings of dependent origination, empty and existent, would not be manifest, and that, again, would be a great error; i.e., self-essence [as eternal, not eternal], etc.. There is no need to go into details. You should understand this within the context of the following topic of common essence. You can understand the other categories [of coins two, three, etc.] accordingly.

Notes. The two errors would be that first, there could be neither the one nor the ten, and second, there would be the terrible error of eternalism and annihilationism. Fa-tsang's reasoning is based squarely on the Buddhist axiom that if a *dharma* were to have a real self-nature, a *svabhāva*, it would remain eternally that thing and would be in all ways independent of any other thing by definition. It could not therefore become a component of a larger totality. Because it is indeed empty of self-essence, it can exist as a relational component of the whole. Thus, many "ones" can make ten. Because each dharma is empty, they can make ten; because the ten exist as a totality, there can be such a thing as the "one" which is part of the ten.

Taikei II.84-85; Kōgi 522-23

Text. Question: If one were identical with ten, it wouldn't be one. If ten were identical with one, they wouldn't be ten. Answer: Just because one is identical with ten, it is called one. Why is that? That which I call "one" is not the common-sense "one". It is the one formed by conditions, without a [self-] nature. For this reason, the one which is identical with the many is called "one". If this were not so, it would not be called "one". Why is this? Because if it were to have a nature of its own, if there were no conditions, the one would not be formed. With regard to the ten being identical with the one, you can simply compare it with the foregoing. Do not be erroneously attached [to the notion of one]. You should understand it in this way.

Notes. The one under consideration is not the one of common-sense understanding, but the one without self-essence and empty. If it were an independent one, it would not be part of dependent origination. Thus, outside its relationship with others in the complex of pratītyasamutpāda, it could not be one. In order to be the one among the ten, it must necessarily relate to the other nine. With regard to ten being identical with one, the same meaning applies.

Taikei II.85-86; Kōgi 523-24

Text. Question: Are these above one and many [in their mutual identity] simultaneous, or are they in sequence and non-simultaneous? Answer: They are simultaneous and they [also] are in sequence. Why is that? They can all be like this because of dependent origination which is the nature of *dharmas*, because of reverse and normal [order], because being of common essence, they are not mutually exclusive, and because they are completely free in quality and function, and do not obstruct each other.

Notes. Fa-tsang says that there is both a sequence involved and a complete simultaneity. *Dharmas* do indeed follow after each other in time, vertically, but at the same time, they exist at any given moment in a horizontal simultaneity. Of the reasons given, the reverse and normal orders of considering the relationships of the one and many refers to sequentiality. Common nature and free inter-inclusiveness refer to simultaneity. Freedom of quality and function and free interrelationship refer to both sequentiality and simultaneity. Thus, Fa-tsang is able to use his system with regard to horizontal ontological relationships and in regard to vertical temporal relationships.

Taikei II.86; *Kōgi* 524-25

Text. What are the characteristics of the above discussed going [in regular order] and coming [in reverse order]? Answer: [The one and the many] remain undisturbed in their own states, yet, they eternally go [from the one to the many] and come [from the many to the one]. Why is this? Because going and coming and not moving are the same thing. The concepts of coming and going and so forth, are discussed only in order to arouse wisdom and illuminate ultimate principle 理. When wisdom is aroused, all is then beyond words; that is, it is the previous result part [beyond description] which is meant here.

Notes. Ultimately, the teaching of the identity of the one and the many is only and expedient device calculated to arouse knowledge in the practitioner. Once this wisdom is aroused, the real state of things is seen to be inexpressible, as was asserted previously when it was said that the content of Buddha-wisdom is inexpressible, something to be known really only by the perfectly enlightened. The question, specifically, is concerned with the identity of the one with the many, shown earlier in the progressive order of counting coins, and the identity of the many with the one, shown there by the reverse order of counting the coins. The questioner is mainly concerned with the fundamental characteristics of the one and many when they become identified. What happens to the one when it is identified with the many? What, on the other hand, happens to the many when they are identified with the one? The "oneness" of one does not cease being that oneness, but it becomes identified with the many. Conversely, the "maniness" of the many retains its own status, but becomes identified with the one. The immovability or fixed status of the one and many refers to their essence as one or many, while their mutual identity refers to interpretation. The point is that the one and many, or part and whole, each retains its own identity as part or whole while yet being identical with the other. Therefore, there is unity in diversity and diversity in unity.

Taikei II.87; Kōgi 525

Text. [504b] Question: If [the relationship of the one and many] is a result of wisdom, then it would not exist before. How can it be said to exist intrinsically in this way? Answer: If wisdom is aroused, dependent origination is not discussed. Because it is based on wisdom, it is said to exist intrinsically like this. Why is this? Because not being formed is the same as already being formed; that is, it is divorced from before and after, because wisdom and the Dharma are formed intrinsically 舊来成 .

Notes. The question is, how can the relationship of the one and many be said to exist intrinsically, or originally, if the knowledge of it awakens with enlightenment? In actuality, when there is enlightenment, the true state of the dharma-dhātu as the content of enlightenment is inexpressible. The reason this relationship can be said to be an original, intrinsic state of things is that when there is initial enlightenment, this state, as the content of enlightenment, becomes illuminated by the initial enlightenment. Thus, when intrinsic enlightenment and initial enlightenment unite to form final enlightenment, this relationship of things can be said to be an intrinsic state. Referring back to the ninth chapter, where Buddha-nature was discussed, this is a restatement of the position there that Buddha-nature is said to truly exist when innate Buddhahood, or intrinsic enlightenment, is united with initial enlightenment, forming a non-dual whole. Thus, the unenlightened individual truly does not perceive a universe in which the one and the many are intimately interrelated, but upon enlightenment, the universe can be seen to have always been, and to be, this way. Here, wisdom means initial, or historic enlightenment, and Dharma means innate enlightenment.

Taikei II.87-88; Kōgi 526

Text. Is it based on wisdom, or is it on the basis of the Dharma that it is like this [i.e., formed intrinsically]? Answer: It is like this because it is based [both] on wisdom and the Dharma. Why is this? Because it is endowed with both simultaneously. You can understand the remaining concepts in accordance with this. This is the end of the large section of [topic] number one, different essence.

Notes. Because it exists intrinsically as intrinsic enlightenment, initial enlightenment can illuminate it. Because initial enlightenment illuminates it, it can be said to have existed intrinsically. Again, this position should be seen in terms of the earlier discussion in chapter nine of the question of innate and acquired enlightenment.

Taikei II.88; Kōgi 526-27

Text. Number two is common essence; there are also two concepts. The first is the many in the one and the one in the many. The second is the identity of the one with the many and the many with the one.

Notes. The basis for discussion here will be the use of the ten coins, as before, where "ten" is to be taken as "many". The classic analogies for the idea of mutual inclusion and identity on the basis of common essence are the reflection of the moon in many pools of water and the reflection of many forms in a mirror.

Taikei II. No note; Kōgi 727-28

Text. The first topic [i.e., mutual inclusion] has two parts. 1. The many in the one; 2. the one in the many. First, the many in the one: there are ten categories which are not identical. First is one. Why is this? Because it is formed by conditions. This is the basic number. This one has ten in it. Why? Because the self-essence of this one is one, and it is also the one of ten. That is to say, it becomes the one for two, and, finally, it becomes the one for the ten, so it is the ten's one. Therefore, this one itself fully possesses ten one's within it. Yet, it is one, not ten, because this is not the topic of identity. Since this is the case for the first coin, each of the remaining two, three, four, five, etc. are the same. You can understand these accordingly.

Notes. In the discussion of common essence, mutual inclusion is taken up first, and because this does not posit identity between the coins, each coin remains what it is while including the others within it. Again, we start with the first of ten coins. In this case, coin number one remains coin number one but at the same time becomes qualified as it in turn becomes related to others of the whole ten. Thus, with relation to coin two, it remains itself and simultaneously is the one of two. Thus, for instance, while a person does not lose his identity as that person, he simultaneously is a son to his father and a father to his son, and so on. Thus, in terms of _dharmas_, a _dharma_ has the power to function in various ways in connection with various other _dharmas_. While from one point of view a _dharma_ is result, from another viewpoint it is a cause. The difference here between common essence and the previous different essence is that when we speak of different essence, this means that, in the case of mutual inclusion, all _dharmas_ are completely different, and the mutual inclusion is a relationship between things of heterogeneous nature. In the case of common essence, any given _dharma_ possesses within itself the qualities of all other _dharmas_. This is the situation presently at hand. Coin number one remains coin number one, but contains within it the coin one of two coins, three coins, etc.. The relationship of inclusion is no different from that of the preceeding section on different essence; the distinction is that of different essence and common essence.

Taikei II.89-90; _Kōgi_ 528-29

Text. Second, the one in the many: there are also ten categories. The first is ten. Why is that? Because it is formed from conditions. In the ten there is one. Why is that? Because this one makes one for ten; i.e., because that preliminary one exists in the one of ten, it is no longer the preliminary one apart from the one of ten. Therefore, this one is the one in the ten. Still, it is ten, not one. Each of the other nine, eight, seven ...one is like this. You can understand it in the same way.

Notes. This is the reverse order, starting, as before, with ten. Here, ten is the ten with one in it, and this presents an abbreviated form of the argument, which should start with the nine in ten, then the eight in ten, and so on down to the one in ten. One here loses its status as the preliminary one of the ascending series because when it becomes the one of the ten---that is, not an independent one but a one serving to make up ten---it ceases to be independent. It is not one apart from being the one of the ten. This apparently is an attempt to distinguish the independent one of the category of different essence from this one which is only the one within the ten. In short, ten in essence is nothing but ten one's, and, conversely, one is only one of ten one's making up the ten.

Taikei II.91; Kōgi 529-30

Text. Question: What is the distinction between this and the previous "different essence"? Answer: The previous [section,] different essence, saw the preliminary one from the point of view of the subsequent nine, and was simply the mutual inclusion of the different [dharmas]. Now, in the common essence, the one of itself possesses ten within it, and it is not discussed from the standpoint of the prior and subsequent of the other topic.

Notes. Here, under the topic of common essence, mutual inclusion is not discussed with reference to the relationship of the one and an exterior many. The one of itself possesses the others intrinsically, with no recognition of others outside itself. It is equally true that with reference to the totality, each one has the same quality.

Taikei II.92; Kōgi 530

Text. Second, one is identical with ten and ten is identical with one: there are also two divisions. First, one is identical with ten. There are also ten categories which are not the same [as when discussed under the topic of different essence]. The first is one.

Why is that? Because it is formed from conditions. One is [finally] ten. Why is that? Because this one of ten is the preliminary one. Because it has no separate self-essence, therefore, ten is identical with one. You can understand the remaining nine categories in this way.

Notes. This and the following text deal with mutual identity on the basis of common essence. This text takes the ascending order of counting, and begins by establishing the first coin as coin number one on the basis of conditions; i.e., it is one because it is conditioned by the others. This one is then seen to be identical with the other coins. Again, it is said to be identical because in its capacity as the one coin which enables the many others to be many, it is identical with all, the many individual one's, each individual of which is also serving in the same capacity. Essentially, their common essence lies in their emptiness, which is to say their complete interdependence. Each thing has the total ultimate Buddha-nature which forms all other things.

Taikei II.92-93; Kōgi 531

Text. Second, ten is identical with one. There are also ten categories which are not the same. The first is ten. Why is that? [504b] Because it is formed by conditions. Ten is identical with one. Why is that? Because that first one is identical with ten, and moreover, there is no individual one, therefore, the first one is identical with this ten. You can understand the other nine in the same way.

Notes. Ten is nine, eight, seven, and so on down to one. Ten is identical with one because the preliminary one is nothing but the quality possessed by ten to make the one of ten. The preliminary one is ten, and not a one which does not form the ten. Thus, while one is the one which makes the ten, it is also a quality of ten which makes it the one of ten.

Taikei II.93; Kōgi 531

Text. Question: Does this matter of one being identical with ten, etc., in the common essence [mean that the one] only includes ten or does it include an infinity? Answer: These are both established in accordance with wisdom. If ten is necessary, it is identical with ten; if an infinity is necessary, it is an infinity. Such an increase and decrease is accepted as a result of wisdom. [One] being identical with ten is as explained before. With regard to infinity, in one category there are ten; however, these ten also in themselves are mutually identical and mutually inclusive and form an infinity over and over. However, this repeated infinity is completely included within the first division.

Notes. The one may include ten or an infinity, in accordance with the requirements. The one may, as was shown above, include ten, but these ten within the one also each include the others over and over infinitely, so the one may also include an infinite number of dharmas. This really goes without saying, however, because ten really only symbolizes infinity.

Taikei II.94; Kōgi 532

Text. Question: Does [the one] only include the repeated infinity among its own one category, or does it include the infinity among the other different categories? Answer: Either all may be included, or else only its own infinity. Why is that? If there were no infinity within its own single division, the infinity of the other categories would not be formed, so, therefore, within the first category of common essence are included the inexhaustible, inexhaustible, inexhaustible, inexhaustible, inexhaustible, inexhaustible, inexhaustible, inexhaustible, inexhaustible, inexhaustible of the two categories of common and different [essence], so that there is nothing in the whole round, perfect realm of dharmas that is not included. On the other hand, it may only include the infinity of its own single category of common essence. Why is that? Because the other [nine] different categories are like space, because they are unconnected [with the one], because [the one] is of itself endowed [with all the others], and also there is nothing to be included. This is accepted simply in accordance with wisdom. The one is not disturbed.

Just as this one category [of common essence] is endowed with infinite units of infinity and forms an infinity of mutual identities and mutual inclusions, in just the same way each of the remaining categories forms an infinity of infinities. This is the way you should understand it.

This [above section] has been concerned a while with [the analogy of] manifestation of coins. How much more true is it of the one vehicle Dharma of the dhāraṇī of the inexhaustibility [of dharmas] of dependent origination. That is not to say that dharmas are only like this. You should eliminate erroneous conceptions and think of them according to tathatā.

Notes. This concludes the analogy of the ten coins, and here Fa-tsang makes a general statement about the relationship of the one and the many. The relationship among *dharmas* is infinite. Any one *dharma* includes within it an infinity of other *dharmas*, and this includes the infinite number of *dharmas* possessed by all and each of the other *dharmas* as well. Therefore, in answer to the question, Fa-tsang emphasizes the fact that not only does the one coin include the inexhaustibility of its own category---which means that all *dharmas* contained within the one category are infinitely interrelated---but it includes the same infinite interrelationship as possessed by each of the other *dharmas* when considered to be different and other than this first *dharma*. Also, however, it can be said that the one category only includes the inexhaustible relationships within itself. In this case, the one *dharma* is seen to possess total causal power and not to require conditions, all of which are latent within itself. Therefore, it is independent of external conditions, or, in terms of the present section, the first coin contains within it the other coins. In the first case, however, the one coin acts in conjunction with the other different coins to perfect the totality, and so in this case, the one coin contains within it the interrelations of the others. The whole question in the text should be seen in terms of the earlier discussion of common essence and different essence as they refer to the matter of either not requiring or requiring conditions.

Taikei II.94-96; *Kōgi* 533-34

Text. Second is an extensive discussion of the Dharma; in outline there are two parts. First, the meaning is established; second, the explanation. First, in establishing the meaning, ten topics are set up as a summary way of showing inexhaustibility. What are the ten? [505a] 1. Doctrine and significance; i.e., this includes all the doctrines and their significance of the one vehicle, three vehicles, and so on up to the five vehicles. Each of the other nine topics can be understood in the same way. 2. Noumenon and phenomena 理事 ; i.e., this includes all the noumena and phenomena [discussed by the various doctrines]. 3. Comprehension and practice; it includes all comprehension and practices. 4. Cause and result; i.e., it includes all causes and results. 5. Men and Dharmas; i.e., it includes all men and the Dharmas [which are taught by them]. 6. Divisions of wisdom and its objective realm and stages 分齊境位 i.e., it includes all divisions of wisdom-objective realm and stages. 7. Teachers and pupils, Dharma and wisdom; i.e., it includes all teachers and pupils, Dharma and wisdom. 8. The two kinds of *karma* recompense of primary [= Buddha] and attendants [= Bodhisattvas] 主伴依正 . 9. Response and stimulus 隨其根欲示現 i.e., it includes all response and stimulus. 10. Completely free relationship 自在 of contrary and conforming and essence and function 逆順體用 ; i.e., it includes the free interrelationship of all contrary and conforming and essence and function. These ten topics are the headings, and each totally includes all *dharmas* and forms inexhaustibility.

Notes. This first part establishes the framework for the following more detailed discussion. The ten topics are ten pairs of contrasting items, and, as in the T'ien-t'ai system and elsewhere in this treatise, the ten are an abbreviated form of the whole universe. The following section is in reality an application of the analogy of the ten coins discussed above. The ten pairs given above are slightly different both in order and form than they are in the *T'an-hsüan-chi*. Why this should be so is not entirely clear, though if the representative or symbolic nature of the ten is kept in mind, it will be clear that a variant form probably is not very significant. This is certainly true of the matter of order, as the following texts show. The items themselves are clear enough in most instances. It might be worth while to point out, however, that number eight refers to the two kinds of *karma* result consisting of the body and psychic makeup on the one hand, and the world receptacle in which the individual functions on the other. The rubric refers to the two kinds of recompense *re*. the Buddha 主 and the Bodhisattvas 伴. Number nine refers to the stimulus as the needs of beings and the response as the Buddha. Ten means the free relationship of the contrary and conforming and the free relationship of essence and function. Yusugi (*Kōgi*, 536) says that an example of contrary would be the Bodhisattva being transformed into an advocate of a non-Buddhist religion in order to teach and convert people to the true Dharma. An example of conforming would be the two Bodhisattvas Avalokiteśvara and Mahāsthāmaprāpta converting beings through the manifestation of compassion and wisdom. Essence and function refer to the *Dharma*-*kāya* and *saṁbhoga*-*kāya*, and to the *nirmāṇa*-*kāya* respectively. (Cf. Ui Hakuju, *Bukkyō*-*Hanron*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966, pp.745-46.) However, each and every *dharma* possesses essence and function, as well as contrarity and conformity.

Taikei II.97-99; *Kōgi* 534-36

Text. Second, the explanation: By means of ten topics, I will explain the former ten concepts and in this way show inexhaustibility. Question: How can we understand that inexhaustibility is shown through the use of the number ten? Answer: On the basis of the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra*, the number ten is established as the heading [for different categories] and in this way shows the concept of inexhaustibility.

1. Simultaneous perfection and relationship 同時具足相應: The above ten concepts are simultaneously related and form one dependent origination. There are no distinctions of prior and subsequent, first and last, etc.. [Each] possess all, the contrary and conforming are freely mixed, but they are not confused, and they form the

limit of dependent origination. This [first meaning] is achieved on the basis of the Concentration Which Is Like the Images of the Ocean, which luminously revealed it simultaneously.

Notes. This is the first of the ten profound statements concerning dependent origination. It is ageneral statement which covers the following nine. These ten topics are an explanation of the infinite interrelationship of the ten pairs of items just enumerated above. In this way, each of these pairs of items is seen in the above text as being freely interrelated, so that the two sides of each category are freely exchanged without losing their own respective identities. Also, each of the ten pairs is interrelated with the other nine, as well as with the present ten topics, forming an infinite interrelationship. The basis for this view of things is based on the experience of the Samudra-mudrā-samādhi, which was nothing else than this vision of infinite interrelationship.

Taikei II.100-01; Kōgi 536-37

Text. 2. One and many are mutually inclusive and different 一多相容不同 . One category of the above [ten pairs of items] wholly includes all the dharma categories of cause and result, noumenon and phenomena, etc.. This is just like the first coin including within it inexhaustible meanings. However, even though there are many within this one, still, the one is not identical with those many. The one in the many can be understood in the same way as the above. Each of the remaining categories is the same, because of repeated inexhaustibility. Thus, some verses of the [Avataṁsaka] sutra say, "One Buddhaland fills up the ten directions, and the ten directions fill up the one, without remainder. The intrinsic characteristics of the universe, however, are not destroyed. This can be so because of its incomparable qualities." [9.414] However, even though the one and many are mutually inclusive, and mutually related with complete freedom, still, their essence is not the same. The reason is as explained in the meaning of the coins above. This has [both] common essence and different essence. This can be understood in accordance with the above [simile of the coins].

Notes. The first topic made a general statement about the simultaneity of the relationship of the *dharmas* of dependent origination, but did not deal with the basis for this mutuality, which is now explained in this second topic as being the possession and non-possession of efficiency or power within each *dharma*. Thus, whereas the first topic was of a general nature, this text is concerned with the specific matter of mutual inclusion, referring to both common essence and different essence. Fa-tsang continues, in the next text, with the specific matter of mutual identity.

Taikei II.102-03; *Kōgi* 538

Text. 3. All *dharmas* are mutually identified freely 諸法相卽自在 . All these above meanings [i.e., the *dharmas* of dependent origination] are [such that] one is identical with all and all are identical with the one, and they are perfectly free and unhindered in their interfusion.

Notes. Mutual identity is based on the possession of each *dharma* of both emptiness and existence with regard to causal power. If one coin is missing, the ten are missing; if there are no ten, there is no one (as one of ten). In terms of the *mārga*, within the one stage of the perfection of faith are included the subsequent three *bhadras*, ten *bhūmis*, and perfect enlightenment. When one klesa is extinguished, all are extinguished. Also, when one person becomes a Buddha, all become Buddhas.

Taikei II.106; Kōgi 538-39

Text. With reference to common essence, [one] of itself possesses and includes all dharmas. However, the all of this [dharma "A"] also in themselves are mutually inclusive, because they are repeatedly inexhaustible [in their interrelations]. [505b] However, this inexhaustibility is within the first category. Therefore, this [Avataṁsaka] sutra says, "The qualities of a single thought of a Bodhisattva who has aroused the first thought of enlightenment are deep and extensive, without boundaries. The Tathāgata [himself] could not finish describing them if he took an eon. How much more so if [the Bodhisattva] were to possess and cultivate the meritorious practices of the ten perfections [pāramitā] and ten stages [bhūmi] for boundless, innumerable, immeasurable eons!" [T.9.433 Int.] This means that if one thought is deep, extensive, and boundless, it is indeed due to the fact that in the universe of dependent origination, one is identical with all. Thus, this is just like the repeated inexhaustibility of the one coin in the division on common essence.

Notes. The particular discussion on mutual identity will be dealt with in two parts, the first, above, with reference to common essence, the second, following, with different essence. Here, the one is identical with all, and the individual units of the all contained in the one all equally identify with all, so that there is an infinite interrelationship and identity of dharmas contained within the one. The parallel example of this is the famous net of

Indra, where any one jewel in the net reflects all the other jewels, and in each of the many jewels reflected in the one there are reflected the many. It is worthy of note that in this text, Fa-tsang equates his philosophy of mutual identity with such things as Bodhisattva practices. It is quite evident that among the implications of this philosophy, the practical matter of stages and practice is important. Something of the repercussions of this view can be seen in the outlook of some of the Japanese sects of Pure Land Buddhism, where it is said that one's own repetition of the formula namu Amida Butsu is everyone's repetition, etc..

Taikei II.106-07; Kōgi 539-40

Text. "How much more so if, for boundless eons...", means that each of the other [nine] categories shows inexhaustibility. The reason this is so is that the [Avataṁsaka] sutra also says, "The Bodhisattva who arouses the thought of enlightenment for the first time is a Buddha." [T.9.452] Because of the wonderful principle of dependent origination, prior and subsequent are all the same. If the prior is obtained, the subsequent is obtained. When the end is finished, then one penetrates to the bottom of the beginning. This is possible because it is like the above simultaneous possession [i.e., the first topic]. The sutra also says, "The qualities of all stages are totally included in one stage." [T.9.395] Therefore, if one is obtained, all are obtained. It also says, "[The one moment of the perfection of the stage of faith includes all six stages] because you should know that one is identical with all and all are identical with the one." [T.9.446 Int.] Becoming a Buddha in the last moment of the ten kinds of faith is what is meant here.

Notes. This text is devoted to the explanation of the previous text. In the previous text, Fa-tsang explains his meaning in terms of common essence; here, the explanation is in terms of different essence. Thus, the different characteristics of the stage of faith and the stage of Buddhahood remain distinct and mutually reliant, and within this context it is claimed that the one is identical with the many and also that the many are identical with the other stages, including the stage of Buddhahood, and vice-versa. The Fu-ku-chi (Taikei II.108) says that this refers to the identity of the two stages in terms of rank or status 位 rather than in terms of practice 行 . As far as practice is concerned, the sequence from the first stage up to the last is acknowledged, while Buddhahood of rank means the first is identical with the last, as Fa-tsang says here. We therefore have to understand the Buddhahood of the first stage of faith as existing in the sense of inevitability. In ordinary Mahāyāna terms, this would mean that with the awakening of the thought of enlightenment, one is said to possess the Buddha-nature in actuality for the first time. However, this does not preclude the necessity for subsequent practices, during which time de facto enlightenment is perfected.

Taikei II.108-09; Kōgi 541-42

Text. Question: If in the one category of common essence all are included infinitely, are all revealed simultaneously or in sequence? Answer: All being clearly revealed simultaneously belongs to the very subtle [interpretation]. Being repeatedly revealed alternately as hidden and manifested belongs to [the interpretation symbolized by the realm of] Indra. [However, these are not what is meant here. This is the interpretation of mutual identity of] the concepts of identity and difference, many and few, existence and non-existence, beginning and subsequent. In this way, they are endowed with all the infinite dharma categories. Accordingly as one is presented as the chief 首 , the others become the retinue 伴 . This principle is never once obstructed. [All dharmas thus have this connection] in this way from the beginning. This simply explains the possession in the one category of common essence of infinite qualities. The other categories such as different essence can be explained in the same way.

Notes. Of the three possible interpretations, the third is accepted as applicable here. That is to say, mutual identity does not refer to simultaneity or sequence, but to such categories as identity and difference, etc.. The point of the discussion is therefore the possession of each dharma of all other categories, and this must be seen outside the considerations of time. The first matter, simultaneity, is dealt with in the fifth topic, and the second, sequentiality, is discussed in topic four.

Taikei II.109; Kōgi 542-43

Text. Question: If all are totally possessed by the single category, what is the use of the other categories? Answer: The other categories are like space. Why is that? Because all are possessed by the one category of common essence utterly, without exception.

Notes. The question is rejected as irrelevant. Here, identity is based on the situation whereby the one dharma alone possesses and is identical with the other dharmas. If the others are brought into the discussion, this is no longer within the context of common essence but rather concerns different essence. Thus, the function or use of the others identified with the one is not appropriate to the present discussion. In this case, the others are like space, which means that though they exist, they are not considered to be relevant.

Taikei II.109; Kōgi 543

Text. Question: With regard to the all which are included in this category of common essence, [the one category] ought to include only the all of its own category. How can it include the all of the other categories? Answer: Since it includes the all of its own category, it also includes the all of the other categories completely. In this way, it repeatedly encompasses the whole realm of *dharmas*. Why is this? Because if one is missing from the perfectly interfused realm of *dharmas* where the *dharmas* of dependent origination are infinitely interdependent, then the totality will not be formed. Because these two refer to the true qualities of the family of *dharma essence* 法性家, the limits [of each *dharma*] are incalculable. [505c] Thus, some verses of this [*Avataṃsaka*] sutra say, "If one were to propound the inexpressible for an inexpressible number of ages, the inexpressible number of ages might come to an end, but the discussion of the inexpressible would not be over." [T.9.586] Also, some other verses say, "The thoughts of all living beings can be distinguished and understood, the atoms of all [Buddha-] lands can be numbered, and the space in the ten directions can be measured with a hair, but the Bodhisattva's first thought of enlightenment can never be measured." [T.9.458] Truly, this is because in this Dharma teaching of the one vehicle on the completely unimpeded interrelationship [of *dharmas*], when one is acquired, all are acquired.

Cause and result being equal, there is no distinction of prior and subsequent. Thus the *Treatise on the Daśabhūmika* [by Vasubandhu] says, "The Bodhisattva in the stage of faith, and everything up to inconceivable Buddhahood, [together] make a single dependent origination. They are united 括 by the meanings of the whole and the parts, etc., of the six meanings [in a single *dharma*]." [T.26.142 Int.] You should understand that cause and result are simultaneous, mutually inclusive, and mutually identified, each [stage] includes all [six stages] and mutually serve as primary and secondary. This is beyond doubt if you consider it deeply and correctly. Also, this [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra says, "Why is that? Because the Bodhisattva who puts forth the thought of enlightenment for the first time is identical with the Buddha, he is equal to all the *Tathāgatas* of the three times, he is equal to the objective realm of the Buddhas of the three times, he acquires the one body or countless bodies of the *Tathāgatas* and the uniform wisdom of the Buddhas of the three times." [T.9.425] "Beings who are converted are all the same." [The sutra] also says, "When he first arouses the thought of enlightenment, he achieves perfect enlightenment, is endowed with the body of wisdom, and is enlightened [of himself,] not because of others." [T.9.449] It continues in this way; the detailed discussion is in the sutra.

Notes. Most of this text is devoted to explaining and illustrating the assertion that the one not only includes all within itself, but also includes the all included in each of the others. Practically speaking, this means, as the corraborative quotations say, that each stage includes and is identical with all six stages of development. The later quotations are all in support of the thesis that cause and result are the same. The general reason given for this is that each _dharma_ contains the six meanings given above. Fa-tsang sees the whole of the six stages as forming one interrelated whole, where the cause is the cause of a result and can not be considered apart from the result. If the result were not somehow implied in the cause, the so-called cause would not really be the cause for that result. Behind this reasoning, however, is another important, though implicit, point to be noticed. Though we ordinarily speak of human beings performing practices in the causal stages in order to realize the Buddhahood of the result stage, we might recall that according to Hua-yen doctrine, beings are already Buddhas, which is to say that we are the phenomenalized expressions of the absolute conceived as Buddhahood. We are not only beings in the causal stages but are also already Buddhas of the result stage; the two are not essentially different. Consequently, the present treatise has made the point several times that Buddha, beings, and Mind are not different things at all. In terms of stages and practices, this is tantamount to saying that ultimately, initial enlightenment and intrinsic enlightenment are the same. When Fa-tsang says that things are identical on the basis of common essence, he means that all things are identical in their common emptiness, which means in turn that the distinct characteristics are put in the background, and the identity is made on the basis of this emptiness. Thus, there is nothing but _tathatā_ in the final analysis. If, on the other hand, identity is based on different essence, we now begin to account for the distinct characteristics of the phenomenal world, and recognize that these _different things_ all interact in complete interdependence to form the whole; moreover, in this interdependence, any single _dharma_ can be considered to be a cause for that whole, and therefore, all _dharmas_ are identical in this ability to be causes (and results, of course) simultaneously. We need to remember, however, that _each dharma_ has both common essence and different essence when seen in relation to others, so that a _dharma_ is identical with other _dharmas_ both in its emptiness and in its existence. In its capacity as being both of common essence and different essence, it not only includes all things within itself, in a one-step identity, but at the same time includes the whole included in each of the others in the whole; for this reason, Fa-tsang says that all things in the universe are mutually inclusive and identified not once but infinitely.

Taikei II.110-114; Kōgi 543-46

Text. Question: These all simply praise the qualities of the cause; how can you claim that they are the qualities of the result? Answer: In the one vehicle, cause and result are of the same essence and form a single dependent origination. If one is acquired, the other is acquired, because the one and the other are identical. If one did not acquire the result, the cause would not be a cause. The reason for this is that if the result is not acquired, the cause is not a cause.

Question: Above, it was claimed that the result is divorced from conditions and inexpressible, and that only the cause is discussed. Why do you now discuss the Dharma of acquiring the result in the final moment of the ten kinds of faith and becoming a Buddha? Answer: With regard to speaking of becoming a Buddha, after the first existence of seeing and hearing, one perfects understanding and practices in the second existence. The person in whom the causal stage, the last moment of understanding and practice, is complete, acquires in the third existence the final, sovereign, perfect result. Because the essence of this cause is formed on the basis of the result, therefore, the one who has fulfilled the cause [strives energetically and] is immersed in the ocean of result. Because this is the realm of realization, it is inexpressible. This is like the Nāga Maiden, Prince Universal Glory [? 普莊嚴童子] . Prince Sudhana, and the sons of the Satisfied Gods winning the result in three lives. The full details are as discussed in the sutra. You should consider it accordingly.

Notes. As has been explained on previous occasions, when the result is spoken of, it is not the result per se, which is inexpressible and known only to Buddhas, but rather a conversational result; i.e., meant to round out the discussion. Result is mentioned because here it is asserted that with the perfection of the causal stage of faith, one is a Buddha, because cause and result are mutually dependent. There is no cause apart from result; if there is a cause, there is necessarily a result, and if there is no result, the cause can not be called cause. The examples from the sutra show that in one's second existence as a pratitioner of the one vehicle Dharma, during the causal stage of comprehension and practice, one acquires the result. Though it is said that upon completion of the second existence one acquires the result of the third existence, we must here understand "third existence" as pertaining to the actual acquisition of the result, and not to a temporally later time. In fact, the two lives or existences are, as the text claims, identical.

Taikei II.115-17; Kōgi 547-48

Text. [506a] Question: Above, you say that in one instant one becomes a Buddha. Since this interpretation also exists in the three vehicles, what is the difference between your interpretation and theirs? Answer: The three vehicles consider becoming a Buddha in one instant from the point of view of the absolute 理 . Now, in the one vehicle, the one instant is endowed with all the above categories such as doctrine and essence, noumenon and phenomena, cause and result, etc., and one becomes a Buddha simultaneously, simultaneously, simultaneously,

simultaneously, simultaneously, simultaneously, simultaneously, simultaneously, simultaneously, simultaneously along with all beings, and afterwards, all extinguish their illusions anew stage by stage. Also, one does not abide in the [causal] stage of learning, but achieves perfect enlightenment and possesses [the bodies of] the ten Buddhas, because he manifests infinite qualities [of Buddhahood which function both] retrogressively and progressively 逆順. Also, the nine times and ten times, etc., of the wonderful realm of Indra universally pervade all stages. That is to say, we simply teach that from the last moment of the ten kinds of faith, the ten kinds of comprehension, ten kinds of practices, ten kinds of transfer of merit, ten stages, and stage of Buddhahood, etc., are achieved universally at one time, and one completely possesses all, without prior and subsequent. Still, there is no difference between this one instant and a hundred thousand eons. You should reflect on this. The third topic, the free mutual identity of all dharmas, is concluded.

Notes. The question has arisen because earlier, Fa-tsang spoke of the Sudden Doctrine as teaching the acquisition of Buddhahood in a single instant, and now he is presenting the acquisition of Buddhahood in the final instant of the stage of faith as a special characteristic of the Perfect Doctrine. The three vehicle doctrine, however, is maintained strictly from the standpoint of ultimate reality, while from the standpoint of conventional truth, it is acknowledged that there is a gradual, sequential process in attainment of final result. This means that although the proto-Zen school mentioned here acknowledges that all people possess, or are, Buddha-nature, which is instantly revealed when circumstances are correct, still this instantaneous stage is of necessity preceeded by a gradual process of self-perfection. The Hua-yen does not mean this when it says one is a Buddha in the last instant of the stage of faith. This means that one instant itself is identical with all other times, past and future, and that the enlightenment of one being includes the enlightenment of all beings, and the eradication of one *kleśa* is the eradication of all, etc.. Though this one instant is technically a very early stage of development, it includes all things, including result. The general point of the passage is that all *dharmas* are identical and mutually inclusive, and this is a temporal as well as spacial relationship. Although the instantaneous enlightenment of the last instant of the stage of faith is strongly upheld, it is also said that subsequent effort is not negated, for in each instant of all the succeeding stages, enlightenment is newly acquired. This is necessarily so, for each succeeding instant is identical with the last moment of the stage of faith.

Taikei II.115-16; *Kōgi* 549-50

Text. 4. The realm of the net of Indra. This differs from the foregoing [number three] in the use of a simile. These above [ten] meanings are completely free in [exchange of] essence and characteristics and are alternately revealed as hidden and manifest infinitely, over and over. Therefore, the [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra says, "In each single atom, *nayutas* of countless *koṭis* of Buddhas are shown preaching the Dharma. In each atom are manifested countless Buddha-lands, Mt. Sumerus, encircling mountains, and horizon, and these worlds do not push against each other. In each atom there are the three evil destinations, divine beings, men, and Asuras, each receiving his retribution [for past acts]." [T.9.564] These three verses show the triple world. It also says, "Buddhas as countless as the atoms of a Buddha-land sit on the tip of a single hair. They all each have countless assemblies of Bodhisattvas and they thoroughly teach the practices of Samantabhadra. Countless oceans of Buddha-lands are placed on a single hair. All [Buddhas] sit on the lotus seat of enlightenment, and they fill up the whole *dharma*-*dhātu*, and they are freely shown on the tips of all hairs." It also says, "Like one hair, all hairs are the same." Other verses continue in the same way. The full discussion is in the sutra.

These [qualities shown in the quotations] are realities; they are not what has been created by way of skillful means for the sake of teaching. This is the realm of discrimination 如量境 within absolute wisdom 如理智. The other [scriptural pssages taught for the sake of] teaching, etc., [in other sutras such as the *Vimalakīrti*-*sūtra*] are not included in these [above] illustrations. Why is that? These [above mentioned qualities] are all the real qualities of the constituents of the *dharma*-*dhātu*, and this is the nature of things. This is not the realm discriminated by the corrupted mind. You should consider this only apart from corrupted senses.

Notes. The text at hand, in applying the simile of the net of Indra, adds the important concept of *infinitely repeated* interrelationships to the previous sections, which, although concerned with infinite interrelationship, postulated only a one-step interrelationship. Fa-tsang's point here is aptly demonstrated through the use of the famous simile. The net is hung over the realm of the heavens of Indra, and in the "eyes" of this net are hung jewels, one to each eye. The net is infinite in size, and therefore so is the number of jewels. Any single jewel in the net reflects all other jewels, including, of course, the reflections of jewels reflecting itself, so that the number of possibilities of relationships between all the jewels is limitless, or infinite, to use a commonly used adjective from Fa-tsang's system. This section, then, is concerned primarily with mutual inclusion or relationship, rather than with mutual identity. I believe that what Fa-tsang means by the jewels, or *dharmas*, being alternately hidden and manifest is that in the case of the jewels, if one jewel is arbitrarily contered upon as the reflector, the others are in a relationship to it of reflected to reflector, or hidden to manifest. In case of the *dharmas*, or things, symbolized by the ten meanings such as doctrine and essence, cause and result, etc., this means that though one *dharma* stands out for special notice while the others are less visible, still, the outstanding *dharma* includes the others, due to the six meanings possessed by any one thing. The following quotations from the *Avataṁsaka* are meant to be scriptural evidence. The first shows the three worlds of enlightenment (or Buddha), world receptacle, and beings respectively. The second quote does the same, though the order of the three worlds varies. This three-fold world is then said to be included on the tip of a hair, and this process can be carried out infinitely. Fa-tsang concludes by saying that this is the true state of the cosmos, and is not a result of teachings elaborated for the sake of converting beings. This statement by the Hua-yen itself, however, is not a true reflection of the content of the *samudra*-*mudrā*-*samādhi*, which is completely inexpressible, but is simply an *ex post facto* accommodation to the needs of beings; in short, it is *pṛṣṭhalabdha*-*jñāna*. By "other teachings", Fa-tsang is alluding to such a passage from the *Vimalakīrti*-*nirdeśa* (T.14.527) which says that "A *kalpa* is included in the [first] seven days of the Buddha's inconceivable enlightenment, and Mt. Sumeru is included in a mustard seed." This sort of teaching is adaptational, for the sake of beings, whereas the doctrine of the *Avataṁsaka* is a reflection of the true state of *dharmas*.

Taikei II.119-22; *Kōgi* 550-52

Text. Question: The preceeding [passage concerning] countless Buddha-lands and so forth being manifested in a single atom is only a one-step revelation [of inexhaustibility] and no more: why do you claim that it is manifested over and over, then? [506b] Answer: When the *Avataṁsaka* was taught in this world 方, it is said to have been taught also in all atoms. When the *Avataṁsaka* was taught in other atoms, it is said to have been taught like that in all atoms. In this way, [the teaching] was extended [limitlessly]; i.e., infinitely infinite numbers of times. You should consider [the sutra passages] accordingly.

Question: According to these passages, it is [a matter of] repeated infinity; what delimitations are there, and how can you discuss [such distinctions as] beginning and end [i.e., cause and result]? Answer: It is understood in accordance with wisdom. If one [*dharma*] is presented as the primary, the others are the retinue [or secondary 伴]. If the principal [= *dharma* "A"] is taken as the center, the others encircle it as its retinue, like the above doctrine and essence, etc.. All are thus freely formed [as alternately primary and secondary]. Also, in this way, the foregoing complete freedom of [mutual] identity and inclusion, etc., include all *dharmas* and the infinite *dharma*-*dhātu*, and form the [realm of the net of] Indra.

Notes. This text tries to further clarify the infinitely repeated interrelationship of things. The relationship has to be seen as being like the infinitely repeated reflections in the jewels in Indra's net. Thus, while the sutra was taught in this Sahā world, it was simultaneously taught in each atom of the cosmos. However, as it was taught in any other place, it was also taught in all other places, creating an infinite number of repeated inclusions. The second question and answer raise the question of the possibility of such distinctions as cause and effect, or sequentiality. In this view of the dharma-dhātu as a complexly interrelated infinity of things which mutually support each other, there can be no real question of sequence of cause and effect or of any delimitations. The relationship of the one and the many is thus seen on a horizontal level. However, wisdom shows that in any particular situation, one dharma is acting as the principal, or center, of the cause-effect nexus, and in this circumstance distinctions can be seen.

Taikei II.123-24; Kōgi 553-54

Text. 5. Phenomena are included in the miniscule and peacefully abode 微細相容安立. The above [ten] meanings possess all the topics of the Dharma such as first and later, simultaneity and sequence, before and after, contrary and orderly, etc., within a single thought instant. Just as an arrow is revealed as equal to its point, in a single instant, [the ten meanings, or all dharmas] are revealed simultaneously as equal to the point, without a one that is not manifest.

Notes. This section is concerned with the inclusion of the large within the small, the many in the one. Here, the "minuscule" is equivalent to the one thought instant. The universe is symbolized again by the ten pairs of meanings enumerated before, and these dharmas are said to be simultaneously present in a single flash of consciousness as simultaneous, in the sequence of cause and result, etc.. Here, the hsiang of the title of the section 微細相容安立, does not mean mutual, but means phenomena, and in Fa-tsang's typical shorthand it stands for the large. Thus, in a single atom are included countless Buddha-ksetras, but despite this inclusion of the many and large in the small and single, the large and many suffer no harm. The ten dharmas are all equal to the one thought instant in the same way that it can be said that an arrowhead contains the whole arrow. The point to this fifth section is that in the mutual inclusion of _dharmas_, even though the many are included in the one, the integrity of the many is not destroyed, nor is that of the small and single. Large remains large, and small remains small. This is underlined in the title by the words "peacefully abide".

Taikei II.124-25; _Kōgi_ 554

Text. Therefore, the [_Avataṁsaka_] sutra says, "In a single thought instant, the Bodhisattva [Śākyamuni] causes his spirit 神 to descend from the Heavens of the Satisfied Gods into his mother's womb and also communicates with Śāriputra, and the eternality of the abiding of the Dharma, and all the beings who benefit from it, are revealed in a single thought instant." [T.9.666 Int.] The complete details are in the sutra. It also says, "On the tip of a single hair, countless Buddha-lands are adorned and purified, and peacefully abide there without limit." [T.9.410] It also says, "In a single atom there are minute lands, within which all atoms, etc., abide." You should understand it according to reality.

Question: What is the difference between this interpretation and the previous [section which discussed the realm of] Indra? Answer: The alternate appearance [of _dharmas_] obscured and shining, over and over, belongs to [the discussion about the net of] Indra; clearly revealed as equal to the point [i.e., the minute] belongs to [the discussion of] the minuscule. These topics are not identical. You should consider them accurately.

Notes. The quotations from the sutra ostensibly show the inclusion of the large in the small, but they are also interpreted as showing the Buddha teaching the Dharma in the worlds contained in each atom. The answer to the question means that the previous topic of Indra's realm was meant to illustrate the repeated infinite interrelationship of _dharmas_, but the present topic illustrates only that all things can be included in the smallest space and time. Repeated infinite interrelationship is not the issue here.

Taikei II.125-26; _Kōgi_ 555

Text. 6. The mystery of the simultaneous formation of the hidden and revealed. The above [ten] concepts [of doctrine and essence, etc.] simultaneously exist in their obscurity and manifestation. Thus, the [_Avataṁsaka_] sutra says, "If one enters concentration in this region, one emerges from concentration in the other directions. If one enters concentration by means of [contemplating] the eye, one emerges from concentration by means of [contemplating] forms, etc.." [T.9.438] It also says, "If one enters concentration as a man, one emerges from it as a woman, etc.. If one enters concentration in one atom, one emerges from concentration in all atoms. If one enters concentration in all atoms, one emerges from concentration on the tip of a hair." In this way, the one is hidden and the other is revealed with complete freedom, and concentration and emerging from concentration are achieved simultaneously in a mysterious way. Also, the sutra says, "Because there are conditions [i.e., beings in need of help] in the ten directions, one saves beings by going and returning, entering and leaving concentration." The Bodhisattva may be seen entering concentration, or [506c] he may be seen leaving concentration. It also says, "In all the worlds in the ten directions, he is seen achieving perfect enlightenment instantaneously, turning the wheel of the Excellent Dharma, entering *nirvāṇa*, having his remains [*śarīra*] divided, and saving living beings." Such [passages] are countless. The complete discussion is in the sutra. Also, for instance, when the Buddha makes a prediction [of eventual Buddhahood] for all the Bodhisattvas, he may make an open prediction, or he may make a secret prediction which is not open, etc.. For instance, the ten coins in the first coin, above, are said to be manifested, while the second coin, from the point of view of the ten coins within the one, is said to be hidden. Why is this? Because if you see these [ten coins in the one], you do not see the others [such as the second, third, etc., coins], because there is no connection between them 不相知 . Even if there is no connection between them, however, because when one is formed the others are formed, both are said to be formed. You should consider it in this way accordingly.

Notes. Eight scriptural passages are given here as the basis for this particular category, the secret, or hidden formation of both the hidden and manifest. The last passage, for instance, is interpreted to mean that while the Buddha makes a manifested, or open, prediction of impending Buddhahood in one place, he makes it in a secret, or unmanifested manner in other places.

The concluding recourse to the analogy of the ten coins helps to put the matter at hand within the context of common essence and different essence. It will be recalled that all dharmas are symbolized by ten coins. The whole ten coins seen as contained within the first coin are of the category of common essence; they are identical with one. As such, they are said to be manifested; i.e., the whole is seen in the parts. However, if we switch our attention to coin number two, or coin number three, etc., these are said to be of different essence, and in relation to the ten coins seen as identical in essence to coin number one, they are said to be empty. The reason is, when the one coin is seen as having complete power to form the many, all the others are then said to be without power, so in this one circumstance, the other nine coins are not evident in any causal capacity; they are empty. However, despite the difference between coin one and coin two, let us say, they do exist together as part of the totality, and though one is manifest in a causal situation and the other is unmanifest, or hidden, in relation to that situation, still, because of the infinite interrelationship of all the dharmas in the nexus of pratītyasamutpāda, both the manifest and unmanifest are simultaneously operating as cause, albeit within different contexts. Another example is that of a single person who may be said to have various names in relation to others of his family. To his parents, he is a son, to his wife a husband, to his own children a father, to his older brother a younger brother, and to his younger brother an older brother. He is all these at the same time, but if we consider only his relationship to his parents, he is only a son. In this case, his qualifications as a son are manifested, while his qualifications as father, husband, etc., are, in this circumstance, unmanifested, or hidden. In any case, it is only one person we are looking at. It is thus clear that while with relation to one set of facts an object can be seen to exercise a causal function, and not with relation to another, or several, sets of facts, still, the essence of that object remains the same despite whether it is manifest or not. While we regard the individual only from the standpoint of being a son to his parents, he does not cease to exist with regard to wife, children, etc..

Taikei II.128-31; Kōgi 557-58

Text. 7. The qualities which all dharmas have of being both pure and mixed 諸藏純雜具德. The above [ten pairs of] meanings may be pure 純 or mixed 雜. For instance, taking the category "men", of the previous [categories of] men, Dharmas, etc., then because all are "men", [that category] is called pure. Also, because this category includes all different dharmas such as noumenon, phenomena, etc., it is called mixed. For instance, a Bodhisattva enters a concentration and just practices giving [dāna], and even though it is immeasurable and boundless, still, because it lacks the other practices, it is called pure [or simple]. Or else, he enters a concentration and perfects, simultaneously, countless, boundless other mixed practices such as giving, morality, saving beings, etc.. In this way, [dharmas] are intermingled in profusion in the dharma-dhātu, and with complete freedom exist as pure or mixed, without exception. This is how you should consider it.

Notes. 諸藏 here means dharmas. Any single dharma may be considered to be simple or mixed, itself alone, or as including all dharmas. Thus, when the Bodhisattva practices giving, he practices all practices as giving; all dharmas can thus be seen to be practice, and therefore they are called simple, or pure. However, the Bodhisattva may practice giving in such a way that the giving includes all other practices, in which case the dharmas are said to be mixed. In effect, then, by practicing one of the Bodhisattva practices, the individual is practicing all. This title is the "old" title; in later works, Fa-tsang substituted the title "The completely free interrelationship of the broad and narrow"廣狹自在無礙 , apparently feeling that the title of the present treatise was misleading. "Broad and narrow" clearly refer to limited phenomenal objects, and he wants to make the point that the small and large are freely mutually inclusive. In the above "old" title, however, "all dharmas" (since these include the noumenon of the ten pairs of meanings) must of necessity include the category "noumenon", and therefore, the title would imply only the mutual inclusion of noumenon and phenomena, rather than the mutual inclusion of phenomenon and phenomenon of this title.

Taikei II.132-33; *Kōgi* 559

Text. 8. The distinct existence of separate *dharmas* of the ten times. These above various mixed things pervade the ten times and are manifested as being simultaneous and different, because time and *dharmas* are not distinct from each other. Ten times means that in each of the three times, past, future, and present, there are past, future, and present, making nine times. However, because these nine times are mutually identical and mutually inclusive, they form one general unit. If you add the general [one] to the distinct [nine], they make ten times. Because these ten times are endowed with particularity and are manifested simultaneously, and form dependent origination, they are able to be mutually inclusive.

Therefore, this [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra says, "A long eon [*kalpa*] may be included in a short eon, and a short eon may be included in a long eon. Or else a million great eons make a single thought instant, and a single thought instant makes a million great eons. [507a] Or, the past eons are included in the future eons, and the future eons are included in the past eons." [T.9.601 Int.] Time being completely free in this way, it is without impediment, mutually identical and mutually inclusive, and interfused. The sutra also says, "All Buddha-lands of the three times are manifested simultaneously in a single atom." It also says, "Within a single atom, all beings of the three times are revealed." It also says, "All the acts of the Buddhas of the three times are shown in a single atom." Also, "The turning of the wheel of the Dharma by all the Buddhas of the three times is established in a single atom." The passages such as these are numerous. The complete discussion is in the sutra. These [passages] wholly include the above [ten pairs of] meanings and simply show that all are freely manifested in the ten times. Consider it correctly.

Notes. This section is concerned with the vertical, temporal interrelationship of dharmas. The ten times are the past, future, and present in each of the past, future, and present, plus the totality of the nine times as they exist in a single thought instant. The title means that even though all time is identical and mutually inclusive, the dharmas of the different times remain distinct. More specifically, the meaning is that all time is telescoped into a single thought instant, without differentiation, and, on the other hand, spread out over the nine times. Time is dependent on dharmas, so inasmuch as dharmas are identical and mutually inclusive while remaining distinct, so does time have the same status. It is, in fact, ultimately false and illusory. Time is an invention lacking any reality apart from the functioning of dharmas. There is, for instance, no real season called spring in which flowers bloom, only the blooming of flowers which we characterize by the time-word "spring". A dharma which has exhausted its function is called "past"; one which is functioning is called "present"; one which has not yet manifested its function is called "future". However, it is evident that past and future exist, always, relative to the present; in any supposed past or future, moreover, there is always, in reality, only a present, so that at any given time, there is only a real present and a relative past and future. A thing really only moves from a present to another present. There is only, in reality, an eternal present which is identical to the relative past and future, and this eternal present is the "one thought instant," the real present, of which Fa-tsang speaks.

Taikei II.138-40; Kōzi 562

Text. 9. Excellent formation [of all *dharmas*] through the transformation of absolute mind. These above [ten pairs of] meanings are the transformation of the essentially pure mind of the absolute *tathāgata*-*garbha*. [This mind] is different from that [mind conceived by the] three vehicles, just because it possesses the qualities of origination from essential nature 性起. Moreover, this absolute mind is endowed with ten kinds of qualities. What is meant here is, for instance, the teaching in the chapter on the "Arising of the *Tathāgata* from Essential Nature," [in the *Avataṁsaka*] on the ten kinds of mind 心. The reason for speaking of "ten" is in order to express infinity. In this way, it freely possesses an infinity of qualities. These above meanings are completely the functioning of this mind, and there are no other things [outside this mind]. Therefore, we speak of the transformation of absolute mind. Think of this correctly.

Notes. This topic clearly sets forth the important Hua-yen doctrine of the evolution of the phenomenal world from the Dharma-kāya, or essential nature (identical with what the Chinese mean by *li* 理). The earlier enumerated ten pairs of *dharmas*, which symbolize *all* *dharmas*, or everything, are here said to be nothing but the transformation of this absolute mind; that is, they are the appearance in space and time of the absolute. This mind which expresses itself in the world as phenomena does not lose its essential purity and immutability during this transformation; Fa-tsang defines it, in the *T'an*-*hsüan*-*chi*, by saying, "Non-alteration is called essential nature, and the revelation of its function is called arising." Thus, *hsing*-*ch'i* 性起 expresses the non-arising of arising, the eternal immutability and permanence of the absolute as changing and impermanent things-*dharmas*. It is this status of the infinity of things of being expressions of the absolute that lies ultimately at the basis for the Hua-yen doctrine of the infinite interrelationship of these things. Fa-tsang's intention here, in this section, is to show the infinite interrelationship of things, and his method here is to show the underlying reason for that relationship. Apparently he felt that he had not expressed it perfectly, for later, in the *T'an-hsüan-chi*, he changed the title to 主伴圓明具德 , which more certainly emphasizes the interrelatedness of *dharmas*, rather than the interpenetration of phenomenal 事 and noumenal 理 .

Taikei II.141-43; *Kōgi* 563-64

Text. 10. Begetting understanding by showing *dharmas* through the expedient of phenomena. By distinguishing the above [ten] meanings through the expedient of phenomena, the distinct [characteristics of] *dharmas* are revealed; that is to say, all the Dharma topics such as noumenon, phenomena, etc.. For instance, in this [*Avataṁsaka*] sutra, the Dharma topics are such things as the ten kinds of jewels, kings, clouds, etc.. It shows the value of the above [ten] meanings by creating [the image of] jewels, and it shows the freedom of these meanings through the use of the king. In order to show the beneficial quality of these meanings, because they benefit, and because [they appear like] many gums [of a dragon's teeth], clouds are used. These sorts of things are discussed *ad infinitum*. You should consider it according to the sutra.

Notes. This last section deals with a very special doctrine of Hua-yen, the doctrine that the symbol and the symbolized are identical. Thus, even though the ten Dharma categories such as noumenon and phenomena, doctrine and essence, etc., are symbolized in the sutra by such things as clouds, jewels, kings, etc., and their infinite interrelationship is shown through the use of the number ten. Understanding of the universe subsumed under the ten pairs of _dharmas_ is achieved through the use of symbols, but the relationship of the symbols themselves directly indicates the special status of the _dharma_-_dhātu_.

Taikei II.143-44; _Kōgi_ 564-65

Text. Question: Since the three vehicles also has this concept, what is the difference between them and you? Answer: The three vehicles show different principles through the expedient of the characteristics of different things. With us, the characteristics of things used by the one vehicle are the very principles shown [by the three vehicles] and are not at all different. They are endowed with noumenon, phenomena, doctrine, essence, etc., and all the above Dharma topics, without exception. You should consider it according to the principle.

Notes. In the three vehicles, the symbol is the symbol and the principle it stands for is principle, and the two remain different. However, in the one vehicle, the symbol itself is the principle, the Dharma topic. Thus, the things which are used expediently as symbols are themselves the principle which is shown. If a single item is presented as an illustration, it in itself is endowed with all the other _dharma_ categories. In any one thing, all other things are included.

Taikei II.145; _Kōgi_ 565

Text. The explanation of the above ten [profound] topics, and the ten [pairs of] meanings of the original text are all simultaneously interrelated and form the topic of the qualities of the dependent origination of the _dharma_-_dhātu_. When you clearly perceive this in truth, from the realm of universal vision, it only exists in the mind of [existences of] great comprehension, great practice, and great seeing and hearing [among the three existences]. Moreover, each of these topics of the ten includes all the others, without exception. [507b] You should understand these in combination with the skillful device of the six characteristics.

Everything which has been explained above is just the revelation of the concept of dependent origination in the distinct doctrine of the one vehicle. Also, in this connection, all the characteristics of *dharmas*, questions and answers, removal of objections, etc., are sometimes the same as, and sometimes different from, the three vehicles. [Considering the three vehicles to be] the property, the institution, and the skillful means, etc., [of the one vehicle] is as explained extensively in the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra*, *Commentary on the Daśabhūmika*, the *Sou-hsüan-chi* [by Chih-yen], etc., the *K'ung-mu-chang*, and the *Fifty Essential Questions and Answers* [both of which are also by Chih-yen]. This is completely different from the three vehicles. You should consider the details in accordance with the *Avataṁsaka-sūtra*'s universal vision.

Notes. Fa-tsang explains, in the last paragraph, that some of his positions on certain matters are occasionally the same as those of the three vehicles and sometimes quite different, but the similarity is due to the fact that the categories, descriptions, etc., of the three vehicles are, as explained in various Hua-yen works, nothing but the skillful means of the one vehicle.

Taikei II.145-49; *Kōgi* 566-67

Text. Question: The above religious principles and the concepts of the three vehicles are distinct and non-identical; this must be believed. On the basis of what evidence are we to know that there is a distinct one vehicle outside the three vehicles? Answer: Because this [Avataṁsaka] sutra itself has a substantiatory passage. A verse says, "Few are those of the many people in the world who seek the way of the disciples; fewer still are those who seek the way of the pratyekabuddhas; those who seek the great vehicle are indeed rare. It is still [comparatively] easy to seek the great vehicle; it is extremely difficult to believe in this [one vehicle] Dharma." [T.9.44]

Indeed, because this Dharma escapes common sense and is difficult to believe, the Blessed One used the three vehicles to compare and criticize it. Also, some verses say, "If beings are inferior and have thoughts of distaste [for saṁsāra] and [desire for] cessation [in nirvāna], I shall reveal the path of the disciples and cause them to escape suffering; these are the small vehicle. If there are beings whose capacities are slight but bright and sharp, who delight in the law of cause and conditions, I shall teach the [path of the] pratyekabuddhas; this is the intermediate vehicle. If there are persons whose faculties are bright and sharp, who have thoughts of great compassion, who benefit all beings, I shall teach them the path of the Bodhisattva; this is the great vehicle. If there are some with unsurpassed minds, who are resolved to seek great things, for them I shall reveal the bodies of the Buddha and teach the inexhaustible Dharma of the Buddha; this is the one vehicle." Since this one vehicle is not fit to be accepted by those of inferior capacities, the Great Sage used skillful means and taught a small amount in accordance with the capacities and expectations of those in the rank of the three vehicles. Since he did not [in this teaching] reach the extremity of the *dharma*-*dhātu*, he also provisionally revealed the Buddha of two bodies, three bodies, etc.. Now, for those beings of unsurpassed minds who delight in great matters, right at the start he revealed the realm of the ten bodies of the Buddha, and taught the inexhaustible Dharma of the Buddha. This is called revealing the body of the Buddha and teaching the inexhaustible Dharma of the Buddha. The three vehicles are [taught] in accordance with faculties, and [the Buddha] did not manifest the very realm of the ten bodies of the Buddhas, so he did not manifest the [real] body of the Buddha. Also, because he taught only a little of such principles as one characteristic 一相 , one cessation 一寂 , and one flavor 一味, it is not the teaching of infinity. Why is that? Because the three vehicles would make mistakes about infinity, but the one vehicle considers infinity to be the real characteristic [of the *dharma*-*dhātu*].

Also, this sutra says, "In a single *dharma*-*dhātu*, one hears the sound of the teaching of one vehicle, [507c] or two, three, four, five, or even countless vehicles." [T.9.787] This is said simply on the basis of the divisions of fundamental and derivative. The meaning of the holy teaching is clear; one should not be amazed by his perverted senses.

4. The Concept of the Perfect Interfusion of the Six Characteristics

Text. The dependent origination of the six characteristics will be discerned through the use of three topics. First, the names will be briefly explained. Second, the idea which has made the teaching prosper will be shown. Third, is the elucidation through questions and answers.

First, to present the names: that is, the characteristics of universality, speciality, identity, diversity, intergration, and disintegration 總別同異成壞. "Universality" means that the one includes many qualities. "Speciality" means that the many qualities are not the same 非一, because the special fills up the universal 總 in dependence on the universal. "Identity" means that the many concepts 義 are not different 相違, because they form the one whole identically. "Diversity" means that each of the many concepts is different 異 with regard to each other. "Integration" means that [the totality of] dependent origination is formed as a result of these [various concepts or dharmas]. "Disintegration" means that each of these concepts remains in its own dharma and does not move.

Notes. Each thing (and here, dharmas are things) possesses the six characteristics. Universality and speciality refer to essence, identity and diversity refer to the characteristics, and integration and disintegration refer to the functions. The meaning of the six characteristics can be further shown by the analogy of a building. "Universality" refers to the whole house composed of pillars, rafters, ridge-pole, etc.. In this case, the totality is emphasized. "Speciality" refers to the rafters, pillars, etc., which, though forming the whole, each retain their own essences. "Identity" means that the parts which form the whole unite their power in common, without conflict. "Diversity" simply means that the various components, while uniting and forming the whole, retain their differences; the pillars are vertical, the rafters are on a slant, and the ridge-pole is horizontal. "Integration" means that all parts form the whole. "Disintegration" means that each part retains its own separate identity in the whole. It is evident from the form of these six marks of each dharma that any given dharma retains its own essence and form while at the same time being interrelated and intermixed with all other dharmas. Its self-identity is retained through its possession of the characteristics of speciality, diversity, and disintegration, and it is identical with and mutually included in all other dharmas through its universality, identity, and integration. On the basis of this situation, Hua-yen is able to maintain its doctrine of unity in diversity. Although the most striking application of this is in the Hua-yen picture of a universe of infinitely interrelated things, a more practical application lies in the area of Bodhisattva practices and stages. Although, due to the six characteristics of each stage, the Bodhisattva is, in a sense, already a Buddha in the early stage of faith, this does not exclude the necessity for later stages and practices. One stage is equal to all stages, but the Bodhisattva nevertheless traverses the whole 52 stages.

Taikei II.153-57; Kōgi 570-72

Text. Second, the idea which has made the doctrine prosper: this teaching tries to reveal such things as the dependent origination of the *dharma*-*dhātu* of the perfect doctrine of the one vehicle, the complete freedom of the infinite interfusion [of all things], the identity and unobstructable interfusion [of things], and, finally, the infinity of noumenon and phenomena, etc., in the wonderful realm of Indra.

When these [ten] meanings are present [in the mind of the practitioner], then when one of the many obstacles is brought to an end, all are ended, and one obtains the destruction of [defilements] of the nine times and the ten times. In practicing the virtues, when one is perfected, all are perfected, and with regard to reality, when one [part] is revealed, all is revealed. All are possessed of universality and distinctness, beginning and end are the same, and when one puts forth the thought of enlightenment, he also becomes perfectly enlightened. Indeed, it is the result of the dependent origination of the *dharma*-*dhātu* being the fusion of the six characteristics, the simultaneity of cause and result, perfectly free identity, and being endowed with contrary and conformity 逆順. The cause is the comprehension and practice and the enlightenment 解行證入 of Samantabhadra, and the result is the infinitude of the realm of the ten Buddhas which is manifested. The detailed discussion is in the *Avataṁsaka*-*sūtra*.

Notes. The contrary and conformity of the last sentences refers to the contrary and orderly progress in the stages, the first referring to a movement from upper to lower, for the sake of suffering humanity, and the other referring to the orderly movement through the stages of Bodhisattva development. Ultimately, there is no contradiction seen in the two movements.

Taikei II.158-161; Kōgi 572-74

Text. Third, the elucidation through questions and answers: however, the law of dependent origination is common to all situations. Now, for a little while, I shall briefly discuss this in connection with [the example of] a building formed from conditions.

Question: What is it which is the universal? Answer: It is the building. Question: This is only various conditions such as rafters; what is it which is the building? Answer: The rafters are the building. Why is that? It is because the rafters alone completely create the building. If you get rid of the rafters, the building is not formed. When there are rafters, there is a building.

Question: If the rafters alone wholly make the building, if there are still no tiles and other things, would they make a building? [508a] Answer: When there are no tiles and such things, [the rafters] are not rafters, so they do not make [the building]. This does not mean that when [rafters] are rafters they can not make a building. Now, when I say they can make it, I am only discussing the ability of rafters to create it, I am not saying that non-rafters can build it. Why is that? Rafters are causes and conditions. Because when they have not yet formed the building there are no causes and conditions, they are not rafters [= 緣]. If they are rafters, they ultimately wholly form [the building]. If they do not wholly form it, they are not called rafters.

Notes. The totality of the building is a confluence of cooperating conditions, mutually supporting and aiding. When the building exists in its wholeness, rafters can be rafters for the first time. Conversely, if there are no pillars, roof tiles, ridge-pole, etc., there are also no rafters *per se*. Consequently, if there are no pillars, tiles, etc., there are no rafters, and so, it follows, the rafters can not form the building. From the point of view of the rafters of the building, it can be said that they have absorbed total power to create the building; the whole is totally made by the rafters. However, the rafters as rafters exist only in the total context of the building.

Taikei II.161-63; *Kōgi* 574-75

Text. Question: If the various conditions such as rafters each exert partial power and create [the building] together and do not [each] totally create it, what would be the error? Answer: It would be the errors of annihilationism and eternalism. If they [each] do not [each] wholly cause [the building] to be made and only exert partial power, then each of the conditions would have only partial power. In this case, there would be only many individual partial powers, and they would not make one whole building, so this would be annihilationism. [On the other hand,] all the conditions cannot completely form the building if they [exert] partial power together, so if you hold that there is a whole building, then because it exists without a cause, this is eternalism. Also, if [rafters] do not wholly create it, [and instead only partially create it,] when one rafter is removed, the building should remain. However, since the *total* building is not formed, then you should know that the building is formed not by the partial power [of the rafters], but by the total power.

Notes. The question concerns the status of the individual units of the building. By partial power is meant the situation whereby rafters are only rafters, tiles are only tiles, etc.. This is opposed to the situation where, say, the rafters function as the totality of conditions. It would seem that if each part of the building exerted its own special powers, then all these separate, partial powers acting together ought to form a building. Needless to say, this is not the case. The part of the text from "Also, if rafters do not..." gives the reason why the rafters have total power.

Taikei II.164; *Kōgi* 577

Text. Question: How would there be no building when one rafter is removed 無 ? Answer: This is just a spoiled house, not a perfect house. Therefore, know that a perfect house is inherent in 屬 the one rafter. Since it is wholly inherent in the one rafter, therefore know that the rafter is the building. Question: Since the building is identical with the rafter, then the remaining planks, tiles, etc., would be identical with the rafter, wouldn't they? Answer: Generally speaking, they are all the rafter. Why is that? Because if you take away the rafter, there is no building. The reason for this is that if there is no rafter, the building is disintegrated. Because the building is disintegrated, you can not speak of planks, tiles, etc.. Therefore, the planks, tiles, etc., are the rafter. If they are not the rafter, then the building is not formed. Rafters, tiles, etc., together do not form [the building]. Now, since they do not together create it, you should know that they are simply identical. Since this is so of one rafter, the other rafters are the same by this example. Therefore, if all the *dharmas* of dependent origination are not integrated [as an interrelated totality], then they cease 已. If they are integrated [in a whole], then they are mutually identical and interfused, completely free in their interrelationship, extremely difficult to conceive of, and escape erroneous calculation. The dependent origination of the nature of *dharmas* 法性 pervades all situations, and you should understand it accordingly.

Second, the characteristic of speciality 別相: all conditions such as rafters, etc., are parts in the whole. If they were not parts, they would not form the whole, because when there are no parts, there is no whole. What does this mean? Originally, the whole is formed of parts, so if there are no parts, the whole is not formed. Therefore, the parts become parts by means of the whole. Question: If the whole is identical with the parts, how could it form a whole? Answer: Because the whole is identical with the parts, therefore it is able to form the whole. Just as the rafters are identical with the building and therefore we call this the characteristic of universality, so also because they are rafters, we speak of the characteristic of speciality. If they are not identical with the building, they are not rafters; if [the building] is not rafters, it is not a building. The whole and the parts are identical. [508b] This is how you should consider it.

Question: If they are identical, how can you speak of parts? Answer: Because on the basis of their identity, [parts] form the parts. If they [i.e., parts and whole] were not identical, the whole would exist outside the parts, and therefore would not be the whole. The parts would exist outside the whole, and therefore would not be parts. You can understand it in this way.

Question: Where would the error be if they are not [considered to be] special? Answer: There are the errors of annihilationism and eternalism. If there were no parts, there would be no parts such as rafters, tiles, etc.. Because there are no parts such as rafters and tiles, then because the whole building is not formed, this is the error of annihilationism. If there are no parts such as rafters and tiles, and yet there is a whole building, if the building is considered to exist without a cause, this is the error of eternalism.

Third, the characteristic of identity: the various conditions such as rafters, etc., all combine and make the building. Because there is no difference in them, all are called conditions of the building. Because they do not make other things, this is called the characteristic of identity. Question: What is the difference between this and the characteristic of universality? Answer: The characteristic of universality is only spoken of from the standpoint of a single building. This characteristic of identity concerns all the various conditions such as the rafters. Even though the essence of each is different, because [there is no difference among them in their mutually creating the building and] they are equal in the power of formation, this is called the characteristic of identity. Question: If they are not identical, what is the error? Answer: The error of annihilationism and eternalism. Why? If they are not identical, the conditions such as the rafters would act against each other and they would not make the building identically. This would be annihilationism because there would be no building. If [on the other hand,] they do not create the building because they are different, then if you judge that there is still a building, then because the building exists without a cause, this would be eternalism.

Fourth, the characteristic of diversity: the various conditions such as rafters are distinct from the point of view of each other in conformity with their own individual species. Question: If they are diverse, wouldn't they be identical? Answer: They are identical simply because they are diverse. If they were not diverse, then since the rafters are [about] eleven feet long 丈二, the tiles would also be the same, and because this destroys the original condition [i.e., the tile as it ordinarily should be], then, as before, we would lose the meaning of forming the building alike and identically. Now, since they form the building, they are identically called conditions, so we know they are diverse.

Question: What is the difference between this and the characteristic of speciality? Answer: The previous characteristic of speciality meant only that all the conditions such as rafters are distinct within a single house, so we speak of the characteristic of speciality. Now, when we speak of diversity, we mean that each of the various conditions such as rafters are diverse from the standpoint of each other.

Question: If they were not diverse, what would be the error? Answer: The errors of annihilationism and eternalism. Why? If they were not diverse, then the tiles, like the rafters, would be [about] eleven feet long. This would destroy the original condition [i.e., the tile as it would ordinarily be] and not form the building. Therefore, this is annihilationism. If you remain attached to the existence of a building while the building is not formed, as a result of the destruction of conditions, then a building which exists without cause means eternalism.

Fifth, the characteristic of integration: Because as a result of these various conditions the concept of house is formed, because they form a building, the rafters, etc., are called conditions. If this were not so, then neither of the two [i.e., the forming conditions and the formed building] would come to be. Now, since [the conditions] actually form [the building], know that this is the characteristic of integration.

Question: [508c] When we actually see the various conditions such as rafters, each consists of its own dharma and does not intrinsically become the building; what is the reason for its being able to form the concept of building? [I.e., integration is contradictory to disintegration, which is what is meant by each condition retaining its own identity.] Answer: Simply because the various conditions such as rafters do not make [the building, because they retain their own qualities], they are able to form the concept of building. The reason this is so is that if the building is made of rafters, then they lose their intrinsic [qualifications as] conditions, and therefore the meaning of building would not be formed. Now, because they do not make [the building], the conditions such as rafters, etc., are manifested. Because they are manifested [just as they are], the concept of building can be formed. Also, if they do not become the building, the rafters and so forth can not be called conditions. Now, since they acquire the name of conditions, you should clearly knew that they definitely make the house.

Question: If they do not integrate, what would be the error? Answer: The errors of annihilationism and eternalism. Why? The building is formed originally as a result of the various conditions such as the rafters, etc.. Now, if they do not make the building all together, the existence of the building is not possible; therefore, this is annihilationism. Originally the conditions form the building and in this way are called rafters; now, since they do not form the building, since there are no rafters, this is annihilationism. If they do not integrate, then because the building exists without a cause, this is eternalism. Also, it is eternalism if the rafters do not make the house and yet are called rafters.

Sixth, the characteristic of disintegration: each of the various conditions such as rafters, etc., retains its own separate nature 住自法 and intrinsically does not become [the building]. Question: If you see the various conditions such as rafters right before you, making and perfecting the building, how can you say they intrinsically do not become [the building]? Answer: Simply because they do not become [a building], the *dharma* or building can be formed. If they become the building while not retaining their own nature 住自法 then the concept of building is not brought about. Why? Because if they become [the building], they lose their [individual] characteristics 法 and the building is not formed. Now, since the building is formed, you should clearly know that they do not become [the building].

Question: If they do become [the building], what is the error? Answer: There would be the two errors of annihilationism and eternalism. If it is claimed that the rafters do become the building, the characteristics of the rafters would be lost. Because the characteristics of the rafters are lost, then the building has no conditions and can not exist. This is annihilationism. If the characteristics of the rafters are lost and yet a building were to exist, this is eternalism, because a building would exist without conditions.

Also, universality is the one building; the speciality consists of the various conditions; identity is the non-difference [of the conditions]; diversity is the difference of the various conditions; integration means that the various conditions dispose of the result; and disintegration means that each [condition] retains its own characteristic 法. If these are made into a verse, it is said that

The many in the one
Is the characteristic of universality;

The many not being identical with the one
Is the characteristic of speciality;

[509a] Many varieties in themselves being identical
Forms the universal!

The essence of each being distinct
Manifests their identity.

The principle of the dependent origination
Of one and many is wonderful integration;

Disintegration means
Each retains its own characteristic,
And eternally does not become [the whole].

This is only the realm of wisdom,
It is not a discussion of phenomena;

By means of this skillful device,
You can understand the one vehicle.

Notes

The notes are listed according to the four sections of the introduction, and begin from number one with each new section. The works are cited in full in the first reference, but appear in abbreviated form thereafter.

Section 1

[1] Another favorite device is that of the golden image of a lion, used by Fa-tsang in his "Essay on the Golden Lion." This use can be seen in the following translations of Fa-tsang's essay: *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, ed. William Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) I, 329, and *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Wing-tsit Chan (Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 409. The original can be seen in number 1881 of the *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, ed. Takakusu Junjirō and Watanabe Kaikyoku (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppansha, 1924-34), pp. 667 ff. (Hereafter referred to as *Taishō*.)

[2] Translation, p. 532.

[3] For instance, in the translations of the "Essay on the Golden Lion," in the works edited by Chan and de Bary, mentioned in the first note.

[4] Such descriptions of a general nature can be found in Takakusu Junjirō, *Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy* (Honolulu, 1947), and Sogen Yamakami, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought* (Calcutta, 1912), but these tend to be very brief and unsatisfying.

[5] The completed Hua-yen system is due to Fa-tsang (643-712), but the term *Hua-yen tsung* was apparently not used before the time of his successor, Ch'eng-kuan, the fourth patriarch of the school. See Kamata Shigeo, *Chūgoku Kegon Shisō Shi no Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Zaidan Hōjin Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1965), pp. 51, 53, and note five.

[6] The extent to which Fa-tsang was indebted for many of his basic ideas to these texts, particularly the *Awakening of Faith*, can be seen by the number of times he uses them for corroboration. A modest statistical

study of his citations from canonical literature can be found on pages 113-15 in the introduction.

[7] E. Obermiller, *The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation*: *Uttaratantra* (Shanghai, 1940), pp. 156-57. (Parentheses in the passage are Obermiller's.) While in this text, the germ (*garbha*) is said to exist in "all that lives," the view came to be held that even inanimate things possessed the germ, but since emancipation was restricted to things that have a *citta*, the discussions were generally in terms of living things. Fa-tsang discusses the problem in the ninth chapter, when he discusses the question of who possesses Buddha nature.

[8] Yoshito S. Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 31 ff.

[9] Most of the second section of this introduction is concerned with Fa-tsang's treatment of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*), and some space is devoted to the pattern "emptiness and existence."

[10] For instance, in Ch'eng-kuan's *Hua-yen fa-chiai hsüan-ching* (*Taishō* no. 1883, first *chüan*) The four kinds of *dharma-dhatu* can be found in seminal form even in the system of the first Hua-yen patriarch, Tu-shun, but the developed form is not found until it appears in Ch'eng-kuan's system. See Kametani S., *Kegon Tetsugaku Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Meikyō Gakkai, 1922), pp. 109-28, and Kamegawa Kyōshin, *Kegon-gaku* (Kyoto: Hyakkaen, 1949), pp. 128-55.

[11] Borrowed from Saitō Yuishin, *Kegon-gaku Kōyō* (Tokyo: Shueisha, 1920), pp. 132-33.

[12] Kamegawa, p. 190.

[13] See, for instance, p. 216 in the translation.

[14] Translation, p. 452.

[15] Translation, pp. 452-53. For the classical treatment of these four conditions, see *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, trans. Louis de La Vallée Poussin (Paris: Geuthner, 1923-31), pp. 199-331 (Chapter 2).

[16] For a discussion of the stages of practice in the small vehicle, see the synopsis by La Vallee Poussin, "Avant Propos," *Abhidharmakośa*, iv-xii (Chapter 5).

[17] *Yaḥ pratītyasamutpādam paśyati idaṁ sa paśyati*.

Quoted in T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. 166, note 5. Murti also quotes the passage *Yaḥ pratītyasamutpādah śūnyatā saiva te matā*. See also Murti's comments concerning this on pages 122 and 166. See, also, Jacques May, *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* (Paris, 1959), p. 224.

[18] Translation, pp. 188-93.

[19] This is clear in Fa-tsang's treatment of the three natures in the first part of the tenth chapter. The existence of *dharmas* means that they appear as a result of conditions, which in turn means that they are empty. This seems to be perfectly in line with Nāgarjuna's equation of emptiness with *pratītyasamutpāda*.

[20] *Samudra-mudrā samādhi* 海印三昧. My translation is tentative. *Mudra* is usually translated as "seal," particularly within the context of esoteric Buddhism. However, to translate the name literally as "ocean-seal concentration" is misleading if we have this conviction of its connotations. The *Tsūroki* (*Taikei* I. 18) glosses 印 with 印現, which I take to mean an image, impression, or sign. The metaphoric name refers to the ocean which has become so still in the absence of wind that it is able to reveal all things in its surface. The concentration is like the ocean in that the stillness of the mind during this deepest and most excellent *samādhi* allows all things to be revealed there. In trying to retain the obvious intent of the metaphor, I have translated the name as "the concentration which is like the images of the ocean." The *samādhi* appears in the *Avataṁsaka*, *Mahāprajñā-pāramitā-sūtra*, *Ratnakuṭa-sūtra*, and *Mahasannipata-sutra* (? *Taishō* no. 397), according to Professor Yusugi Ryoei, *Daizōkyō Kōza*: *Go-kyō-shō Kōgi* (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoin, 1932), p. 29. (Hereafter referred to as *Kōgi*.) See, also, Oda Tokunō, *Bukkyō Daijiten* (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppansha, 1966), p. 159, and Mochizuki Shinkō, *Bukkyō Daijiten* (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1931-32), I, 376-77.

[21] The *Daśabhūmika* and *Gaṇḍavyūha* sections of the *Avataṁsaka*, and probably the chapters on "The Arising of the Tathagata from Essential Nature," and "Names of the Tathāgata," are based on Sanskrit originals. The first two were finished in about the second century. See Watanabe Shōkō, *Nihon no Bukkyō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1960), p. 170. These two works are extant in Sanskrit versions, the first having been edited by Kondō Ryukō, *Daśabhūmiśvaro Nāma Mahāyanastotram* (Tokyo, 1936), and the second having been edited by Daisetz T. Suzuki and

Hokei Idzumi, New Revised Edition (Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kankō Kyōkai, 1959). Some of the other chapters were apparently composed in Central Asia, as can be seen from place names. Many chapters, including the first two above, were translated independently in China from the time of Lokakṣema up to the time when the whole of the *Avataṁsaka* was translated by Buddhabhadra (in the period of 418-20). See Takamine Ryōshū, *Kegon Shisō Shi* (Kyoto: Kōkyō Shoin, 1942), pp. 3-4.

[22] I do not wish to give the impression that I believe that the interpretations of Fa-tsang and others had no basis. Some of the chapters of the sutra, such as the "Arising of the Tathāgata from Essential Nature," are obviously rich in the kind of material which is characteristic of Hua-yen. Other chapters lend themselves easily to Hua-yen interpretation. The *Daśabhūmika* contains much that was suggestive to Fa-tsang and the long line of predecessors in the Ti-lun school. Such a passage as the one which says, in the original, *Cittamātram idam yad idam traidhātukam* was very meaningful to Fa-tsang, who had his own notion of what the Mind in question was. (See, for instance, the first part of the ninth chapter of the translation, where he discusses the varying interpretations of *cittamātra*.) However, as I have remarked, the obvious intent of the *Avataṁsaka* was to show the details of the Bodhisattva's career.

[23] Cf. his two major works, listed in the bibliography. While Kamata has offered much valuable data in connection with the development of the concept of the identity of the noumenal and phenomenal, he does not present much explicitly on the matter of the origins and development of the concept of the identity of phenomena with phenomena. However, his research is very suggestive.

Section 2

[1] A detailed discussion can be found in an article by Nagao Gadjin, "Several Problems in Fa-tsang's Discussion of the Three Natures," *Fifty Year Anniversary Commemorative Anthology of the Kyoto University Department of Arts and Letters* (Kyoto, 1957), pp. 183-205. (In Japanese) See, also, Kamata, *Chūgoku Kegon Shisō Shi no Kenkyū*, p. 140.

[2] *La Siddhi de Hiuen-tsang*, trans. Louis de La Vallée Poussin (Paris, 1928), p. 526. "*Pariniṣpanna* is the eternal separation of *parikalpita* from *paratantra*."

(*Niṣpannas tasya pūrvena sadā rahitatā tu yā*.) The discussion of the three natures in my introduction is based on Hsüan-tsang's treatment in the *Siddhi*, from pages 514 to 534 in Poussin's translation.

[3] Poussin, *Siddhi*, p. 515.

[4] See, for instance, the discussion of the three natures in the French translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* by Etienne Lamotte, *La Somme du Grand Véhicule* (Louvain, 1938), pp. 107-52. In this regard, another interesting treatment of the same subject can be found in the third chapter of the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, ed. Nagao Gadjin (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964).

[5] Translation, p. 441. Also, see Lamotte, *La Somme du Grand Véhicule*, p. 125, and Poussin, *Siddhi*, p. 526. In Hsüan-tsang's work, the perfected nature is said to consist of the removal of the discriminated nature from the dependent nature. Since all three natures belong to any one thing, this implies, as in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, that *paratantra* can be seen under the aspect of either of the other two natures.

[6] Nagao, "Some Problems," pp. 188-89.

[7] *Ibid*., p. 189

[8] Translation, p. 423. Cf., also, Nagao, "Some Problems," p. 193.

[9] Nagao, "Some Problems," p. 186. See, also, Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith*, in the first several pages of the text, where this situation is described.

[10] Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Le petit traité de Vasubandhu-Nāgārjuna sur les trois natures," *Mélanges* Chinois et Bouddhiques, II-V (1932-35), p. 158. This treatise is also interesting because of its identification of each nature with the other two, thus showing some of the same tendencies we find in Fa-tsang's thought. The treatise, with Sanskrit and Tibetan texts and a French translation can be found in pages 147-61 in the above volume of *MCB*.

[11] While this is, I believe, evident in the treatise, a clearer and more explicit treatment of this matter can be found in Fa-tsang's commentary on the *Avatamsaka*, the *T'an-hsüan-chi*, where he comments on the chapter called "The Arising of the Tathāgata from Essen-

tial Nature." This can be found in *Kokuyaku Daizōkyō: Henshūbu* (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoin, 1933), III, 1274 ff. The Chinese text is in *Taishō* no. 1733, pp. 405 ff.

[12] *Taishō* no. 1733, pp. 346c ff. See, also, Kamegawa, *Kegon-gaku*, pp. 128 ff. In the *T'an-hsüan-chi*, Fa-tsang says that the three vehicles admit only to the existence of causal nature in the *bīja* stored in the *ālaya*, but the perfect doctrine (Hua-yen) sees the mind as being also endowed with result; i.e., innate Buddhahood, because Buddha-nature pervades both kinds of *karma* recompense, the mind and material environment .

[13] Various scholars have characterized Fa-tsang's system as a species of *tathāgata-garbha* thought, and almost all who have discussed his system have recognized at least his great indebtedness to the *Awakening of Faith*. See, for instance, Kamata Shigeo, *Chūgoku Bukkyō Shisō Shi Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1968), p. 376.

[14] Nagao, "Some Problems," p. 201.

[15] The activity of Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi in translating the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* and beginning a tradition of study of its contents occurred shortly after Hsüan-tsang returned with the text from India in 650, which was during the early years of Fa-tsang's life.

[16] Kamata, *Chūgoku Kegon Shisō Shi no Kenkyū*, p. 139.

[17] *Ibid*., pp. 144-49.

[18] Nagao, "Some Problems," p. 201.

[19] Kamata, *Chūgoku Bukkyō Shisō Shi Kenkyū*, pp. 220-21.

[20] *Ibid*., pp. 220-21. The work cited is *Taishō* no. 1877.

[21] This is what Walter Liebenthal means by "patterns," in his discussion of the *Chao-lun*. *The Book of Chao* (Peking: Catholic University Press, 1948), pp. 17 ff. Patterns such as *li-shih* 理事 or *t'i-yung* 體用 are common in Chinese thought. They supply the thinker with a way of handling concepts and relationships, so that despite the fact that the words may vary, they are handled on the model of some archetypal scheme such as *t'i-yung*. Thus, for instance, when a Chinese Buddhist considered the na-

ture of Buddhahood, and its relationship to the things (primarily living beings) in which it inhered, he often thought about the problem with the archetypal pattern of *t'i-yung* in the back of his mind. This often imposed connotations on the new material which were not original to it. Fa-tsang's "emptiness-existence" is in many ways an expression of these patterns.

[22] *Taishō* no. 1876.

[23] For instance, in *Lao-tzu*, chapters I and IV (*The Way and Its Power*, trans. Arthur Waley, New York, n.d.). See, also, chapter VI of the *Chuang-tzu*, trans. Burton Watson (New York, 1964). This same line of thought is continued by the Neo-Taoists such as Wang-pi. (Cf. Chan, *Source Book*, pp. 321-24)

[24] *The Way of Chuang-tzu*, trans. Thomas Merton (New York, 1969), ch. 22.

[25] From an untitled guidebook of Tōdaiji, p. 3. (No publication data)

[26] Cf. the two books by Kamata Shigeo in the bibliography.

[27] Kamata, *Chūgoku Bukkyō Shisō Shi Kenkyū*, pp. 272-74.

[28] *Ibid*., p. 274.

[29] *Ibid*., pp. 352-55.

[30] *Ibid*., pp. 349-50. His work 大乘義章 is *Taishō* no. 1851.

[31] Recorded in 歴代三宝紀, *chüan* 12. See Kamata, *Chūgoku Bukkyō Shisō Shi Kenkyū*, pp. 313-14.

[32] Almost all books about Hua-yen discuss *dharmadhātu pratītyasamutpāda* in some detail. The following are some of the best: Takamine, *Kegon Shisō Shi*, pp. 180-87, 233-36; Kamegawa, *Kegon-gaku*, pp. 103-27, 200-68; almost the whole of Kametani's *Kegon Tetsugaku Kenkyū* is devoted to a discussion of different theories in regard to *pratītyasamutpāda*. Pages 174-288 are devoted to Hua-yen theory. See, also, Kamata, *Chūgoku Kegon Shisō Shi no Kenkyū*, pp. 537-59.

[33] *Taishō* no. 1522, p. 170b. Translated by Bodhi-

ruci as 十地經論.

[34] *Taishō* no. 1606, p. 712c. Translated by Hsüan-tsang as 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論.

[35] Translation, p. 452.

[36] Translation, pp. 447-51.

[37] Translation, p. 455. See, also, Fukauchi Seibun, *Yuishiki-gaku Kenkyū* (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshōdō, 1964), II, 394-95.

[38] This is one of the main points of the *Ālambana-parīkṣā*, which says that the seven *vijñānas*, meaning, for instance, visual consciousness, are ideas projected by the power of *bīja* in the *ālaya*. Therefore, like a double moon seen by someone with eye disease, they can not cause perception. This removed the cause of the image from a real objective entity external to consciousness and relegates it to the *bīja*.

[39] Translation, p. 455.

[40] Cf. also, translation, p. 445. See, also, the discussion in Lamotte, *La Somme du Grand Véhicule*, II, 39-41, and the notes to those pages. See, also, Fukauchi, *Yuishiki-gaku Kenkyū*, II, 391-95.

[41] Translation, p. 456. The six meanings of cause and their relationship to the six meanings of the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* are discussed by Kamegawa, *Kegon-gaku*, pp. 183-98.

[42] Translation, p. 456.

[43] Kamegawa, *Kegon-gaku*, p. 195.

[44] *Ibid*., pp. 183-98. There is a very thorough and useful discussion in Kametani, *Kegon Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, pp. 205 ff.

[45] This is, of course, the burden of the first part of the tenth chapter. It is discussed in some detail in the first part of this section of the introduction.

[46] Translation, p. 462.

[47] Translation, p. 476.

[48] A clear and thorough discussion of Nāgārjuna's

methods and critical standpoint can be found in Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 166 ff.

[49] Kamata, Chūgoku Kegon Shisō no Kenkyū, p. 142.

[50] Richard Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 56.

Section 3

[1] Much information concerning the translation of Buddhist literature into Chinese can be found in E. Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China (Leiden, 1959), passim, and in Takamine, Kegon Shisō Shi, pp. 3-15. One of the best brief accounts can be found in Ui Hakuju, Bukkyō Kyōten Shi (Tokyo: Tōsei Shuppansha, 1957), pp. 171 ff.

[2] Chapter titles and numbers follow the list of ten topics or chapters on the first page of the translation (p. 117).

[3] For instance, see parts 1 and 5 of the tenth chapter.

[4] An example of this can be seen at the end of the fourth part of the ninth chapter.

[5] Many Śūnyavāda and Mādhyamika texts such as the Hundred Treatise and Treatise on Twelve Topics are mentioned.

[6] For instance, in the ninth chapter, p. 216. There, Fa-tsang speaks of the undeveloped as understanding "only the one aspect of the ālaya-vijñāna which is that it arises and subsides. Therefore, they establish the ālaya among phenomena which arise and cease in dependence on conditions." Fa-tsang distinguishes between these and the others who believe simply that all things are empty by designating the former as "undeveloped doctrine with respect to characteristics," and the latter by "undeveloped doctrine with respect to emptiness."

[7] Yusugi Ryōei, Kegon-gaku Gairon (Kyoto: Ryūtani Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1941), p. 81.

[8] Fa-tsang's dates are 643-712; Hui-neng's are 638-713. The prominence of Hui-neng during his lifetime

makes it difficult to make any connection between the two, but this is irrelevant, since I wish only to suggest that by Fa-tsang's time, the Ch'an sect perhaps would have been prominent enough to come to the attention of Fa-tsang. The fifth patriarch of Hua-yen, Tsung-mi, was in fact closely connected with Ch'an.

[9] A reference to the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*, in which Vimalakīrti answers the question by Mañjuśrī on the meaning of emptiness by remaining completely silent, thus giving the best answer. This is the "thunderous silence of Vimalakīrti." See Etienne Lamotte, *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti*(Louvain, 1962), p. 317.

[10] Professor Ui Hakuju, in *Bukkyō Hanron* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), pp. 659-60, has discussed this briefly. He also sees Fa-tsang's classification of Buddhism in five doctrines as based on the varying interpretations of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

[11] For instance, Chih-i and Hui-ssu, on p. 172 of the translation.

[12] Takamine, *Kegon Shisō Shi*, pp. 238-39.

[13] There is a mild implicit criticism of the Fa-hsiang school, which was strong in Fa-tsang's time. Though he does not criticize the school by name, criticism is, I believe, implicit in his use of Vijñānavāda material as material for his own more comprehensive system. I have discussed this briefly in the second part of the introduction, p. 46.

[14] The third chapter, in the translation by H. Kern, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka or The Lotus of the True Law* (New York: Dover Publications, 1963), originally Vol. XXI of *Sacred Books of the East*.

[15] "By means of one sole vehicle, to wit, the Buddha-vehicle, Śāriputra, do I teach creatures the law; there is no second vehicle, nor a third." (Kern, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, p. 40.)

[16] A pamphlet which I received at Tōdaiji, the Japanese headquarters of Hua-yen, in Nara, welcomes all visitors as follows: "Therefore, we cordially invite all those who visit here as the believers of Buddhism, regardless of their religions and nationalities." (No publication data) It is evident from this that we are all included within the fold of the one

vehicle, whether we know it or not, and whether we desire it or not.

[17] The four kinds of dharma-dhātu have been discussed by most scholars of Hua-yen. The following sources have good material: Yusugi, Kegon-gaku Gairon, pp. 96-160; Kamegawa, Kegon-gaku, pp. 128 ff.; Saitō, Kegon-gaku Kōyō, pp. 102-10; Ui, Bukkyō Hanron, pp. 710-13. Fa-tsang does not deal explicitly with the four types in his treatise, but the system is implicit in his discussion of the five doctrines. In fact, one way in which his successors developed his system was to make the four kinds of dharma-dhātu a more important part of the Hua-yen doctrine. The following chart (from Saitō, Kegon-gaku Kōyō, p. 103) shows the relationship between the five doctrines and the four kinds of universe. I have altered the chart slightly as found in Saitō's book, on the basis of the discussion by Kametani, in Kegon Tetsugaku Kenkyū, pp. 116-28.



[18] Unno Taitetsu, "Dimensions of Practice in Hua-yen Thought," Bukkyō Shisō Shi Ronshū (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppansha, 1964), p. 61.

[19] Translation, pp. 142-43.

Section 4

[1] Yusugi, Kōgi, p. 19.

[2] Yusugi Ryōei, Daizōkyō Kōza; Go-kyō-shō Kōgi (Tokyo, Tōhō Shoin, 1932).

[3] Yusugi Ryōei, Bukkyō Taikei: Kegon Go-kyō-shō (Tokyo: Bukkyō Taikei Kanseikai, 1923), I, 17. See also, the bibliography by Kamata Shigeo in Kegon Shisō, ed. Kawada Kumatarō and Nakamura Hajime (Tokyo: Hōzōkan, 1960), p. 489.

[4] Opinions expressed to me in conversation with Professors Takamine Ryōshū and Kamata Shigeo, in 1967.

[5] Suetsuna Joichi, Kegon no Sekai (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1962), p. 6.

[6] Yusugi, Taikei I, 4-5.

[7] Cf., for instance, Hōbōgirin: Fasicule Annexe, ed. Paul Demiéville (Tokyo: Maison Franco-Japonaise, 1931), p. 182. Among Japanese commentaries, those of Gyōnen (1240-1321) and Hōtan (1657-1738) are of great interest.

[8] The work called the Abhidharma-sūtra is problematic. It is not known whether this refers to a no-longer extant work on Mahāyāna abhidharma, or to a group of sutras in which abhidharma plays some part. Yusugi says (Kōgi, p. 481) that the Mahāyānasaṁgraha is said to have been one chapter in the Abhidharma-sūtra. This opinion is shared by Nagao Gadjin, who believes that the title may refer to a group of texts. He has expressed doubt as to the existence at any time of a single work by that title, since it is unlikely that a text which was so important would have been lost in India, Tibet, and China. (These are opinions expressed by Professor Nagao in a seminar on Mahāyāna Buddhism at the University of Wisconsin, in the winter of 1965-66.)

[9] Taishō no. 1530.

[10] Taishō no. 1522. Attributed to Vasubandhu and translated into Chinese by Bodhiruci.

[11] See my comments on this work in my note to the text on page 252 of the translation.

[12] This work, which I have translated as the *Sutra on the Original Act of the Bodhisattva*, was one of the independent sutras translated into Chinese before it became incorporated into the larger text of the *Avataṁsaka*, or *Hua-yen ching*. It is extant as a separate translation by Fo-nien (*Taishō* no. 1485). A brief examination of the text leads me to believe that its contents are similar in many ways to the *Daśabhūmika*, and in fact, Fa-tsang seems to shift back and forth between the two texts freely.

[13] I am not sure what the reference is here, but apparently Fa-tsang means the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa* by Vasubandhu, *Taishō* nos. 1519 and 1520, translated by Bodhiruci and Ratnamati respectively.

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TITLE OF THESIS FA-TSANG's TREATISE ON THE FIVE DOCTRINES: AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

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